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1 
Introduction  
Stating the case 
Within Third World Studies in general, and African Studies in particular, cul-
tural encounters have always been pivotal in research. Over the years we have 
learnt a great deal about the interaction between colonisers and missionaries on 
the one hand, and those colonised and (possibly) converted on the other. In 
African Studies, there are debates on colonial stereotypes about ‘Africa’ and 
‘Africans’, colonial violence and African resistance to colonialism. The history 
of missionary societies has likewise received ample attention. The missionaries’ 
relationship with the colonial state, their influence in areas of religion, medicine 
and education, their reaction to local beliefs and practices, and local interaction 
with the missions have been the subject of many historical and anthropological 
interpretations.1  
The situation is very different in Development Studies. The history of the 
‘Development Era’, as it has been called, dates back to the 1940s, with some 
development organisations having been in existence for over fifty years. Yet 
few studies to date have been devoted to the history of development. The 
advantages and disadvantages of ‘development’ have been intensively debated 
but little is known about the history of development practices and the changing 
ways in which development institutions have operated over time. If there is any 
mention of the past at all, it is usually limited to statistics and comments about 
its bureaucratic, formal history. Interpretations that view the history of devel-
opment in terms of a cultural encounter are few and far between.  
                                                 
1  For an overview, see Frederick Cooper, ‘Conflict and connection: Rethinking co-
lonial African history’, American Historical Review 99, (l5): 1516-1545; Henry 
Bredekamp & Robert Ross, eds, Mission and Christianity in South African History 
(Johannesburg, 1995). 
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SNV Netherlands Development Organisation, a Dutch development organi-
sation that started its activities in the 1960s, is no exception to this general rule 
but this study hopes to offer an interpretation of its history. The aim is to pre-
sent SNV’s history through the eyes of those involved in the organisation and 
the people in the communities in which SNV has been active. 
SNV 
The Stichting Nederlandse Vrijwilligers (SNV) was formally founded on 16 
July 1965. The first groups of volunteers had left two years earlier for Camer-
oon and Brazil under the name JVP and in 1965 the state-led JVP and the JVC, 
an initiative organised by various private Dutch organisations, formally joined 
forces to form SNV. Since its inception, SNV has been striving to reach its 
main aim of contributing meaningfully to the economic and social development 
of societies in the developing world.  
Initially SNV sought to do this by dispatching young, single volunteers to 
work on practical projects. Later, the focus changed to sending out technical 
experts and professionals, and in recent years SNV has been transformed into a 
professional advisory organisation. Since the 1990s, the number of staff from 
the developing countries themselves that are working for the organisation has 
increased rapidly and relations between SNV and its partners in the Third World 
have changed considerably. Initially, the idea was to integrate local people into 
projects that had been designed in The Netherlands but, at a later stage, the 
wishes and ideals of local partners became ever more important. Within the 
Netherlands, major changes have taken place in relations between SNV and the 
state and, having initially been set up as part of the Netherlands Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, SNV is now an independent NGO. 
These changes are related to both external and internal factors. The devel-
opment concept itself has been radically revised since the 1960s. International 
relations, world politics and ideas about what development work should entail 
are now so different from what they were forty years ago that all development 
organisations have, in one way or another, felt the impact of these changes. 
Furthermore, the course of Dutch development policies has altered in many 
ways over the years. As SNV started as an organisation within the Dutch state, 
these changes have certainly influenced the organisation’s policies. Dutch 
public opinion, the national press and changes in Dutch society can also be 
identified as factors of change. However, internal redefinitions of its policies 
and frequent reorganisations have taken place, and are changes from within 
SNV itself. These internal changes were constituted by an interplay between 
political dynamics within the organisation, ideas formed by the organisation’s 
leadership and influences stemming from development practices in the field. 
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This latter aspect – development as done – will receive significant attention 
in this study; not in the sense of detailing the technicalities of development 
activities but by focusing on the views and expectations of development practi-
tioners and local participants. In a socio-cultural study, changes are presented as 
they are evaluated and interpreted ‘from below’. Both critics and advocates of 
development work often neglect the perspectives of those who are meant to 
benefit from development work. It is our conviction that changes in develop-
ment do not only stem from factors situated purely in the donor context: the 
practice of development work is shaped by complex negotiations and interaction 
between donors and recipients.  
We should not exaggerate the importance of this study. SNV, on average, 
has only been allowed to spend about 1% of the annual Dutch development 
budget and this, in turn, has been less than 1% of the national budget. It is esti-
mated that in 1990 only 5% of the Dutch population was familiar with SNV and 
that most journals and newspapers that mentioned the organisation translated its 
name incorrectly.2  
All the same, SNV had many links with Dutch society and Dutch politics. 
Over the years, thousands of young Dutch people have been sent to work on 
projects in more than forty-five countries on four continents. SNV is well 
known in many parts of the world and countless people there at local, national 
and international level are familiar with its work. For the past forty years, 
development cooperation has been an integral part of Dutch foreign and domes-
tic policy, and SNV can be seen as an exponent of that policy. Although it has 
never been a very large organisation, SNV’s influence in development policy-
making in The Netherlands has been considerable due to its close ties with the 
Ministry. 
In addition to its international and national fame, SNV has entered Dutch 
living rooms in a variety of ways. Before the sharp increase in intercontinental 
tourism in the 1990s, SNV sometimes formed the most direct link between the 
average Dutch citizen and the developing world. Many neighbourhoods and 
villages across the country had their own volunteer – later called an SNV devel-
opment worker – who was stationed in some faraway country. Particularly in 
the 1970s, when SNV conducted active conscience-raising programmes in 
which returned SNVers travelled throughout The Netherlands and many twin-
town bonds were forged by SNV people, popular support for development work 
was widespread. Socutera’s short film documentaries often featured SNVers on 
television and, in the 1970s, SNV was mentioned in the Dutch press when 
                                                 
2  Archives, SNV, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania: Box: Teamleidersoverleg 1990, etc; File: 
‘Aanbevelingen CV ‘89’, etc: ‘Overige RV-aanbevelingen (1990), bijlage bij agen-
dapunt. Aanbevelingen RV’s tav: Voorlichting en imago’ p. 1. 
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negative examples of its functioning were used to attack the policies of the 
Minister of Development Affairs.3  
Although only a few people spent their entire careers with SNV, a consider-
able number of former SNVers continued to work within development circles or 
in foreign affairs. A quick look through the personnel lists of The Netherlands 
Ministries for Development Cooperation and Foreign Affairs is revealing in this 
respect.4 In later years, SNV also became a breeding ground for professionals in 
the countries where the organisation had its activities: In Guinea Bissau, for 
example, a number of people who worked with SNV as counterparts or consult-
ants later became prominent in politics, business, law and other areas.5 As an 
example, we could mention Brenda Liswaniso, one of the first Zambians to 
work in SNV, who joined Zambian NGOs after having worked with SNV: ‘My 
experiences at SNV helped me as a springboard for my career’.6 For the above-
mentioned reasons, SNV’s past merits more attention than it has hitherto been 
accorded. A study that attempts to interpret the changes in SNV can contribute 
to the history of development thinking and practice in a more general sense, as 
well as to an understanding of Dutch development policies in particular.  
Limited literature 
To date, very few publications have dealt with SNV’s history. There are numer-
ous reports and documents about SNV but they do not approach the organisa-
tion from a primarily historical perspective. There are publications that deal 
with part of the history of SNV; such as SNV in Botswana, Niger and Mali,7 
and there are also a number of celebratory and commemorative publications but 
these are not based on an extensive range of sources and are limited in scope. If 
they deal with the past at all, these studies focus on the official data of adminis-
trative change.8 This situation is not particular to SNV and in the limited num-
ber of studies dealing with Dutch development history, formal policies and 
                                                 
3  Jan-Bart Gewald, ‘40 Years SNV. Proposal for a Research Project’ (Unpublished 
proposal, Leiden, 2005). 
4  See also Aernout Zevenbergen, De deskundige: leerling en leermeester. Een halve 
eeuw uitzending van ontwikkelingswerkers (The Hague, 2002) p. 48. 
5  Interview 14.  
6  Interview 122. 
7  For example, Janet Hermans, SNV in Botswana. A 25-Year Saga (Gaborone, 2001); 
SNV Botswana, Down Memory Lane, SNV Botswana 20 Years in Pictures (Gabo-
rone, 1998); Jan Kees van de Werk, Met één vinger kun je geen steen oprapen. Un 
doigt ne suffit pas pour ramasser une pierre (Rijswijk, 2004). 
8  Exceptions: Ton Nijzink, Dag vrijwilliger! Twintig jaar SNV (The Hague, 1984); 
Dolly Verhoeven, Aid – A changing necessity; SNV: From Volunteers to Advisors 
(The Hague, 2002). 
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bureaucratic changes have been the central concerns. Also internationally, 
attention for the history of development is only now emerging.  
It has, however, been pointed out that in the case of SNV there is a gap 
between formal policies and actual practice. As Ton Nijzink states in his book 
about SNV policy and practice, Dag vrijwilliger! Twintig jaar SNV (‘Bye 
Volunteer! SNV 20 Years’): ‘It seems justified to suppose that both have their 
own dynamics, that they sometimes mutually influence each other and at other 
times function completely independent of each other’.9 From interviews, it is 
clear that in the field, policy is often perceived as a bubble of buzz words that 
has little to do with the actual practice of development work.10 It thus comes as 
a surprise that relatively little attention in Nijzink’s book is paid to ‘the field’. 
The author provides keen insight into the history of SNV in The Hague, with all 
its political ins and outs, its relationship with the Netherlands Ministry of For-
eign Affairs, tensions between the private JVC factions and the state part of 
SNV, SNV’s image in the Dutch press, and its major policy changes. However, 
remarks about what happened in practice remain cursory and, apart from a few 
quotes from returned volunteers, the Third World appears mostly in the form of 
pictures.11 In the SNV archives housed at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the 
minutes of SNV board meetings refer extensively to the Dutch political situa-
tion, policy-making and the organisation’s internal bureaucratic structure but 
only cursorily to the practice of development work.  
There is, nevertheless, a body of literature in which development practice 
has a prominent place. Evaluation reports usually focus on the practice of 
development work and it is here that the effectiveness of development projects 
and programmes is assessed, sometimes very critically. This kind of literature is 
valid as such but its aim is obviously not to offer an interpretation of the history 
of development work. Moreover, in the evaluative literature, the formal policy 
of development organisations in the final analysis remains the guiding principle: 
the effectiveness of development practice is measured against it. Evaluation 
reports therefore form a body of literature that is informative as historical source 
material but does not offer arguments with which to engage.12 
The conclusion is thus twofold. Firstly, historical studies on SNV as a devel-
opment organisation are lacking and the literature dealing with the past focuses 
                                                 
9  Nijzink, Dag vrijwilliger!, pp. 77-78. 
10  For example, Interviews 2, 3, 50, 79, 81, 126, 165 and 168. 
11  See also the discussion in Lau Schulpen, ed., Hulp in ontwikkeling. Bouwstenen voor 
de toekomst van internationale samenwerking (Assen, 2001), pp. 2-4. 
12  In the case of SNV, the IOV/IOB reports notably form a rich body of literature on 
the organisation and Dutch development policy in a more general sense. 
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too narrowly on formal policies. Secondly, the literature on SNV’s work in 
practice has rarely adopted an historical approach. 
Development and the past 
As already mentioned, a lack of attention to the history of development organi-
sations is not specific to SNV but a general feature of the development world. 
As a matter of fact, this project started after its initiator, Jan-Bart Gewald from 
the African Studies Centre in Leiden, wrote in a leading Dutch daily newspaper 
that development organisations had failed to develop their own ‘institutional 
memory’ and were thus incapable of understanding their role in the societies in 
which they were active. As Gewald explained: ‘There is not only a lack of 
historical insight concerning Africa, but also as concerns Dutch development 
cooperation there’. To learn from the past, we must first study it, he argued.13  
Such overall neglect of the past is not coincidental. As James Scott pointed 
out:  
Any ideology with a large altar dedicated to progress is bound to privilege the future 
(…) The past is an impediment, a history that must be transcended; the present is the 
platform for launching plans for a better future.14  
Development as a concept is not oriented towards the past; it presupposes 
not merely change but directional growth too. Before it was borrowed from 
biology and applied to social phenomena, the term referred to the gradual 
process by which an organism reaches it fully grown natural state of being. This 
final ‘developed’ state of being is known for each organism; the direction that 
growth takes cannot be chosen but is laid out in advance. In the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries when the word ‘development’ came to be used in the sense 
of ‘social process’, it was linked unequivocally to concepts like progress, natu-
ral law and evolution. It acquired clear positive overtones, often being con-
trasted with decline and stagnation. In this normative sense, development came 
within the orbit of the ‘new-is-better’ configuration that was customary in the 
intellectual history of the time.15 
                                                 
13  Jan-Bart Gewald, ‘Ontwikkelingshulp faalt door onkunde’, NRC Handelsblad (6 
October 2004) p. 9. 
14  James C. Scott, Seeing like a state. How certain schemes to improve the human 
condition have failed (New Haven/London, 1998), p. 95. 
15  Peter Kloos, ‘Gewapend met kennis. Ontwikkelingssamenwerking en kennisontwik-
keling’. In: Kristoffel Lieten & Fons van der Velden, eds, Grenzen aan de hulp. 
Beleid en effecten van ontwikkelingssamenwerking (Amsterdam, 1997), pp. 315-
333; Gustavo Esteva, ‘Development’. In: Wolfgang Sachs, ed., The development 
dictionary. A guide to knowledge as power (London/New York, 1992), pp. 6-25. 
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Over the years, the influence of the evolutionism and determinism that went 
along with the development concept has declined. The fixed stages of growth in 
evolutionism and the cast-iron teleology of natural law philosophy obviously do 
not form the framework of reference in the formulation of policy documents for 
development organisations. These days, few of those working in the develop-
ment world would accept the positivist ideas of the nineteenth century and sub-
scribe to notions like the ‘survival of the fittest’, the theoretical dogmas of 
eugenics or an uncritical belief in the advantages of technology and industriali-
sation. But it is impossible to erase the word’s history. Development as a con-
cept carries with it a past that needs to be taken into account rather than denied: 
Development cannot delink itself from the words with which it was formed – 
growth, evolution, maturation. Just the same, those who now use the word cannot 
free themselves from a web of meanings that impart a specific blindness to their 
language, thought and action. No matter the context in which it is used, or the 
precise connotation that the person using it wants to give it, the expression becomes 
qualified and coloured by meanings perhaps unwanted.16 
Apart from the ahistorical tendencies in the theoretical framework with 
which the development concept was connected in the nineteenth century, there 
are other aspects of the development sector that foster an ahistorical climate. 
The prospective, forward connotation of the term ‘development’ continues to 
remain important: development has remained aspirational. In this constellation 
of aspiration and improvement, development organisations themselves are 
expected to set the example and function as a model of development in the 
sense of ‘change for the better’. The rate of change in these organisations is 
high, something which should come as no surprise given the interplay of so 
many political and social factors that could possibly lead to change and the 
desire to avoid negative assessments. Within SNV, the personnel felt that at 
times the changes amounted to a chasing of the latest approach in development 
policy, without any reflection on the organisation’s legacy or building on what 
had been achieved. As such, change was considered necessary: an organisation 
that has come to a complete standstill cannot be expected to be effective. SNV 
was, however, said to be sometimes swinging too abruptly from one side to the 
other.17  
This rate of change in the development world is not likely to contribute to a 
historical climate. As one SNV country director stated: ‘This history project, I 
don’t know (...) Would it not be better to let bygones be bygones? We are now a 
                                                 
16  Ibid., p. 10. 
17  For example, Interviews 44, 50, 81, 165, 168, 174, 175, 253, 265 and 260. 
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very different organisation.’18 This attitude towards the past was also at times 
expressed to former SNVers. A former volunteer, who married a Cameroonian 
and lived in many countries before she returned to Cameroon, was told that 
‘The SNVers are now completely different people. And that we had just been 
nothing, that we had only done some stupid preliminary work. It was Dutch 
SNVers who told me this.’19 With each new approach, development institutes 
display a tendency to negate the past or portray it as negative. As Crush states, 
‘There is, within the development sector, an “almost overwhelming need to 
reinvent or erase the past”’.20 This negative evaluation of the past as being 
‘obsolete’ is often coupled with a clear message about the current approach: 
new policies and approaches will overcome the shortcomings of the past and 
cannot but lead to success. In this sense, if the past receives any attention at all, 
it is merely used as a negative mirror image of the present.  
In this respect too, SNV is no exception. Thus in the first phase of develop-
ment cooperation, remarks on past interaction with the Third World were often 
confined to a simple condemnation of colonialism.21 In the 1970s, the boldness 
of the 1960s was dismissed as arrogant and intrusive. Since the second half of 
the 1980s and in the 1990s, past SNV work was labelled as well-intentioned but 
disorganised and improvisatory: the new professional approach was expected to 
be more fruitful. SNV’s past is in many ways treated negatively and evaluated 
with benign patience at best, and in many cases even seen as harmful: ‘We no 
longer work with the idea: We’ll just fix it. It was such a colonial idea. It 
actually led to the taking over of state functions, which threatened to completely 
undermine the state.’22 One former SNVer succinctly expressed this tendency: 
‘SNV is a club that does not wish to believe in the “ideal” recipe for develop-
ment, but constantly believes that now it is very close to reaching such a recipe. 
                                                 
18  Interview in 2006: Name withheld for reasons of privacy. Translations of quotes 
(from Dutch, French, Portuguese and Swahili into English) were made by the 
author. 
19  Interview 228. (‘Maar toen ik hier terugkwam in Kameroen, toen werd mij zeer 
nadrukkelijk op het hart gedrukt dat de SNV’ers nu een heel ander soort mensen 
zijn. Dat wij maar niets waren, dat wij maar wat stom voorwerk hadden gedaan. Dat 
waren Nederlandse SNV’ers die mij dat vertelden.’) 
20  Jonathan Crush, ed., Power of development (London, 1995), p. 9. 
21  See also Gewald, ‘Ontwikkelingshulp faalt door onkunde’, p. 9. 
22  For example, SNV film: ‘Still far to go’ (1993) in DVD series: ‘Een geschiedenis in 
beeld: Van vrijwilligers naar adviseurs’ (The Hague: 2000); Marc Broere, ‘Het 
nieuwe SNV. Waarom zouden we ons moeten profileren?’, Vice Versa 37 (1), p. 4; 
Tjitske Lingsma, ‘Het breekbare bruggetje van succes’, Vice Versa 30 (4), pp. 12-
13. Quote: Interview 261. (‘Maar niet meer vanuit het idee: We gaan het even op-
lossen. Dat was zo’n koloniaal idee. Bovendien neem je dan ook de functie van de 
staat over en zo dreigt die volledig uit te hollen.’) 
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There is a constant disparaging of practices from the past in order to defend 
whatever new approach happens to be invented.’23 In this light, it is remarkable 
that SNV has supported this research into its history and actively cooperated 
with the African Studies Centre in the writing of this book. What is presented 
here will hopefully contribute to a better understanding of the functioning of 
development organisations over time and inspire other development agents to 
investigate their own role, past and present, in society. 
The constant dichotomy between a failing past and a successful present or 
future leads to a distorted institutional memory. At the same time, the rate of 
change is such that some people have accused organisations like SNV of suf-
fering from structural amnesia. Fears were even expressed that this might be 
due to the narrow definition of the organisation’s objectives and performance 
criteria. As these objectives and criteria are not even properly evaluated within 
the organisation, a balanced consideration of their historical role is entirely out 
of the question.24 
Learning from the past may demand more than a simple condemnation of it. 
From the start, people working for SNV have attempted to do their best to fur-
ther its aim. Many of them will admit that mistakes were made but this does not 
lessen their contribution to the organisation’s history. To do justice to the past, 
it has to be treated with respect. 
Evaluations 
In the course of its history, SNV has been under attack from many sides. From 
the left, the centre and the right, people have sharply criticised Dutch develop-
ment policies, using SNV as an example. It has been claimed that development 
cooperation has not been effective at all and has merely led to ‘cathedrals in the 
desert’.  
In the 1970s, for example, the right-wing Dutch newspaper De Telegraaf 
launched a campaign to blacken SNV’s image, stating that Dutch taxpayers’ 
money was being wasted on useless projects. Although the journalist concerned 
later revised his opinion, such attacks occurred on a regular basis and SNV 
found itself increasingly in a defensive position.25 Some critics even held that 
                                                 
23  Interview 290. (‘SNV is een club die aan de ene kant niet wil geloven in het “ideale” 
recept voor ontwikkeling, maar constant denkt dat ze NU heel dicht in de buurt zijn 
van zo’n recept. Er is een constant afgeven op de praktijken uit verleden om te ver-
dedigen wat er nu weer voor nieuws verzonnen is.’) 
24  Interviews 3 and 9. 
25  Henk de Mari, ‘Hulpstichting smijt al jaren met miljoenen’, De Telegraaf, 3 May 
1974; Henk de Mari, ‘Pronk werpt zijn blaam op zijn voorgangers’, Ibid. 14 May 
1974; For a review, see J. van Tijn, ‘Vrijwilligers. Tweede aanval op Claus mislukt. 
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the effectiveness of Dutch development cooperation had never seriously been 
measured.26 Such accusations cannot be sustained and, especially after the 
installation of the IOV (Policy and Operations Evaluation Department, later 
IOB) at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1977, development cooperation 
became the Dutch government branch that was most extensively evaluated. In 
the course of its history, the IOB produced nearly 300 full-length evaluation 
reports on all areas of Dutch development cooperation. As van Beurden and 
Gewald pointed out, the problem was not so much the quantity and quality of 
the evaluative reports but more the interference of factors external to develop-
ment cooperation, such as Dutch political rivalries and electoral gain. These 
external factors prevented those concerned from drawing any conclusions.27 
Apart from outside critiques, SNVers themselves have also been critical of 
the organisation they were employed by. They often had high hopes and grand 
ideals before going overseas and were disappointed with the results of the 
projects they were involved in. Most SNV volunteers and professionals were 
people with a deep engagement in social and political affairs, and with initiative 
and strong opinions. After the first phases of SNV’s history, they were usually 
well-educated and had considerable expertise in their field. It is small wonder 
then that many of them have been outspoken and critical of their own work and 
the functioning of SNV. On reading their interview reports, a striking number of 
the (former) SNVers we interviewed felt that their comments were too negative. 
Even when the report was a literal transcription of what they had said, several 
stated that they had intended to project a more positive image of SNV than the 
notes in fact presented. For all its faults and for all their criticism of it, they felt 
that, in general, SNV was a useful organisation that had employed many capa-
ble, interesting and positive people over the years. Showing commitment and 
frustration, irony and amusement, their reactions to their SNV experience 
cannot be reduced to a one-sided interpretation. 
More cautious when voicing their opinions were those towards whom SNV’s 
activities were directed. As will become clear in the following chapters, their 
evaluations were likewise not one-dimensional and offered a combination of 
praise, complaints, claims and hopes. Local participants/recipients often called 
for more development during the interviews but refrained from open critique as 
                                                 
De vermakelijke geschiedenis van een Telegraaf-rel’, Vrij Nederland 35 (18 May 
1974); For a revised opinion, see Henk de Mari, ‘Vrijwilligershulp steeds meer ten 
goede aan armsten’, De Telegraaf, 9 April 1975. 
26  VVD MP Zsolt Szabo, Tweede-Kamerfractie, News announcement, 10 November 
2004: http://www.vvd.nl/nieuws/p_ni_li.asp?ItemID=40&ID=5923. 
27  Jos van Beurden & Jan-Bart Gewald, From output to outcome? 25 Years of IOB 
evaluations (Amsterdam, 2004); Gewald, ‘Ontwikkelingshulp faalt door onkunde’, 
p. 9; Gewald, ‘40 Years SNV’. 
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they did not wish to antagonise the organisations that were supposed to support 
the process of development. While trying to unravel forty years of history, we 
spoke to many people who had worked with SNV in the past but were no longer 
in touch with the organisation. These people often praised SNV for its accom-
plishments but regretted that the relationship had ended and more had not been 
done to address their problems. 
In the course of our research, we noticed that many people, in line with the 
genre conventions of writing about development, expected us to judge SNV’s 
activities. However it was never our aim or intention to either condemn or 
praise SNV for its achievements. Our aim was to arrive at an interpretation of 
SNV’s history and frame the ideals, hopes, expectations, frustrations and 
achievements of both local participants/recipients and SNV workers in their 
specific context. The purpose of this work is, therefore, to increase our under-
standing of what made so many Dutch people chose to go abroad and how both 
Dutch and national SNVers and the people they worked with viewed their rela-
tionship. All the same, SNV’s history will not always appear in a positive light 
in this publication. One reason for this lies in the nature of historical interpreta-
tion. When interpreting history, there is an inherent tendency to focus on 
problematic issues and problems call for an explanation, far more so than 
projects that run smoothly. A second reason is related to the aim of this book. In 
studying the views of (former) SNVers and the people SNV worked with, we 
cannot but present their evaluations in full, relating their positive and their 
negative comments. As already stated, the strong character of many SNVers and 
the sometimes extreme conditions under which they had to work give their 
evaluations a more intense character than might have been the case in other 
organisations. 
Development as done 
The lack of attention to the history of development cooperation to date is not 
restricted to SNV: few studies have dealt with past development work in 
general. While historical interpretations of development organisations are 
limited, much more discussion has been invested in the theoretical assumptions 
underlying the development concept. The emphasis here is on development 
discourse28 and development in practice has been much less studied. Back in 
1978, J.D.Y. Peel explained that the Dependencia critique of development in 
this sense had had a reverse effect. The centre dictated the course of events on 
                                                 
28  Cf: Monica van Beusekom & Dorothy L. Hodgson, ‘Lessons learned? Development 
experiences in the late colonial period’, Journal of African History 41 (2000), pp. 
29-33. 
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the periphery, so studying the periphery seemed immaterial to an understanding 
of the power relations at stake.29 This argument was reiterated in 2002: as the 
focus is on development ‘as a Western ideology, discourse, and set of institu-
tions, the people who are to experience “development” disappear from view or 
become mere passive recipients of development-oriented technologies, knowl-
edge, and institutional reforms’.30  
The focus on discourse and the limited attention for development ‘as done’ 
has in turn strengthened the view of development as a hegemonic project de-
signed in the West, and in this sense becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy. As we 
already saw, criticism of development policies from conservative, right-wing 
circles has generally focused on inefficiency and the perceived abuse of devel-
opment money, without questioning the premises on which the development 
agenda was based. Critique from leftist milieus has, in its extreme form, held 
that development was colonialism by other means; a programme entirely de-
signed by the West and imposed on developing countries and their people. 
Wolfgang Sachs, for example, summarised these power relations as follows: the 
age of development only ‘provided the cognitive base for both arrogant inter-
ventionism from the North and pathetic self-pity in the South’.31 
These critical approaches to development have been essential in bringing to 
the fore the power relations and hierarchically framed discourses underlying the 
development paradigm.32 Yet the interpretation of development as designed in 
the West has been shown to suffer from serious disadvantages. Frederick 
Cooper & Randall Packard hold that a first argument against this interpretation 
lies in the sphere of historical change. As the Chapter Two will show, there are 
many lines of continuity between the colonial period and the Development Era. 
However, as Cooper & Packard point out, there is little reason to conflate 
development and colonialism on these grounds as ‘development’, unlike ‘colo-
nialism’, was a paradigm widely accepted not only in the West but also by 
nationalist elites and, eventually, by many ordinary people in developing coun-
tries. While the content of what development should entail has been viewed 
differently, ‘development’ was set as an ideal by both sides of the new devel-
oped/under-developed divide.33 
                                                 
29  J.D.Y. Peel, ‘Ọlaju: A Yoruba concept of development’, Journal of Development 
Studies 14 (1978), pp. 139-165. 
30  Monica van Beusekom, Negotiating development. African farmers and colonial 
experts at the Office du Niger, 1920-1960 (Portsmouth, 2002), pp. 187-188. 
31  Sachs, ed., The Development Dictionary, p. 2. 
32  Van Beusekom, Negotiating development, pp. 187-188. 
33  Frederick Cooper & Randall Packard, ‘Introduction’. In: Frederick Cooper & Ran-
dall Packard, eds, International development and the social sciences: Essays on the 
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Frederick Cooper shows that calls for ‘development’ and ‘welfare’ policies 
followed after strikes in the West Indies and Africa in the 1930s and 1940s. 
Despite the spurious agenda behind the calls, which was largely meant to keep 
the world order stable, the conclusion must be that development policy and 
practice have, from the very start, been triggered by events in developing coun-
tries.34 At present, international migrancy and security issues are being used as 
arguments in the debate about the effects of development.35 A view that merely 
focuses on development as something imposed by the West reduces people in 
the South once again to being merely passive recipients who are unable to 
engage in any meaningful action. 
If we look into development as it is being done instead of focusing on dis-
course and formal policy, the view of development as a purely hegemonic 
project designed by the West becomes untenable. Cooper & Packard’s book 
contains a contribution on Nepal in which it is aptly shown how development 
projects can be informed by local practices and ideas. These may come from 
villagers trying to put themselves on the development agenda as well as from 
political and intellectual elites for whom it is important to frame themselves in 
the global society. The projects thus become ‘a matter of simultaneous Nepali-
sation and globalisation’.36 
In a similar vein, the editors of a special issue of the Journal of African 
History entitled ‘Lessons Learned. Development Experiences in the Late Colo-
nial Period’ point out that development agendas cannot be viewed as hegemonic 
or unchanging: they have a history rooted in earlier experiences and practices, 
and are linked to both changes at the macro level and to ‘locally-specific con-
figurations of power’.37 In her contribution to the special edition as well as in 
her book Negotiating Development, Monica van Beusekom shows that there 
was a sharp discrepancy between policy and practice in the case of the colonial 
Office du Niger. While social evolutionary theory remained largely the same 
                                                 
history and politics of knowledge (Berkeley/Los Angeles/London, 1997), pp. vii, 
viii. 
34  Frederick Cooper, ‘Modernizing bureaucrats, backward Africans, and the develop-
ment concept’. In: Cooper & Packard, eds, International Development and the So-
cial Sciences, pp. 66-67, 84. 
35  Mark Duffield, ‘Securing humans in a dangerous world: Exploring the links be-
tween development and internal war’, IDOGA Paper (Gent, 22 March 2005). 
36  Stacy Leigh Pigg, ‘Inventing social categories through place: Social representations 
and development in Nepal’, Comparative Studies in Society and History 34 (1992), 
p. 512; Stacy Leigh Pigg, ‘“Found in most traditional societies”: Traditional medical 
practitioners between culture and development’. In: Cooper & Packard, eds, Inter-
national development and the social sciences, pp. 259-290. 
37  Van Beusekom & Hodgson, ‘Lessons learned?’, pp. 29-33. 
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over the years, changes took place in practice and a far more pragmatic ap-
proach was taken than the grandiose plans that the development officers pro-
posed. This disjuncture between theory and practice was largely the conse-
quence of local resistance and negotiation regarding development plans.38 
It is clear then that the narrow focus on formal policies does not suffice for 
an understanding of the history of development organisations. The intentions 
and expectations of those concerned and the actual implementation of develop-
ment work in the field not only form an integral part of SNV’s history but may 
even be more constitutive of its past than formal policies. 
A socio-cultural history 
This study hopes to provide a socio-cultural history of SNV and by using the 
term ‘history’ we want to make it clear that the focus is on the interpretation of 
change and continuity. Interpretations are never conclusive: they offer a pro-
posal to allow one to view events in a specific relationship. Such a proposal is 
based on facts and data but the suggested relationship is not in the past: it is a 
construct of the historian. The aim cannot therefore be to write the history of the 
SNV, as if there was only one ‘right’ way of viewing SNV’s past. We hope to 
contribute to the debate on the advantages and disadvantages of the proposals 
made to date in the realm of the history of development and to arrive at a better 
understanding of SNV’s history in its socio-cultural context.  
By using the term ‘socio-cultural’, we indicate that we are aiming at ‘a his-
tory from below’. The emphasis will be on the changing perspectives of ordi-
nary people rather than those of high-level politicians. Central to this study 
therefore are the perspectives of development workers as well as local partici-
pants in developing countries: their hopes, expectations, frustrations and eva-
luations. Focusing on perspectives, this research can be viewed as part of the 
tradition of the history of ideas or intellectual history, although probably less 
strongly oriented to the collective aspect of perspectives than is customary in 
these disciplines. 
These perspectives often included aspects that fell outside the sphere of 
policy-making and formal decisions. With our informants, we share the convic-
tion that such aspects had important consequences for SNV’s past. In many 
cases, formal policies are not the most important factor determining develop-
ment practice. ‘Micro factors’ such as personal character, relationships between 
people and problems in the private sphere frequently influence development 
                                                 
38  Monica van Beusekom, ‘Disjunctures in theory and practice: Making sense of 
change in agricultural development at the Office of Niger, 1920-1960’, Journal of 
African History 41 (2000), pp. 79-99; Van Beusekom, Negotiating development. 
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work significantly.39 To a certain extent this holds true for all organisations and 
their structures and systems, which are after all designed by humans. Several 
factors can be noted, however, that contribute to a relatively high degree of 
influence of micro factors in development practice. Development practice 
brings together people of very different backgrounds in terms of nationality, 
education and social status. In this complex setting, different notions of devel-
opment and poverty meet, and may conflict. Rather than viewing development 
as a Western instrument imposed on passive recipients, in this book Crehan and 
von Oppen’s proposal to view development ‘as a particular arena of interaction 
or struggle’ is adopted.40 On the ground, exchange and negotiation between 
agents with different interests, histories, cultures and views always change 
people’s initial plans. This not only leads to the famous gap between policy and 
practice. Differences between expectation and outcome also exist for those for 
whom the development activities are meant. As long as poverty and deprivation 
continue, development may be seen by those for whom development activities 
are carried out as ‘a promise that has not been fulfilled’.41 The meeting point of 
people and concepts in development practice is not neutral ground: some 
people’s views and actions carry more leverage than others. These power rela-
tions may stand in the way of the overall goal of development and this unease is 
an additional point affecting the importance of micro factors. 
SNV as an organisation has attempted to mitigate the influence of personal, 
relational and local factors in the course of its history. Policies were designed to 
give coherence and structure to SNV activities, field offices functioned as a 
negotiating space between the field and head office, and the professionalisation 
process was to some extent meant to exclude the influence of ‘micro’ factors 
beyond SNV’s control. Yet at the same time, the nature of SNV as an organisa-
tion enhanced the importance of such factors in some respects. Firstly there was 
the relatively decentralised character of SNV because for a long time SNV staff 
and volunteers could take many decisions and act as they deemed fit without 
consulting head office in The Hague. In addition, many SNV volunteers were 
employed within the framework of a local organisation as of the late 1960s and 
saw their allegiance as lying with this organisation rather than with SNV. SNV 
was viewed by some volunteers as an agency and an intermediary, and they 
                                                 
39  Fons van der Velden & Judith Zweers, ‘Personele samenwerking. Beleid, resultaten 
en perspectieven’. In: Lieten & van der Velden, eds, Grenzen aan de hulp, p. 256.  
40  Kate Crehan & Achim von Oppen, eds, Planners and history: Negotiating ‘develop-
ment’ in rural Zambia (Lusaka, 1994), p. 6.  
41  Pigg, ‘“Found in most traditional societies”’. In: Cooper & Packard, eds, Interna-
tional development and the social sciences, p. 266.  
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identified more with the local organisation which they interacted with on a daily 
basis. 
Methodological consequences 
Obviously, these remarks pose pertinent methodological problems. Apart from 
the difficulties in tracing such micro factors, their very nature makes them dif-
ferent for each individual. They can range from personal interest to local politi-
cal factors, from family ties to housing circumstances, and from divorce to a 
problematic relationship with a direct superior. In this sense, representation 
becomes impossible: we lose sight of SNV as a starting point and the individual 
becomes central. Any socio-cultural history is then likely to have to balance 
anecdotal and historical narrative, and description and historical representation.  
A focus on perspectives leads us away from formal policy: people’s per-
spectives related to development in practice rather than to development as 
designed. This tendency is reinforced by the research direction that the term 
‘socio-cultural history’ implies: a focus on social and cultural aspects of SNV’s 
history is unlikely to produce a factual chronicle of the bureaucratic develop-
ments of SNV. While the daily bureaucracy at head office may hardly be part of 
the development world as experienced by practitioners and participants, the 
overall decisions, organisational structure and general changes become, whether 
people like it or not, part of their world. Sometimes without people knowing it, 
experiences in the field can inform decision-making in the policy sphere. A 
socio-cultural history should, therefore, attempt an interpretation that combines 
policy changes and practical experiences, developments in the field, the world 
of high-level politics and general trends. 
This is no easy task, as combining factors in the realms of policy-making 
and organisational change with factors in the personal and local sphere is, to 
some extent, a contradictory enterprise. An institutional history of SNV presup-
poses interpreting those aspects that connect SNV’s history in a certain epoch. 
By stressing these centripetal aspects, however, the general aspects of SNV’s 
history are over-emphasised at the cost of the particular and the specific. In the 
search for historical lines that interlink SNV’s past, the local practice of devel-
opment inevitably loses out. A socio-cultural history should start from the local 
context: participants and development workers view the organisation from 
there. SNV had, in the past, offices in over forty-five countries but as it became 
a relatively decentralised organisation, each of these offices developed its own 
specific history and culture that was related to the country in which it was 
based. The influence of local conditions and changes cannot be underestimated. 
The histories carried out by commissioned researchers made this very clear. 
Marja Hinfelaar, for example, wrote:  
 INTRODUCTION 17 
 
 
This study is based on the assumption that international lending institutions and 
NGOs did not shape the history of Zambia, despite their strong influence on Zambia. 
Reasoning from within this premise, the history of SNV in Zambia ought to follow 
the socio-economic and political developments of Zambia.42  
Here SNV is viewed from a country perspective and such a view can be 
further crystallised into regional, local and individual perspectives. It is at times 
difficult to combine interpreting the past ‘from below’ with historical explana-
tion. Policy-makers have to make choices and do so after consideration, delib-
eration, exchange and debate. For people in the field, the arguments underlying 
the choices may be less evident. The views presented in this study therefore do 
not always explain the background of SNV policies but instead focus on how 
changes and decisions were received by the people who had to implement or 
deal with them.  
Questions and concepts 
It is impossible to cover every aspect of SNV’s history. As explained above, the 
aim here is to write a socio-cultural history and the term ‘perspective’ has been 
crucial in defining our research questions. This focus excludes many other 
possible research alleys. For example, relatively little will be said about rela-
tions between SNV and state politics, about financial aspects, and about SNV’s 
bureaucratic history. 
We also had to make a choice in geographical terms: it would not have been 
efficient or useful to try and study all the countries in which SNV has been 
active. Seven countries were chosen as case studies, although material from 
interviews and archival documents on other countries is included too. General 
criteria for selection were a considerable length of SNV activities and, for 
logistical reasons, a current SNV presence in the focus country. SNV has al-
ways been most active in African countries (see Appendix 3 and 4). Given the 
preponderance of African-based activities and the expertise within the African 
Studies Centre in Leiden, five countries in Africa were selected. In an effort to 
achieve geographical and linguistic diversity, the choice was finally made as 
follows: Guinea Bissau, Mali, Cameroon, Tanzania and Zambia. In Latin 
America and Asia, Bolivia and Nepal were selected. A commissioned local 
researcher conducted interviews in these countries, studied the archival material 
available and wrote an essay on SNV’s history in the country concerned on the 
                                                 
42  Marja Hinfelaar, ‘A history of SNV from a Zambian perspective, 1965-2005’, 
(Unpublished manuscript, commissioned research report within the project frame-
work 2006). 
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basis of what they had heard and read. These contributions furthered our re-
search analysis. 
Our central concern lies with changing perspectives. However to understand 
the perspectives of both (former) SNVers and local participants we need to 
study the central activities and concerns of SNV Netherlands Development 
Organisation and the ways in which these have changed over time. Mapping 
these changes through the eyes of those involved was important and the fol-
lowing research questions were identified: 
 
 What were SNV employees’ intentions and expectations, and how do they 
look back on their activities? 
 What were the expectations of the communities in which SNV was active 
and how are SNV activities now evaluated by people from these communi-
ties? 
 
This book is not an evaluation report and there is no list of recommendations 
in the conclusion. However the people concerned both within and outside SNV 
naturally expressed their opinions about development cooperation in general 
and SNV activities in particular. And so, in this sense, the results of SNV’s 
activities are assessed and discussed. 
Different words have, over the years, been used to describe the countries in 
which development cooperation has taken place. Starting off as ‘less-developed 
territories’ soon after World War II, they then came to be known as the ‘Third 
World’. A clear disadvantage of this term is that it is closely related to the epoch 
of the Cold War when the First and the Second Worlds were at odds. It also 
suggests that part of the world’s population do not inhabit ‘our’ world, but live 
in another world that is separate and unconnected. Another set of words is 
related to the word ‘development’ itself: developing countries, under-developed 
countries, under-developed world, etc. Here again, there are serious theoretical 
problems. As already mentioned, the concept of ‘development’ was borrowed 
from biology and refers to unilateral change in a specific direction; a series of 
stages with one fixed final stage. The idea that some countries are ‘developing’ 
suggests that other countries have already reached this final stage and need to 
experience no further development. Similarly, the word ‘under-developed’, that 
gained currency within the Dependence Theory, carries meanings in the realm 
of immaturity and backwardness. It is not for nothing that some scholars have 
decided that the term ‘development’ is analytically useless.43 
                                                 
43  Peter Kloos, ‘Gewapend met kennis. Ontwikkelingssamenwerking en kennisontwik-
keling’. In: Lieten & van der Velden, eds, Grenzen aan de hulp, pp. 319-325. 
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More recently ‘the South’ has gained ground as a term indicating the parts of 
the world to which development money and expertise are sent. This geographi-
cal division is, however, not correct. There are countries in the southern hemi-
sphere that are donors rather than recipients and in the North some countries are 
still very poor, such as Albania, for example, where SNV is currently active. A 
solution is perhaps to simply speak of ‘poor countries’. After all, poverty is 
what development cooperation is all about but this suggests that everyone in 
these countries is equally poor and, while poverty may be more broadly defined, 
the notion of a poor country is unequivocally linked to economic issues. The 
conclusion has to be that all the terms used so far have their drawbacks. As the 
world is already plagued by clumsy neologisms, we will, for lack of a better 
term, use these concepts interchangeably, bearing all the critique in mind. The 
same holds for donor countries. These have largely been indicated by geo-
graphical notions – the West, the North and the North Atlantic – and these terms 
are also used in this volume despite their obvious shortcomings.  
The history of the terms used for the people for whom development activi-
ties are meant is revealing in itself. Starting as ‘recipients’ or ‘beneficiaries of 
aid’ in the early phases of the Development Era, ‘target groups’ came to be used 
in the 1970s to indicate that it was not countries themselves but specific groups 
within countries that were the focus of activities. ‘Local people’ was also 
popular in development circles at the time but with an increase in the number of 
local personnel working for development organisations later on, the term lost its 
meaning. With its ongoing professionalisation, SNV has of late shifted from 
‘partners’ to ‘end-user clients’. In this book the word ‘participant’ is used to 
indicate people’s involvement and agency in development activities. 
Sources 
Given the limited amount of published literature dealing with the history of 
SNV, this book relies on archival sources and interviews for most of its argu-
ments. Information was gathered by Anne-Lot Hoek and Inge Brinkman be-
tween February 2005 and September 2006. Much of the archival material was to 
be found in The Netherlands but before the project kicked off, it was decided 
that research would extend beyond just the Dutch context and include inter-
views and archival documentation in the focus countries. 
A part of the SNV archives is housed at the SNV building itself but the 
majority is at the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Some other archives 
– such as KIT (Koninklijk Instituut voor de Tropen, Royal Tropical Institute), 
KDC (Katholiek Documentatie Centrum, Catholic Documentation Centre), PSO 
(Personele Samenwerking met Ontwikkelingslanden, Personnel Cooperation 
with Developing Countries, now PSO Capacity Building in Developing Coun-
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tries) and IISG (Internationaal Instituut voor Sociale Geschiedenis, International 
Institute of Social History) – also have information about SNV’s past activities. 
Archival material was found on visits the researchers made to Guinea 
Bissau, Mali, Cameroon, Tanzania, Zambia and Bolivia. A planned visit to 
Nepal had to be cancelled at the last minute due to the country’s internal politi-
cal situation but archival material was fortunately received through the commis-
sioned research in Nepal carried out by Kathinka Sinha-Kerkhoff in cooperation 
with Masoom Reza. It was striking what little care had been taken of the archi-
val material in most countries and although some of the offices regularly send 
archival material to The Hague, it was obvious that much had been lost through 
neglect, moving offices, vermin, war and other negative conditions. As was 
made clear in a letter written from Nepal:  
The conclusion is that the part that is stored in archival boxes is possibly infected 
with mould (the documents in the boxes are clammy to the touch). The part stored in 
files is filthy, dank and eaten away by rodents, probably mice.44 
Marja Hinfelaar indicated a similar situation in Zambia:  
(…) in some instances the SNV projects had long-standing effects that could only be 
noticed over a long period of time. It is therefore all the more astonishing to note 
that SNV does not keep a record of its long-term participation in Zambia. All docu-
ments quoted in this paper came from the Netherlands Embassy archives in Lusaka. 
She attributes the neglect to the high turnover in personnel, the short con-
tracts, a lack of accountability and the wish to present SNV as an organisation 
with a completely new approach and no links to the past.45  
Access to the existing materials in most countries was readily provided and 
we and the commissioned researchers were assisted in retrieving the documents 
available. Only on occasion did problems arise; as in the case of Nepal: ‘(…) 
this material was made available only after Masoom’s display of stamina and 
through cooperation with the Nepalgunj office rather than that of the headquar-
ters in Nepal’s capital Kathmandu’.46 
The archival sources provide a wealth of data on SNV’s formal policies, 
bureaucratic changes and their political connections and offer insight into the 
views of ordinary SNVers and their daily lives. In letters sent from the field, 
                                                 
44  Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (hereafter ‘Foreign Affairs’), file 
2013/00449, memo, Stef Buitendijk to SNV archive, 21 January 2003. 
45  Marja Hinfelaar, ‘A history of SNV from a Zambian perspective, 1965-2005’ (Un-
published manuscript, commissioned research report within the project framework 
2006). 
46  Kathinka Sinha-Kerkhoff, ‘Development in the “Isolated Universe”, SNV in Nepal 
(1980-2005)’ (Unpublished manuscript, commissioned research report within the 
project framework 2006). 
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interim reports, advice on successors and other documents, personal views are 
expressed about working conditions, relations with local participants and SNV 
as an organisation. In this respect it is noteworthy that the archival material 
concerning the 1960s and 1970s is richer in detail than later material. The archi-
val sources are less informative about local participants’ perspectives. While 
reports and letters sometimes present the opinions of the people for whom 
development activities were meant, on the whole there is little information 
about local perspectives on SNV activities. 
Through the interviews, we hoped to address this issue. We spoke with over 
a hundred people who had worked for SNV at one stage or another in their lives 
and some two hundred people who had been in touch with SNV as local partici-
pants or consultants (see section on interviews). Some forty interviews were 
held in The Netherlands but the majority of them were conducted on visits to 
the focus countries. These visits were facilitated by the SNV offices in the indi-
vidual countries and they arranged transport, access to archives and contacts. 
These short but intensive visits did not allow for in-depth study of the country 
context or the building up of relationships of trust with interviewees. Often we 
were regarded as SNVers and people’s evaluations were made in the light of 
this perception. It did not always prove easy to talk to people who had been 
participants on SNV projects in the past. People currently working in SNV 
offices in the focus countries frequently did not know many of the former 
participants: changes in policy had altered many relationships and because of 
the high staff turnover, many contacts had been lost. Some of the interviewees 
had been in contact with SNV in the 1980s and 1990s but tracing more of the 
participants from earlier periods would only have been possible if we had had 
more time. In its initial stages, SNV cooperated with very poor people in remote 
villages, and to establish contacts we depended not only on transport facilities 
but also on the village context. In this sense our endeavour may not have 
differed much from the experiences of many development planners. Local elites 
were often keen to be interviewed, seeking to strengthen their position as 
development brokers but, as always, the ‘poorest of the poor’ were hard to 
reach.47  
On our visits to the focus countries, contacts were also established with the 
project’s commissioned researchers. Their interaction with local participants 
was different from ours: they were in general not seen as SNV people and were 
familiar with the country’s language, history and culture. In terms of establish-
ing contacts though, they faced similar problems to those Anne-Lot and I did 
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2000). 
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and the emphasis of their interviews likewise tended to be on the later periods of 
SNV’s history.  
Despite this setback, we managed to gather a wealth of perspectives on SNV 
from local participants from very different backgrounds who had cooperated 
with SNV in all the different stages of its history, and from (former) SNVers 
who had worked for the organisation, often for a considerable period of time. 
The findings from the archives are combined in this publication with the inter-
view material and the contributions from local researchers.  
The structure of this book 
The chapters in this book offer a chronological interpretation of SNV’s history 
and highlight several specific processes. The first was a move towards seculari-
sation. In its initial phase, SNV’s history was marked by tense but intensive 
relations between state and private initiatives (Chapter 3). The 1970s, however, 
saw a secularisation of development in a narrower sense: formal cooperation 
between private and state initiatives ended and in 1978 private organisations 
went their own ways. In the field too, SNV’s connections with missionary and 
church development work ended in many regions; although these changes were 
more gradual (Chapter 4).  
The second change was the professionalisation process. The young men and 
women who went overseas in the 1960s and 1970s were all volunteers but in the 
1980s it was decided to start recruiting salaried personnel instead. The average 
age of SNVers rose and most now had a university education (Chapter 5). These 
changes in social profile had huge consequences for SNV’s interaction with 
local people. 
The third process has been the organisation’s struggle for independence. In 
the past, SNV had a peculiar relationship with the state. It started off as a state 
organisation, later became a quango (quasi NGO) (Chapter 5) and since 2002 
has formally been an independent organisation (Chapter 6). Its changing rela-
tionship with the state, showing a tendency towards increased independence, 
continues to this day  
The fourth process can be identified as ‘internationalisation’. SNV started as 
a Dutch initiative and originally all its staff and volunteers were Dutch and its 
projects and policies were designed in The Netherlands. Slowly, however, more 
attention was given to the wishes and needs of local participants and a process 
of decentralisation reduced the importance of the head office in The Hague. In 
the 1990s, an increasing percentage of SNV’s in-country personnel were na-
tionals and English was adopted as the organisation’s official language of 
communication (Chapter 6). These internationalising factors were noticed by 
everyone involved with SNV.  
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Woven through these processes of change, shifting approaches to develop-
ment can also be discerned. Projects in the 1960s focused on practical commu-
nity development, while the emphasis shifted in the 1970s to appropriate tech-
nologies, a basic needs approach and an awareness-raising programme in The 
Netherlands. The second half of the 1980s saw a move towards the management 
of larger programmes; a process that continued throughout the 1990s. The pro-
cess approach was adopted in the early 1990s, while at the same time women’s 
issues (later ‘gender’) and the environment became important development 
themes. SNV has since abandoned its project approach and stopped meting out 
financial support. Instead, it now concentrates on giving advice to meso-level 
organisations. 
Some of these changes were closely related to development in practice. It 
would be limiting to see them only in terms of consequences as the changes 
were, at least in many cases, partly initiated as a result of SNV’s experiences in 
practice. The relationship between development theory, policy and practice are 
therefore better denoted by the term ‘interaction’ than by being interpreted in 
purely causal terms. SNVers and local participants not only ‘do’ development 
within the limits set and the possibilities offered by SNV as an organisation; 
they also in part create future limits and possibilities.  
All these changes are spelt out in detail in the following chapters. First 
however, we need to look into the historical connections between SNV and the 
periods prior to its foundation. The next chapter discusses how the novelty of 
the so-called Development Era should not be overstated and considers the links 
between development and colonial and missionary work. 
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Photo 1.2 Making new knives from old iron, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, 1976. 
Source:  SNV photo archives, White, Tanzania, Technische instructie. 
Photographer:  Unknown. 
  
2 
Merchants and ministers:  
Understanding SNV’s 
background 
An understanding of the context in which SNV came into existence takes us 
back into the past. Usually ‘development’ is associated with the period after 
World War II but a number of studies point to the importance of historicising 
development practices on a scale of longue durée. In all the colonies, state and 
missionary projects were implemented, even in the nineteenth century, to 
improve the ‘state of being of the natives’ and protect the environment. These 
colonial betterment schemes, development programmes and missionary activi-
ties in the fields of health, education and technological innovation may have 
been very different in nature from the projects envisaged in the Development 
Era. Yet their planning and implementation means that the post-war Develop-
ment Era cannot be viewed as a new phenomenon without historical antece-
dents, a kind of deus ex machina. As Monica van Beusekom & Dorothy 
Hodgson pointed out:  
(…) development had been a central feature of encounters between the West and 
Africa since at least the early twentieth century, so that by the 1950s, all parties in-
volved in the encounter had substantial experience of its policies and practices.1  
It is from within such reasoning that this chapter will not only tell the story 
of Dutch post-war involvement in the development enterprise but starts with 
colonial and missionary development experiences from earlier times. This will 
frame SNV in a historical context of colonial and post-colonial, national and 
international development experiences. Developmental activities were not in-
                                                 
1  Van Beusekom & Hodgson, ‘Lessons learned?’, Journal of African History 41 
(2000), p. 29. 
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vented after World War II but are part of a long-standing past of missionary 
activities in social welfare and betterment policies by the colonial state. It was 
with these two crucial traditions that SNV started out. 
‘Christianity, civilisation and commerce’ 
‘Christianity, civilisation and commerce’ formed the motto of Livingstone’s 
travels.2 Christian missionaries travelling in Africa, Asia and Latin America in 
the nineteenth century were not only evangelists and tradesmen but saw it as 
their task to lead the people out of darkness and bring them ‘civilisation’. This 
emphasis on enlightenment was, from the start, related to technological innova-
tion, educational facilities and medical services. In many cases, the missionaries 
had no choice but to enter into these fields. As Peel explains for the Yoruba:  
The early missionaries could only operate as the clients of powerful kings and 
chiefs, with whom they sought to ingratiate themselves by offering a range of tech-
nical, medical and clerical services.3 
For missionaries, these services were a means of reaching their ultimate goal 
of creating a Christian community where there had not been one before. The 
missionary K.G. Cameron, for example, stated: ‘Medicine [is] (…) a handmaid 
to the Gospel’.4 Evangelisation remained the most important objective and the 
teaching of new skills, such as writing, carpentry and sewing, as well as sup-
plying services in the field of health were the tools the missionaries operated 
with to achieve their religious mission. 
Yet precisely because the missionaries linked ‘civilisation’ with their par-
ticular view of modernity, Christianity came to be seen as being related to 
missionary schools, hospitals and workshops. Through these various activities, 
the missions might grow into famous centres with a widespread reputation over 
large areas. Becoming a Christian was not merely a matter of baptism; it 
entailed adopting a new and modern way of life that involved new ideas and 
practices in hygiene, clothing, architecture, agriculture, trade, labour and educa-
tion. It is no coincidence that ọlaju, the Yoruba word for ‘improvement and 
progress’, links Christian ‘enlightenment’ and missionaries ‘bringing light into 
the darkness’ to the ‘modernity’ of development.5 
                                                 
2  Thomas Pakenham, The scramble for Africa 1876-1912 (London, 1991), pp. 1, 254. 
3  Peel, ‘Ọlaju’, Journal of Development Studies 14 (1978), p. 147.  
4  Quoted. In: Jean & John L. Comaroff, Of revelation and revolution. Volume II: The 
dialectics of modernity on a South-African frontier (Chicago/London, 1997), p. 333. 
5  J.D.Y. Peel, Religious encounter and the making of the Yoruba (Bloomington, 
2000), pp. 169, 243, 317. 
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The emphasis gradually shifted from evangelisation to social work. Mission-
aries like Albert Schweizer, who arrived in Africa well after the first large-scale 
establishment of mission stations, were Christian-inspired but their primary goal 
was no longer the conversion of heathens but, in his case, the provision of 
health care.6 
The Netherlands was no exception to this general outline. Dutch Protestant 
as well as Roman Catholic churches sent large numbers of missionaries abroad 
and there were several centres in The Netherlands where Catholic priests and 
Protestant missionaries were trained to work in overseas territories. Throughout 
the twentieth century, the traditional stress on conversion remained important 
but the missionaries’ role in poverty relief, education, health, transport, handi-
craft training and other matters went hand in hand with their religious mission. 
Initially the emphasis of the Dutch missions was on Indonesia and most of the 
various denominations’ work in the archipelago was in education, health and 
other social areas and predated any state activity in these spheres. 
The white man’s burden  
Colonialism started with the economic interests of the European motherlands in 
mind; the aim being to open up new areas, find and create new markets, explore 
natural riches and gain access to labour reserves. Even so, arguments were 
sought to justify this as being beneficial for those being colonised. The General 
Act of the infamous Conference of Berlin, which partitioned Africa among 
Europe’s imperial powers, argued that colonial rule and ‘promotion of the na-
tive races’ should go hand in hand: 
All the Powers exercising sovereign rights or influence in the aforesaid territories 
bind themselves to watch over the preservation of the native tribes, and to care for 
the improvement of the conditions of their moral and material well-being, and to 
help in suppressing slavery, and especially the Slave Trade. They shall, without 
distinction of creed or nation, protect and favour all religious, scientific, or charita-
ble institutions, and undertakings created and organized for the above ends, or which 
aim at instructing the natives and bringing home to them the blessings of civiliza-
tion.7 
The ‘White Man’s Burden’, originally coined to refer to the costs of Ameri-
can colonisation of the Philippines, came to be seen as the ultimate defence of 
colonialism: The colonial powers were to ensure improved living conditions in 
                                                 
6  John Iliffe, The African poor: A history (Cambridge, 1987), p. 195. 
7  General Act, Conference of Berlin 1885, quoted in: Barbara Harlow & Mia Carter, 
eds, Archives of Empire. Vol II. The scramble for Africa (Durham, 2003), p. 31. Cf. 
Pakenham, The scramble for Africa, pp. 254-255. 
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the colonies. Such justification for empire not only came to be used in connec-
tion with British colonial rule; the French with their mission civilisatrice (civi-
lising mission) and the Portuguese with their assimilado status used similar 
arguments for their colonial enterprises too. At the beginning of the colonial era, 
‘development’ was mostly used to denote the process of opening up regions to 
the world market and rendering them economically profitable,8 while state pro-
jects designed to improve the living conditions of the colonised tended to be 
caught up in terms like ‘welfare’, ‘betterment’, ‘progress’ or other similar con-
cepts. At a later stage, the meaning of the notion ‘development’ shifted closer to 
these latter concepts. In any case, the justification for the colonial system rested 
to a large extent on ‘development’ arguments.  
From 1900 onwards, an ethical policy (ethische politiek) was introduced in 
the Dutch colony of Indonesia aimed at the emancipation of the colonised 
population. As Weber, Kreisel & Faust pointed out:  
The ethical policy was conceived as development aid for the native population, 
while the Gidslandgedachte, the concept of a guidance nation, was linked to a Dutch 
desire to lead the way in terms of a European ethical policy.9  
Following criticism of the brutalities of the colonial system, notably after the 
publication of an article entitled ‘Een eereschuld’ (A Debt of Honour) in 1899, 
the Dutch ethical policy was introduced to increase the welfare of the ‘native’ 
population through irrigation, emigration and education. In the programme’s 
irrigation component, many of the projects in the field of agriculture, water and 
credit facilities were realised, while the emigration part was intended to reduce 
over-population on Java and create a labour pool in other areas. In the educa-
tional sphere, village schools as well as higher educational facilities were 
started. The introduction of the ethical policy went hand in hand with a new 
health programme and an increased (but still limited) influence of Indonesians 
within the Dutch colonial government. Despite these aims, the living standards 
of Indonesians did not increase between 1900 and 1940. The colonial state 
failed to bridge the gap between the growing inequalities between profitable 
companies and the impoverished ‘natives’.10 Within the framework of this book, 
                                                 
8  Cf. Michael Havinden & David Meredith, Colonialism and development: Britain 
and its tropical colonies, 1850-1960 (London, 1993). 
9  Robert Weber, Werner Kreisel & Heiko Faust, ‘Colonial Interventions on the Cul-
tural Landscape of Central Sulawesi by “Ethical Policy”: The Impact of the Dutch 
Rule in Palu and Kulawi Valley, 1905-1942’, Asian Journal of Social Science 31 
(3), p. 409, referring to Steven Wedema, “Ethiek” und Macht; die niederländisch-
indische Kolonialverwaltung und Indonesiens Emanzipationsbestrebungen, 1901-
1927 (Stuttgart, 1998), p. 18.  
10  Humphrey de la Croix et al., ‘Indië herinnerd en beschouwd.’ Sociale geschiedenis 
van een kolonie (1930-1957) (Nijmegen, 1997), pp. 43-46.  
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it is impossible for us to offer an interpretation of the complex causes of the 
failure of the colonial betterment schemes before World War II. It is important, 
however, to realise that, both in the colonies and in their (former) motherland, 
people were familiar with state projects aimed at development, progress, wel-
fare, betterment or similar concepts. Claims to development were important 
throughout the colonial era. Prior experiences and failures at this time informed 
the initiatives, decisions, activities and reactions in the field of development of 
people from the developed world and those in developing nations after World 
War II. 
Official development discourse later upheld strong divisions between colo-
nialism and development but many local people saw development interventions 
in the light of earlier experiences in the colonial era. An example given by 
Donald Moore is the Zimbabwean post-colonial state policy for resettlement in 
the Kaerezi Resettlement Scheme that was implemented in the early 1990s. The 
programme was based directly on colonial plans for removal and resettlement 
that had been designed in the 1930s. The resistance of the area’s population was 
seen by state officials as ‘antagonistic to development activities’ but the people 
concerned interpreted it differently: 
The administrator used the English term villages to describe the linear grids (…) 
Most Kaerezians called these empty spaces simply the lines, the same term used for 
colonial land use plans that had forced Africans into linear settlement grids sepa-
rated from fields and pastures.  
Kaerezi people evaluated the development policies of the post-colonial 
government in the light of their experiences during the colonial era.11 This illus-
trates the influence of the historical context of development on post-colonial 
policies and practices.  
The development era: Change and continuity 
In many interpretations of development, Harry Truman’s 1949 inaugural ad-
dress, in which he unfolded plans for a new programme, is taken as the starting-
point: 
We must embark on a bold new program for making the benefits of our scientific 
advances and industrial progress available for the improvement and growth of 
under-developed areas. (…) The old imperialism – exploitation for foreign profit – 
                                                 
11  Donald S. Moore, ‘The crucible of cultural politics: Reworking “Development” in 
Zimbabwe’s eastern highlands’, American Ethnologist 26 (3), pp. 654-689 (quotes 
pp. 666, 654).  
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has no place in our plans. What we envisage is a program of development based on 
the concepts of democratic fair-dealing.12 
This Point Four Program, as it was later called, was presented as a break 
with the past as Truman referred to a dichotomy between the ‘old imperialism’ 
and his own ‘bold new program’. This was also implied in a new set of words 
that came into being. Henceforth the world would no longer be divided into 
‘civilised’ and ‘primitive’ areas, into ‘heathen’ and ‘Christian’ people or into 
‘colonies’ and ‘motherlands’. The new terms of discussion were to be ‘devel-
oped’ and ‘under-developed’. Many authors view the post-war period as the 
start of a new paradigm and Truman’s speech is seen as marking the beginning 
of the new Development Era.  
The post-war Development Era differed from the development and welfare 
activities that had been in vogue before it in a number of respects. Apart from 
the geo-political shift from motherlands/colonies to a developed/under-devel-
oped world, the growth of a huge development industry – with its institutions, 
bureaucracies, particular linguistic categories and flows of people, goods and 
money – is a major feature of post-war history. Cooper & Packard argued that, 
unlike the word colonialism, development as a concept garnered much support 
in the colonies. Not only in the West but also among nationalist elites and the 
population of newly independent states, development evoked the promise of a 
better life.13  
Despite these differences, the current image of development superseding 
colonialism is false for a number of reasons. Long before Truman ever gave his 
speech there was, as already explained, a history of colonial and missionary 
projects aimed at development and welfare. In addition, many countries contin-
ued to be colonised for decades after World War II. And finally, motives in the 
former motherland for joining the new development programme were often 
related to the colonial experience. In other words, the Development Era showed 
both changes and continuities in relation to the earlier development activities of 
the colonial state and the missions. 
Truman’s speech reflected other processes that were already taking place in 
the international sphere and his ideas did not come out of the blue as such. Steps 
were taken at the United Nations to organise development institutes aimed at 
multilateral cooperation and, after the Bretton Woods Accords of 1944, the 
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund were set up to regulate inter-
national trade and financial exchange.  
                                                 
12  Quoted in: Gilbert Rist, The history of development from Western origins to global 
faith (London/New York, 2002), pp. 259-260. 
13  Cooper & Packard, eds, International development and the social sciences, p. 1. 
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Late colonialism and development 
Colonialism and the new Development Era were contemporaries for a consider-
able time, especially in Africa. Many countries only became independent in the 
early 1960s, more than ten years after Truman’s speech, and it was not until the 
1970s that independence was finally obtained in the Portuguese colonies. 
In the period in which colonialism and the Development Era overlapped, the 
colonial states were very active in the field of development. It should be noted 
that the impetus for increased engagement in development projects came from 
events within the colonies. Before World War II, activities in the development 
sphere had been largely left to missionaries but a wave of strikes in the 1930s in 
the West Indies and Africa led to an increased awareness of dissatisfaction in 
the colonies and the limited support for colonial governments. The British Colo-
nial Secretary stated:  
(…) if we are not now going to do something fairly good for the Colonial Empire, 
and something which helps them to get proper social services, we shall deserve to 
lose the colonies and it will only be a matter of time before we get what we de-
serve.14  
It was the Colonial Development and Welfare Act of 1940, perhaps more so 
than Truman’s speech, that led to a number of large-scale projects aimed at 
promoting well-being and welfare in the British territories. In the French 
colonies, the creation of FIDES (Fonds d’Investissement pour le Développement 
Économique et Social) in 1946 and FERDES (Fonds d’Equipement et de Re-
cherche pour le Développement Économique et Social) in 1949, opened up new 
possibilities for the French colonial government to start development activi-
ties.15 The Portuguese were to join the modern development approach much 
later and focused on settlement schemes in the context of nationalist warfare.  
The late-colonial projects seemed purely technical but the underlying aims 
were politically expedient – justifying imperial rule and increasing colonial 
control – as well economic. It was hoped that development would benefit both 
the colonial and the motherland economies. The direct reactions to the strikes of 
the 1930s focused on redressing the behaviour of juvenile delinquents in the 
colonial towns through social welfare programmes. By the end of the 1940s 
however, the emphasis came to lie in Community Development, a model from 
which the entire population was to benefit and not only specific groups within 
society. The aim was to stimulate the economic development of the rural ma-
                                                 
14  Quoted in: Frederick Cooper, ‘Modernizing bureaucrats, backward Africans, and the 
development concept’. In: Cooper & Packard, eds, International development and 
the social sciences, pp. 66-67. 
15  Van Beusekom, Negotiating development, p. xxvi. 
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jority, although the approach did not intend to protect the poorest or most vul-
nerable in society but raise levels of wealth, health and education in a commu-
nity. Mass education, instead of the earlier clerical education aimed at only a 
few, was regarded as one of the means to achieve this, while at the same time 
the active participation of the community was sought. Community Development 
was described as:  
A movement designed to promote better living for the whole community with the 
active participation, and, if possible, on the initiative of the community, but if this 
initiative is not forthcoming spontaneously, by the use of techniques for arousing 
and stimulating it in order to secure its active and enthusiastic response to the move-
ment.16  
In the course of the 1950s, support for colonial rule and development waned: 
the costs were considered too high and, with so many projects failing, attempts 
at development were leading to more criticism of colonial rule than to a sense of 
justification.17 
This critique, however, only came with hindsight. At the time, many colonial 
officers were convinced that the new development and welfare approach would 
bring prosperity and well-being to the colonised populations. And many future 
nationalists then saw the future within the structures of colonialism and devel-
opment, rather than opposing the terms. Numerous cases testify to this. An 
example is the first president of Zambia, Kenneth Kaunda, who was deeply in-
volved in development and progress activities within the colonial structures in 
the 1950s.18 While Cooper & Packard’s argument about general support for the 
concept of development still holds water, the concept did not, as they suggested, 
initially stand against colonialism. 
 
                                                 
16  Iliffe, The African poor, pp. 201-207; F. van Dam, ‘Mode in ontwikkelingsvraag-
stuk’, Economisch-Statistische Berichten 17 (5), pp. 496-500. David Brokensha & 
Peter Hodge, Community development: An interpretation (San Francisco, 1969), pp. 
25-45 (Quote: p. 34, referring to Colonial Office, Social development in the British 
colonial territories (London, 1954), Appendix D, p. 49). 
17  Dorothy L. Hodgson, ‘Taking stock: State control, ethnic identity and pastoralist 
development in Tanganyika, 1948-1958’, Journal of African History 41 (2000), pp.  
75-77. 
18  Marja Hinfelaar, ‘A history of SNV from a Zambian perspective, 1965-2005’ (Un-
published manuscript, commissioned research report within the project framework 
2006), referring to Henrietta L. Moore & Megan Vaughan, Cutting down trees. Gen-
der, nutrition, and agricultural change in the Northern Province of Zambia, 1890-
1990 (Portsmouth/London/Lusaka, 1994), p. 113. 
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The Dutch case 
In the Dutch case, the overlap between colonialism and the Development Era 
was limited as its historically important colony of Indonesia became independ-
ent in 1949. The New Guinea affair, however, came to play a significant role in 
Dutch involvement in the new development programme. New Guinea had been 
part of the Dutch East Indies but, unlike Indonesia, remained under Dutch rule. 
As the Indonesian government felt it should become part of Indonesia, the 
1950s were characterised by increasing tensions between Indonesia and The 
Netherlands. In 1962, the situation nearly escalated into a fully fledged war 
when Dutch military activity was at its height and Indonesia threatened to 
invade New Guinea. Amid strong international pressure, The Netherlands gave 
up Dutch control over the colony in 1962 and New Guinea became part of 
Indonesia under the name of Irian Jaya in 1963.  
While most attention in the literature is given to the military and diplomatic 
aspects of the affair, post-war Dutch experiences in New Guinea involved many 
activities in the field of development. Jos van Gennip, who started his career in 
development in the 1960s, was on the SNV Board in the 1970s and has always 
been regarded as one of the most influential people in Dutch development 
policy,19 explained it as follows:  
(W)e can of course only understand Dutch development aid – and we are speaking 
here of the period 1963-1967 – in the light of our colonial history. In 1959-1960 we 
were in the midst of the New Guinea conflict. ‘We’ll roll up our sleeves and develop 
the country enormously.’ So we sent colonial officers by the tens, by the hundreds to 
New Guinea. They would all develop the people there. (…)  
The father of the current Minister of Foreign Affairs was State Secretary for New 
Guinea. Theo Bot saw the country develop and develop. But our foreign policy 
failed and we had to let go of New Guinea – it was an act of free choice. And in the 
midst of this difficult process, Father Bot says: ‘You dear colonial officer, you re-
ceive my guarantee that you will have a job when you get back to The Netherlands’. 
So all of a sudden these officials formed the heart of the Ministry for Development 
Affairs at Foreign Affairs! 
It was nicely contiguous: We started with development aid, while our role in New 
Guinea was reduced. But with it, I also had a big problem, almost up until today. 
Because these people had a certain idea about development: It was top-down: one 
would develop from the capital, from the government, from the state.20 
                                                 
19  Frans Bieckmann & Roeland Muskens, ‘De top tien. Macht en invloed op het ont-
wikkelingsbeleid’, Vice Versa 38 (4), pp. 10-13. 
20  Interview 242. (‘… wij kunnen Nederlandse ontwikkelingshulp natuurlijk alleen 
maar begrijpen – we spreken dan van de periode ‘63/’67 – in het licht van onze ko-
loniale geschiedenis. Wij zaten in 1959, 1960 midden in het Nieuw-Guinea conflict. 
‘Wij gaan de mouwen eens opstropen en we gaan het land geweldig ontwikkelen.’ 
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Most of the initial Dutch experiences in the new development programme 
thus came from within the colonial context of New Guinea. And these mirrored 
the tide of the time: Late-colonial paternalism and a top-down development 
approach went hand in hand.  
Experiences with development activities in the late-colonial period not only 
had a bearing on motherland policies. For many people in the former colonies, 
the new brand of whites that came seemed hardly any different from their pre-
decessors. When SNV volunteers arrived in Zambia, they replaced the colonial 
teachers and nurses who had lost their jobs at independence. The volunteers 
soon realised that their presence was unlikely to be interpreted differently from 
that of the white colonial settlers, many of whom were still there. As Meindert 
Witvliet, who worked as an SNV volunteer in Zambia in the late 1960s, ex-
plained: 
For the Zambians there was no difference between us SNVers and the former colo-
nials. When you arrive as a young bloke, driving a large Land Rover and being able 
to buy anything you want (…) You could do anything and have somebody cook and 
wash for you, then it does not matter for the local population who you are. They 
would look at us like: ‘Oh, there’s that white guy’. You shouldn’t have the illusion 
that they regarded us any differently than the white farmers, not really.21  
In many newly independent states there was an interest in forging new links 
or extending old networks with the Western world. Attempts were made to 
overcome the immediate association between white people and colonialism. For 
                                                 
Dus toen hebben we tientallen, honderden bestuursambtenaren naar Nieuw-Guinea 
gestuurd, die gingen daar allemaal het volk ontwikkelen (...) De vader van de hui-
dige minister van Buitenlandse Zaken was staatssecretaris van Nieuw-Guinea. Theo 
Bot, die ziet dat land ontwikkelen en ontwikkelen. Maar onze buitenlandse politiek 
loopt mis en wij moesten Nieuw-Guinea afstaan – act of free choice. En dan zegt hij 
in dat moeilijke proces, pa Bot: ‘U, beste ambtenaar in Nieuw-Guinea, u krijgt van 
mij de garantie dat u hier in Nederland in dienst wordt genomen.’ Dus die ambte-
naren hadden opeens de kern van het ministerie voor de diensten van ontwikkelings-
samenwerking op BZ. Dat sloot dus lekker aan: we begonnen met ontwikkelings-
hulp en we bouwden Nieuw-Guinea af. Daarmee zat ik ook met een geweldig pro-
bleem, tot op de dag van vandaag bijna, dat die mensen een bepaalde blik hadden op 
ontwikkeling, dat was top down. Ontwikkelen deed je vanuit de hoofdstad, dat deed 
je vanuit de overheid, vanuit de staat.’) 
21  Interview 13. (‘Voor de Zambianen was er geen verschil tussen ons als SNV’ers en 
de oud-kolonialen. Als je daar als jong broekje komt en je rijdt in een dikke land-
rover en kan alles kopen wat je wilt (…) Je kon alles doen en je hebt iemand die je 
eten en je was doet, maakt het voor die bevolking niets uit wie je bent. Die keken 
naar ons van: ‘Oh daar heb je die blanke’. Je moet niet de illusie hebben dat ze an-
ders tegen ons aankeken dan tegen die blanke boeren, echt niet.’) 
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example, in Guinea Bissau, the Dutch volunteers were to become a counterpoise 
to the old image of the Portuguese colonialists.22 
Colonial motives 
Truman’s speech suggested a clear break between colonialism and the Devel-
opment Era, but the links between colonialism and development were multifari-
ous and complex. The initial phase of Dutch development aid has also been 
described as: ‘The twilight zone between colonial policy and the formulation of 
a new policy’.23 At the time, these links were often not regarded as shameful or 
negative, as a document prepared for the JVC confirms.  
It would lead us too far to give an extensive analysis of the manifold activities 
undertaken over the years that were aimed at the development of the population of 
non-Western territories.  
We may think of the influence that colonial administrations had on education, health 
services, agricultural development, and village as well as regional organisation; the 
initially parallel running work of the Protestant and Catholic missions, in recent 
years ever more developed and adapted also to the material needs of the local popu-
lation; the influence of the – not always purely altruistically motivated – bilateral 
technical aid and investments, and aid programmes in the industrial sector, often 
accompanied by local possibilities for training, and, finally, the international, multi-
lateral aid, as meted out by the UN and its special organisations.24 
Post-war Dutch motives for participating in development aid were closely 
related to the country’s colonial history and there was initially little interest in 
development aid within Dutch political circles: most of the initiatives that there 
were originated in ex-colonial circles. These people were eager to re-enter the 
Indonesian context through the new development programme, although their 
attempts fell short in Indonesia’s new political order. The job opportunities 
within the new sector of development aid were an important reason for them to 
push for the new programme, while at the same time their experiences in the 
Overseas Territories had created a sharp awareness of poverty and a concern for 
‘progress’ and ‘welfare’ among many of them. Hence their motives, mirroring 
the Dutch ‘Merchant and Minister’ principle (koopman en dominee), were a 
                                                 
22  Raul Mendes Fernandes, ‘Les 40 ans de SNV en Guinée-Bissau’ (Unpublished 
manuscript, commissioned research report within the project framework 2006).  
23  Paul Hoebink, Geven is nemen: De Nederlandse ontwikkelingshulp aan Tanzania en 
Sri Lanka (Nijmegen, 1988), p. 47. 
24  P. Kruithof, ‘Samenvatting en conclusies, naar aanleiding van het onderzoek – in 
opdracht van de NJG – naar activiteiten en mogelijkheden op het gebied van interna-
tionaal hulpbetoon vanuit Nederland t.o.v. de ontwikkelingsgebieden’ (Amsterdam, 
1962), p. 3, in: Private archival documents, Prof. Frans A.M. Alting von Geusau. 
With kind acknowledgements to Prof. Alting von Geusau. 
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mixture of self-interest and engagement. They criticised the UN’s technocratic 
approach, holding that this purely economic and result-oriented paradigm did 
not take the specific nature of developing countries into account.25 
At the diplomatic level, the new development approach was largely regarded 
in instrumental terms: Dutch money for development was meant to improve 
Dutch-Indonesian relations and job opportunities presented a motive for sup-
porting development initiatives. After Indonesia gained independence, many 
Dutch people living there returned to The Netherlands, as did colonial officers, 
young men attending the Colonial Institute and people who had been working in 
the sugar, coffee, tea and tobacco sectors when Dutch control over New Guinea 
ended in 1962. In total, some 250,000 people returned to The Netherlands be-
tween 1945 and 1962. Among them were many tropical experts whose knowl-
edge, it was felt, could be used in the new Dutch development programme.26 
However, with many of its colonies gone, job opportunities for young Dutch 
people in the tropics were limited. 
Dutch motives for joining the development programme were largely similar 
to those of France and the UK in the sense that the prime consideration of The 
Netherlands was its international profile. For these other two countries, relations 
between development and colonialism were stronger as most of the French and 
British territories only became independent in the 1960s. In the UK, the role of 
domestic charity organisations was greater than in the Netherlands, while in 
France political motives concerning French prestige and the counterbalancing of 
growing US hegemony were important. American motives centred on diplo-
matic ties and geo-political strategies in the context of the Cold War. Anti-
communist feelings only played a limited role in Dutch motives for engaging in 
development aid and these were far less important than the wish to preserve its 
colonial legacy. 
Post-war missions 
The missions and Christian organisations were affected by the post-war trends 
in international development and these proved to be a major influence on devel-
opments. Christianity was a principal dynamic in politics in any case and the 
Church was a power to be reckoned with. This was certainly the case in The 
Netherlands. Dutch society in the 1950s was divided into pillars: Protestants, 
                                                 
25  J.J.P. de Jong, ‘Onder ethisch insigne. De origine van de Nederlandse ontwikke-
lingssamenwerking’. In: J.A. Nekkers & P.A.M. Malcontent, eds, De geschiedenis 
van vijftig jaar Nederlandse ontwikkelingssamenwerking, 1949-1999 (The Hague, 
1999), pp. 61-81. 
26  F.H. Peters, ‘Van de nood een deugd. Technische hulp na de dekolonisatie’. In: 
Nekkers & Malcontent, eds, De geschiedenis, pp. 91-92.  
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Catholics, socialists and liberals, each with its own social, cultural and political 
institutions and organisations. Christian denominations (Roman Catholics and 
the different Protestant churches) thus formed an important basis of political 
constituency, and church influence on Dutch politics was significant. 
The emphasis on social work in missionary circles grew after World War II. 
In the UK in particular, locally active charity organisations, mostly with a 
Christian background, developed into international organisations and later were 
important in the new NGO sector that emerged.27 
In the Dutch context, the various missions also started interpreting their 
activities in the light of ‘development’. While Philip Quarles von Ufford and 
Hans Tennekes saw a change towards ‘secularisation’ in the Christian message 
in the 1970s, social development, rather than conversion, was already being 
emphasised. In feedback to their home audience, Dutch missionaries increas-
ingly focused on their role in health care, education, poverty relief and voca-
tional training. While earlier missionary propaganda had stressed the impor-
tance of faith, post-war missionary messages from developing countries con-
centrated more on progress and development.28  
Initially the focus of Dutch missionary activities had been on the Dutch 
colonies but after World War II, both the Protestant and Roman Catholic mis-
sions began to diversify and missionaries started to be stationed in countries in 
Africa, Latin America and Asia that had never been part of the Dutch empire. 
Dutch church communities at home took a keen interest in missionary ac-
tivities: Weekly collections for the mission were organised and the circulars 
sent from abroad were read by church members. In fact, many of the first SNV 
volunteers initially learnt about development work through church channels.29   
Merchants and ministers 
The historical legacy of a nation of merchants and ministers (Koopman en 
Dominee) or, to put in other words, of capitalists and Calvinists, came to play a 
role in Dutch development aid. In the early days of development aid, self-inter-
est was expressed shamelessly: Prime Minister Drees argued in 1953 that tech-
nical assistance ‘was of importance to the whole world, but above all to The 
                                                 
27  Ondine Barrow & Michael Jennings, eds, The charitable impulse: NGOs and devel-
opment in East and North-East Africa (Oxford/Bloomfield, 2001), pp. 8-19. 
28  Philip Quarles van Ufford, ‘Cycles of concern. Dutch reformed mission in central 
Java, 1896-1970’. In: Philip Quarles van Ufford & Matthew Schoffeleers, eds, Reli-
gion and development. Towards an integrated approach (Amsterdam, 1988), pp. 73-
94; Hans Tennekes, ‘Religion and power: Modernization processes in Dutch protes-
tantism’, in: Ibid., pp. 31-52. 
29  Interviews 18, 63, 120 and 113. 
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Netherlands’.30 Economic gain and diplomatic relations certainly played an 
important role in the new endeavour. The government was keen to increase its 
representation abroad and development aid was expected to have a positive 
impact on the international image of Dutch science, technical know-how and 
trade, which would in turn positively influence export figures. In addition, 
Dutch international prestige was felt to have received a major blow after Indo-
nesia became independent and development aid was seen as a way of partially 
compensating for this. At home, many Dutch people felt that with Indonesian 
independence, the era of The Netherlands as an important maritime country 
with large overseas territories had come to a close. The country’s development 
programme was, therefore, one way of showing that it could still play an im-
portant role internationally. While the fear of Communism and the Cold War 
informed the development policies of many countries, this only became a factor 
in The Netherlands at a later stage and then only to a limited degree.31 Dutch 
motives for participation in the new development programme clearly reflected 
political and economic interests. And despite all Truman’s statements, there 
seemed to be little inhibition at the time about expressing the self-centred 
interests behind Dutch aid.  
The deep sense of moralism in Dutch history proved, however, to be a strong 
inducement to Dutch development aid. Humanitarian reasons, which were often 
Christian-inspired, were a crucial factor. Just as it was one’s moral duty to help 
a person in need, so aid should be given to poor countries, the reasoning went. 
The economic success of the Marshall Plan in The Netherlands seemed ample 
proof that aid could rebuild an economy in a relatively short period of time.32 
The Netherlands was one of the first countries to jump on the new development 
bandwagon and although it started off with a limited Dfl. 1.5m, by 1956 it 
ranked second in terms of the number of experts it was sending abroad. Despite 
this initially low budget, the percentage of GNP the Dutch spend on develop-
ment cooperation has always been amongst the highest in the world.33 
In a peculiar Dutch form of internationalisation, The Netherlands attempted 
to put itself across as a global ‘guide’ (Nederland gidsland). The idea was that, 
although small in size, the country could adopt a pioneering role in many areas. 
In subsequent years, this notion of being a leading force and a role model was 
connected with Dutch policies concerning human rights, conflict management 
                                                 
30  Quoted in: J.A. Nekkers & P.A.M. Malcontent, ‘Inleiding. Doe wel en zie niet om’. 
In: Nekkers & Malcontent, eds, De geschiedenis, p. 13. 
31  Ibid., pp. 12-14. 
32  Website: Esther Helena Arens, ‘Entwicklungshilfe und Entwicklungspolitik in den 
Niederlanden seit 1945’, http://www.uni-muenster.de/HausDerNiederlande/Zentru 
m/Projekte/NiederlandeNet/Dossiers/60-00/index.html  
33  Hoebink, Geven is nemen, pp. 48, 232-233. 
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and diplomatic negotiations, and was also reflected in the area of development 
aid. Some argue that the Netherlands was in fact not a guiding force at all, They 
claim that in many respects the Dutch did not play a vanguard role and, in terms 
of effectiveness, the way Dutch aid money was spent was certainly not exem-
plary.34 
The initial phase of Dutch development aid 
Dutch economist Jan Tinbergen, who was awarded the Nobel Prize for Eco-
nomics in 1969, argued way back in 1945 that one of the world’s greatest prob-
lems was the increasing gap between rich and poor nations. Although this view 
was exceptional at the time, The Netherlands became involved in the new 
development programme soon after Truman’s 1949 speech and Withall (Werk-
commissie Inzake Technische Hulp aan Laag Ontwikkelde Landen) was 
founded in the same year. At first it was unclear which ministry would assume 
responsibility for the new programme. The Ministry of Economic Affairs, that 
of Oversees Territories and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs all had a stake in the 
matter and only after much discussion was the programme entrusted to The 
Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs.35 
Withall advised the government on policy vis-à-vis the United Nations and 
was presided over by the head of the Directorate International Organisations 
(DIO, Directie Internationale Organisaties); the official body within the Minis-
try of Foreign Affairs that was responsible for all matters concerning the United 
Nations and the coordination of technical assistance to developing nations. A 
bureau for International Technical Assistance (Bureau voor Internationale 
Technische Hulp, ITH) was set up to execute Withall’s programme. Aid took 
the form of technical cooperation, which at the time consisted of offering ad-
vice, expertise and technical knowledge that would contribute to development. 
The activities had two forms: Grants were offered to students from countries 
with low levels of development and tropical experts were sent to these countries 
to work. Initially these were highly qualified experts, many of whom had lived 
in Indonesia before it became independent. However during the 1950s, the ITH 
was confronted with a shortage of experts. The UN requested 400 experts in 
1951 but only 275 posts could be filled, and in 1960 it made 800 similar re-
quests and the ITH was only able to provide 145 candidates. It had, therefore, to 
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engage younger agricultural engineers who were dispatched as junior ‘assistant 
experts’. Dutch (academic) interests were clearly central to the programme and 
the benefits for the receiving countries were only mentioned in passing. The 
Dutch experts worked primarily in the fields of tropical agriculture and health. 
Agricultural experts were sent through the FAO to projects in Libya, Ethiopia 
and Iran, and in the 1960s doctors were sent to work at the Medical Centre in 
Nairobi, where the Dutch spread know-how on tropical diseases, research pro-
jects were carried out and Kenyan medical students were trained.36  
In the first years of Dutch development aid, there was little theoretical 
thinking about what development should entail. Policy plans and strategies were 
lacking and long-term planning was regarded as unnecessary as it was thought 
that developing countries would soon catch up with the rest of the world. The 
entire programme very much depended on the man on the spot.37 Jan Meijer, for 
example, a civil servant at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, rose to prominence 
and single-handedly directed much of the Dutch development sector in the late 
1950s and early 1960s. From 1956 onwards he headed DIO and later became 
Director General of International Cooperation.38  
The Netherlands was one of the first countries to offer financial support for 
the multilateral aid programme of the United Nations. In practice, most of the 
Dutch aid donated in the first ten years went to Indonesia, Surinam and the 
Netherlands Antilles. J.J.P. de Jong calculated that between 1951 and 1955 90% 
of the total Dutch annual budget for aid to developing countries went to its 
former colonies. And between 1956 and 1962, aid to former colonies still ac-
counted for 70% of this budget.39 All the same, the multilateral approach was 
defended in political circles. It was felt that, for a small country like The Neth-
erlands, bilateral aid would lead to too much fragmentation and a multilateral 
approach would strengthen the position of the United Nations, something that 
was seen as desirable.40  
Increasing public interest  
As in most European countries, Dutch public interest in development aid started 
to increase in the 1950s. At an international level, some organisations were 
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founded by private initiatives to provide development assistance but there were 
also many international NGOs that had started even before the end of World 
War II and that grew in size and impact in the context of international develop-
ment in a growing number of independent states where the stress was now on 
social work within missionary activities. In the Dutch context too, the new 
focus on commitment on a more global scale became ever more important in the 
1950s and 1960s. Specific to the Dutch context, however, was the flood disaster 
of 1953 that hit the southwestern parts of The Netherlands and changed the 
country into an aid recipient itself. The foreign aid provided following this 
disaster made a lasting impression on the Dutch and afterwards many people 
felt that the Dutch government should greatly increase its assistance to countries 
in need.  
Fortnightly speeches in The Hague’s Plein (Square) in 1954 by Father 
Jelsma about world poverty and the need to set aside tax money for develop-
ment aid attracted much attention. This Pleingroep (Square Group), as it be-
came known, together with a Protestant group led by the pacifist minister 
J.B.Th. Hugenholtz, set up NOVIB (Nederlandse Organisatie voor Internatio-
nale Bijstand) in 1956.41 Queen Juliana’s call for an increase in development aid 
in her Queen’s Speech in 1954 also made a deep impression on the Dutch 
public.42 And in a speech for the NJG (Nederlandse Jeugdgemeenschap, Dutch 
Youth Community) and the Nederlandse Studentenraad (Dutch Student Coun-
cil) in 1955, the Queen repeated her concerns about the growing gap between 
rich and poor nations, combining the concept of ereschuld (debt of honour), 
which was related here to criticisms of colonial excesses, with Christian duty: 
We, who call ourselves Christians, all too often presented ourselves to the rest of 
humanity as barbarians, who were only concerned about material welfare, our own 
in the first place, to be sure! Only in the last century did this change. Even now the 
largest share of wealth is in our hands. Our debt of honour consists of working to the 
best of our abilities to ensure that also our other fellow world citizens can participate 
in our welfare.43  
Numerous other initiatives were taken throughout the 1950s and early 1960s, 
mainly by church and youth organisations. A lot of the early development 
organisations in The Netherlands were built on the missionary tradition and had 
their roots in Dutch churches, and although many were small-scale and short-
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lived, others formed the basis for the larger organisations of the Third World 
Movement in the 1970s and 1980s. The churches offered the most important 
platform on which the debates and activities related to development in Dutch 
public society took place. 
Conclusion 
The post-war Development Era can be seen in relation to two important histori-
cal processes. The first was the gradual increase in development activities in 
colonial states, especially in the inter-war period. These early development 
programmes greatly influenced post-war policies. The second important current 
was the missionaries’ presence abroad with their role in poverty relief, educa-
tion, health care and vocational training which far exceeded their original 
strictly religious approach. 
After the war, the concept of development came to be used with new vigour 
and in a new institutional context. Newly independent states embarked on 
development schemes, international organisations ranging from the United 
Nations to the World Bank and NGOs created new networks of communication 
and exchange, development money led to new terms of negotiation and eco-
nomic relations, and new research centres focusing on technical innovation 
were set up. These institutions and the new relations that were forged did not 
erase the colonial and missionary experiences in development. In many areas, 
colonialism had not yet come to an end and the colonial regimes joined the new 
development trend, combining the aim of economic growth in the colonies with 
the need to justify imperial rule. For former motherlands, development provided 
a new way of relating to their old colonies.  
In the missionary sphere, the relationship with development was one of 
mutual influence. Social welfare and charity had been a feature of the mission-
ary enterprise since its inception but after World War II, missions and churches 
became very active in the development sector and still remain a major force in 
development work today.  
The change from evangelisation to charity to development on the one hand 
and from colonisation to welfare programmes to development on the other has 
been a gradual process. The Dutch context, with its mixture of humanitarian 
motives and self-interest, has proved no exception to this general process of 
change. 
 
  
  
 
 
Photo 3.1 Queen Juliana bids the first JVP team farewell, 1963. 
Source:  SNV photo archives, Blue, hoge gasten. 
Photographer:  ANEFO, Amsterdam, 1963.
  
3 
SNV’s start: Bricks, mortar and  
the transfer of knowledge 
(1963-1972) 
Two Dutch voluntary organisations started their activities in 1963: a state 
organisation (JVP) and a private, mainly confessional, initiative (JVC). From 
the outset, the two stood in fierce competition and their merger into one organi-
sation (SNV) in 1965 was only a marriage of convenience. This affiliation 
between state and Church marked SNV’s history in the 1960s and early 1970s. 
While development is often conceived of as a secular, technical discourse, this 
chapter shows that during the initial phase of SNV’s history, religious factors 
played an important role too. In SNV’s first decades, the missionary and church 
tradition in developmental activities at times conflicted head on with state 
initiatives in the realm of development. While these may initially be seen as 
personal bickering, behind the controversies lay a structural conflict revolving 
around divergences in method and manner, the jealous guarding of each group’s 
independence and the incompatibility of two, vastly different traditions. 
This chapter first traces the origins of SNV in the light of these conflicting 
missionary and state traditions. So as to understand the new development pro-
gramme of the Dutch state, it is not only necessary to outline the evolving con-
text of development aid in Dutch politics but also to note the colonial legacy in 
this new realm of activities. The long history of missionary and church initia-
tives was felt especially in the private organisations for development aid. Sub-
sequently in this chapter, an attempt is made to describe the practice and 
underlying ideas of SNV’s activities in this initial phase.  
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Institutionalising Dutch development 
1963 was a remarkable year for Dutch development policies because for the 
first time in history, a State Secretary for Foreign Affairs ‘charged with the aid 
for less developed territories’ (‘belast met de hulp aan minder-ontwikkelde 
landen’), was appointed. The Christian Democrat I.N.Th. Diepenhorst was 
chosen for this position. Working in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the State 
Secretary was to ensure that development aid was put on the Dutch govern-
ment’s agenda. His task proved hard, however. The new State Secretary felt that 
both the Ministries of Finance and that of Foreign Affairs saw development as 
‘wasted money’ and were generally opposed to it.1 Officials at the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs were far more powerful in development affairs than the Minis-
ter. Minister Joseph Luns was kept uninformed about matters and decisions 
were taken without his knowledge. The officials had little interest in drawing 
the new State Secretary into their circle and conscious attempts were made to 
keep him in the same position as the Minister of Foreign Affairs, a tactic that 
would clearly lead to conflict and misunderstandings.2 The appointment of a 
special State Secretary for Development showed, however, that the increasing 
attention for development aid was slowly being institutionalised in The Nether-
lands. 
Various factors were playing an influential role in the Dutch developmental 
arena. The entire period under discussion showed a gradual increase in the 
number of private organisations engaged in development work. In the confes-
sional sphere, a twofold development took place: new organisations – such as 
Vastenaktie (1961), Sjaloom (1963), ICCO (1964) and Cebemo (1969) – were 
founded, while others were transformed into development organisations like the 
much older medical organisation Memisa. A documentation centre was set up 
by Catholic students that later formed the basis of the COSsen (Centra voor 
Ontwikkelingssamenwerking), centres providing information on development. 
In the non-confessional realm new action groups and organisations were also 
founded. Some of these became permanent faces in the Dutch development 
landscape, like HIVOS (1968) and Wereldwinkels (1969) that initially cooper-
ated with the Catholic fair-trade organisation S.O.S. (Steun Onderontwikkelde 
Streken, 1959). Links with the political sphere slowly evolved, notably with 
organisations like the Angola Comité (1961), anti-apartheid groups and groups 
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organising demonstrations in The Netherlands against the US war in Vietnam, 
which had started in 1965.3  
Voluntary service 
In Europe and the US, the beginning of the 1960s saw an increase in organisa-
tions sending youngsters abroad to work in tropical areas. These initiatives were 
related to the start of the American Peace Corps in 1960 but other links were 
also important and even back in the 1920s, large youth movements, such as the 
Boy Scouts, had inspired Roman Catholics to found Christian youth organisa-
tions. A Dutch example was De Graal that initially aimed at ‘world conversion’ 
by having Christian female university students organise factory girls. After 
World War II, the movement was transformed into an international Christian 
women’s organisation that sent young female volunteers overseas too.4 A simi-
lar group was the Belgium/Dutch Kajotter movement (KAJ, Catholic Workers’ 
Youth) of Father Jozef Cardijn, which started in 1924 and also sent youngsters 
abroad on a voluntary basis. As they established an international branch in 1957 
and were by then active all around the world, they may well have inspired later 
volunteer organisations. Some SNVers suggested a direct link between the 
origins of SNV and the KAJ.5 And VSO (Voluntary Service Overseas), a Chris-
tian-inspired British movement that started its activities in 1958 was also per-
haps of influence. 
The Peace Corps was founded in the US in 1960 after President John F. 
Kennedy challenged students at the University of Michigan to serve their coun-
try in the cause of peace by living and working in developing countries. An 
important motive was to counter the image of the ‘Ugly American’ and to fight 
the ‘Communist threat’.6 A further impetus for organising voluntary services 
was the American-organised conference in Puerto Rico in 1962 on the need for 
‘middle-level manpower’, which shifted the attention from highly qualified 
experts to young people of middle-level education with little professional ex-
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perience.7 Within the Dutch context, the experience with sending out junior 
‘assistant experts’, which had started in the 1950s, also contributed to accep-
tance of the idea of dispatching young people in the framework of development. 
A direct follow-up to Kennedy’s Peace Corps idea was the foundation of the 
EWG (Europese Werkgroep, European Working Group) in 1962, that included, 
amongst others, Princess Beatrix, Laurens Jan Brinkhorst, Frans A.M. Alting 
von Geusau, and Bas de Gaay Fortman who were then all students or alumni of 
Leiden University or Amsterdam’s Free University. It aimed to create a plat-
form for international voluntary service at a European level. As each European 
country started its own voluntary service, however, and especially because the 
Dutch government opted for a state initiative at the national level rather than 
seeking European integration as the EWG proposed, the initiative was blocked. 
After six years of voluntary service at an international non-governmental level, 
the EWG was dissolved in 1968.8 
Foundation of the JVC 
Inspired by Queen Juliana and the foundation of the Peace Corps, members of 
the NJG and their leader, the Protestant Reverend Steenbeek, developed plans 
for a new youth voluntary service in The Netherlands. This was initiated by the 
large sum of money that had been collected by the NJG during a campaign in 
1961: ‘After this enormous effort the question arose whether it was not high 
time to participate in development work not only with money, but also with 
more personal commitment.’9 
The idea was to bring together all the present activities and provide a plat-
form for overseas youth voluntary services in The Netherlands. The organisers 
were well aware of earlier activities in this sphere within the Dutch organisa-
tional arena and cautious negotiations were started with the various players in 
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and Peace Corps, and hosted representatives from more than forty countries (John F. 
Kennedy, ‘Statement by the President Announcing an International Conference on 
“Human Skills in the Decade of Development” September 3rd, 1962’, John Woolley 
& Gerhard Peters, The American Presidency Project website:  
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=8845&st=&st1) 
8  Peter Bak, Bewogen en bevlogen. Het Europees elan van prinses Beatrix (Amster-
dam 2005). Interviews 203 and 288. 
9  Foreign Affairs, file 24, speech, ‘Toespraak op de jaarsamenkomst van de Algemene 
Raad van de Stichting Jongeren Vrijwilligers Corps, 28 febr. 1969, gehouden door 
Ds. N. Steenbeek’, 28 February 1969, p. 1. 
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the field. In March 1961 the first steps were taken to organise a ‘Dutch Peace 
Corps’: letters went to and fro, meetings were held and proposals were debated 
with all possible partners. In contrast to state initiatives, such as the American 
Peace Corps and later the JVP that were set up very quickly, it was some time 
before the Dutch private organisations’ initiative took off. It was only in Sep-
tember 1961 that bylaws for the new foundation were prepared and, even then, 
it still took over a year before the formal foundation of the JVC (Jongeren 
Vrijwilligers Corps: Youth Volunteers’ Corps) in November 1962.10  
Some sixty organisations participated in the JVC initiative, the NOVIB 
being amongst the most influential. Many of the participant groups were suspi-
cious of the JVC initiative as they feared losing their own identity. They were, 
however, anxious to participate in case any benefits were meted out and did not 
want other organisations to profit at their expense. There was no formal clarifi-
cation of the relationship between the JVC Board and the various organisations, 
and the division of tasks and responsibilities were not spelled out. The KAJ – 
with its long-standing experience in the field – had little faith in the organisa-
tional qualities of Rev. Steenbeek and by October 1963 the KAJ was no longer 
in league with the JVC and was requesting direct cooperation with the state.11 
The Reformed churches too indicated a preference for working directly with the 
state instead of having the JVC act as an intermediary.12  
The atmosphere in which the foundation was set up remained within the 
realm of Christian charity. While the focus in development policies at large was 
on economic growth, JVC ideology explicitly extended beyond economic fac-
tors and included, for example, loving one’s neighbour, care and humility. ‘May 
we meet with thee?’ was the motto.13 As nearly all the organisations in the JVC 
had a confessional background and the NJG was led by a Protestant minister, 
both discourse and practice closely resembled the Dutch missionary tradition. 
Later critique of the government initiative also referred to this ideology: The 
JVP was felt to be too businesslike and detached, and ‘not imbued with the 
notion that it concerns aid for OTHERS.’14 
                                                 
10  Ibid. file 7, addendum, ‘Jongeren Vrijwillige Hulp, een initiatief van de Nederlandse 
Jeugdgemeenschap’, 15 August 1962, pp. 1-4. 
11  Ibid. file 7, memo, Van Dam to Dio: ‘Gesprek met KAJ over samenwerking met 
JVP en andere organisaties’, 6 May 1963; Ibid. file 492, letter, A.P. Umans, KAJ to 
Luns, 14 June 1963; Ibid. file 492, memo, DIO to R: ‘Samenwerking met het JVC’, 
10 March 1964. 
12  Ibid. file 7, memo, Mej. Verhoeff to NJVP, 19 April 1963. 
13  Ibid. file 13, meeting minutes, NJG and Foreign Affairs, 13 March 1961. (‘Mogen 
wij U eens ontmoeten’). 
14  Ibid. file 294, journal article, ‘Konkreet’, August 1963, p. 4 (capitals in original). 
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In the few references to the foundation of JVC and JVP, it is suggested that 
news about the private initiative only reached the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 
1963.15 In fact, the process was more gradual: In the course of 1961, officials at 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs learned about the NJG initiative and a meeting 
was held with NJG representatives on 13 March 1961. As soon as the JVC 
delegates left the room, government officials started discussing their own role in 
this endeavour and one of them was charged with studying the possibilities of 
sending ‘middle-level manpower’ overseas through state channels rather than 
through a private organisation.16 
Foundation of the JVP 
Shortly before the foundation was formally announced in February 1963, the 
JVC applied to the Dutch government for financial assistance. Immediate action 
was taken at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This, it was felt, ought to be a state 
affair: not something that should be left to private initiative. A hand-written 
memo in the archives of Foreign Affairs stated that: ‘We have to operate very 
carefully now, as we have to literally bowl everything over.’17  
Although, as we saw, officials at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had heard 
about the JVC plans prior to 1963, it was felt that this private initiative had 
created circumstances that were pressurising the government to act. There was 
as such no political will to start with a voluntary service organised by the Dutch 
state: The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Minister declared, had no interest in 
development aid.18 Faced with the JVC plans though, the officials felt they 
could not but take matters into their own hands and counter the developments in 
the Dutch private organisations. Hasty steps were taken to outdo the JVC initia-
tive and just before it was officially launched, a state organisation was founded. 
In the following quote, Prince Claus’s biographer, who was chairman of the 
SNV from 1974 to 1980, explained how chaotic the foundation of JVP came 
about: 
From the start already the two were in conflict: When the highest development offi-
cial Jan Meijer heard that the private organisations were about to found the JVC, he, 
                                                 
15  Frans Bieckmann, De wereld volgens Prins Claus (Amsterdam, 2004), pp. 131-132. 
16  Foreign Affairs, file 13, meeting minutes, NJG and Foreign Affairs, 13 March 1961, 
pp. 7-8; also Ibid. file 6, memo, DIO to M: ‘Vrijwilligerscorps ten behoeve van 
minder-ontwikkelde gebieden’, 28 October 1962. 
17  Ibid. file 8, memo, illegible (probably Van den Bergh) to Van Dam, s.d. (‘Er moet 
nu zeer voorzichtig geopereerd worden, want we moeten letterlijk alles omkegelen.’) 
18  Ibid. file 5, memo, Dio to S, 14 January 1963. Interview 288. 
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on the very same day, rented a building, had a placard ‘JVP’ hammered on it, staffed 
it with an official and had Luns announce it all festively in a press conference.19  
JVP was to be a foundation, with its own board and staff, but would report to 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. All staff members were formally state employ-
ees and major decisions on the selection of projects, recruitment and training 
were to be taken by the Minister. 
Nothing had been prepared: there were no plans, no projects, no policies and 
no personnel. But within a short space of time, a number of staff had been 
appointed who were either young and enthusiastic in the perception of those in 
favour of the endeavour or young and inexperienced in the eyes of the more 
senior officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs who hoped that it would all 
come to nothing. The barracks where the new board was to start working were 
completely empty: not even a pencil could be found.20 Joseph Luns stated at the 
inauguration of the new JVP staff: ‘You start out with a 1,000 questions in front 
of you, without any answer. Your task is to end with 1,000 responses and not 
one question left unanswered.’21 The most important issue was to have a project 
as soon as possible and to start sending out volunteers. During his press confer-
ence, Luns had stated that in 1963 fifty volunteers would leave the country, so 
in order not to lose face, this had to be organised within the year of JVP’s foun-
dation. At the same time, it was imperative that these projects be well prepared 
since failure could harm the image of The Netherlands internationally.22  
The first problem was that this new initiative by the Dutch state was not 
known anywhere; so while volunteers would only formally be sent out at the 
explicit request of the government of one of the underdeveloped nations, in 
practice, JVP staff had to press governments, through their embassies in The 
Netherlands, into placing such a request. On top of this, in matters such as 
recruitment and the selection of projects and volunteers, JVP staff depended on 
the permission of the Minister and, after the installation of Diepenhorst, on the 
State Secretary. These decisions were, however, often delayed as officials at 
Foreign Affairs did not inform their superiors but instead tried to monopolise 
information. This was especially problematic because of Joseph Luns’s promise 
about the fifty volunteers that would go abroad in the first year. With officials at 
                                                 
19  Bieckmann, De wereld volgens Prins Claus, pp. 131-132. 
20  Interview 288. 
21  Foreign Affairs, file 1, speech, ‘Toespraak van Minister Luns bij de installatie van 
de staf van het Jongeren Vrijwilligers Programma’, 25 April 1963, pp. 4-5. 
22  Ibid. file 1, press conference, ‘Minister Luns over Nederlands Jongeren Vrijwilligers 
Programma tijdens persconferentie Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken op 12 febru-
ari 1963’, 12 February 1963, pp. 1-5; Ibid. file 1, memo, Luns to Prime Minister, 
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Foreign Affairs stalling on matters, precious time was lost. For example, the 
JVP staff needed permission and financial support for the first preparatory 
course at the Royal Tropical Institute in Amsterdam but in the first instance 
attempts by the staff to get matters organised fell short due to obstructions by 
officials at the Ministry. Finally, the same officials tried to hold the new foun-
dation in a tight grip: a few of the JVP staff were former Foreign Affairs staff 
and had orders to report back on proceedings to their former superiors. Rela-
tions with Foreign Affairs officials were thus by no means easy and many con-
flicts over major and minor issues erupted.23  
By May 1963 however, seven projects were being studied and some seventy 
youngsters had shown interest in the organisation.24 It was decided that the 
Peace Corps model would be followed in many respects. The volunteers were to 
be organised into teams but, in contrast to the Peace Corps, it was thought more 
valuable to dispatch youngsters with a technical background instead of univer-
sity students and to have an experienced field staff member accompany them. 
The field staff idea was closely related to the expert programme at Foreign 
Affairs and created the opportunity to engage professionals with experience 
overseas.25  
In June the very first JVP team would leave for West Cameroon. There was 
no particular reason for choosing this region, it was just that several events 
coincided to make this project the first. In 1962 a horticultural research team 
from the Free University in Amsterdam that was visiting West Cameroon had 
looked into the possibility of sending volunteers there through NOVIB. The 
Cameroonian government had reacted to these plans with due enthusiasm but 
the Dutch then had second thoughts as they did not consider Cameroon a suit-
able partner. NOVIB had withdrawn in silence, thus endangering relations 
between Cameroon and The Netherlands. The situation had led officials at 
Foreign Affairs to suggest JVP take over the project. Although Cameroon’s 
central government was somewhat suspicious of any activity related to Anglo-
phone West Cameroon, the cordial relations between the Dutch royal family and 
Cameroon’s President Ahidjo may have been a factor in the project getting off 
the ground. And so it was that in November 1963 a JVP team set out for West 
Cameroon.26  
                                                 
23  Interview 288; Hellema, ‘Beschamende situaties’. In: Nekkers & Malcontent, eds, 
De geschiedenis, pp. 127-144.  
24  Foreign Affairs, file 293, memo, Van Walsum to staff JVP, 21 May 1963.  
25  Nijzink, Dag vrijwilliger!, p. 10; Mr F.A.M. Alting von Geusau, letter to the author, 
26 February 2007. 
26  Foreign Affairs, file 1772, report, T.W. Bieze, ‘Jongeren Vrijwilligers Programma, 
Kameroen, Chronologische weergave van relevante feiten en gebeurtenissen, bene-
vens een evaluatie,’ s.d. (1965), pp. 2-3, 7; Ibid. file 1767, memo, vice-DVE (Direc-
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Photo 3.2 Team II setting off for Colombia, 1964. 
Source:  SNV photo archives, Blue, Colombia, SNVers.  
Photographer:  De Telegraaf, 1964. 
 
The first teams 
The first JVP team left on 19 November 1963. To add a sense of grandeur to the 
occasion, the volunteers had been invited for a reception at the royal palace 
some days before their departure and Minister Luns had personally seen them 
off on the train to Paris. They were a group of eleven men and ten women, aged 
between 21 and 30, who would start working in the English-speaking western 
region of Cameroon. Upon arrival, it was clear that the promised housing facili-
ties were not available. In order to resolve this, some villagers and junior state 
officials were forcibly removed from their homes so that the volunteers would 
have housing in Bambui.27 It emerged that the school buildings where they had 
                                                 
toraat Verdragen) to A. van der Goot: ‘Overeenkomst met Kameroen inzake Neder-
landse vrijwilligers’, 31 January 1964; Saïbou Issa, ‘La SNV au Cameroun: 1963-
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27  Interview 12. ‘Eerst Nederland, dan nog Nederland en dan andere landen’, Vice Ver-
sa 19, 3 (1985), p. 28; Foreign Affairs, file 8, letter, R.S Uit den Boogaard NOVIB, 
September 1963; Ibid. file 1772, report, T.W. Bieze, ‘Jongeren Vrijwilligers Pro-
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been supposed to work no longer existed. The volunteers then took the initiative 
to start agricultural instruction in the nearby villages.28 The project had not been 
well defined beforehand so the volunteers had to look for ways in which they 
could contribute to development themselves. As Harry Sesink-Clee, one of the 
field staff members in Cameroon, put it: ‘In those days it was all rather infor-
mal. If somebody said: “Yeah, this is what I would like to do”, then they just set 
out to do it.’29 With extremely limited transport facilities and no money for 
building, the volunteers and staff members could not do a lot: they were all 
‘seriously discontent’. On top of this, the field staff declared the team ‘incapa-
ble’ and initially the volunteers did not have permission to enter the villages: 
They were to learn Pidgin English and receive a theoretical background first. 
This, in turn, led to disgruntlement amongst the volunteers, who wanted to start 
with ‘their project’. The volunteers were barely aware of the fact that they were 
supposed to work within the framework of the Cameroonian government devel-
opment programme and the regional authorities, in turn, had no wish to dispose 
of their personnel to function as counterparts for the young volunteers. A Dutch 
evaluator suspected that, if anyone was appointed as counterpart at all, the 
government tried in many cases to send people they saw as ‘misfits’ (kneusjes). 
Within a year, the regional Cameroonian authorities were even less enthusiastic 
and refused to cooperate on some matters. A leading official of the Agricultural 
Department declared at a meeting with the JVP field staff that: ‘he was fed up 
with the volunteers’.30 A visit by the JVP director did not help to improve mat-
ters and his behaviour towards the Cameroonian officials from the Agricultural 
Department exacerbated the problems as he devoted more attention to the 
women than to the work of the volunteers.31 A JVP staff report on Cameroon 
indicated that expectations regarding the project had been too high, promises 
had not been kept and language problems had been difficult to overcome. The 
mission could hardly be said to have been a great success and in 1967 an exter-
nal evaluation classified it as a failure.32 It is therefore all the more surprising 
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that satisfaction was expressed over the ‘viability of the Dutch programme’ in a 
1969 evaluation and that the present volunteers ‘were (then) still building on the 
foundations laid by the first team’. From the Cameroonian side too, appreciation 
grew. Several volunteers were invited to return and at least one was awarded a 
Cameroonian knighthood.33 
A second team was sent to Brazil some months later and one of its members 
was the daughter of the new State Secretary. In his speech on the quay, Diepen-
horst stated: ‘It would probably surprise you, after all the changes that you have 
already experienced, if there wasn’t a change at the last moment.’34 The depar-
ture had been delayed several times and now the volunteers were told that they 
would have to spend several weeks in the capital before they could start work-
ing. The envisaged project had finished just before the volunteers were dis-
patched. As in Cameroon, the team found that they had to create their own 
work: Very little had been organised and in most cases the volunteers ended up 
working in sectors they had never been trained for. Unhindered by a pre-de-
signed focus, the volunteers became active in, amongst other things, health, 
education, road construction, hygiene, housing, electricity and agriculture. JVP 
teams sent to Palestinian refugee camps and Indian health centres were even 
less lucky and these deployments were abandoned.35 In most cases the volun-
teers, and occasionally their team leaders as well, blamed The Hague for the 
improvisation and chaos that characterised the beginning of the volunteers’ 
service. ‘Much grousing, lack of understanding’, was how a 1964 letter assessed 
the view of those in the field about ‘The Hague’.36 The confusion and lack of 
planning and preparation did not escape outsiders and continued to plague the 
organisation during this entire period. Even after SNV had been in operation for 
several years, complaints about the unclear nature of its aims continued. In 1968 
Ir. S.S. Mutal, the coordinator of the Latin American teams, wondered: ‘Princi-
ples and objectives: Does SNV have any?’37 
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Despite the setbacks, the number of volunteers, countries and projects in 
which the JVP was active grew rapidly in the course of the 1960s. Given the 
haste with which the first teams were sent off, Ton Nijzink argued that: ‘In 
hindsight it is astonishing that no greater blunders were made.’38 
Troubled relations 
The JVP’s foundation caused consternation among private organisations and the 
JVC. It was regarded as an outright coup by the state, especially as private 
organisations in The Netherlands had a rich tradition in the field of voluntary 
services, while the government had no experience of it whatsoever. The matter 
was aggravated by the fact that in the press conference announcing the JVP’s 
foundation, Luns had only referred to the new American Peace Corps as a 
source of inspiration and had not even mentioned the private Dutch organisa-
tions and their historical role in development.39 
KAJ’s reactions were sharp; their activities had been negated, state interven-
tion would only be associated with (neo-)colonialism and the state volunteers 
were a waste of money. KAJ was sending out its volunteers on a much lower 
total budget.40 Such opinions were widely shared and nearly all those working 
overseas regarded the foundation of the JVP with scepticism and reserve. Father 
Janssen wrote from Chad that he suspected half of the Dfl. 800,000 budgeted 
for JVP ‘would be used for setting up a screening organisation: Expensive 
psychologists and expensive gadgets’, after which he expressed his need for a 
jeep.41  
JVC organisers were, unsurprisingly, also not amused. They saw their at-
tempts to organise a voluntary service on a nationwide scale thwarted and 
feared a state monopoly. While officials at Foreign Affairs had been informed 
about JVC plans, there had been no attempt at cooperation and no one had 
bothered to inform the JVC about the state initiative. Rev. Steenbeek held that 
the entire matter had been ‘in conflict with good custom’. According to him, the 
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JVC had even been asked to stop its activities before the JVP’s foundation was 
announced. The JVP had subsequently incorporated all ‘good staff’ and the JVC 
was left ‘just lurching behind’.42  
In government circles, on the other hand, there were serious doubts about the 
capabilities of the private organisations to ensure Dutch interests were being 
adequately defended by JVC volunteers: 
As is known to you, by now private organisations, especially from the circles of the 
umbrella group of youth organisations, are taking an interest in starting to send 
volunteers abroad. For this reason, on 13 November 1962 a ‘Foundation Youth 
Volunteers’ Corps’ was born. It is, as yet, not very clear what activities this founda-
tion envisages undertaking, yet they do, all the same, expect facilities and financial 
support from the Government. It has furthermore become clear, from contact with 
this group, that the problems and risks related to the dispatching of youngsters are 
being underestimated. The Government, of course, carries responsibility for the re-
presentation of The Netherlands abroad.43  
Rev. Steenbeek was characterised by ‘third people’ as a ‘naïve, talkative 
man who kindles enthusiasm for his plans, but who suffers from a realisation 
deficiency,’ and as somebody who ‘does not keep his appointments’. In addi-
tion, he was classified as one ‘who does not know what he is talking about. He 
thinks in terms of youth hostel work.’44 
The conflict between private and state activities in the Dutch voluntary 
sector was never completely mended and attempts to come to an understanding 
failed initially despite public statements as to their willingness to cooperate. In 
the course of 1962-1965, several meetings were held but the private organisa-
tions continued to be disgruntled about state attempts to control matters. One of 
the JVC representatives flatly held that: ‘We can hardly speak of cooperation. 
As private organisations we have the feeling that something has been created by 
the government, and we are merely allowed to say something once in a while.’45 
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Despite the overtures made by first JVP head (chef), F.A.M. Alting von Geusau, 
in practice nothing came of it and by the end of 1963 the two groups were in 
open conflict once again.46  
The JVC went into a deep crisis and, at a certain stage, the JVP management 
proposed directly cooperating with the private organisations as many of them 
had in any case disassociated themselves from the JVC.47 The private organisa-
tions recognised that they could not but take the existence of the JVP into 
account. During a press conference, JVC representatives angrily stated that 
‘voluntary service is now a sort of fashion. People think that the first volunteers 
were Peace Corps volunteers. But Catholic and Protestant missionaries started 
much earlier with this form of assistance.’ It was added, however, that the needs 
were too urgent to allow for problems to stand in the way and Rev. Steenbeek 
openly acknowledged that the JVC was willing to cooperate with the state: ‘The 
state is always stronger and disposes of more money’.48 Both parties were am-
bivalent: the state JVP could make good use of the experience within the private 
organisations but continued to aim at a state monopoly in the voluntary sector, 
while the private organisations were keen to receive state subsidies but feared 
losing their independence. 
In 1964 the JVC overcame its internal crisis and negotiations between the 
JVC and the JVP started again. Yet, in this new context too, relations were 
marked by tensions and argument: The government representatives held that 
there was hardly any point in cooperating with ‘an organisation that had as yet 
no clear character’, to which JVC representatives wryly responded that the 
character of the ‘new JVC’ partly depended on the present negotiations.49 Head 
of DIO Jan Meijer compared the JVC proposals with ‘drawings, that one 
continuously sees being made in institutes for the mentally disturbed, by pa-
tients who as such are not aggressive, but for whom hope of reintegration into 
society no longer exists’.50 The problems notwithstanding, both parties realised 
that it was imperative to come to an agreement. 
                                                 
lijk van samenwerking spreken. Als particuliere organisaties hebben wij het gevoel 
dat door de overheid iets gecreëerd is, waarbij wij af en toe iets mogen zeggen.’) 
46  Nijzink, Dag vrijwilliger!, p. 11; F.A.M. Alting von Geusau, ‘Tien jaar geleden: Een 
tumultueus begin’, Vice Versa 5, 22 (1973), pp. 3-4. 
47  Foreign Affairs, file 8, memo, Alting von Geusau to chef DIO, ‘Begrotingsbehan-
deling punt 53d’, 6 November 1963. 
48  Ibid. file 8, meeting minutes, ‘Verslag van de persbespreking gehouden op 31 
oktober 1963, 16.30 uur in de Nieuwspoort te Den Haag’, p. 2. 
49  Ibid. file 9, meeting minutes, ‘Kort verslag van de 3e bespreking over de samen-
werking tussen Overheid en JVC op 16 Maart 1964 op het Bureau voor Interna-
tionale Technische Hulp’, p. 3. 
50  Ibid. file 492, memo, J. Meijer DIO to State Secretary Diepenhorst: ‘Besprekingen 
omtrent samenwerking met JVC’, 5 March 1964, p. 3 (‘tekeningen, die men in in-
 SNV’S START   59 
 
 
SNV’s foundation in 1965 
Negotiations in 1964 resulted in a draft cooperation agreement that was signed 
by JVC and JVP representatives, and in July 1965 a new foundation, the 
Stichting Nederlandse Vrijwilligers (Dutch Volunteers Foundation), SNV was 
formed. Considerable pressure was exerted on the JVC to accept the construc-
tion but there were reasons to unite for both parties. The only Dutch links in 
many countries were historical ties established by the private organisations and 
as the state had no connections in these areas, the Ministry was forced to rely on 
these contacts. The private organisations in the Dutch political landscape were 
too powerful a force to be discarded. In addition, it was felt that rivalry between 
state and private voluntary services in The Netherlands would not be good for 
the country’s image abroad. JVC had not had an easy start and the hope was that 
the organisation would have greater access to finance and facilities through 
cooperation with the state. The JVC built on a longstanding tradition of mis-
sionary work in the social sphere and its aim was to function as an umbrella or-
ganisation for private NGOs in the Dutch development sector. Yet in terms of 
finance and administration, it functioned independently of the missionary or-
ganisations and NGOs, and so came to depend on the state for financial support. 
The hope for state subsidy was all too clear for the officials at Foreign Affairs: 
‘They are mainly interested as to how in legal (or nearly legal) ways money can 
flow from the state’s treasury to their organisation.’51 The ties during this period 
between the Dutch state and private organisations became closer and in 1965 
the Co-Financing Programme (MFP) was started whereby the state supported a 
limited number of private organisations (MFOs), such as NOVIB and ICCO, by 
providing them with a fixed subsidy.  
JVP and JVC continued to recruit volunteers through their own channels. 
However, in areas such as social security and financial compensation, JVC 
volunteers did not have the same status as those recruited through the state 
channels, which led private organisations to fear they would be less appealing to 
prospective volunteers. The JVC wished to maintain its independent position 
though, at least to a certain extent. Relations between the JVC and the state part 
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of SNV continued to be characterised by mutual distrust, uncertainty over the 
division of responsibilities and, especially among private organisations, fears of 
losing control over their organisation. Basically, the JVC organisations had 
never wanted to accept government interference in project selection and volun-
teer recruitment. The requirement to have the volunteers’ preparatory course at 
the former Colonial Museum, by then already re-named KIT (Royal Tropical 
Institute), was much resented; with one of the delegates declaring openly that a 
preparatory course ought not to be organised in ‘this fortress of ex-colonials’. It 
was felt that the SNV structure left too little room for the JVC to organise its 
own projects, its own preparatory course and its own recruitment procedure. 
The SNV continued to be seen as a government institute, dominated by state 
officials and administrative regulations. Relations between JVC representatives 
on the Board and the officials forming the executive staff were never smooth.52 
The Ministry’s aim was clear: The new foundation was to have no policy – or 
decision-making powers and the role of the Board could only be an advisory 
one. The Minister and his officials would remain in control but this led to 
tensions between the Ministry and the SNV Board in general.53  
The SNV became a foundation governed by a board that would propose 
internally approved projects to the Minister. Its activities were carried out by a 
group of civil servants within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (at first called JVP 
staff, later AJV and as of 1976 ANV). At first this ‘Hague staff’ (Haagse staf) 
resorted under the head of DIO but as of 1966 it formed a separate group of 
officials within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The head of this executive staff 
was at the same time secretary/treasurer of the foundation’s board. The organ-
isational board came to exist of representatives from both JVC and JVP, and 
later a number of ex-volunteers were also included on it. The final say over the 
selection of projects and the recruitment of volunteers/staff rested with the 
Minister of Development Cooperation, who formally determined the allocation 
of funds and the appointment of the institute that would organise the prepara-
tory course. Field staff members were all put on the Ministry’s payroll.54  
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This construct, called a ‘monstrosity’ (monstrum)55 by a later analyst, gave 
extensive powers to the head of the JVP staff who was torn between many dif-
ferent interests so that his room for manoeuvre was in practice quite limited. He 
had to take into account the wishes of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and those 
of the Minister of Development Affairs, the Hague staff attached to the Minis-
try, the SNV Board with its various representatives, field staff and volunteers, 
and Dutch public opinion. On top of this, frequent staff changes plagued the 
organisation at the start. Given the problems that JVP and SNV faced, it should 
come as no surprise that ex-volunteers in hindsight characterised this initial 
phase as ‘the period of ill-considered experiments and numerous chefs (direc-
tors)’.56 By 1966, the organisation already had its fifth director. These setbacks 
did, however, not prevent the organisation taking off. In the following ten years, 
1,417 volunteers were dispatched to, in total, eighteen countries in over eighty 
projects. In 1966 the number of volunteers sent overseas doubled and by 1971 
there were over 500 volunteers in the field. These numbers show the dramatic 
growth in the organisation that would only slow down after 1974. As SNV had 
an ever higher budget at its disposal, there were opportunities to start new 
projects, take on more people and organise publicity campaigns. SNV’s name 
spread rapidly, thanks to the new mass medium of television.57 SNV’s founda-
tion in 1965 did not change much for those already in the field: The JVP and 
JVC volunteers continued their work as before but now under the new flag of 
SNV.58 
Changes in Dutch development policy 
Some major changes in policy regarding Dutch development aid had occurred 
in the meantime. Before 1965, The Netherlands had considered itself too small 
to engage in bilateral aid and it had focused on multilateral aid. Under 
increasing pressure from the business lobby, bilateral aid rose sharply as of 
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1965 at the cost of multilateral aid. This change can be seen as a major caesura 
in the history of Dutch development policy.59  
1965 was also the year when the position of the State Secretary was changed 
into a ministerial post without portfolio. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs housed 
both the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the ‘Minister without Portfolio, in 
Charge of Aid to Developing Countries’. Van Beurden and Gewald described 
the precarious position of the new minister: ‘The new minister remained with-
out a department and without a budget, he lacked the authority to appoint civil 
servants and was wholly dependent upon the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.’60 In 
addition, the first minister was the KVPer Th. H. Bot, a former colonial official 
who had been severely criticized on a number of issues in the Cabinet before. 
His appointment was a political stop-gap measure and openly opposed by the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs Joseph Luns. One of the MPs commented that it 
was the strangest appointment since Caligula had turned his horse into a con-
sul.61  
The new minister had a group of civil servants – DGIS (Directoraat Generaal 
Internationale Samenwerking, Directorate-General for Development Coopera-
tion) – to support him in carrying out his tasks and an advisory body led by Jan 
Tinbergen (NAR: Nationale Raad van Advies inzake de Hulpverlening aan 
Minder Ontwikkelde Landen, National Advisory Board concerning Assistance 
to Less-Developed Countries).  
The creation of this new ministerial post can be seen as indicative of the 
growing interest in development aid. A further indication of this was the budget 
for development aid that, in the course of the 1960s, rose from Dfl. 137.5 m in 
1963 to Dfl. 281.2 m in 1966 to Dfl. 738.2 m in 1970, an increase from 0.31% 
to 0.61% of Dutch GNP. Although SNV’s budget rose sharply in absolute 
amounts, in terms of percentage of the overall Dutch development budget it 
sunk from 4.8% in 1965 to 3.9% in 1970 and in subsequent years did not even 
reach 1%.62 Decision-making concerning the budget for development affairs 
took place in the Ministry of Economic Affairs, with the new Minister having 
no say in this matter. Giving more importance to development affairs (as 
demonstrated by the higher budget) and growing political interest were trends 
not only in the Dutch context but internationally too. 
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Theo Bot attempted to formulate a development policy but as the cabinet fell 
in 1967, he did not have much opportunity to convert his plans into practice.63 
After the 1967 elections, the economist B.J. Udink learnt on the radio that he 
was to become the next ‘minister without portfolio in charge of aid to develop-
ing countries’. Under his charge, the Dutch economic lobby came to have a 
greater say in development affairs. Udink basically regarded development coop-
eration as a means for job creation and income generation for The Netherlands. 
It came as no surprise that he stated, without the slightest sense of remorse, that 
100% of the development aid for Indonesia and for ‘countries like India, Paki-
stan, Kenya, Colombia, Peru, Tunisia’ was in fact spent in The Netherlands.64 
He successfully lobbied for an increase in the budget for development aid, while 
also trying to focus using the aid in a limited amount of countries, which led to 
much discussion within the various ministries.65  
Before the cabinet fell, Theo Bot had asked Professor Janssen at the Univer-
sity of Tilburg to create a task force to evaluate Dutch development aid. The 
‘Report Janssen’, as it came to be called, created considerable political contro-
versy. The task force was very critical in its conclusions, especially concerning 
SNV’s volunteer programme. Reactions to the report naturally varied. The SNV 
directorate denied the conclusions, stating these were ‘superseded’ and did not 
correspond to reality. The fact that requests for volunteers continued to be made 
showed a clear need for the programme. The JVC Board demanded to be al-
lowed to see the report and pressed for disclosure of the findings to the general 
public. Minister Udink attempted to keep quiet about the report, while the oppo-
sition tried to use it to denounce the minister and the government in general. 
This first serious attempt to evaluate Dutch development aid not only led to 
debate but also to some amendments to improve matters and ensure a more 
efficient approach.66 
Udink was succeeded by the ARP jurist C. Boertien, who was in office until 
1973. By then the title of the ‘minister without portfolio’ had been changed to 
                                                 
63  Nekkers & Malcontent, ‘Inleiding’. In: Nekkers & Malcontent, eds, De geschiede-
nis, p. 30. 
64  Quoted in Hoebink, Geven is nemen, p. 55, referring to interview with Ubink 
(Accent, 4 January 1969). 
65  Nekkers & Malcontent, ‘Inleiding’. In: Nekkers & Malcontent, eds, De geschiede-
nis, p. 20; website: Arens, ‘Entwicklungshilfe und Entwicklungspolitik in den Nie-
derlanden seit 1945’. 
66  Werkgroep Evaluatie Ontwikkelingshulp, ‘Rapport Evaluatie van de Nederlandse 
Ontwikkelingshulp’ (Tilburg, 1969); Foreign Affairs, file 373: telegram 28 February 
1969, Board JVC to Luns; Ibid. ‘commentaar SNV op evaluatierapport’; file 702, 
part II, June 1969, ‘Udink oneens met rapport ontw. Hulp’; Ibid. 18 June 1969, ‘Jan 
Pronk in economische statistische berichten’. 
64 CHAPTER 3 
 
‘in charge of development cooperation.’ Boertien’s policy was a mixture of 
conservatism and progressiveness. Among these more progressive tendencies 
was Boertien’s insistence on the ‘one-per-cent norm’, which had been proposed 
by the United Nations as the percentage of GNP that each donor country should 
spend on development cooperation.67 Boertien’s strategy towards the NCO 
(Nationale Commissie voor Ontwikkelingsstrategie, National Commission for 
Development Strategy) was proof of the more conservative tendencies of his 
policy. The NCO had been founded in 1970 to encourage organisations in the 
fields of research, information and awareness-building on development affairs. 
With Prince Claus as its president, the NCO had encountered several diplomatic 
incidents. In 1971 Boertien refused to give permission for a subsidy that the 
NCO had offered to the Dutch Angola Komité aimed at a boycott of Angolan 
coffee, and in 1973 he even proposed dissolving the NCO, which was only 
prevented by a change of Cabinet in the same year.68  
Dutch colonial links 
The previous chapter discussed the many political and institutional links be-
tween colonialism and development. As Uma Kothari indicates, these links may 
be best studied through the personal narratives of the people who experienced 
both colonialism and development work.69 In the case of SNV, these personal 
experiences are of particular importance as not only did the legacy of Dutch 
colonialism play an important part in the foundation of the Dutch volunteer 
service but the input of ideas and policies relating to colonial times also largely 
came from personal experience. 
By the time the JVP was founded in 1963, some of the direct links to the 
colonial era had waned. All the same, the fact that the Dutch had lost control 
over New Guinea to Indonesia in 1962 contributed directly to the foundation of 
the JVP, which was financed by money that had been reserved for the develop-
ment of New Guinea.70 On top of this, many of those working or studying in 
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New Guinea had returned to The Netherlands only to find that there were few 
prospects for continuing their international experience. Unsurprisingly, a 
considerable number of people active in the JVP had formerly worked in the 
colonies and its foundation was even partly meant to ensure these returnees 
found suitable and relevant work. The very first SNV director in 1965 was a 
former resident of New Guinea who had been engaged in development work. 
His application for the directorship was appraised with: ‘Mister Kouwenhoven 
has implemented an exceptionally interesting series of projects for the develop-
ment of the valleys in New Guinea and for the development of the population. 
He also received his PhD on the basis of that.’ Léon Mazairac, the deputy 
director, who was to become SNV’s director between 1969 and 1972, had been 
Kouwenhoven’s assistant during these projects.71 Many of the staff at the Royal 
Tropical Institute were former colonials and, for example, the preparatory 
course that the volunteers received before departure was given by an ex-colonial 
marine. Advice for the course came from the former director of the Technical 
School at the Office of Cultural Affairs of the Dutch New Guinea government. 
He felt that the volunteers had to learn a number of practical skills, for instance, 
‘working with the patjol and parang’.72 Suzan Bolland, in the first JVP team, 
explained: 
JVP actually started when New Guinea stopped. Many colonial officials and military 
ended up in the voluntary programme. Also the preparation still bore an Indonesian 
stamp. We had lessons in agriculture, health care and the like all grafted on the 
Indonesian situation. Hardly anything was known about Cameroon.73 
Among the team leaders and field staff too, many men were former colonial 
officials. These people saw no contradiction whatsoever between their former 
positions and their new role in development. The previous chapter argued that, 
instead of viewing colonialism and development as being radically opposed, 
there were in fact many institutional and structural links. Also at the personal 
level, the policies of late colonialism and development were at the time viewed 
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as a continuum rather than as being in opposition. The first field director in 
Zambia remembers:  
For me, it was a logical choice. I came from New Guinea, I was a former civil 
servant. There were others with me who were all without jobs because New Guinea 
was handed over to Indonesia. That was in 1963 when JVP was founded. JVP was 
looking for staff and now many people with four or five years experience in the 
tropics were coming back from Indonesia. Fresh people, not those of the old colonial 
stamp so to say, but people with a more modern outlook.74  
If any opposition was felt at all, it was between this colonialism of ‘the old 
stamp’ and the new ‘modern outlook’. The new generation of officials was built 
on the tradition of ethical concern but they were keen to avoid the mistakes of 
past colonial policies. When the opportunities to implement these new ideas in 
the Dutch colonies ended, they were more than willing to enrol in the new 
Dutch development programme to put their ideas into practice. Even some of 
the JVP volunteers had been in the colonies: Suzan Bolland, for example, who 
was in the first team to go to Cameroon, had previously worked as a teacher in 
New Guinea.75 These people helped bridge and connect the two epochs of 
colonialism and development. Their views on development did not radically 
alter when they joined the JVP and their ideas about development that had been 
prevalent during their time in New Guinea continued in their new positions.  
JVP did not start projects in any of the (former) Dutch colonies as none of 
the governments of these countries had filed a request for Dutch volunteers.76 
However colonial practice was also used as a source of information and a pool 
of knowledge for current projects. Thus before setting off for Cameroon, field 
staff sought advice from an agricultural engineer who had worked in Indonesia 
and New Guinea,77 and pyrethrum in Kenya was related to sugar production in 
Java.78 In the first half of the 1960s these colonial connections were still men-
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tioned without inhibition, but after the Dutch left New Guinea, the tide quickly 
turned and the country’s colonial legacy in development was no longer ac-
knowledged in public opinion or in broader political circles.79 
Other colonial contexts 
Apart from the colonial legacy that pervaded development organisations such as 
JVP and later SNV, the developing countries themselves were nearly all former 
colonies that had inherited a colonial state apparatus. Public administration, 
government structures and strategies in the field of development were in most 
cases directly related to the colonial past. Especially in Africa, many of the 
countries to which volunteers were sent had only recently become independent 
and nothing much had changed in government structures and policies. As a state 
organisation, JVP (and later SNV) cooperated directly with government offi-
cials and ministries. Some of those advising the new organisation were aware of 
these complexities and Prof. de Vries, for example, thus suggested that attention 
be paid to the ‘complicated colonial administration of Cameroon’ before a team 
was dispatched.80 In some cases, the volunteers stepped straight into jobs for-
merly carried out by colonial officials as no local expertise was as yet avail-
able.81 
The colonial legacy not only continued in government structures as a white 
minority of settlers stayed on in the former colonies. Some volunteers estab-
lished personal links within these ex-colonial circles, especially in former 
colonies with relatively large numbers of European settlers. But even in coun-
tries like Cameroon, some of the volunteers built up contacts within former 
colonial circles. As Rob de Coole explained: ‘A small number of volunteers felt 
attracted to the colonial sphere. They liked going to the club on a regular basis 
and drank themselves into a stupor.’82  
While this was only true for a minority of the volunteers, contact with other 
white people was deemed important in the volunteers’ social lives. The presence 
of Peace Corps volunteers, missionaries and white settlers was seen as reassur-
ing for the young volunteers in faraway places. For the youngsters themselves, 
this argument may not have been all that important but as the possibilities for 
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recreational activities were limited, any opportunity to go swimming, play 
tennis, go fishing or horse-riding was more than welcome. Such opportunities 
were more likely to occur in white circles than in African milieus. For the fami-
lies of the field staff, interaction with other white people was seen as a way of 
alleviating boredom.83  
Over the years, the Dutch public had received information about (former) 
Dutch colonies: foreign words and foodstuffs had entered the Dutch culture and 
news about the political and social situation in (former) colonial areas was pro-
vided through government and missionary channels. Information about other 
areas, however, was negligible in The Netherlands and in those days it was re-
garded as a major step to go to such faraway places. As Theo Huber put it: ‘It 
was still terra incognito after all. The Netherlands had always focused on its 
former colonies – New Guinea and Indonesia. But Africa? Cameroon? That was 
somewhere over there!’84 Travelling abroad was exceptional in the 1960s and 
only a few people had experience of the tropics. Apart from state officials and 
some business people, only missionaries had gone that far. 
Relations with the churches 
In the initial phase of SNV’s history, contacts with missionaries were often 
strong. JVC board members were usually closely associated with missionary 
tradition and many of the JVC project proposals were developed with mission-
aries from Roman Catholic as well as Protestant denominations. A number of 
the volunteers recruited through the private organisations of JVC were sent to 
work directly on church projects. Yet for the other volunteers too, church ties 
were often important even if they had not been recruited through the JVC. This 
was still the age of compartmentalisation or ‘pillarisation’ in The Netherlands: 
political parties, education, the media and social life were all divided along 
denominational and/or political lines. One field staff member remembered how 
worried parents had called him to ask whether their child would be able to go to 
a proper church during his stay abroad.85 In one of the introductory courses, 
some Catholic youngsters had been to a Protestant wedding ceremony: ‘They 
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were simply astonished to recognise each other as Christians.’86 In the teams, 
people from various backgrounds met and, for many, this was a unique experi-
ence in itself. 
Volunteers could be posted through the government or other development 
organisations but in many cases they were involved in projects organised by 
missions. This was a logical choice: ‘What we realised immediately was that the 
mission: Those fathers had been there for a hundred years.’87 In many cases the 
missionaries were the only Dutch people familiar with the context in the coun-
tries where the JVP, and later SNV, started activities. As matters were difficult 
to organise from The Netherlands, the missionaries’ support was much appreci-
ated, while the missionaries in turn hoped to benefit from the volunteers’ work. 
The state officials working in JVP realised that they could not do without the 
information, advice and logistical support of the missions. Especially during the 
first years of JVP/SNV activities, the selection of projects was often closely 
linked with Catholic and Protestant missionary networks in The Netherlands.88 
In eastern Cameroon, for example, SNV volunteers worked on projects 
designed by the Roman Catholic diocese, although after independence, relations 
between the state and the Church in Cameroon changed considerably. The state 
regarded it as its task to expand its services in the field of education, transport 
and health at the cost of the missionary activities there. The churches wanted to 
maintain their position and came to see the state as a rival. Dutch Spiritan 
fathers in Bertoua were no exception: they hoped to continue their traditional 
role and, with the help of SNV volunteers, to reduce their workload.89 The 
teams of young male and female volunteers were housed in missionary build-
ings, where they also joined the fathers for meals. The team leader’s house and 
the SNV office were right next to the bishop’s house. However cooperation was 
not easy and problems started soon after the first team arrived in 1968, as some 
of the volunteers had difficulties adapting to missionary morality.90  
Often the volunteers received support from the missions in terms of logistics, 
practical tips and cultural information. At a later stage, this at times took on a 
more institutionalised form: Johan Wachters, who had lived in Mali and Ivory 
Coast since 1965, was asked in 1968 to provide incoming volunteers with 
                                                 
86  G.A. Kirchner, ‘Visum vragen aan de opleidingsstaf’, Visum 4 (January 1964), p. 5 
(‘Men was eenvoudig verbaasd elkaar als christen te herkennen’); also: Foreign Af-
fairs, file 21, meeting minutes, SNV Board, 9 March 1967, pp. 8-12. 
87  Interview 10. (‘Wat we ons gelijk gerealiseerd hebben, is de missie: die paters zaten 
daar al honderd jaar.’)  
88  Foreign Affairs, file 1, meeting minutes, ‘Evaluatievergadering’, 16 August 1963,  
p. 3.  
89  Ibid. file 1784, letter, Van Heygen to SNV, 21 June 1966. 
90  Interview 83. 
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information about West African culture.91 In this era, the ‘spiritual care’ of the 
volunteers was a theme that was frequently brought up by JVC representatives 
during discussions in The Hague. Sometimes Protestant ministers or Catholic 
fathers visited the teams to assess their religious needs and ensure the volun-
teers’ faith was not lapsing.92  
Bricks, mortar and transferring knowledge 
The 1960s and early 1970s can be described as the SNV’s bricks-and-mortar 
stage. Development work largely consisted of practical aid: SNV volunteers 
were active in building, farming, and carrying out medical tasks. This roll-up-
your-sleeves approach was prompted by the realisation that advice alone did not 
suffice. Reflecting on the earlier Dutch expert programme, many felt it was now 
time for action: 
When technical assistance started after World War II, this first took the form of 
sending advisors and of allowing young people to go to follow courses in the devel-
oped countries (…) After some years the opinion started to gain ground that it is not 
sufficient to give advice about how to solve a problem or to fill a lacuna (…) Then 
people were sent out who subsequently converted the given advice into practice for 
the concerned government.93 
Community Development was one of the spearheads of voluntary service. 
This largely entailed informing (male) farmers, either individuals or those 
organised in cooperatives, about ‘modern’ agriculture (for the male volunteers) 
and village women about nutrition and hygiene (for the female volunteers). 
Other volunteers were working as teachers, nurses and builders. In all cases, the 
‘transfer of knowledge’ was a key concept: the knowledge that a volunteer had 
needed to be passed on to local people, so as to ensure continuity after the team 
had left. This transfer of knowledge implied that volunteers were not only to 
carry out practical tasks but were also required to teach the people around them 
how to carry out the tasks themselves. To do this successfully, the teams were 
                                                 
91  Interview 43. 
92  Foreign Affairs, file 9, memo, chef JVP to R through DGIS: ‘Gesprek met Ds P.L. 
Schram’, 13 July 1964.  
93  Van der Velden & Zweers, ‘Personele samenwerking’. In: Lieten & van der Velden, 
eds, Grenzen aan de hulp, p. 266, note 6, referring to Redactie Internationale 
Samenwerking 1972, p. 191 (‘Toen na de Tweede Wereldoorlog de techische hulp 
op gang kwam was dat in de eerste plaats in de vorm van het zenden van adviseurs 
en het laten overkomen van jonge mensen voor het volgen van cursussen in de 
ontwikkelde landen (...) Na enkele jaren begon de opvatting veld te winnen dat het 
niet voldoende is adviezen uit te brengen over hoe een probleem moet worden aan-
gepakt of een lacune opgevuold (...) Men begon mensen (te sturen) die vervolgens 
voor de betrokkken regering de uitgebrachte raad in praktijk brachten.’) 
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to work with local counterparts, to whom they would pass on their knowledge. 
The field staff mainly had an advisory role, while the volunteers were closer to 
the ‘people’ and were engaged in more practical work.94 To ensure a lasting 
impact, ‘good (?) and diligent farmers’ (goede (?) en werkwillige boeren’) were 
identified who could set an example for the rest of the community.95  
Board discussions in this initial period mainly concerned practical matters: 
Projects had to be identified and evaluated, prospective volunteers and staff had 
to be addressed and recruited, contacts with the countries had to be established, 
transport and housing organised, communication between the field and The 
Hague improved, and publicity campaigns launched. There was not much time 
to discuss the ideological background to the activities or the organisation’s 
management framework.  Some organisational structures came into existence 
without any prior planning. For example, in Zambia the function of field leader 
(coordinating the various teams at country level) grew ‘historically’ and was 
adopted later in other SNV countries. There was some discussion about dis-
patching volunteers in teams but for the time being this system was continued.96 
In general, there was little reflection on the concepts, objectives and principles 
underlying the organisation. Given the Dutch context of ‘pillarisation’, there 
was some debate about the volunteers’ religious backgrounds and whether or 
not they should be divided up according to religious denomination.97 It was not 
until 1967 that notions like ‘volunteer’, ‘transfer of knowledge’ and other issues 
were discussed. Some held that the concept of ‘volunteer’ was too closely asso-
ciated not only with a ‘mud-hut’ idealist but also with ‘war volunteers’ who had 
fought during World War II against the Japanese in Indonesia.98 The idea of 
‘transfer of knowledge’ was also criticised: Some felt that the ‘possible influ-
encing of behavioural patterns’ and ‘improving relations between nations’ more 
adequately described voluntary work or, as suggested in another document, 
‘knowledge confrontation’.99 
                                                 
94  Foreign Affairs, file 21, meeting minutes, SNV Board, 18 May 1967, p. 11. 
95  Ibid. file 1827, report, G.J. Van Rinsum: ‘Verslag betreffende het JVP team in Ka-
meroen. Periode 1/1-23/4 1965’, 25 April 1965, p. 4. 
96  Ibid. file 21, report, ‘Nota terzake van de vrijwillige hulpverlening’, s.d. (1967),  
p. 4; Ibid. file 22, minutes meeting, SNV Board, 29 November 1967, p. 10. 
97  Ibid. file 21, meeting minutes, SNV Board, 24 February 1967, pp. 6-10; Ibid. file 21, 
meeting minutes, SNV Board, 9 March 1967, pp. 8-13. 
98  Ibid. file 21, meeting minutes, SNV Board, 18 May 1967, p. 10-13; Ibid. file 21, 
report, ‘Nota terzake van de vrijwillige hulpverlening’, s.d. (1967), p. 1. 
99  Ibid. file 22, minutes meeting, SNV Board, 29 November 1967, pp. 1-6. (p. 2: ‘een 
mogelijke beïnvloeding van een gedragspatroon door de aanwezigheid van de vrij-
williger’ (...) ‘uitgangspunt voor in ieder geval deze vorm van hulpverlening moet 
zijn de goede verstandhouding tussen de volkeren te bevorderen en hopenlijk (sic) te 
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From the start, there was concern about equality in development relations: 
the request for volunteers had to be identified by the developing country, the 
government of that country had to define the volunteers’ tasks, the volunteers 
were embedded in local authority structures, they had to cooperate closely with 
their counterpart and ensure that their technical know-how was passed on to 
them, and they had to respect the local people. From the start, these ideals also 
led to dilemmas. At an SNV board meeting in 1965, it was held that it would be 
difficult to demand a government stick to an agreements made with SNV, as 
this might be seen to ‘infringe on its recently acquired sovereignty’.100 
SNV ideals also conflicted with assumptions about development that were 
still closely related to evolutionism: Backward countries needed to be shown 
how developed nations had got to where they were standing now and follow the 
same path. The young volunteers were going to build, plant and explain new 
technologies with diligence and zeal. ‘Do good and don’t look back’ (doe wel 
en zie niet om). This motto, an old Dutch expression, was being interpreted 
literally. Volunteers were expected to bring about major changes in the villages 
and although the local people would, of course, at first resist their attempts, 
soon even the elderly would see the benefits of the new techniques offered by 
the volunteers. It was a matter of know-how and show-how, as an SNV public-
ity film of 1969 put it.101  
Setting out 
All were keen to start. The first Brazilian team on the boat to Recife could 
hardly wait to arrive and start working, and the Cameroon teams too were full 
of enthusiasm: ‘The entire period for the volunteers was fantastic, it was all so 
exciting! We thought that we were working on something really great for the 
future. We had such high spirits, we worked so hard.’102 
The preparation before going abroad was not exactly tailored to development 
work. The Royal Tropical Institute provided a three-month course and the 
volunteers stayed in the nearby youth hostel and mainly received language 
                                                 
bereiken’); Ibid. file 11, report by L.P.J. Mazairac, The Hague, November 1968,  
p. 9. 
100  Ibid. file 13, minutes meeting, SNV Board, 28 September 1965, pp. 8-9 (‘een aan-
tasting van de zojuist verworven souvereiniteit’).  
101  Film: ‘Ontwikkelingssamenwerking: raakpunt van twee werelden’ (1969) in DVD 
series: ‘Een geschiedenis in beeld’. 
102  Mieke van der Heijden, ‘Zeer geachte stafleden’, Visum (January 1964), p. 8; Inter-
view 228. (‘De hele tijd als vrijwilliger was fantastisch, zo spannend was het! We 
dachten dat we aan iets ontzettend groots werkten voor de toekomst. We hadden 
zo’n goede spirit, we werkten zo hard.’) 
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training in English or French. The rest of the course, partly separate for boys 
and girls,103 consisted of ‘a little bit of everything. They (the course organisers) 
were themselves not very sure as to what to do.’ What was most important was 
that the team grew into a close unit during this introductory phase.104 In later 
years, the recruits also received some practical training: How to make fire and 
cook in the open air, lessons in driving a 4x4, how to cross a river by making a 
rope bridge and other skills thought to be indispensable to life in the tropics. 
The scouting-type activities had the upper hand, with only limited attention 
being given to the culture and history of the country to which the volunteers 
were going. The limited preparation was not regarded as a problem: The people 
in the Third World had to change anyway, so there was little need to study the 
context in which they lived. Given the improvised nature of the programme, it 
was difficult to prepare oneself for the task: Ellen van de Craats had learnt some 
Senufo, the language spoken in the area of Ivory Coast where she was to go, but 
as the project was discontinued, she was sent instead to Cameroon, a country 
about which she had learnt nothing during her introductory course.105  
The volunteers would naturally need cultural empathy to be able to cope 
with the problems they would inevitably encounter, but especially the first 
teams were dispatched in great haste, being considered more of a political 
publicity stunt than anything else.106 
Lacking knowledge about their destination, many volunteers had little idea 
of knew what to expect. Wil van Steenbergen arrived in the heat of Cameroon 
in winter stockings,107 and the Dutch army had provided the Bambui team with 
ample food parcels without knowing that there was a supermarket in nearby 
Bamenda.108 For some of the volunteers, the idea of travelling and living in a 
foreign country was the most appealing factor and the main reason for joining 
SNV. For most, the goal of ‘helping poor African people’, as it was put in those 
days, was a decisive factor in becoming a volunteer.109 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
103  ‘De opleiding van de vrijwilligers voor Ivoorkust’, Visum (January/February 1965), 
p. 13. 
104  Interview 10, (‘… een beetje van alles wat. Eigenlijk hadden ze zelf nog niet echt 
een idee wat ze moesten.’) 
105  Interview 289. 
106  Interview 10. 
107  Film: ‘Nuchter avontuur’ (1968) in DVD series: ‘Een geschiedenis in beeld’. 
108  Interview 10. 
109  Interview 7. 
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Photo 3.3 JVP float at the annual celebration of independence,  
Korhogo, Ivory Coast, 1965. 
Source:  SNV photo archives, Blue, Ivoorkust, SNVers. 
Photographer:  Unknown. 
 
Light in the darkness 
This was the age of African independence: many countries had recently been 
decolonised and there was great optimism about the possibilities of develop-
ment in these new nations. The idea was that although some were at a different 
stage of development, they would soon catch up and achieve the same level of 
development as Western countries. This process would inevitably take place 
along the same lines as it had done in the West. Countries were viewed as a 
whole and development was largely seen in macro-economic terms, with GNP 
being an important indicator. It was, what Mark Duffield has called, ‘aspira-
tional development’. These young nations would just follow the course that 
developed nations had taken and all would be well.110 Armed with the new 
knowledge and skills brought by these development workers, developing coun-
tries would soon make good use of the aid meted out and acquire the same level 
of prosperity and progress as wealthier nations.111 A miracle had occurred in 
                                                 
110 Finnemore, ‘Redefining development at the World Bank’. In: Cooper & Packard, 
eds, International development and the social sciences, p. 203; Duffield, ‘Securing 
humans in a dangerous world’ (IDOGA Paper, Gent, 22 March 2005). 
111  Leendert W. van den Muyzenberg, ‘Welvaart nu!’, Visum (April 1964), pp. 8-10. 
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post-war Europe so why could such development not happen in Africa too? The 
aim was to bring underdeveloped people into the modern era. ‘The educational 
task of the volunteer is no easy one, but very rewarding: to bring light in matters 
that are still complete darkness to the other.’112 Although planning and policy 
can hardly be said to have informed the initial volunteers, there were clear 
assumptions about the nature of the task. ‘The main idea is to get the men, who 
at present do practically nothing, to work and to give the overloaded women a 
more domestic task.’113 
It was assumed that many obstacles would await the young volunteers: they 
would have to change age-old methods of farming and cooking, overcome the 
sceptical attitudes of conservative Africans, and teach responsibility and coop-
eration.114 Furthermore, the villagers, especially the women, were said to have 
concentration problems and that they could not absorb any new information and 
would ‘become restless’ after just half an hour.115 There was no question about 
the superiority of the knowledge and techniques being introduced by the devel-
opment worker. S/he was there to ‘teach’ the local people and the assumption 
that s/he knew better was taken for granted. This attitude is explained by Alex 
Fonkula, who was a domestic worker for some of the volunteers: 
We were very happy when the Dutch came; they taught us how we should live (…) I 
was a domestic worker. I lived with a Dutch man as a servant. I learned how to cook 
European dishes, like a salad for instance. Europeans were not used to African food, 
so we learned how to make European food. Otherwise they couldn’t teach us how to 
prepare food.116 
Local culture was in general seen as a hindrance to development. Although 
not explicitly stated, it was often implied that the reason for poverty largely lay 
with the poor people themselves. In SNV publicity films, it was suggested that 
‘their’ methods of milking, ploughing and preparing food were all ‘wrong’. It 
was because of ‘religion’ that children in India were so pale and thin,117 people 
                                                 
112  Film: ‘Ontwikkelingssamenwerking: raakpunt van twee werelden’ (1969) in DVD 
series: ‘Een geschiedenis in beeld’. 
113  Foreign Affairs, file 1772, report, T.W. Bieze, ‘Jongeren Vrijwilligers Programma, 
Kameroen, Chronologische weergave van relevante feiten en gebeurtenissen, bene-
vens een evaluatie,’ s.d. (1965), p. 20 (‘De hoofdgedachte is de mannen, die nu prac-
tisch niets uitvoeren, aan het werk te zetten en de overbelaste vrouwen een meer 
huishoudelijke taak te geven’). 
114  Film: ‘Ontwikkelingssamenwerking: raakpunt van twee werelden’ (1969) in DVD 
series: ‘Een geschiedenis in beeld’. 
115  Foreign Affairs, file 16, letter, Lieke Koenraadt to Elizabeth, Mamfe, 9 October 
1965.  
116  Interview 67. 
117  Film: ‘Nuchter avontuur’ (1968) in DVD series: ‘Een geschiedenis in beeld’. 
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in Africa ‘want to take care of cattle, but do not always know how’, hygiene 
was sub-standard and the people lacked discipline and a sense of responsibil-
ity.118 Yet, as the film commentator explained, the people themselves were 
hardly to blame, as they did not know any better: SNV’s struggle was also one 
against ignorance.119 These ‘simple, primitive’ people would have to adopt the 
only right way of doing things, the way of ploughing, milking and planting 
taught by the volunteers. Yet, just like the missionaries before them, there were 
complaints that, after implementing the new methods taught by the volunteers 
for some time, the local people would return to their old, bad ways: ‘The road to 
hell is paved with good intentions,’ one of the publicity films concluded. The 
volunteers thus did not only have to teach practical matters; the people also had 
to learn about ‘responsibility’ and ‘discipline’. Soon the people would have to 
‘stand on their own’, which was seen as a crucial element in development.120 
It was assumed, that eventually the people would realise that with scepticism 
alone they would not succeed and that the work of the volunteers would help 
them to ‘break out of their isolation’. The trick was to start in the village and 
once agricultural methods had been improved and roads had been built, industry 
would follow and ‘the first steps on the road to a healthy society and a decent 
existence’ would have been taken.121 
In the course of the 1960s these ideas about development, closely related to 
paternalism and charity, began to undergo major changes, yet they were part of 
the paradigm with which SNV started out. Such notions within SNV circles 
about the nature of development were not at all exceptional and in most West-
ern countries similar ideas about development were informing the development 
discourse and policy. At first sight and according to ideas guiding the process, 
development was imposed by Western nations, such as The Netherlands, on 
developing nations and followed a design and layout related to Western notions 
of stages of growth. This method of Western imposition could not be sustained 
however, and as soon as the first volunteers were dispatched, the organisation’s 
activities became a matter not of imposition but interaction, albeit in an unequal 
relationship. 
 
                                                 
118  Film: ‘Ontwikkelingssamenwerking: Raakpunt van twee werelden’ (1969) in DVD 
series: ‘Een geschiedenis in beeld’. 
119  Film: ‘Nuchter avontuur’ (1968) in DVD series: ‘Een geschiedenis in beeld’. 
120  Film: ‘Ontwikkelingssamenwerking: Raakpunt van twee werelden’ (1969) in DVD 
series: ‘Een geschiedenis in beeld’. 
121  Ibid. 
 SNV’S START   77 
 
 
Team work 
The first volunteers arrived in teams of ten to twenty young, single men and 
women. They had usually met on the introductory course at KIT and after a 
sometimes long journey to the country where they were to be posted, the group 
would have become a close-knit unit. Within the country, the groups would 
sometimes live together, as was the case among volunteers in Cameroon and 
Ivory Coast, where they lived in separate villages or compounds and formed a 
small Dutch community. In other cases, like in Brazil, they were dispersed 
across the country but still managed to stay in touch with each other. These 
were young people trying to find their place in society and the ties that grew 
were often strong. Several marriages, duly announced in the JVP magazine 
Visum, and close friendships followed from the team experience. Today it is the 
members of these initial teams who have remained in regular contact and or-
ganise reunions.  
Contact between the field staff and the volunteers was usually somewhat 
more formal. There was often an age gap of over ten years and some field staff 
were living overseas with their families. In addition, staff members were on the 
payroll of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, while the volunteers only received a 
daily allowance. And, being a field leader in the 1960s required some distance 
and formality vis-à-vis the volunteer team: ‘Contacts were difficult. In those 
days there was also a larger difference. There was a distance, there was no 
democracy.’122 Field staff and volunteers also differed in their cultural back-
grounds. While many of the field staff were people with tropical experience in 
the former Dutch colonies, quite a number of the young volunteers had never 
been abroad before. That is not to say that the relationship between staff and 
volunteers was impersonal. Meindert Witvliet remembered how everybody 
went to church with the Zambian field leader Willem Zevenbergen: ‘Even if 
you were not a church-goer, you would join them as afterwards everyone would 
go for coffee at his home.’123 At a certain stage, Zevenbergen had 97 volunteers 
‘in the field’. Whenever one of them had to visit the capital, due to illness or for 
some other reason, s/he would stay at Zevenbergen’s house: there was always a 
place to sleep and meals were shared. And when Zevenbergen insisted that this 
was becoming difficult to combine with his family life, ‘The Farm’ was built, a 
place where volunteers could stay during their time in the capital.124  
                                                 
122  Interview 11. (‘Het contact was in eerste instantie niet al te makkelijk. Het begon 
met een soort afstandelijkheid. In die tijd had je ook een groter verschil. Het was een 
afstand, er was geen democratie.’) Also: Interview 5. 
123  Interview 13. (‘Ondanks dat je niet kerkelijk was, je ging toch mee want daarna 
gingen we met zijn allen koffie drinken bij hem thuis.’) 
124  Interview 5. 
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Thrown into such group situations, many of the volunteers hardly had a 
private life of their own. With limited medical services, transport problems and 
few amenities, the volunteers and their staff were often dependent on each 
other’s assistance. The circumstances were often extremely difficult and the 
teams could count on little assistance from The Netherlands. Relations within 
the teams could be extremely good but could also turn extremely sour if per-
sonalities clashed. 
Especially at the beginning, contact with The Netherlands was limited: Mail 
was slow and irregular, and in most cases there was no other means of commu-
nication. Consequently, some volunteers took magazines, music and food stuffs 
with them from home. 
The other 
The volunteers ‘met’ people in the host countries although many of them were 
embedded in national structures, such as the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of 
Agriculture, etc. Direct interaction at this level was, however, usually non-exis-
tent or limited to sending out a request for volunteers and signing an agreement 
between the governments of The Netherlands and the respective country. At an 
intermediary level, the teams were supposed to work with local counterparts, to 
whom they were to pass on their technical skills and knowledge, and in many 
cases they cooperated with state officials from the ministries to which the teams 
were attached. These were people who had had an educational background and 
were expected to become the cadre in the newly independent countries. Often 
they were enthusiastic young officials, keen to acquire knowledge and to ex-
plore their new powers. The officials in charge were extremely conscious of the 
power relations involved and did not appreciate the, at times, blunt and open 
criticism expressed by inexperienced volunteers. Working in a sensitive politi-
cal context, SNV field staff often had to carefully negotiate relations in political 
circles. The volunteers, most of them without any prior working experience, 
were not always aware of the complex relations involved and in their enthusi-
asm and naivety were sometimes surprised by the reactions their words and 
deeds generated. In one case, two volunteers filed in an evaluation in which 
they negatively assessed the work of their counterpart, the daughter of the 
regional Minister of Community Development and Cooperatives. This made it 
very difficult for the government official in charge and, while all the lower offi-
cials were silently enjoying the fact that somebody had had the courage to 
openly criticise her, it endangered JVP’s position in the country. Field staff tried 
to make it clear that the volunteers had to follow hierarchical lines and express 
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their criticism to field staff, who would take the necessary steps to address the 
issue in official circles in Cameroon.125  
At the local level, volunteers were expected to improve the lot of the people 
in the villages. They were to give them advice and to work together in order to 
pass on their knowledge. Not formally acknowledged but still important were 
the volunteers’ contacts with local support staff, such as cooks, cleaners and 
guards. These people often became their most important source of knowledge 
about the country.  
As already mentioned, many of the initial teams formed close internal bonds 
and it was perhaps because of these that contacts with local people were classi-
fied as good but superficial.126 The wife of one of the team leaders remembered 
how they had once organised a potato festival where they prepared potatoes in 
all different possible ways: baked, cooked, mashed, etc, but that none of the 
local people they invited turned up at the festival. They all came up with an 
excuse.127  
The volunteers had to adjust to their new context, not least to win over the 
confidence of the people. Adapting to local culture was seen as a sign of good-
will on the part of the volunteers:  
We adapted by wearing guanas, the blankets that they wear. It must have been a 
funny sight, all those Europeans in blankets. Not only to us but also to them. But as 
a gesture it counted, I think.128 
Elements of Dutch culture were also introduced into local society. After 
Dutch volunteers participated in a school party ‘Ingele, ingele hopsa-sa’ re-
sounded on the Colombian streets.129 On the whole, such exchanges initially 
remained superficial and the volunteers and the people with whom they were 
working remained at a distance.  
This could be different for some of the counterparts or state officials with 
whom the volunteers and their staff cooperated. Nicoline Suh described the 
emergence of new patterns of interaction among the local elite, to which the 
volunteers came to belong:  
We had a very good social life because there were all sorts of volunteers: The Peace 
Corps, the English, the French, the missionaries and we had very close ties and that 
                                                 
125  Foreign Affairs, file 1827, report, G.J. Van Rinsum: ‘Verslag betreffende het JVP 
team in Kameroen. Periode 24/4-15/8-‘65’, 23 August 1965, pp. 6, 8-9. 
126  Interviews 10 and 11. 
127  Interview 11. 
128  Film: ‘Nuchter avontuur’ (1968) in DVD series: ‘Een geschiedenis in beeld’; ‘Vrij-
willigers in het veld’, Visum (November/December 1964), pictures following p. 6. 
129  Toos Rattink, ‘Colombia’, Visum (September/October 1964), p. 8. ‘Ingele, ingele 
hopsa-sa’ is a Dutch children’s song. 
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made life exciting. We also had great contact with the local authorities. It was one 
big family.130 
Worlds apart 
During the Cold War era, the world was not one but was divided in two power-
ful blocks, with a third group of countries as a strategic playground. There was 
the age of the First, Second and Third Worlds.  
This view can also be seen as emblematic of a wider one of distance and 
difference. In general, it was assumed that people in the Third World lived in 
another time, often called ‘traditional’ or seen as primitive. This gap, both in 
time and in space, showed in the title of a 1969 SNV film: ‘Ontwikkelings-
samenwerking: Raakpunt van twee werelden’ (Development cooperation: Inter-
face of two worlds). The SMV logo that was used in those days and symbolised 
a bridge between two worlds was also indicative of this difference. 
The distance between the local culture and the world from which the SNV 
volunteers originated was considered huge but it was assumed that the local 
cultures would soon disappear to make way for a modern society along the lines 
of that found in Western nations. When the first volunteers left, the gap between 
the Western world and the Third World was thought to have been overcome by 
only a very few people in the Third World. The assumption was that with these 
‘modern’ people, although in some instances they were accused of copying 
Western culture, one could establish contact. Thus, if a marriage took place 
between an educated person from a developing country and a volunteer, this 
was regarded by most field staff as acceptable. Although SNV as an organisa-
tion had no regulations concerning relationships with local people, and in many 
cases no objections were made, some of the field staff openly rallied against 
such forms of contact. A female volunteer in Zambia was asked to leave the 
organisation after she married a Zambian man.131 In general it was felt that 
especially if a volunteer courted ‘a girl from a simple family, irrevocably prob-
lems would start’.132  
Such cases would usually concern male volunteers and they were sometimes 
sent back to The Netherlands. The reason for repatriation would vary from fears 
                                                 
130  Interview 228. (‘We hadden een heel goed sociaal leven, want er zaten van allerlei 
vrijwilligers: Peace Corps, de Engelsen, de Fransen, de missionarissen en we hadden 
een hele goeie hechte band en dat maakte het leven bijzonder exciting. We hadden 
ook een geweldig goeie relatie met de lokale instanties. Het was één grote familie.’) 
131  SNV Zambia Jaarverslag 1970-1973, quoted in Marja Hinfelaar, ‘A History of SNV 
from a Zambian Perspective, 1965-2005’ (Unpublished manuscript, commissioned 
research report within the project framework 2006). 
132  Interview 7. 
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that a boy might be poisoned by a girl’s family to the reputation and functioning 
of the organisation being at stake: 
Two boys, or actually two young men of 21-22, spent too much time with the ‘loose 
women’ of Lusaka. They made a mess of it, those two. They were excellent profes-
sionals but their behaviour started to give me problems. If I made a remark during 
meetings with the Youth Service about the functioning of the staff or about the 
things they did, matters did not go too well, I was told immediately: ‘You’d better 
look at your own people.’ So it was limiting my chance of working in a professional 
way.133 
Interference in the volunteers’ private lives was nothing exceptional. It 
largely depended on the opinion, character and disposition of the field leader. A 
female volunteer who decided to live in a mud hut with an African family in the 
early 1970s was not very lucky in this respect. The nuns at the local hospital 
were shocked by her decision, other volunteers insisted she needed a refrigera-
tor (which she refused), and the field leader accused her of insulting the local 
notables and of not setting a good example. Despite her arguments to the con-
trary (the local doctor and the judge did not have any objections when she went 
to ask their opinion and she held that she had in fact set a fine example by 
improving her hut with local, cheap materials that were within the reach of the 
majority of the villagers), she was ordered to accept a luxury villa opposite the 
sous-préfet in a residential quarter. When she refused, she was threatened with 
dismissal. In the meantime, a Dutch medical official had come to check whether 
she was living in hygienic circumstances. Only when a Dutch friend who had 
returned to The Netherlands called head office in The Hague and explained that 
SNV’s attitude was so strange that a Dutch newspaper might jump on the story 
did the problems stop and she was left alone. A few hundred kilometres to the 
west, other volunteers were living in similar circumstances and nobody had 
raised any objections.134 
For some, the commandment to ‘love your neighbour as yourself’ and the 
fear of coming into contact with people from other cultures posed considerable 
dilemmas. One team leader remembered that a girl who belonged to a strict 
Protestant denomination was told to remove all things African from her house 
in The Netherlands, after she had had a miscarriage: ‘You must remove it all, 
                                                 
133  Interview 5. (‘Twee jongens, of eigenlijk mannen – ze waren 21 of 22 – die gingen 
teveel tekeer met de losse dames uit Lusaka. Die maakten ere en rotzooitje van , die 
twee. Uitstekende vakmensen, maar ik kreeg er last van. Want als ik opmerkingen 
maakte in de vergaderingen met de Youth Service over het doen laten van de staf 
daar en het feit dat dat toch allemaal niet goed van de grond kwam, dan kreeg ik 
onmiddellijk te horen: ‘Ja kijk jij maar eens naar je eigen mensen.’ Dus dat ging ten 
koste van mijn mogelijkheden op het vlak van professioneel werk.’) Interview 7. 
134  Interview 289. 
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burn it!’ And she did.135 This may have been an exceptional case but, on the 
whole, local religion, political institutions, economic activities and cultural 
traditions were seen as difficult to combine with modern development.  
Some experiences 
The first teams had been dispatched in great haste and policies and plans were 
then almost non-existent. These teams had to be very flexible and quickly adapt 
to new circumstances and requirements:  
I had actually been sent to be a sports teacher at schools in Cameroon although I did 
not have any qualification for that. They assumed I would be able to do it. But in 
practice, that never happened at all. Almost all the female volunteers were involved 
in giving information to local women and girls about food and health.136 
As there was hardly any knowledge about local needs and wishes, the 
volunteers often just did what they felt was right. Most volunteers left with 
great optimism about the possibilities for change, about the local circumstances 
and about their own abilities to contribute to development. However it was not 
long before some of them realised that ‘the struggle against poverty, hunger and 
ignorance’137 was not as simple as they had anticipated. In Cameroon, for exam-
ple, the chickens that were introduced by the volunteers had a disease that 
proved fatal for local breeds.138 And in the same area, the Agricultural Depart-
ment proved unable to deliver planting materials, equipment and oil for the 
machines. This led to a problematic situation for all the parties involved:  
The farmers count on us. We, together with the agricultural personnel in the villages, 
count on the Agricultural Service. This service is not able to comply with the 
requests. The persons responsible look foolish (…) In fact they are not to blame. 
After all, the JVPers were dropped into their world like a bolt from the blue.139  
                                                 
135  Interview 11. 
136  Interview 10. (‘Ik was eigenlijk uitgezonden om sportles te geven op scholen in 
Kameroen. Daar had ik helemaal geen kwalificatie voor. Ze gingen ervan uit dat ik 
dat wel zou kunnen. Maar daar is helemaal nooit iets van terecht gekomen. Alle 
vrouwen hebben bijna allemaal voorlichting gegeven aan vrouwen en meisjes op 
allerlei terreinen die met gezondheid en voeding te maken hadden.’) 
137  Film: ‘Nuchter avontuur’ (1968) in DVD series: ‘Een geschiedenis in beeld. 
138  Foreign Affairs, file 1827, report, G.J. Van Rinsum: ‘Verslag betreffende het JVP 
team in Kameroen. Periode 1/1-23/4 1965’, 25 April 1965, p. 3. 
139  Ibid. file 1827, report, G.J. Van Rinsum: ‘Derde verslag van G.J. Van Rinsum (as-
sistant Projectleider), Periode: tweede kwartaal 1964, ‘ 12 July 1964, pp. 2-3. (‘De 
boeren rekenen op ons. Wij, met het landbouwpersoneel in de dorpen, rekenen op de 
Dienst van Landbouw. Deze dienst is niet bij machte om aan de verzoeken te vol-
doen. De verantwoordelijke personen staan als het ware in hun hemd (...) In feite 
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Although JVP and later SNV tried to organise the housing facilities, trans-
port and equipment necessary for carrying out projects, this often proved far 
more difficult than anticipated. In 1966, Ritse Keestra, who was to train young 
farmers in how to set up an agricultural cooperation in Zambia, travelled from 
Lusaka to Solwezi on a tractor that the Zambian government had donated to the 
project. Completely at the whim of the driver, this trip had taken the young 
volunteer eleven days to complete.140  
For the field staff, a number of whom had brought their families, life was not 
always easy either. The wives of field staff (who in the initial phase they were 
nearly all men), who had not been assigned a formal task, were in danger of 
getting bored and were likely to be dissatisfied with housing conditions and 
facilities. An excerpt from a poem for a field staff member written for the Dutch 
Sinterklaas festival referred to the appalling housing conditions, the impact this 
had had on family life and the promises of improvement made by head office in 
The Hague: 
Want ‘t is een schande, zo ze je zitten laten  
In een huis met minder vloer dan gaten! 
Je kinderen kunnen er niet spelen. 
Je vrouw loopt zich te vervelen. 
Plezier in haar werk heeft ze niet 
Daaglijks groter wordt haar verdriet. 
Maar binnenkort is ’t uit met ‘t “gedonder” 
Ook al lijkt het je nu nog een wonder. Sint. 
(In English: It is a shame they are letting you stay / In a house with less floor than 
holes! / Your children cannot play in it / Your wife is bored stiff / She has no plea-
sure in her work / Every day her sadness increases / But soon your troubles will be 
over / Even though that may seem a miracle to you now. Santa Claus)141 
On 23 May 1964, the team leader in west Cameroon wrote that ‘the leading 
principle of JVP projects, namely “transfer of knowledge at middle level” as 
such is not realistic. It involves so much more!’142 
                                                 
treft hun geen schuld. Per slot van rekening zijn de J.V.P-ers als een donderslag bij 
heldere hemel in hun wereldje neergeploft.’) 
140  Film: ‘Nuchter avontuur’ (1968) in DVD series: ‘Een geschiedenis in beeld’. 
141  Foreign Affairs, file 1827, report, G.J. Van Rinsum: ‘Eerste verslag van G.J. Van 
Rinsum (assistant project coordinator). Periode 24 Oktober 1963 tot 31 december 
1963’, 20 January 1964, included after p. 12. 
142  Ibid., file 1827, letter, L.F. Kortenhorst to W.J.H. Kouwenhoven, Bambui, 23 May 
1964, p. 2 (‘Waarmee ik ook wil zeggen dat het uitgangspunt van J.V.P.-projecten, 
nl. “kennisoverdracht op middelbaar niveau” zonder meer, niet reëel is. Er komt 
meer bij kijken!’) 
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Different ideas 
Soon it also became clear that the local people might not be prepared to adapt to 
Western notions of development and that the volunteers might be forced to 
change their plans. Volunteers often turned out to be wholly dependent on local 
people in terms of time, budget and organisation and the volunteers’ work might 
be altered depending on local circumstances. Thus the female horticulturalist 
Miss van Helsdingen in Colombia was not given much opportunity to work in 
her specialisation: ‘above all the women in the veredas (villages) asked for 
cooking and sewing lessons’.143 In many countries, the goals with which the 
volunteers had come changed as soon as they arrived in their new working envi-
ronment. In Cameroon, how to sew uniforms was deemed the most important 
thing that the volunteers could teach but from remarks made, it is obvious that 
the sewing course had much more to do with local status than with poverty re-
duction.144 Original plans had to be continuously modified and revised.  
The volunteers were in no position to push their plans in a forceful way. If 
any counterparts were available, although that was very often not the case, they 
insisted on new and egalitarian relations with Westerners. Complaining that two 
years was too short a time to come to any lasting results, B.A.C.M. van Gool 
reported from Ifunda Technical Secondary School: ‘It was a real effort to get 
the various competent teachers to carry out this work. Now that we are all equal 
in Tanzania, no more orders can be given; the work must be debated, induced 
and motivated!’145 In other words, there was no way that Western development 
organisations could work in a uni-directional manner; the projects depended as 
much on local circumstances as on prior planning at head office. Local politics 
were part of the projects before the volunteers had even reached their destina-
tions. Thus in west Cameroon, the counterpart of some of the female volunteers 
was the daughter of the regional Minister of Community Development and 
Cooperatives and one of the pilot farms in the agricultural projects was owned 
by the wife of the regional Vice President.146 
                                                 
143  ‘Vrijwilligers in het veld’, Visum (November/December 1964), p. 6. (‘Vóór alles 
vragen de vrouwen in de vereda’s naar kook- en naailes, etc.’) 
144  ‘Nieuws over de projecten; Kameroen’, Visum (July-August 1964), p. 6. 
145  Archives, Ifunda Technical Secondary School, Tanzania, File: rapportage, 3e kwar-
taal 1972. (‘Het was een hele moeite om de verschillende kompetente leraren te be-
wegen dit werk te doen; nu we allen gelijk zijn in Tanzania kunnen er geen op-
drachten meer verstrekt worden; het werk moet gediscussieerd, aangepraat en gemo-
tiveerd worden!’) 
146  Foreign Affairs, file 1827, report, G.J. Van Rinsum: ‘Verslag betreffende het JVP 
team in Kameroen. Periode 24/4-15/8-‘65’, 23 August 1965, pp. 6, 8-9. 
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The villagers also benefited from the volunteers’ presence in quite different 
ways than anticipated. An example is the description of the first JVP activities 
in the area of ploughing: 
A disadvantage has turned out to be that ploughed land yields worse results than 
land that has been worked by women with hoes. In all probability, the reason is that 
less organic material is dug into the ground with ploughing. The cut elephant grass 
is being taken off the land. With the hoe treatment, the women lay the grass in 
lengths and cover these subsequently with the top soil of the strips in between. So 
beds are created on a layer of organic material that, after is has been covered with 
earth, is burnt (soil burning). Ploughing will hence only yield good results if a fair 
amount of stable dung is used. In the report period, a simple cart for the ox-team was 
constructed, originally to transport cow dung from the Fulani rugas to the farm. 
However because the transportation of heavy material constitutes a problem in the 
village, the villagers are enthusiastic, much more so than about the possibility of 
ploughing.147 
While the volunteers saw their adaptation to local culture and even their 
mere arrival as a sign of their goodwill, local people may have interpreted it 
rather differently. As Coby Huber explained for Cameroon: ‘People only came 
to our health meetings because they wanted medication. (..) But the hygiene, 
that was difficult. They listened to us because the volunteers were nice people 
but they didn't understand the use of it.’148 Initially there was little interest in 
Zambia in the volunteers’ mission: ‘You can just imagine how we, as two pale 
faces, came across saying: “Guys, we have come to start up an agricultural 
school with you!” Those boys were of course not interested at all. The first few 
weeks we were just busy being accepted. In the final analysis though we did 
achieve something.’149 These examples reveal that, from the start, practice in-
formed the ideas and policies of development organisations like SNV. 
 
                                                 
147  Ibid., p. 1. 
148  Interview 10. (‘Ze kwamen naar die spreekuren toen omdat ze gewoon graag medi-
cijnen wilden hebben. (…) Maar al die hygiëne, dat was moeilijk. Ze deden het dan 
wel omdat het aardige mensen waren (de vrijwilligers) maar de zin die zagen ze er 
absoluut niet van in.’) 
149  Interview 13. (‘Je moet je voorstellen dat wij daar als twee bleekneuzen komen en 
zeggen: jongens wij komen hier om een landbouwschool met jullie op te zetten. Die 
jongens hadden natuurlijk helemaal geen interesse. De eerste weken zijn we alleen 
maar bezig geweest om geaccepteerd te raken bij de jongens. We hebben uiteindelijk 
wel wat kunnen bereiken.’) See also Kees Hartog, Thank You Bwana, graag gedaan 
Afrika (Bussum, 1971). 
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Assessing aid 
While the volunteers and their staff regarded their presence as a sign of be-
nevolence, local people stressed their goodwill in receiving the volunteers as 
guests and showing them their hospitality. The personal bonds with the volun-
teers were seen as crucial: The aid was not being regarded as institutional or 
framed within an organisation but as personified. Many interviews started by 
listing the names of the volunteers. Agnes Bijngsi expressed her personal 
appreciation of the volunteers as follows: 
The Dutch came in 1963. I remember Trees Bolland, I worked with her in Mezam 
near Bafut in the field and I also remember Rob de Coole. Miss Dinie lived in my 
house. We were so happy that the Dutch came. They helped us with nutrition, 
hygiene and advice on how to bring groups together. They brought all kinds of stuff 
for us, like grain for maize, a sewing machine and a Suzuki motorcycle, which I still 
have in my garage.  
Miss Dinie stayed at my house for two years. There was a problem with housing 
when the Dutch came as there were not enough houses. So some of the Dutch people 
came to live with us. Miss Dinie was wonderful. We were real friends. She wanted 
to do everything the way I did it, she wanted to cook like me, dress like me. She ate 
everything in the house! We are still in contact.150 
Mrs. Bijngsi touches on factors in the material and the social realms, without 
seeing these as being in any sense contradictory or mutually exclusive. Coop-
eration with people from a different cultural background and building up social 
relations with the volunteers were mentioned by many informants as their most 
treasured memory of the volunteers. At the same time, the importance of tangi-
ble material benefits was equally stressed in evaluations of the cooperation. This 
combination of appreciation in the social and the material sphere shows very 
clearly in the account by Agnes’ husband, Simon Bijngsi:  
The Dutch were well received, they helped us a lot. You see, the training centre they 
set up was to train young farmers to become self-reliant. That would help solve 
poverty problems in the area. Young farmers were trained for nine months in the 
field of agriculture, growing crops, keeping animals etc. They did a very good job 
and most of the trainees have benefited from it. Loans were given to trainees to set 
up a centre for small businesses. When the businesses started, they had to pay back 
their loans. That’s how it operated. Most of those people are still in their small 
holdings that were set up by the Dutch.  
The Dutch were very sociable people. We were very impressed by their behaviour. 
Friendly, not arrogant like other Europeans like we knew. We lived through the 
colonial system with the British. Those were very reserved people. But the Dutch 
                                                 
150  Interviews 66 and 59. 
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were open to the population. They used to come over to the villages and mix with 
the people freely. We were very impressed indeed.151 
Even if this was formally not their task, the volunteers had at their disposal 
transport and equipment which local people often had little or no access to. A 
nun working in Zambia stated: ‘SNVers were always a useful pair of hands 
when the sisters needed something fixed. We had no tools!’152 The arrival of a 
team of volunteers must have had drastic consequences for the local economy. 
In west Cameroon, women were hired to plant potatoes for an agricultural test 
station, while men were recruited to renovate houses for the teams.153 As ex-
plained earlier, no housing was available for the volunteers when they arrived 
so local inhabitants were removed from their houses by the Cameroonian 
government to make space for the teams. This was expected to be a temporary 
arrangement but when it turned out that JVP The Hague did not plan to send 
any funds to cover the costs of renovation, the teams could not move to the new 
buildings and the forty workers hired to do the work were dismissed. One of 
those fired asked permission to speak at the meeting at which their dismissal 
was announced: 
Sir, we worked well with you and this I dare to say on behalf of everybody present 
here. But you Dutch, what are you doing here? You Dutch do not have money. If 
only you were Americans, then we would be building together right now and then 
our people could return to their houses, the houses in which you are living. Now we 
are fired and tomorrow we are without jobs. (…) Do you know what that means for 
us?154 
Former volunteers were not unanimous in their assessment of their activities. 
Even within one interview, the evaluation could be different. Maarten van der 
Hout went back to Issia in Ivory Coast, the place where he had worked 25 years 
ago: ‘There was still a small office, 25 years after we had gone. That small 
office did about the same work as we’d done: Drawn some plans, constructed 
houses. That was very nice.’ Ellen van de Craats, who had been a volunteer in 
                                                 
151  Interview 68. 
152  Interview 151. 
153  Foreign Affairs, file 1827, letter, L.F. Kortenhorst to A. van der Goot, Bambui, 14 
April 1964, p. 2. 
154  Foreign Affairs, file 1827, report, H.M. Sesink-Clee, ‘Overzicht: Onderbrenging van 
de Nederlandse Vrijwilligers te Bambui’, 14 March 1964, p. 8 (‘Mijnheer, we heb-
ben prettig met jullie gewerkt en dat durf ik hier te zeggen namens iedereen, maar 
jullie Hollanders, wat doen jullie hier, jullie Hollanders hebben geen geld. Waren 
jullie maar Amerikanen, dan waren wij nu met ons allen daar aan het bouwen en 
onze mensen weer gauw in hun huizen, de huizen waar jullie nu in wonen. Nu zijn 
we ontslagen en morgen zijn wij werkeloos (…) weten jullie wat dat voor ons be-
tekent?’) 
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Cameroon, saw matters differently: ‘Transfer of knowledge? As a matter of 
fact, at the end I wrote a report saying: “Hey, they really do not need me, they 
can really do it themselves”. There was a very good midwife in Abong Mbang 
where I was. She in fact trained me!’155 
Quite a number of the volunteers have revisited the places where they had 
worked for two years. In some cases it was a disheartening experience, as it was 
for Nicoline Suh: 
It was highly emotional. Every step was full of memories. Yet at the same time it 
was terribly disappointing. Mamfe had completely collapsed. Nothing much re-
mained of the town and most of the people I had known there had died.156  
She was full of fond memories of her experience and on the walls of her 
present house were pictures of the babies that had been named after her. And 
Dik IJf regretted that SNV had simply left everything behind in Zambia, with-
out ensuring any succession. The buildings in which all the volunteers and staff 
lived had all collapsed: ‘They (local people) did not want to live in houses 
where we had lived.’157 
As ideas about what development work should entail changed so drastically 
afterwards, the approach of the 1960s, in retrospect, seemed absurd to some:  
I think we never actually realised that the connection between baking a cake or knit-
ting a bonnet and the value of development cooperation really lay elsewhere. With 
hindsight, it was ridiculous.158 
Whatever their assessment may be in retrospect, their experiences ‘in the 
field’ made the volunteers more modest about their role in development. 
 
                                                 
155  Interview 289. (Maarten: ‘En daar was nog een bureautje, 25 jaar nadat we weg 
waren gegaan. Dat bureautje deed ongeveer hetzelfde werk dat wij deden, ook plan-
netjes tekenen, huizen uitzetten. Dat was heel leuk’; Ellen:‘Kennisoverdracht? Ik 
heb eigenlijk aan het eind geschreven in het rapport: ‘Joh ze hebben mij helemaal 
niet nodig, ze kunnen dat gewoon zelf.’ Daar zat een hele goeie vroedvrouw in 
Abong Mbang waar ik zat. Die heeft mij eigenlijk een beetje opgeleid.’) Another 
example of a project undertaken by the very first volunteers and that is still in 
existence – a vegetable garden in West Cameroon – was given in Interview 10. 
156  Interview 228. (‘Het was geweldig emotioneel. Iedere stap was vol herinneringen. 
Maar het was tegelijkertijd enorm teleurstellend. Mamfe was helemaal in elkaar ge-
zakt. Er was niet veel over van de stad en de meeste mensen die ik daar had gekend, 
waren dood.’) 
157  Interview 116. 
158  Interview 11. (‘We hebben denk ik nooit overzien dat het verband tussen cake bak-
ken of een muts breien en het nut van ontwikkelingssamenwerking eigenlijk ergens 
anders was. Achteraf gezien was het belachelijk.’) 
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Changing times 
Some volunteers took great interest in local culture. One volunteer, who was 
sent out as a poultry-farm advisor and later started a farm in Zambia, tried to 
gather as much information as he could: 
I felt the work as a volunteer was interesting because I found the people stimulating 
to work with, it wasn’t just about chickens. To learn what people thought, what their 
character was. I collected a lot about that, how the people went hunting, what kinds 
of bows and arrows they had (…) Also their ceremonies and musical instruments; 
that is what I found interesting. I learnt a lot about that and, later, when I started this 
farm I benefited from that.159 
Over time, the contact between the volunteers and the people amongst whom 
they were living grew. Placed in a new context, the volunteers learned about 
local circumstances and aspects of culture. A 1960 picture of Agnes Bijngsi 
even showed Dutch volunteers in traditional African dress, while the African 
women sported the latest fashion in mini-skirts.160 The direct contact with 
villagers, officials and counterparts taught them that development was more 
complex than it had seemed at first. Many of the volunteers came to see the 
people they worked with as more than an anonymous mass of ‘poor African 
people’. Friendships were made, every now and then weddings were celebrated, 
and some volunteers decided to stay. Such contacts made any initial naivety 
disappear. 
Sharp dilemmas also came into being in the political sphere. Volunteers 
working in Colombia wrote a pamphlet in which they claimed that unless 
projects were accepted under strict conditions and fitted a larger aid framework, 
the effect of voluntary service would not go beyond that ‘of heavily subsidised 
scouts work’. The pamphlet stressed the importance of political factors and 
claimed that only political consciousness built up from the grassroots and the 
redistribution of wealth could meaningfully contribute to development. It held 
that SNV ought to make an in-depth study of a project and its consequences at  
 
 
 
                                                 
159  Interview 120. (‘Ik vond het werk als vrijwilliger wel interessant, omdat ik de men-
sen interessanter vond dan om met die paar kuikens te werken. Om te leren hoe de 
mensen dachten, hoe ze in elkaar zaten. Daar heb ik veel van verzameld, hoe de 
mensen gingen jagen, wat voor een pijlen en bogen ze hadden. Ook hun ceremonies 
en hun muziekinstrumenten, dat vond ik interessant. Daar heb ik veel van opgedaan, 
wat mij later toen ik deze farm ben begonnen ten goede is gekomen.’) 
160  Interview 66. 
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Photo 3.4 Gerard Wesseling (Community Planning, Kasempa) with a farmer  
who asks for agrarian advice’, Zambia, 1968. 
Source:  SNV photo archives, Blue, Zambia, SNVers. 
Photographer:  N. Halbertsma. 
 
 
the outset.161 These insights, based on the views and experience of the early 
volunteers, were to have a huge influence on the next generation of volunteers. 
The changes not only came through experiences in ‘the field’. The initial 
teams had been educated in the 1950s and by the late 1960s the volunteers had a 
different background. A rapid increase in the sale of televisions had brought the 
war in Vietnam and other news items into Dutch living rooms. Notions about 
mobility were changing as a result of mass car ownership and the large waves of 
Dutch emigration to the New World in the 1950s that had turned the US, 
Canada, South Africa and Australia into places one could travel to. Students 
                                                 
161  SNV archives, Part 2, Box 1, ‘Vrijwilligers in een ontwikkelingsland’ (s.d. May 
1968); Foreign Affairs, file 547, article, ‘De frustraties van de jongeren-vrijwilli-
gers’, Haagse Post (9 November 1968). 
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became familiar with pop music, ideas of revolution, and flower power. Willem 
Zevenbergen had already noticed the difference between the initial and subse-
quent teams. For the first team Christianity had been important, while following 
groups were less tied to their faith.162 In a novel on volunteers in a developing 
country by the well-known Dutch author An Rutgers-Van der Loeff, the 
changes from the 1960s to the 1970s are beautifully illustrated by the two main 
male characters. The naive, practical Dirk or ‘Joris Goedbloed from Druten’ 
(‘Soft touch’ from the village of Druten) is challenged on many occasions by 
the better-educated, insecure, conscious-ridden Lex, who explains the world’s 
problems in a very erudite fashion but is far less practical in his approach to 
everyday life.163 
Slowly, a discrepancy came to exist between the SNV’s formal publicity and 
what was happening in the field. Much of the publicity material continued to 
exude the atmosphere of optimism and naivety with which the SNV had started 
out. Yet in the field, the volunteers had come to different conclusions. New 
volunteers no longer shared the welfare orientation of the organisation’s begin-
nings and by the 1970s, SNV’s head office could not avoid noticing this in-
creasing discrepancy. The times, they were changing. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has described the process that led to SNV’s foundation. A first 
characteristic of this period was the institutionalisation of ‘development’, both 
in the formal political sphere as well as in private initiatives. Secondly, the 
period was marked by a tense, but also intense, relationship between the state 
and private – mainly church – initiatives in the voluntary sector. In the few 
publications that refer to SNV’s origins, the setting up of the JVP is usually 
given as an instant reaction to the establishment of the JVC, which in turn is 
unequivocally related to the foundation of the US Peace Corps. Although these 
links certainly existed, this chapter proves that the process of foundation was 
more complex. Both the JVP and the JVC have their origins in a range of events 
and processes that occurred much earlier. The junior ‘expert assistants’, the 
conference on middle-level manpower, the EWG, VSO and the KAJ initiatives 
point to highly diverse impetuses rather than the single causation model that has 
been suggested. 
Despite SNV’s turbulent start, there was no lack of optimism. With the 
pathos that was characteristic of the time, it was announced that the new organi-
                                                 
162  Interview 5. 
163  An Rutgers-Van der Loeff, Gewoon in het ongewone. Een verhaal over jonge vrij-
willigers in ontwikkelingswerk in Afrika (Amsterdam, 1971), p. 12. 
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sation would mean ‘an enrichment, as the individual sacrifice of young people 
added a new dimension of the purest kind (...) An enrichment finally as it 
becomes ever more clear to what degree lesser developed countries need train-
ing of their officials at middle and lower level.’164 After a time in which advice 
had been central, the idea was that action was now required and advice had to 
be turned into practice. This first phase of SNV’s history can therefore be 
characterised as the bricks-and-mortar era of the organisation. In the worldview 
of the time, the teams of volunteers were to teach local people not only about 
modern techniques in agriculture and household sciences but also about respon-
sibility and cooperation.  
Reality proved much more resilient, however, and soon after SNV started its 
activities, relations between ‘The Hague’ and ‘the field’ became charged with 
mutually unfulfilled expectations leading to increased tensions between the two. 
The tensions were often cast in practical terms, focusing on housing, financial 
matters, organisation, etc. An underlying problem was that, from the start, a 
major dilemma plagued development cooperation. While formally attention was 
paid to the needs and wishes of developing nations, agency was exclusively 
attributed to development organisations in the development discourse of the 
time. The people who their activities were meant to help were regarded as 
passive recipients of the transformations introduced by others. The young 
people who went overseas to work as volunteers soon discovered that the so-
called recipients did much more than merely ‘receive’. Local participants had 
interests different from those set in The Hague and projects had to be altered as 
they did not fit local circumstances on the ground. Political structures and local 
hierarchies had a bearing on the implementation of development work and the 
reason for a village’s enthusiasm was often incongruent with a certain project’s 
aims. The volunteers felt that there were severe limitations on the changes they 
could bring about and many came home with views on development that were 
radically different from the ones they had set out with. The increasingly critical 
views on the part of the volunteers form the introduction to the next chapter. 
 
                                                 
164  Foreign Affairs, file 1, press conference, ‘Minister Luns over Nederlands Jongeren 
Vrijwilligers Programma tijdens persconferentie Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken 
op 12 februari 1963’, 12 February 1963, p. 7. (‘Een verrijking, omdat het individuele 
offer van jonge mensen een nieuwe dimensie toevoegt van de zuiverste soort (...) 
Een verrijking tenslotte omdat steeds duidelijker is geworden hoezeer minder ont-
wikkelde landen behoefte hebben aan scholing van hun kaders op lager en middel-
baar niveau.’) 
  
  
 
 
Photo 4.1  ‘Marcel Krom talking to local counterpart’, Dockyard, Mwanza, 
Tanzania, 1976. 
Source:  SNV photo archives, White, Tanzania, Technische instructie. 
Photographer:  Unknown. 
 
  
4 
The years of radical  
commitment:  
Democratisation and  
secularisation (1973-1984) 
SNV expanded rapidly in the early 1970s and critics from within even spoke of 
a ‘period of irresponsible growth’.1 The number of volunteers had risen from 
279 in 1968 to 526 in 1971 and between 1970 and 1974 the organisation saw a 
growth rate of 60%.2 Within this larger organisation all parties wanted to have a 
say and the period under discussion here was marked by democratisation, 
radicalisation and political engagement. It was a time of conflicts: between the 
field and The Hague, between volunteers and field staff, between SNV and ex-
volunteers, between private organisations and the state, between the Minister 
and the Board, and between the staff and the Minister. External critique of the 
development sector, which took SNV as an example, only led to an exacerba-
tion of these internal tensions. 
As in the preceding period, tensions stemmed from structural conflicts be-
tween various interest groups, especially relations between the private JVC 
wing in SNV and the state continued to influence the workings of the organisa-
tion. Circumstances were however changing: The churches’ role in society was 
diminishing and SNV was going through a process of ‘secularisation’. This was 
such a crucial change that in 1978 the JVC wing went its own way and left 
SNV. Relations within SNV also changed in the sense that volunteers and field 
                                                 
1  Foreign Affairs, file 83, memo, Secretary SNV to SNV Board: ‘Analyse van de ver-
trouwelijke notitie en toelichting Mans/van Dort, februari ’74 aan Minister Pronk,’ 5 
June 1974. 
2  Nijzink, Dag vrijwilliger!, p. 34. 
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staff started to demand a greater say in the organisation. This was the age of 
democratisation. 
The Third World movement 
In March 1970 a group of volunteers organised a protest to demand more 
democracy within SNV, by occupying the International Centre, where they were 
housed during their preparatory course in the Royal Tropical Museum.3 This 
event could be seen as symbolic of some of the major changes in SNV’s history, 
and changes that were related to wider international developments. In the 
second half of the 1960s, a wave of democratisation swept across the US, Japan 
and many European countries. 1968 became ‘the year of the barricades’ as 
strikes and student protests were organised, often resulting in a violent police 
response. Young people in the Swinging Sixties held ‘Revolution’ to be the key 
word and they called not only for radical political change but also envisaged a 
sexual revolution. As in many other counties, students in The Netherlands pro-
tested against the establishment and for more democracy. From 1965 onwards, 
‘provos’, a movement of youngsters that aimed to provoke the authorities, 
organised events and demonstrations in Amsterdam, with the most institution-
alised action being the white bicycles for communal used. In 1969 students 
occupied the Maagdenhuis where the university offices and administration were 
located. In the same year a feminist action group, the Dolle Minas (Wild Minas) 
started its campaign for women to become ‘the bosses of their own bodies’.  
This new revolutionary zeal was slow to reach the Dutch development 
sector, and most development organisations and initiatives were barely influ-
enced by the democratic movement and their actions. This also held for SNV: 
the organisation was not involved as such in the actions and only a few of its 
members were directly engaged in the new movements. In this sense, SNV did 
not play a pioneering role in Dutch society but within development circles it did 
have a progressive image as an innovative force in terms of democratisation and 
political engagement.4 It shared this image with many NGOs both at home and 
in the international arena.5 Attitudes within the organisation were closer to the 
NGO sector than to the Dutch state, of which SNV formed part. The fact that 
SNV combined private and state initiatives for such a long time contributed to 
its ambiguous character.  
                                                 
3  ‘Internationaal Centrum bezet’, Vice Versa 4, 13 (1970), p. 31. 
4  Nijzink, Dag vrijwilliger!, p. 38. 
5  For example, Michael Jennings, ‘Development is Very Political in Tanzania’: Ox-
fam & the Chunya Integrated Development Programme, 1972-76’, in: Barrow & 
Jenings, eds, The Charitable Impulse, p. 122. 
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Public interest in development aid had increased slowly during the 1960s but 
in the 1970s and early 1980s a massive expansion occurred, both in volume and 
intensity, and this became the golden age of the Third World Movement. Initia-
tives that had been taken in the 1960s now developed into strong organisations 
enjoying wide public support. Development cooperation and information about 
global poverty became a national issue that attracted large and often keen audi-
ences. Some of these organisations had early roots; for example the X min Y 
Movement can be traced back to Father Jelsma’s calls in the 1950s to send tax-
payers’ money to developing nations instead of to the Dutch state treasury, and 
the tax issue had become an integral part of NOVIB’s activities by the end of 
the 1950s. As of 1968 the concept X min Y (X minus Y) was being coined by 
the World Council of Churches: the X standing for the percentage that a country 
had to spend on aid according to the UN and the Y for the percentage actually 
being spent. Citizens were to make up the difference between X and Y. In 1973 
the X min Y organisation parted with NOVIB to become an independent 
foundation.  
NOVIB itself also experienced a boom: its Gast aan Tafel (Guest at the 
Table) initiative had 32,000 participants in 1975, 90,000 in 1977 and 180,000 
by 1986.6 The Centres for Development Cooperation (COS) expanded rapidly 
as well, as did the chain of Wereldwinkels (World Shops) that opened all over 
The Netherlands offering products from the Third World on a fair-trade basis. 
In line with developments in the growing Peace Movement, political en-
gagement and radical commitment became important characteristics of the 
Third World Movement. As with the demands for increased democracy, it was 
especially young people who radicalised, holding that Western countries were 
responsible for world poverty and that structurally different global relations 
were a prerequisite for development. Development came to be regarded as a 
political issue and action committees that supported the struggles in Chile, 
Nicaragua and El Salvador drew widespread attention. The long-standing Dutch 
rapport with South Africa led to support for the strong anti-apartheid move-
ment: the Comité Zuid-Afrika (later Komitee Zuidelijk Afrika, Committee 
Southern Africa), which had started its activities in 1957, the Christian-inspired 
working group Kairos (1970) and the Anti-Apartheids Beweging Nederland 
(AABN, 1971) and action groups such as Boycot Outspan (South African 
oranges) sought to assist and encourage South Africans fighting apartheid in 
different ways. There was a similarly strong engagement with the Palestinian 
issue and the Dutch Palestina Komitee (Palestine Committee) gained much 
support. Demonstrations against the war in Vietnam and the right-wing regime 
                                                 
6  Novib website: http://www.novib.nl/id3690.html; Hans Beerends, De derde wereld-
beweging. Geschiedenis en toekomst (Utrecht, 1993), p. 152. 
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in Portugal drew large numbers of people. When the regime in Portugal was 
ousted and Mozambique, Angola and Guinea Bissau became independent in 
1974/75 this was seen by many as proof that armed struggle was not only 
inevitable but also an effective way of achieving political goals. Although not 
all people by any means shared this tendency towards revolutionary methods 
and radical democratic ideals, these views had an impact even in the most 
conservative circles. Development aid came to be called development coopera-
tion and the belief that it was difficult to separate politics and development 
became widespread.7 
This growing awareness and the new views that spread amongst people 
engaged in development cooperation, together with the democratisation move-
ment at the end of the 1960s, proved important to the course that SNV would 
take in the years to come. 
Pronk and Prince Claus 
In 1973 the social democrat Jan Pronk, who was then only 33 years old, became 
Minister of Development Cooperation. A year later, Prince Claus, the husband 
of the Dutch Princess Beatrix who would become Queen in 1980, became 
chairman of the SNV. It seemed an unlikely combination: one of the most 
radical social democrats and a member of the royal house and, due to his 
German background, a much disputed one at that. Yet the two were not as 
different as might appear at first sight. Jan Pronk has often been called ‘the 
minister of national conscience,’ and for all his radical statements, he was very 
much a man of Dutch Protestant-inspired moralist traditions. Prince Claus, who 
had grown up in Tanzania, had been President of the NCO before he became 
SNV’s chairman. NCO subsidies to the Dutch Angola Committee, and pro-
Palestinian and anti-apartheid groups had been much disputed and Prince Claus 
was moved to the less controversial SNV. In the years to come, the two of them 
played a crucial role in SNV. 
Pronk made an enormous impact on Dutch development thinking and even 
on its practice. Although some maintained that the influence of Pronk’s policy 
was more limited than was generally assumed, a number of crucial decisions 
were taken under his leadership and Dutch development policy was explicitly 
formulated for the first time.8 The activist development policy, for which The 
Netherlands and Scandinavian countries came to be so widely known, was 
largely his doing. He managed to increase the percentage of GNP given for 
                                                 
7  Ibid.; Beerends & Broere, De bewogen beweging, pp. 48-63. 
8  Nekkers & Malcontent, ‘Inleiding’, in: Nekkers & Malcontent, eds, De geschiede-
nis, p. 39; Rob Visser, ‘Armoedebestrijding als hoofddoelstelling’, in: Schulpen, ed., 
Hulp in ontwikkeling, p. 12; Hoebink, Geven is nemen, p. 58. 
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development cooperation to 1,5%, making The Netherlands one of the few 
countries that exceeded the 1% norm stipulated by the UN. His policy was 
characterised by key words such as the redistribution of wealth, poverty allevia-
tion and self-reliance. He envisaged a development policy that would not bene-
fit ‘states’ but the people in them: the poorest of the poor.9 With this approach, 
The Netherlands was not being pioneering but was fitting into the international 
context and following the model adopted by the World Bank some years ear-
lier.10 As in the period before, the choice of focus countries (concentratie-lan-
den) led to continuous debate between progressive and conservative wings in 
Parliament. To select the focus countries, Pronk used not only criteria in the 
field of poverty and need but also assessed countries’ human-rights policies as a 
prerequisite to them receiving aid. This lead to much political squabbling to the 
point that: ‘if you mention Cuba, then I will mention Indonesia, ha ha! and if 
you mention Indonesia, then I will mention Cuba, ha ha!’11 In the final analysis, 
Pronk was unable to enforce his criteria stringently and countries like Indonesia, 
Kenya and Colombia remained on the list. Pronk’s outspoken character was not 
appreciated by all and the clashes between him and Minister of Foreign Affairs 
van der Stoel were especially fierce. It was the latter who made it public that, 
even though they were from the same party, he would not join a future cabinet if 
Jan Pronk were also included in it: ‘He leaves or I leave’.12 His plea was heard 
and the pragmatic Jan de Koning became the new Minister for Development 
Cooperation in the Cabinet sworn in in 1977. 
SNV was reorganised during Pronk’s time as minister. It remained part of 
DGIS in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs but as of 1977 the responsibility for the 
final selection of projects and personnel came to lie with the SNV Board and no 
longer with the Minister. In 1979, a start was made with SNV funding projects 
itself, especially in countries without any Dutch diplomatic representation.13 
These developments altered the relationship between the Ministry and SNV 
considerably. Given its dual nature, and being based in private initiative and yet 
tied to the Ministry at the same time, SNV had always had an ambivalent 
                                                 
9  Nekkers & Malcontent, ‘Inleiding’, in: Nekkers & Malcontent, eds, De geschiede-
nis, pp. 33-40; Hoebink, Geven is nemen, pp. 57-62. 
10  Finnemore, ‘Redefining Development’, in: Cooper & Packard, eds, International 
development and the social sciences, pp. 203-227. 
11  Quoted in: P.A.M. Malcontent, ‘De schaduwminister van Buitenlandse Zaken. Ont-
wikkelingshulp als politiek instrument’, in: Nekkers & Malcontent, eds, De geschie-
denis, p. 225. (‘als jij Cuba noemt, dan noem ik lekker Indonesië en als jij Indonesië 
noemt, dan noem ik lekker Cuba.’) 
12  Quoted in: Nekkers & Malcontent, ‘Inleiding’, in: Nekkers & Malcontent, eds, De 
geschiedenis, p. 38. (‘Hij eruit of ik eruit.’) 
13  Verhoeven, Aid – A changing necessity, p. 17. 
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character. During the first period of its existence, the Ministry had dominated 
the SNV Board and the private organisations felt their influence was limited. 
Although the influence of JVC as such barely increased in the 1970s, the SNV 
Board as a whole wanted a more independent position vis-à-vis the Ministry. At 
the same time however, SNV started to cooperate more closely with DGIS. 
Initially, this took the form of SNV volunteers working in the framework of 
large DGIS projects but from the 1980s onwards, SNV increasingly became 
responsible for the management of DGIS projects. The next chapter shows how 
these changes formed the basis of a different relationship between the Ministry 
and SNV, one that was formalised in the subsequent period.  
Democratisation within SNV 
The combined developments in The Netherlands in the fields of politics, protest 
and engagement were important in the democratisation movement within SNV. 
Yet much was also related to pressure from the field as many field staff held 
that those actually carrying out the development projects were best positioned to 
decide about the course that should be taken. Especially in SNV field offices in 
Latin America, concerns about democratic procedures were very strong. SNV 
The Hague was criticised for continuing its programmes in countries with right-
wing regimes, such as Peru, Brazil and Chile. National field leaders and other 
SNV field staff urged head office to stop sending SNV activities to these coun-
tries. 
After 1966, team leaders from all the countries where SNV was operating 
started to meet annually at the Veldvertegenwoordigersbijeenkomst (Field 
Representatives’ Gathering) to discuss the future. Later – with the discontinua-
tion of volunteer teams – the meeting consisted of all the national field leaders 
from the countries in which the SNV was active. At the 1970 gathering, field 
staff representatives called for a larger say for ‘the field’ in the policies de-
signed in The Hague and this led to the setting up of the Field Council 
(Veldraad) that was to be a representative body for all serving volunteers. The 
call for these changes came from the staff rather than the volunteers: field staff 
often complained about the volunteers’ lack of interest in the Field Council and 
in policy matters generally. In Kenya, the field leader even had to set up the 
Field Council himself.14 Harry Sesink-Clee wrote from Abidjan that only a few 
volunteers had responded to a call to review SNV policy and, due to a combi-
                                                 
14  Then called SNV Raad (SNV Council), later SVO (SNV-Veld Overleg Orgaan, 
SNV Field Consultative Body) and, as of 1976, Field Council: Nijzink, Dag vrij-
williger!, pp. 38-39, 44. 
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nation of lack of interest and the attitude both of Head Office and the field staff, 
no Field Council was functioning there.15  
The positions from which field staff and volunteers related to SNV were 
very different and this, at least partly, explains why volunteers and field staff 
were engaged in the democratisation process in the organisation in such differ-
ent ways. The volunteers had a two-year contract with SNV but they were 
formally not ‘in’ the organisation. Their role in the organisation and structure of 
SNV was limited. Among the increasing numbers of male volunteers, quite a 
few had become a volunteer as an alternative to doing military service. Many of 
the volunteers had strong ideas about equality, development and the world’s 
economic structures but did not see their future as lying in SNV. In the 1970s 
most of them returned to The Netherlands after their contract with SNV was 
finished. For the field staff this was different: in many cases they had a stake in 
the organisation of SNV and, although only a few stayed with SNV, most field 
staff had prior experience in development work and continued to work in the 
sector after they left SNV. In the preceding period, the field staff had been 
supervising teams of volunteers who often all worked in one place and acted 
more or less as a group. Over time, this idea was abandoned and volunteers 
were placed individually where they were needed and the field staff were sta-
tioned in the larger towns or in SNV’s country office in the capital, travelling to 
visit the volunteers when necessary. The volunteers tried to keep in touch with 
each other but daily contact was only possible if they happened to be working in 
the same place. As a result of these changes, the ties between the field staff and 
the volunteers became less intense, while field staff had much more contact 
with ‘The Hague’ than the volunteers.  
Many field staff held that a change of mentality was required to make the 
volunteers aware of the wider context of their work and they hoped that the call 
for participation in decision-making would ‘edify them above the bickering over 
accommodation, transport and payment issues’.16 This paternalising attitude at 
times led to conflict between field staff and volunteers, and those volunteers 
who did want to invest time and energy in the democratic decision-making 
                                                 
15  Foreign Affairs, file 29, letter, Sesink-Clee to SNV The Hague, ‘Democratisering 
binnen de SNV’, Abidjan, 11 October 1974; Ibid. file 29, letter, Grignion Gaajetaan 
to Sesink-Clee, ‘Commentaar op “discussiestuk democratisering binnen SNV”, 
Agboville (Ivory Coast) 10 September 1974; Ibid. File 29, letter, Ch.H.M. Schut to 
Sesink-Clee, ‘Democratisering binnen de SNV’, Man (Ivory Coast), 19 September 
1974. 
16  Ibid. file 700, van Dort to chef AJV, 19 January 1972; Ibid. file 29, B. Hansen, team 
leader west Cameroon to field leader Yaoundé, Buea, 24 September 1974. (‘... zodat 
zij zich weten uit te heffen boven het gekibbel over huisvesting, vervoer en salarië-
ring.’) 
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process felt that, while they knew best what was happening on the ground, their 
advice was frequently still ignored.17 The country offices did not have an easy 
position as they had to follow directives from The Hague but at the same time 
represent the interests of the volunteers at head office. Pronk reportedly inter-
preted this position in positive terms and regarded the field offices as a ‘labora-
tory for democratisation’ that might form a model not just for SNV as an 
organisation but also for Dutch politics as a whole. Others felt that the ‘endless 
gassing about democracy and structures’ led to ‘10% working and 90% talking’, 
a proportion they could not accept.18 
The V’73 (Veldvertegenwoordigersbijeenkomst of 1973) was especially 
crucial for SNV’s democratisation process. V’73 was the first occasion on 
which the group formally announced its plans for the future and the principles 
of the organisation. A long list of recommendations was drawn up, making it 
impossible for SNV not to change its mind and hindering the practical imple-
mentation of the numerous suggestions made. One of the gathering’s important 
conclusions was that SNV needed to be profoundly restructured in many re-
spects and that the Field Council ought to have more than just an advisory role. 
It needed to become part of the decision-making process. The head of AJV was 
strongly opposed to this idea, but, true to the tide of the times, the field repre-
sentatives did not agree with his objections and in 1974 once again concluded 
that the volunteers ought to have a say in SNV policies. In the end, it was de-
cided that the Field Council would have a voice in the decision-making process 
but that the final responsibility would rest with the field leader.19  
Decisions about democracy continued to be made by the Board in The 
Hague and the volunteers’ influence on SNV policy remained limited.20 From 
the start, there had always been complaints about the lack of communication 
between The Hague and the field and within the democratisation context of the 
1970s and early 1980s the calls for representation from ‘the field’ in decisions 
taken at Head Office only increased. At first, the complaints of field staff and 
volunteers alike had focused on material support but now the lack of democratic 
procedures was of central concern, especially for the field staff. SNV Philip-
pines felt in 1973 that decentralisation had thus been decided upon in 1969 but 
                                                 
17  Ibid. file 29, meeting minutes, SVO-Westelijk Kameroen meeting, Bamenda, 21 
September 1974. 
18  Interview 244. (‘Eindeloos over democratie en structuren uitweiden.’) Also Inter-
view 5. 
19  Nijzink, Dag vrijwilliger!, pp. 38-43; Foreign Affairs, file 82, Reint Rosenstok to 
SNV Board, 22 May 1974. 
20  Bieckman, De wereld volgens Prins Claus, p. 132. 
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had never been put into practice.21 In Cameroon’s 1981 annual report, com-
plaints were voiced about the fact that advice from the field had not been 
followed up on, leading not only to heated debates but also to a dysfunctional 
field staff.22 The gap between the field and Head Office was sharply felt 
throughout this period. 
They (the volunteers) felt that they had a say through the Field Council. But of 
course they had no say at all. The decisions continued to be taken over their heads. 
There used to be correspondence about it and that correspondence was open. That, 
as such, was good, that it was at least clear how matters were taking their course, but 
most of the Board did not bother at all about the Field Council.23 
And the neglect and disregard of volunteers’ views was one of the reasons for 
the lack of interest on their part.  
Apart from the general discontent about relations between the field and Head 
Office, there were many specific cases in which volunteers complained that 
democratic procedures were not being followed. In Zambia, for example, 
volunteers felt that SNV had left the Dutch Farm to the Zambian Council for 
Development merely because it was inconvenient for the field staff to drive ten 
kilometres from the Lusaka neighbourhood where they lived. The volunteers 
thought that SNV was supposed to be an open and democratic organisation but 
manipulation could not be excluded: 
So then a Field Council was called and it would be decided democratically that it 
would be done away with. They played a little trick that partners could also vote, 
and the partners of the staff felt that it was a good deal. One can safely say that 
99.9% of the volunteers were completely against it. And now all of a sudden it 
stopped. Now there was this weird office in town. The people of those days, they all 
regretted it very much. We just gave it away! The social function, the meeting point 
was all of a sudden gone and that was a great pity. 
The participatory culture that had emerged in SNV meant that it was all done as 
democratically as possible. We were allowed to have a say in matters. Also if they 
wanted to start new projects that would be discussed in the Field Council and our 
opinion was asked. I do think that we had any influence on the practical implemen-
tation side of things. Not on the policy in The Hague, but within the framework of 
                                                 
21  SNV Archives, Part 1, Box 21: Joop Liethoff, ‘SNV Filippijnen 1973: verdeling der 
taken en bevoegdheden tussen het hoofdkantoor in Nederland, de landelijke SNV-
vertegenwoordigers en de ontwikkelingswerkers zelf’, 21 April 1973, p. 2. 
22  SNV Archives, Yaoundé, Cameroon: SNV Cameroon, ‘Jaarverslag 1981’, p. 14.  
23  Interview 3. (‘Ze dachten dan dat ze iets te vertellen hadden via de veldraad. Maar 
ze hadden natuurlijk helemaal niks te vertellen. De beslissingen werden toch altijd 
over hun hoofden genomen. Daar werd dan wel over gecorrespondeerd en die cor-
respondentie was open. Dat was op zich wel goed, dat het in elk geval duidelijk was 
hoe het verliep, maar op zich trokken de meeste directies zich niets aan van de 
veldraad.’) Also Interview 111; Zevenbergen, De deskundige, p. 94. 
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the general policy I think that we, as volunteers in that Field Council, were able to 
exert some influence. That was really important then; nothing would be done with-
out letting us know. But there was some manipulation here and there and matters 
were put through if the staff wanted it. Like with the Dutch Farm.24  
The volunteers’ interpretation of events is probably different from the field 
staff’s position on the matter but it does reveal the volunteers’ concern about 
being taken into account in the decision-making process and their inability to 
convince the field staff of their arguments. Many volunteers were less con-
cerned about The Hague and its policies than the field staff were, as they were 
more directly confronted with decisions made in The Hague and policy changes. 
Field Councils were held in many SNV countries on a regular basis but for a lot 
of the volunteers, the social and recreational side of these gatherings was at least 
as important as any possible influence they might have on SNV’s policies and 
its future:  
Hetty: Once every three months we had a meeting. Then we would sit for twenty-
four hours on the train to get there. Often when you arrived, the meeting was already 
over because of delays. But you would go because it was an outing. Most of the 
volunteers from Tanzania, eighty-four in total, would gather in Dar es Salaam. It 
was a big party to be there four times a year. It was called the Field Council. And 
there were also the regional meetings. With Tabora, where there were four SNVers, 
we would go to Mwanza, 500 km away. That was also a party, you would meet 
everybody, and there were a lot of exchanges about projects and you discussed 
problems: ‘How do you solve this?’ and ‘What problems do you encounter?’ You 
would learn a lot from that. We didn’t talk much about SNV as an organisation. If 
you did talk about it, it would be to complain about things or criticise it (…) 
Bert: The Hague was so far away, it was not your concern.25 
                                                 
24  Interview 112. (‘Ze hebben toen in een veldraad, dat zou dan democratisch beslist 
worden, besloten dat het dus weg ging. Ze hadden een trucje uitgehaald dat de part-
ners ook mee mochten stemmen en de partners van de staf vonden dat dus een goeie 
deal. Je kan wel zeggen dat 99,9% van de vrijwilligers daar volledig op tegen waren. 
Nou ging dat opeens weg. Nu hadden ze zo'n raar kantoor in de stad. De mensen in 
die tijd vonden dat allemaal heel jammer. We hebben het gewoon weg gegeven! Die 
sociale functie, die samenkomstplaats was ineens weg en dat was erg jammer (…) 
De ‘inspraakcultuur’ die zijn intrede deed bij SNV hield in dat men probeerde het 
allemaal zo democratisch mogelijk te doen. Wij mochten over dingen mee praten, 
ook als ze nieuwe projecten wilden beginnen, dan werd dat in de veldraad besproken 
en werd om onze mening gevraagd. Ik denk wel dat wij enige invloed hadden op de 
praktische uitvoering, niet op het beleid van SNV in Den Haag, maar binnen het 
kader van het beleid denk ik wel dat we als vrijwilligers binnen die veldraad wel wat 
invloed konden uitoefenen. Dat was toen wel heel belangrijk, niets werd gedaan 
zonder ons daarin te kennen. Maar goed, er werd wel eens wat gemanipuleerd hier 
en daar en dingen doorgevoerd die de staf zo wilde. Bijvoorbeeld die Dutch farm.’) 
25  Interview 8. (‘We hadden één keer in de drie maanden een vergadering. Dan zat je 
24 uur in de trein om daarheen te gaan. Vaak als je aankwam was de vergadering al 
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On occasions, the meetings and discussions stalled rather than facilitated 
decision-making. Too many items on the agenda, personal problems, practical 
issues such as transport, legal matters concerning social security, policy matters 
as broad as ‘the future’ of SNV and ‘development’ in general were all issues 
discussed. In addition, there were often too many people involved: not only the 
volunteers themselves were entitled to vote at the Field Councils; their partners 
could also participate in the debate too. Insistence on democratic procedures 
waned over the years and disappointing results and ineffectiveness certainly 
played a role here.26 
Our fault: New ideas on development 
The annual gathering of field staff representatives during this period not only 
emphasised democratic procedures but also led to changing views on develop-
ment. In the 1960s, as we have seen, poverty was viewed as a problem that not 
only concerned the Third World but also originated there. If only people in 
developing countries acted like those in the West, all would be well and they 
would become as prosperous and successful as their fellow human beings in 
rich countries. In the 1970s these ideas underwent radical changes. The De-
pendencia Theory that was first proposed by Latin American thinkers had 
gained ground among students in The Netherlands. Strongly influenced by 
Marxism, these new ideas about development included the idea that poverty had 
to be regarded as an international and structural problem that was mainly caused 
by unfair trade relations and over-consumption in the West. The West had 
underdeveloped the rest of the world, and only radical action against such 
exploitation could end the poverty trap in which so many people found them-
selves.27  
                                                 
afgelopen want dan had je vertraging. Maar je ging wel altijd, want dat was echt een 
uitje. De meeste vrijwilligers uit Tanzania, het waren er 84 in totaal, kwamen dan 
samen in Dar es Salaam, dat was een groot feest om daar vier keer per jaar te zijn. 
De veldraad heette dat. Dan had je ook nog een regionale vergadering en met Ta-
bora, we zaten daar met vier SNV’ers, gingen we dan naar Mwanza, dat was vijf-
honderd kilometer. Dat was ook echt een feest, je kwam iedereen tegen, er werd heel 
veel uitgewisseld qua projecten en je besprak knelpunten, ‘Hoe los jij dit op?’ en 
‘Waar loop jij tegenaan?’ Daar leerde je ook heel veel van, vond ik. Over SNV als 
organisatie daar had je het niet zo over. Als je het erover had dan was het een beetje 
zeuren of afzetten. (…) Bert: Den Haag was zover weg, daar was je niet mee be-
zig.’) 
26  Nijzink, Dag vrijwilliger!, p. 40. 
27  For more details, see Rist, The history of development from western origins to global 
faith, pp. 109-122. 
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After the optimism that characterised the 1960s, it was realised African 
countries were failing to develop along the lines that many had expected they 
would. Poverty, conflict and corruption were not on the decrease in developing 
countries, on the contrary. Within SNV, volunteers were the first to recognise 
that, even if their work had produced undeniable results, it would not alter 
social structures in the country or improve international trade relations. Reint 
Rosenstok left for the Philippines in 1968, more to avoid military service than 
for any high ideals. The KIT course had not prepared him very well for the 
experience and although he enjoyed his time in the Philippines, he was hit by 
the extreme gap between the rich and the poor there. When he returned to The 
Netherlands two years later, he claimed ‘it had been a little bit too much’ and he 
was ‘deeply touched, hurt and shocked’ by what he had seen. He became one of 
the ‘Angry Young Men’ in SNV: ‘What is happening here? Such misery there, 
and such hypocrisy here! We are all so sanctimonious about aid! What are the 
true interests behind it all?’28 
Many came to the conclusion that the history of colonialism and now the 
constraints of neo-colonialism were preventing development in the Third 
World. Within developing countries, there was a comprador bourgeoisie among 
the elite that maintained existing structures and oppressed their own people. 
Following this line of reasoning, countries themselves were no longer the focus 
of development concerns: within countries there were vast differences and 
development work had to be aimed at the ‘poorest of the poor’. In this sense 
there was a good degree of overlap between Pronk’s policy and the ideas of 
many volunteers. 
Within the SNV, as in other development organisations, it had become clear 
from experience that dictating development would never work. Development 
aid thus came to be replaced with the concept of development cooperation: 
development workers and the ‘poorest of the poor’ had to work together to 
break through the existing impasse. 
Within this concept, the blame for underdevelopment was no longer placed 
on the Third World but was seen to lie with the history of imperialism and 
Western colonialism. Just as Pronk’s policy was informed by a sense of guilt 
and penance,29 many volunteers were also left with such feelings of remorse 
about their own historical and cultural roots. One volunteer explained his 
motives for becoming a volunteer as follows: ‘The reason that we have such a 
good life here is based partly on our colonialism vis-à-vis the Third World in 
                                                 
28  Interview 204. (‘Wat gebeurt hier? Wat een ellende daar en een hypocrisie hier! Wat 
zitten we hier allemaal mooi te doen over hulp. Wat speelt er eigenlijk aan belan-
gen?’) 
29  Nekkers & Malcontent, ‘Inleiding’, in: Nekkers & Malcontent, De geschiedenis, pp. 
36-37. 
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the past. I believe the West has a large debt here and in my own way I am trying 
to repay this debt.’30 Even JVC board members knew that ‘vocation’ as a reason 
for volunteering had became passé, ‘international solidarity’ and ‘technical as-
sistance’ became the new key terms.31 
Country selection  
Being a state organisation, SNV’s activities were based on an inter-state con-
tract, and the request for volunteers had to come from the government of a 
developing country. The volunteers were embedded in national programmes for 
development or worked on projects approved by the national authorities. With 
the increasing importance attached to criteria such as human rights and levels of 
poverty, the choice of countries to cooperate with formed an evermore complex 
dilemma. Minister Pronk had tried to limit the number of focus countries but at 
the same time introduced a separate category of ‘Special Programme Countries’ 
to which aid would be given but only under stringent criteria, and not via the 
national government but through non-governmental organisations. SNV’s 
policy for choosing countries for projects was largely congruent with Pronk’s 
selection criteria, although there was less stress on the ‘poorest of the poor’, as 
Pronk felt that this was a criterion difficult to maintain in the case of a voluntary 
service: the local working context and circumstances (ontvangst-structuur) were 
relatively important in the case of volunteers.32 Within SNV, fierce debates 
were held about the projects in the Special Programme Countries group. Some 
felt that SNV ought to stop its activities in some countries as continuing them 
would be paramount to supporting right-wing regimes. Others argued that pro-
jects should continue as the populations in these countries could not help living 
under such regimes and needed assistance in any case.33 JVC representatives 
were forced to accept the focus countries strategy but did not agree with it, 
wishing to continue to work in countries with which they had historical ties 
regardless of the current political situation there. They felt an ‘instinctive dis-
                                                 
30  ‘Jubileumfilm – 10 jaar ontwikkelingswerk’ (1976) in DVD series: ‘Een geschiede-
nis in beeld’. (‘Dat wij hier zo’n goed leven hebben komt ook door het kolonialisme 
van ons ten opzichte van de Derde Wereld in vroeger tijden en ik geloof dat de 
Westerse wereld hier een grote schuld heeft en die probeer ik op mijn manier in te 
lossen.’) 
31  Foreign Affairs, file 22, meeting minutes, SNV Board, 29 November 1967, p. 3. 
32  Nijzink, Dag vrijwilliger!, pp. 47-49. 
33  Interview 5; SNV Bolivia & SNV Peru, ‘Beginselen van democratische besluitvor-
ming niet gerespecteerd’, Vice Versa 11, 4 (1977), pp. 24-25. 
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like’ against ‘having the developing nations sit the SNV exam’.34 The JVC’s 
proposal to include the percentage of Christians in a given country as a criterion 
was unacceptable to other board members.35  
Those pressing for radical political action wanted SNV to withdraw from all 
countries with a dubious human-rights record or an authoritarian system of 
government. Debates focused on a number of Latin American countries. From 
Brazil came the advice to stop the SNV programme, as matters ‘had little to do 
with fighting social inequality’.36 A volunteer from Chile wrote that his boss 
had stamped him as a communist and that he had been robbed by the military 
and beaten up by the police when he wanted to lodge a complaint about this. 
According to him, there was no point in sending out new volunteers, as they 
would merely replace people who had been ‘kicked out for political reasons’.37 
Peru was another case in point. Former volunteers accused SNV of following a 
top-down approach and disregarding the voices of ordinary Peruvians. Farmers 
gathering at a congress in Lima reportedly called on voluntary organisations to 
leave as: ‘In many places in the country, members of such organisations are 
developing activities of political, pro-imperialist penetration. They are masking 
their political activities of a deep paternalistic character with presumed activities 
of cooperation and international aid.’ But SNV did not pay heed to such warn-
ings and sent a new group of volunteers anyway.38  
For the JVC representatives, such statements were exaggerated and they felt 
that the politicisation in SNV was completely out of proportion and was leading 
only to ridiculous situations: 
                                                 
34  Foreign Affairs, file snv/ara/00313, meeting minutes, JVC Board, 4 October 1977, 
p. 5, (‘... de gevoelsmatige weerstand aan particuliere zijde tegen het laten afleggen 
van het SNV-examen door de ontwikkelingslanden.’) 
35  Foreign Affairs, file 375, memo, Chef AJV to DGIS, ‘Gesprekskring tussen over-
heid en partikulieren’, 25 January 1972; Ibid, file 375, meeting minutes, ‘Gespreks-
kring tussen overheid en partikulieren’, 28 January 1972. 
36  Ibid. file 81, letter, ASJV/hr. Franssen to AJV/PR: ‘SNV Brazilië’, 9 November 
1973, p. 4. (‘De SNV-activiteiten in Brazilië hebben weinig of niets te maken met 
het bestrijden van sociale ongelijkheid.’) 
37  Ibid. file 80, letter, J.P. Leyser, Chili volunteer, 4 February 1974 (‘mensen die er om 
politieke redenen uitgeschopt zijn’). 
38  Ibid. file 497, report, Rosenstok to Pronk, ‘Visie van de Kontaktgroep Nederlandse 
Vrijwilligers op de toekomst van de Stichting Nederlandse Vrijwilligers en tevens 
het KNV-standpunt in de huidige diskussie over de struktuur van SNV’, 19 Novem-
ber 1974, pp. 1-2 (‘Op veel plaatsen in het land ontwikkelen leden van deze orga-
nisaties aktiviteiten van politieke, pro-imperialistische penetratie. Ze maskeren hun 
politieke werkzaamheden met veronderstelde aktiviteiten van samenwerking en in-
ternationale hulp, van een diep paternalisties karakter.’) 
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In SNV there was a tendency to divide the entire world into good and bad. There 
were good governments and bad governments. All governments were in one cate-
gory or the other (…) There was a whole list with boxes to tick. There were people 
on the Board who were highly sceptical about this. 
As the average lifespan of many governments in Third World countries was 
not long in any case, they felt that the whole debate about classifying countries 
according to their political outlook was irrelevant and unnecessary.39  
Apart from the criteria of human rights and political outlook, projects in 
relatively rich countries also evoked debate. Some volunteers in Ivory Coast 
were even ashamed of what they were involved in: ‘The visitor can hear some 
people say that they do not actually dare to return to The Netherlands because a 
mother is waiting there – or a girl – who expects to be looked in the eyes.’ It 
was felt that by continuing activities in Ivory Coast, the V73 was simply not 
being implemented by SNV Head Office.40 In Nigeria too, the volunteers found 
themselves discussing whether their work was pointless or not at every meet-
ing.41 In the end, the relative wealth of both presented a reason for SNV to stop 
sending volunteers to the two countries. In the case of Ivory Coast, the Tele-
graaf row (Telegraaf-rel, see below) – a defamation campaign by a large Dutch 
newspaper – was also a factor in leaving the country. 
The volunteers did not always consider the grounds on which SNV decided 
to include a country as being solid. From Bangladesh came complaints that the 
country had been included on the basis of merely one report and later SNV 
withdrew also only because of one report.42 While field staff thought that SNV 
had ‘stepped into it with their eyes closed’ and it had not been wise to send 
‘such immature-like volunteers’ (van die opgeschoten-achtige vrijwilligers) to a 
                                                 
39  Interview 203. (‘SNV had de neiging om de hele wereld in te delen in goed en 
slecht. Je had goede en slechte besturen. Alle besturen van de wereld zaten in een 
categorie (…) Er was een hele lijst met kruisjes. Er waren mensen in dat bestuur die 
daar heel sceptisch over waren.’) Interview 244. 
40  SNV archives Yaoundé (Cameroon), Reports and documents: M. de Vries, ‘SNV in 
West.Afrika. Verslag van een dienstreis naar Kameroen, Ivoorkust, Boven-Volta en 
Nigeria in de periode van 6 november t/m 4 december 1973)’ (Den Haag, 1973), p. 
26 (‘De bezoeker kan sommige mensen horen zeggen dat ze eigenlijk niet meer naar 
Nederland terug durven gaan, omdat daar een moeder wacht of een meisje, die ver-
wacht in de ogen gezien te zullen worden’); Kees Hartog, ‘Vrijwilligers in Ivoorkust 
stelden zichzelf vele vragen’, Vice Versa 8, 28 (1974), pp. 10-14; Foreign Affairs, 
file 81, meeting minutes, SNV Board, 28 March 1974, pp. 3-6. 
41  Arie Kuiper,‘Het Kano irrigatie-projekt: profijt voor de kleine boertjes?’ Vice Versa 
9, 30 (1975), p. 19. 
42  Foreign Affairs, file 26, letter, Annette Mensink to SNV Board, Dacca, 9 October 
1974, p. 1. 
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sophisticated culture like Bangladesh,43 at least a number of the volunteers felt 
that both the volunteers and the Bengali wanted SNV to continue. Local people 
had reportedly said: ‘That is what always happens with internationals: they start 
with something but never finish it, even though we need them very badly.’44 
Volunteers in Zambia were unsure as to whether Zambia fell within the 
selection norms as it was a relatively rich country, even though some regions 
were very poor.45 Although SNV activities were focused on one of the poorer 
areas (Western Province) the reasons for choosing this area were not idealistic. 
Just as before, each missionary congregation had its own sphere of influence in 
many African countries and the donor countries also partitioned Zambia along 
these lines, with the Dutch ‘receiving’ Western Province as their working area. 
Over the years many Dutch people from SNV, DGIS and other Dutch develop-
ment agencies came to live in Western Province and one of the streets in the 
district capital of Mongu received the nickname of Beatrix Road. The director 
of the local development centre commented that: ‘The feeling most people had 
was that the Dutch government had a liking for Western Province. Some even 
felt that it was being treated as a province of The Netherlands!’46  
In countries with a socialist political orientation, such as Tanzania and Gui-
nea Bissau, SNV worked through the national government. Tanzania in parti-
cular became the ‘donor’s darling’ and the country was flooded with projects, 
loans, programmes and development workers.  
Political action and drawn-out discussions 
Solidarity and political action were crucial concepts during this period. Protests 
were organised against KLM, which was still flying to South Africa, Outspan 
oranges were boycotted and SNV volunteers teaching in the freedom fighters’ 
schools in ANC camps in Tanzania were addressed as ‘Comrade’.47 In many 
Latin American countries and in the frontline states along the South African 
border, the political situation was often tense. Travel could be hazardous and in 
some countries the military and the police hassled local people as well as 
                                                 
43  Kees Hartog, ‘Problemen van Bangladesh zijn onvoorstelbaar groot’, Vice Versa 8, 
28 (1974), pp. 18-21 (‘we zijn er te lompweg ingestapt’). 
44  Foreign Affairs, file 26, letter, Annette Mensink to SNV Board, Dacca, 9 October 
1974, pp. 1-2. (‘Dat, gebeurt nu altijd met internationalen, ze beginnen ergens aan 
maar ze maken het nooit af, terwijl wij ze erg hard nodig hebben.’) 
45  Ibid. file 29, meeting minutes, 19e regio-vergadering Luapula Province, Kawambwa. 
30 March 1974. 
46  Interviews 149 (quoted), 150 and 168. Other examples of such donor partition in-
clude Tanzania and Guinea-Bissau. 
47  Interview 102. 
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foreigners. There were even cases of SNVers being thrown into prison on suspi-
cion of being a South African spy. Arie de Kwaaisteniet saw a camp of Zim-
babwean guerrillas and refugees being bombed near Lusaka and when he and a 
companion attempted to travel from Zambia to Tanzania, they were interrogated 
several times by the Zambian police who took them to be South African merce-
naries. They were attacked by an angry mob, barely escaping.48 Even pamphlets 
sent from The Netherlands to SNV volunteers in Brazil could be interpreted as 
‘subversion’ and led to problems for the volunteers and the people connected 
with them.49 In Bolivia a similar case occurred when volunteers were suspected 
of subversive activities after pamphlets supporting the opposition movement 
were distributed.50 
Political action was usually preceded and accompanied by much discussion. 
And in addition to political action, this was a time of debate about SNV’s aims 
and ideals. In reaction to the vertical decision-making procedures of the period 
before, the 1970s ideal in SNV was that all people have a voice in matters. 
Some held that this even became endemic in the organisation: ‘All according to 
SNV culture this led to drawn-out discussions and interminable meetings.’51 
Such participatory methods within the organisations were not always efficient 
and this was also true of the volunteers’ Field Councils too. At one point SNV’s 
director even tried to lead the organisation through the principle of ‘creative 
chaos’.52  
The stress on individuality in the 1970s and the new ideas about develop-
ment considerably altered views on the nature of voluntarism. When SNV first 
began, the ‘transfer of knowledge’ was seen as characteristic of the role of the 
volunteer. Soon, however, the aims became more modest, as we have already 
seen, with some suggesting ‘knowledge confrontation’ as a more appropriate 
term.53 Since the end of the 1960s, the idea of the volunteer as the know-all 
amongst ignorant locals had disappeared: the SNVer came to be seen as an 
apprentice and the experience in SNV as a learning process for the volunteer. 
From the beginning, the notion of SNV as a pedagogical institute had been 
important and youngsters were to learn through contact with people from other 
cultures. Now, ex-volunteers mentioned the learning process of the volunteer 
                                                 
48  Interviews 118, 8, 111, 112, 139 and 151. 
49  Foreign Affairs, file 497, letter, n.n. to Rosenstok, 4 July 1974. 
50  Interview 267. 
51  Zevenbergen, De deskundige, p. 92. (‘Geheel naar SNV-cultuur leidde dat tot uitge-
sponnen discussies en urenlange vergaderingen.’) 
52  Nijzink, Dag vrijwilliger!, p. 43. 
53  Foreign Affairs, file 11, report by L.P.J. Mazairac, The Hague, November 1968,  
p. 9. 
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rather than that of their counterpart or any other local participant, as an explicit 
aim of the organisation.54  
Some people came to see SNV as a road to self-realisation; a means of 
expanding one’s mind and developing one’s personality. This philosophy grew 
in importance in SNV’s Human Resources Department, leading to fierce con-
flict with the more pragmatic Board and the young radical graduates who 
wanted action. Former volunteers within and outside the organisation had an 
awkward relationship with SNV, while problematic relations between the state 
and private initiatives were still unresolved. Combined with a ‘democratisation 
discussion gone off the rails’ and pressure from the Minister to transform the 
organisation, SNV became plagued by internal divisions and tensions.55  
Although in a very different manner to those before them, SNV volunteers in 
the 1970s still believed that they could change the world. With their radical 
stance and their principled approach, they often clashed with the pragmatism of 
the generation before them, or even with peers of a more practical nature, both 
in The Hague and in the field. Aldert van der Vinne, who was in Zambia from 
1979 onwards, was ten years older than most of the other volunteers, had al-
ready had work experience, had a family to care for and was of a practical 
nature. He explained how his opinion about the role of SNV contrasted with 
that of a new incoming volunteer: 
When a new volunteer arrived, he first had to stay with somebody who had already 
been there for a while. I was allocated one for two and a half weeks. It was someone 
who had completed agricultural university so he had had a better education than me 
and I looked up to him a little for that reason. The first day he asked me: ‘Do you 
speak all these languages?’ and I told him that it was nothing special. But he was 
very impressed and told me that according to the Zambians I spoke their languages 
very well. I told him that Zambians always say so until they want something from 
me that they do not get, then I am the worst person in the world again!  
After a couple of days I told him: ‘Hey, come on man, just do this right now, yester-
day we agreed on it.’ You know, I came from a farm, not from school, I had always 
worked. I had arranged all kinds of tractors with ploughs and machines and of 
course I could manage them much better than all those Africans together. But well, I 
had to teach them that work had to be done as well! At a certain point I might say: 
‘Get right off that tractor, just let me do it and watch how I do it because it has to be 
done right!’  
                                                 
54  Foreign Affairs, file 497, letter, Rosenstok to Pronk, ‘Visie van de Kontaktgroep Ne-
derlandse Vrijwilligers op de toekomst van de Stichting Nederlandse Vrijwilligers 
en tevens het KNV-standpunt in de huidige diskussie over de struktuur van SNV’, 
19 November 1974, p. 5; On their SNV time as learning experience, see Interviews 
10, 113, 116, 168, 266, 287 and 289. 
55  Interviews 5 and 204. W.A. Erath, ‘De grenzen van het vrijwilliger zijn,’ Vice Versa 
8, 24 (1973), p.17; Nijzink, Dag vrijwilliger!, pp. 43, 53 (‘doldraaiende democratise-
ringsdiscussie’). 
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After a week or so the new volunteer came up to me and said: ‘But, this is not right.’ 
I said: ‘Why not?’ ‘Because he has to learn it himself!’ I told him: ‘Then he just has 
to watch me and he will know how to do it. He will not be able to do it yet but then 
he will know that it is better that I teach him because he sees that I am able to do it. 
That is much better than standing on the sidelines telling him I don't know either, 
while I do know and he doesn’t know, and he knows that I know.’ After a week the 
volunteer said: ‘On the one hand I think it is great the way you are working here but 
I do still have some criticism.’ ‘Oh yeah, like what?’ I asked him. ‘Well, you are 
doing all the work yourself!’ 
So I told him: ‘Of course man! All the work needs to be done, right? There is only 
one planting season. At a certain moment you have to plant the maize, that is when 
you have to do it! You could start like, ‘Well let’s talk about this’, but then you’re 
already too late!’ ‘Not really,’ the volunteer responded, ‘you have to look at it 
differently. Don’t you think that the most important task you have is to make your-
self superfluous?’ I told him: ‘Now you tell me, what do you see as your most 
important task here?’ ‘Well, to make myself superfluous.’ I said: ‘Boy, pack your 
bags and go home. Nobody here asked for you, you are completely superfluous, 
really. Just stop it! Boy, I can only give you one piece of advice: Go back to Lusaka, 
talk to SNV and tell them: “I think I am making myself completely superfluous by 
taking a plane” and leave. Boy, that is just complete bullshit! We came here to work 
for a job!’ 
The new volunteer was later removed by the Zambian authorities for being 
lazy.56  
Similarly in Guinea Bissau intense conflict arose over practice and ideology. 
Volunteers had initially been recruited through the Eduardo Mondlane Founda-
tion, while DGIS people and SNV volunteers were hired through standard 
recruitment channels. In the small village of Buba they were put to work on a 
water-supply project. The differences between the various groups soon led to a 
dramatic situation. The field director Jan van Maanen felt that it was the intoler-
ant and orthodox attitudes of some of the Mondlane adepts that made life 
impossible: ‘If one of the SNV volunteers asked: “Shall we go fishing over the 
weekend?”, the Mondlane people would exclaim: “What?! Fishing? Nothing of 
the sort! We must serve the people, so we will have a meeting.”’57 Others felt 
that it was congruent with the élan of the time: some of the Dutch people in 
Guinea Bissau had been engaged in the struggle for independence from Portu-
guese colonialism and among the volunteers as well as among the population, 
there was true enthusiasm for the socialist programme of the ruling political 
                                                 
56  Interview 113. 
57  Interview 18. (‘Vroeg iemand van SNV: ‘Zullen we lekker gaan vissen dit week-
end?’ Die Mondlaners zeiden dan: ‘Wat vissen?! We gaan helemaal niet vissen! We 
moeten het volk dienen en dus vergaderen.’) 
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party. Van Maanen was by some seen as a ‘Nosey Parker who interfered in 
matters they could handle themselves’.58 
In retrospect (but only in retrospect), some former volunteers agreed that it 
was not always wise to draw each and every one into the decision-making pro-
cess: 
Jacob: Those days were really the days of democratisation. Everybody wanted to 
participate in the management.  
Carla: Because didn’t we all knew how matters should go?! And didn’t we all have 
such good ideas?! We really didn’t get it that they did not understand that! 
Jacob: We did not understand that The Hague sometimes had to take decisions 
without each and every idiot in the field airing his view first! And we were con-
sulted; we also had this Field Council. 
Carla: There was no email or fax then, so communication did not go very fast with 
letters. So we would learn that they had decided something and then we would ask 
ourselves why we had this so-called democratisation anyhow.59 
After eleven years in SNV service, one of the first-generation volunteers, 
Elizabeth Badon-Ghijben, stated in an interview that volunteers ‘cannot bring 
about the revolution.’60 
The B Objective 
New ideas about development led to the conclusion that matters not only 
depended on actions in the Third World but that changes in Western societies 
were equally necessary. Development was not merely a matter of ‘a helping 
hand to a developing land’, as the slogan in the 1960s went;61 it needed aware-
ness and the conscientisation of people in the West.  
                                                 
58  Informal conversation with former Guinea Bissau volunteer; ‘SNV had meer eisen 
moeten stellen’, Vice Versa 20, 4 (1986), pp. 28-32 (‘een pottekijker die zich met 
zaken kwam bemoeien die zij zelf wel aankonden’). 
59  Interview 111. (‘Jacob: En die tijd was echt de tijd van de inspraak natuurlijk. 
Iedereen wilde mee regeren. Carla: Want we wisten toch allemaal hoe het moest? 
We hadden toch hele goeie ideeën? We snapten ook niet dat ze dat niet begrepen! 
Jacob: We snapten niet dat Den-Haag soms wel eens beslissingen moest nemen 
zonder dat iedere idioot uit het veld daar zijn mening over had! Er werd wel naar 
onze mening gevraagd, we hadden ook die veldraad. Carla: Er was ook geen e-mail 
en geen fax, dus per brief ging de communicatie niet erg snel. Dan werd verteld dat 
ze al zus of zo besloten hadden en dan vroegen wij ons af waarom er dan zogenaamd 
inspraak was.’) 
60  Marjanke Spanjer, ‘Elizabeth Badon Ghijber verlaat de SNV’, Vice Versa 8, 29 
(1974), pp. 12-13 (‘dat onze vrijwilligers geen middel kunnen zijn om een revolutie 
tot stand te brengen’). 
61  Film: ‘Ontwikkelingssamenwerking: raakpunt van twee werelden’ (1969) in DVD 
series: ‘Een geschiedenis in beeld’. 
 THE YEARS OF RADICAL COMMITMENT  115 
 
 
 
Photo 4.2 SNV’s B Objective: ‘Bram Schutte in Burkina’. 
Source:  SNV photo archives, White, Tanzania, B-vorming. 
Photographer:  Jaap Pieper. 
 
A Dutch proverb roughly meaning ‘He who says A, has to say B as well’ 
(Wie A zegt, moet ook B zeggen)) was used as a slogan to introduce a new SNV 
objective that started in 1974. The B Objective, with the ‘B’ standing for the 
Dutch word for awareness (bewustwording), was to create awareness amongst 
the Dutch populace about the issue of development and SNV’s role in it. In the 
eyes of the more radical (former) volunteers, the B Objective was to receive 
more attention than the A objective of ‘aid’:  
It means that the A Objective, which it is now unthinkingly assumed to mean ‘aid’ 
and which KNV on the basis of experience, evaluation and consideration has to say 
that this is often not the case, has to be changed profoundly and be moved to the 
second plan (we can after all only be very modest about its significance) and that the 
B Objective, hitherto only be put into practice by former volunteers themselves, 
while, to put it mildly, not being encouraged by SNV, become the most important 
goal of the organisation.62 
                                                 
62  Foreign Affairs, file 497, letter, Rosenstok to Pronk, ‘Visie van de Kontaktgroep Ne-
derlandse Vrijwilligers op de toekomst van de Stichting Nederlandse Vrijwilligers 
en tevens het KNV-standpunt in de huidige diskussie over de struktuur van SNV’, 
19 November 1974, p. 7. (‘... dat doelstelling-A, waarvan nu maar klakkeloos wordt 
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In practice the B Objective meant that returning volunteers would tour the 
country providing information about development issues, educational work or 
voluntary service in the NGO sector. 
That was really being drummed in. There was the A Objective (being sent overseas) 
and there was the B Objective when you got back. I did the B Objective when I 
returned. I was on the Tanzania Committee for a while and volunteered in a Fair 
Trade shop (Wereldwinkel). I set up a documentation centre and we went to youth 
centres and schools to present papers. We taught them songs, like Kaka Joni 
(Brother John in Swahili). I did that for years.63  
Vice Versa, the SNV magazine that was first published in 1967, was consid-
ered an ideal tool for the new SNV task of enhancing awareness about devel-
opment among the Dutch public. In the famous Socutera films, Dutch people 
were to learn about SNV’s work on television through succinct ten- to twenty-
minute films highlighting SNV projects. Although the films frequently men-
tioned problems and difficulties, the overall image was usually positive about 
the results of the volunteers’ work. SNV’s B Objective involved a greater 
presence in the media. The SNV volunteer Miss Dollekamp participated in the 
quiz: ‘Wat doe je voor de kost?’, which resulted in requests for more informa-
tion, and two marriage proposals. Even an imaginary SNVer was invented: 
Bram Schutte in Burkina, a character who gave information about development 
work and the Third World, mainly in schools.64 Over the years, the importance 
of the B Objective increased sharply. In 1977 it officially became part of SNV’s 
policy and was institutionalised in 1981 in the name change: SNV (Stichting 
Nederlandse Vrijwilligers) became SNV Organisatie voor Ontwikkelingssamen-
werking and Bewustwording (Organisation for Development Cooperation and 
Awareness).  
                                                 
aangenomen dat zij “hulp” betekent en waarvan KNV op basis van ervaring, eva-
luatie en bezinning moet zeggen dat dit veelal niet het geval is, sterk gewijzigd 
wordt en naar het tweede plan verhuist (we kunnen immers niet anders dan zeer 
bescheiden zijn over de betekenis hiervan) en dat doelstelling-B, tot nu toe alleen 
door de ex-vrijwilligers zelf in de praktijk gebracht, daarbij op z'n zachtst gezegd 
niet gestimuleerd door SNV, het belangrijkste doel van de organisatie wordt.’) 
63  Interview 8. (Hetty: ‘Dat werd er echt ingepompt. Je had de A-doelstelling, het uit-
gezonden worden en de B-doelstelling was hier terug. Ik heb bij terugkomst de B-
doelstelling gedaan. Ik heb toen een tijd in het Tanzania Comité gezeten en in de 
Wereldwinkel. Ik heb een documentatie centrum opgezet. We gingen naar jongeren-
centra, scholen, daar gingen we lezingen geven en leerden we ze liedjes, zoals Kaka 
Joni. Dat heb ik jaren gedaan.’) 
64  Nijzink, Dag vrijwilliger!, p. 59; ‘Vrijwilligers op de buis’, Vice Versa, 8, 26 (1974), 
p. 31; Marjanke Spanjer, ‘Bram Schutte lééft op vele scholen!’, Vice Versa, 8, 29 
(1974), pp. 21-23. 
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Despite investments in the B Objective, the initiative did not enjoy resound-
ing success. The criteria used for the selection of volunteers with technical 
expertise turned out not to be ideal when selecting the people to give informa-
tion to lay audiences. Also some volunteers returned home disappointed and 
very critical of the organisation they had worked for, and others spoke nega-
tively about their experiences. To overcome such problems, a special Informa-
tion Pool was set up of motivated people with obvious didactic qualities. For a 
long time it was not clear what the B Objective entailed and even in 1987 some 
thought that special B SNVers would be hired, but how this would be imple-
mented nobody knew. During one of the meetings in Tanzania’s Northern 
Region, the following question was asked: ‘What is a B SNVer?’ ‘We can’t say’ 
was the answer. Others assumed that the publicity work would remain an extra 
task on top of the A work in the field.65  
The most fundamental issue plaguing the implementation of the B Objective 
was the varied interpretation of its role. Several board members saw the B 
Objective primarily as an interesting way of promoting SNV as an organisation 
and wanted to relate awareness of development issues to SNV’s publicity 
campaign. Radical former volunteers did not share this view, seeing it as one of 
the problems of Dutch development aid that, while SNV only accounted for 
0.001% of GNP, the organisation was strongly mediatised and over-determining 
in its image of Dutch development for the general public. For them, the B 
Objective was one way of unmasking this distortion of the truth.66 However 
others felt that by overstressing conscientisation in The Netherlands, less atten-
tion was paid to people in the developing world. Too much ‘navel gazing’ did 
not do justice to SNV’s main aim.67  
A 1985 evaluation concluded that SNV had not used all the possibilities 
available to the full in efforts to implement the B Objective. Formally conscien-
tisation remained an objective until the early 1990s but, by then, it was gener-
ally felt that other organisations were much better equipped to provide informa-
tion about development to the Dutch public than SNV was.68  
 
                                                 
65  Archives SNV Tanzania, Dar es Salaam, Box: ‘Physiotherapy – ’85-’89, etc’, File: 
‘B Objective’: Minutes of the Regional Meeting Northern Region, 1 November 
1986; Ibid. letter Rob Visser, Dar es Salaam, 22 September 1987.  
66  Interview 204. 
67  Interview 5. 
68  Programma evaluatie SNV, SNV goed bekeken! (Den Haag, 1985), pp. 6, 31-36; 
Van der Velden & Zweers, ‘Personele samenwerking’, in: Lieten & Van der Velden, 
eds, Grenzen aan de hulp, pp. 258-259. Also Interview 17. 
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Returned volunteers and the KNV  
The B Objective had an important side-effect in that after completing their 
contracts volunteers stayed in touch with the organisation and the development 
branch.69 In many cases, returning home proved difficult, as one volunteer ex-
plained: 
Upon coming back, people are full of interest and ask how it was and what you did. 
But that is all. They are not really interested in the problems that you have seen and 
the place you lived. Conversations always remain somewhat superficial.70 
Some volunteers kept in contact with others after their return and a commit-
tee of ex-volunteers had been set up by the end of the 1960s. They had tried to 
garner political influence within SNV as an organisation but Minister of Devel-
opment Udink at the time had blocked all participation. Although this initiative 
was discontinued, in 1970 the Kontaktgroep Nederlandse Vrijwilligers (Contact 
Group of Dutch Volunteers) was founded. At first, reunions of former volun-
teers were the group’s most important activity, but soon more radical ex-volun-
teers became influential in KNV and they sought to alter SNV’s structure. After 
Boertien had taken over the ministerial post, the ex-volunteers gained two seats 
on the SNV Board. Especially when Jan Pronk became minister, KNV repre-
sentatives were allowed some room for political manoeuvre and the group’s 
influence rose over the years. Their role in SNV’s democratisation process, the 
B Objective and the selection of projects and countries cannot be overestimated. 
The presence of KNVers on the Board led to comical exchanges: the style of 
these young radical former volunteers – with their long hair and beards, velvet 
corduroy trousers and sandals – did not quite match with the aristocratic man-
ners of Prince Claus, the administration-minded officials representing the 
Ministry and the inner circle of JVC representatives. One of the KNVers, to 
everyone’s amusement, once said to Prince Claus at a board meeting: ‘Mister 
President, that’s complete bullshit!’71  
                                                 
69  Interview 1. 
70  Arie Kuiper, ‘Teruggekeerde vrijwilligers’, Vice Versa 8, 26 (1974), p. 25. (‘Als je 
terugkomt (…) vragen de mensen vol belangstelling hoe het is geweest en wat je zo 
ongeveer hebt gedaan. Maar daar blijft het bij. Ze interesseren zich niet écht voor de 
problemen die je hebt gezien, voor de situatie waarin je hebt geleefd. De gesprekken 
blijven altijd een beetje oppervlakkig.’) See also Rutgers-van der Loeff, Gewoon in 
het ongewone, p. 143; ‘Terugkerende vrijwilligers krijgen een koude douche – wat 
kan daaraan gedaan worden?’, Vice Versa 12, 1 (1978), pp. 31-33; and Maaike 
Maria van Vliet, ‘In Nederland voelde ik me als een weerloos schepsel’, Vice Versa 
12, 4 (1978), pp. 2-3. 
71  Interview 5. (‘Meneer de voorzitter, dat is groot gelul!’) 
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On the whole however, there was little reason for laughter at meetings as 
relations between the KNVers and the rest of the Board were uneasy from the 
start. In the KNVers’ view, the ‘Old Guard’ of state officials and JVC repre-
sentatives were engaged in horse trading and mutually approving each others’ 
projects without any real analysis.72 The other board members felt that the 
KNVers brought unnecessary polarisation and politicisation, stalled decision-
making with their endless discussion about structures and democratisation, and 
in general lacked any team spirit. They appeared to merely want to oppose 
anything other board members suggested. Jos van Gennip remembered: ‘I used 
to cycle to the meeting every month in a bad mood. Those meetings always 
turned into a brawl.’73 
While some asked whether KNV was in fact representative of all former 
volunteers,74 it generally enjoyed a great deal of support from volunteers still in 
the field and from those who had completed their contracts. KNV meetings 
easily drew audiences of 250 to 300 and the group’s ideas on change were 
highly influential. The first SNV policy document of 13 January 1977 was thus 
entitled ‘Voluntary but not without Engagement’ (Vrijwillig niet vrijblijvend), 
just like the KNV congress held in Odijk some years earlier.75 This is not to say 
that there was no strife within KNV itself and while many had joined merely for 
the social aspect, the relatively radical KNV Board was challenged by Marxists 
and Leninists even further to the political left. And at the ‘Vrijwillig niet 
vrijblijvend’ gathering, they even nearly succeeded in ousting the KNV Board.76 
Critique from the right 
Through the B Objective and KNV, the returned volunteer came to play an 
increasingly important role in the organisation. SNV’s image in The Nether-
lands depended to a large extent on returnees, not an insignificant fact given that 
SNV had a relatively important role in promoting Dutch development coop-
eration. As already indicated, the accounts the returned volunteers gave of their 
experiences were not always positive. Their critique was usually inspired by 
                                                 
72  Interview 204. 
73  Interview 242. (‘Ik fietste iedere maand met een ontzettend kwaaie kop naar dat 
bestuur toe. Dat was een potje vechten, dat bestuur.’) Also Interviews 5 and 203. 
74  Foreign Affairs, file 497, letter, Ten Hove (volunteer in Campina Grande) to Erath, 
12 April 1974. 
75  Arie Kuiper, ‘Vrijwilligerswerk in discussie’, Vice Versa 8, 28 (1974), p. 3; Nijzink, 
Dag vrijwilliger!, p. 61; Interview 204, Foreign Affairs, file snv/ara/00313, KNV to 
Minister, KNV congres ‘SNV-beleid in uitvoering?’, 7 April 1978. 
76  Interview 204. 
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leftist thinking but the Dutch right-wing press eagerly attacked the organisation, 
sometimes quoting the stories of disappointed volunteers.  
Such tales certainly had an impact. On 19 January 1974, under the headline 
Treurige terugkeer van een vrijwilliger uit Afrika: De verloren jaren van Raoul 
Snelder (‘The sad return of a volunteer from Africa: the lost years of Raoul 
Snelder’), De Telegraaf featured the story of the thousandth volunteer who had 
signed his contract with SNV in the presence of Minister Boertien some years 
earlier amid much festivity. Raoul Snelder had been talked into giving an inter-
view by a member of SNV’s PR staff who argued that an interview with a 
quality newspaper would only amount to ‘preaching to the converted’ and that 
his account would be balanced by other, more positive accounts. These turned 
out to be false promises as the journalist, Henk de Mari, merely used Snelder’s 
account to attack SNV and the Minister for Development Cooperation.77 After 
its publication, Snelder wrote a letter to the Minister in which he expressed his 
regret at the ‘one-sided lachrymose tone’ of the article and the Minister held 
that the initiative for the article had not come from SNV itself.78 The damage 
had, however, already been done and SNV withdrew all its staff and volunteers 
from Ivory Coast. This decision did not go down well in the field and was mis-
understood by all concerned:  
We followed it, yes, but my parents in The Netherlands knew much more about it 
than I did. Also communication was bad. There was no Internet then, just every now 
and then a newspaper was sent over. That was very different from now.79 
De Telegraaf launched a full-scale crusade against SNV that culminated in 
May 1974 when news about a so-called secret report on the dismal functioning 
of the SNV caused huge commotion. Two returned volunteers had asked for an 
audience with Minister Pronk who had asked for a written report on their com-
plaints to facilitate the discussion. As the Minister then had more urgent busi-
ness to attend to, the report was left on a pile. Perhaps because of AJV dissatis-
faction with the Minister or just out of naivety, the report was leaked to De 
Telegraaf. The newspaper accused SNV, and through it the minister responsi-
                                                 
77  Interview 169. Henk de Mari, ‘Hulpstichting smijt al jaren met miljoenen’, De 
Telegraaf (3 May 1974); ‘Pronk werpt zijn blaam op zijn voorgangers’, De Tele-
graaf (14 May 1974); ‘Vrijwilligershulp steeds meer ten goede aan armsten’, De 
Telegraaf (9 April 1975); Nekkers & Malcontent, section with pictures; Foreign 
Affairs, file 81, ‘Mondelinge beantwoording door Pronk (Tweede Kamer)’ 9 May 
1974; Ibidem, file 881, questions and answers in Parliament, 1974; For earlier 
articles de Mari had offered beer and cigarettes to volunteers in the field and then 
took pictures: Bieckmann, De wereld volgens Prins Claus, pp. 150-152. 
78  Foreign Affairs, file 493, letter, Raoul Snelder to Erath: ‘Telegraaf artikelen’, 21 
January 1974 (‘al te eenzijdige en larmoyant e teneur’). 
79  Interview 125. 
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ble, of wasting ‘millions of Dutch tax guilders’, bringing the royal house into 
discredit (Prince Clause being SNV’s chairman) and of ‘fraud’ for trying to 
withhold crucial information on the organisation from the Dutch people. The 
crusade was directed more towards Minister Pronk, whose resignation was 
demanded by some opposition MPs, than SNV. However SNV and its image 
were obviously damaged by such negative news reports.80  
Examples abound of people closing ranks when under attack but in this case 
the rifts within the organisation only deepened and the various groupings within 
the SNV barely supported each other. There were tensions between the staff, 
between the Minister and the staff, between the Minister and the Board, be-
tween state and private organisations, between SNV and KNV, between 
KNVers and JVCers, between The Hague and the field staff, and between field 
staff and volunteers. The Board thought that the Minister had withheld crucial 
information about the organisation, their conclusion being that he apparently 
regarded the Board as a quantité négligable. And if this was the case, it was felt, 
he should dissolve the foundation.81 
An attempt was made at KNV’s Odijk meeting to find a balance between 
calls for structural change and support for SNV against criticism from the right. 
De Telegraaf was regarded by many KNVers as the ‘enemy’ and, for all its 
critique of SNV, KNVers were unhappy about the fact that returnees’ stories 
had been used as fuel for the right-wing press. Warnings were issued not ‘to fall 
into De Telegraaf’s trap’.82 All the same, at the meeting the KNVers concluded 
that JVC had to be denied seats on the Board as they were not involved in 
finding structural solutions for development problems and the conscientising the 
Dutch audience. Unsurprisingly, the JVC delegates were not amused when they 
learnt about this.83 KNVers, in turn, protested when van Gennip and Prince 
Claus gave an interview to the press in which they defended the SNV as organi-
sation and attacked KNV for organising activities without informing the 
Board.84 JVC members had an article published in De Telegraaf stressing the 
                                                 
80  Nijzink, Dag vrijwilliger!, pp. 46-47; Foreign Affairs, file 83, memos, Secretary 
SNV to SNV Board: ‘Telegraafartikelen tegen de SNV – Mei ’74’, 5 and 6 June 
1974. 
81  Ibid. file 26, meeting minutes, informal meeting SNV Board, 6 May 1974; Ibid. file 
26, meeting minutes, SNV Board, p. 3; Ibid. file 29, meeting minutes, Staff and 
Minister, 18 and 19 December 1974; KDC archives, file 432/1922, note, ‘Enige 
notities over de problematiek van het SNV’, 7 April 1975.  
82  Ibid. file 497, call for KNV manifestation, ‘Trap niet in de val van de Telegraaf, 
ontmasker hem!’ 13 May 1974; Interview 204. 
83  Foreign Affairs, file 26, meeting minutes, SNV Board, 15 May 1974; Ibid. file 26, 
meeting minutes, SNV Board, 28 March 1973. 
84  Ibid. file 82, Reint Rosenstok and Dick Bol to SNV Board, 22 May 1974. 
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importance of Christian missionaries in development work, and the fact that 
they ‘were not going on a mere two-year contract’.85 The chairman of the SNV 
Board claimed that they were heading down ‘a disastrous route’ if each and 
every party involved followed its own political strategy without considering the 
organisation as a whole.86 
State and private branches 
The unresolved tensions in the 1970s between the private and state branches 
within SNV came to a head. The merge had never worked satisfactorily and 
after ten years it was obvious that the disadvantages of the cooperation out-
weighed the advantages.  
There were still differences in legal status between the JVC volunteers and 
those recruited directly through SNV. All agreed that this situation should 
change but there was disagreement over the conditions under which this would 
take place. While the JVC wanted to keep the selection of projects in its own 
hands, SNV staff insisted that if the volunteers working on JVC projects were to 
acquire the same legal status as the other volunteers, the procedures for select-
ing projects should also shift to the Ministry. Apart from these legal discus-
sions, there was increasing dissatisfaction on the part of some of the young 
radicals about JVC procedures. Many of the more radical volunteers regarded 
the private sections of SNV, which were often closely linked to the churches, as 
being old-fashioned and conservative. One of the theses used in the debates at 
the KNV ‘Vrijwillig niet vrijblijvend’ congress stated:  
Organisations that have a seat on the Board and are not engaged actively with 
conscientisation in The Netherlands and a structural approach towards development 
cooperation ought to put their seats at the disposal of organisations who are engaged 
in this.87 
KNV demanded that JVC give up at least three, perhaps even all six of its 
seats on the SNV Board.88 This idea came to be shared by ministerial officials 
                                                 
85  KIT archives, Box 4046, Newspaper article ‘Bij de missie zinkt de hele SNV in het 
niet’, De Telegraaf (18 May 1974). 
86  Ibid. file 26, meeting minutes, SNV Board, 15 May 1974 (quote p. 5: ‘een heilloze 
weg’); also: Ibid. file 26, meeting minutes, SNV Board, 6 May 1974, pp. 8-10. 
87  Nijzink, Dag vrijwilliger!, p. 51. (‘Organisaties, die een zetel in het bestuur hebben 
en zich in Nederland niet actief bezighouden met bewustmakingswerk en een 
structurele aanpak van de ontwikkelingssamenwerking, dienen hun zetels ter be-
schikking te stellen aan organisaties die dit wel doen.’) See also Ibid., pp. 55-56 and 
Interview 5. 
88  Foreign Affairs, file 497, letter, Rosenstok to Pronk, ‘Visie van de Kontaktgroep 
Nederlandse Vrijwilligers op de toekomst van de Stichting Nederlandse Vrijwil-
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and the minutes of a 1974 meeting between the Minister and the AJV staff 
stated: ‘For eleven years cooperation with private organisations failed to work. 
The JVCers cannot be changed overnight. For Objective A as well as B, the 
JVCers are curtailing matters.’89  
Numerous attempts to rescue the union were made because JVC projects 
formed a relatively large percentage of the total number of projects undertaken 
within SNV. For example, there were JVC projects in Cameroon, Brazil, 
Bolivia, the Philippines and Upper Volta in 1974.90 In the same year, both 
Minister Pronk and the JVC delegates claimed that a schism would be ‘histori-
cally unpalatable, politically difficult and externally unfeasible’.91 With the 
coming of Jan de Koning as the new Minister for Development Cooperation in 
1977, matters changed and when the JVC asked about changing the organisa-
tional structure, de Koning declared that by having ANV officials present, three 
possible models of cooperation existed.92 The first was to leave the situation as 
it was. This was the option chosen by KNV, that held that an organisational 
structure ought not be changed if one of the partners refused to adopt a loyal 
stance. It repeated that JVC influence on the SNV Board should be reduced but 
thought that splitting the two groups would only mean a return to pillarisation.93  
At the historic meeting at which the JVC General Council decided on the 
proposals, it was concluded that the JVC wished that the state had not restricted 
the options to three models, but in the end the JVC council voted against models 
1 and 2. The first model – to continue with the existing structure – evoked a 
long list of past and present grievances on the part of the JVC about the current 
situation. SNV was regarded as a state organisation and the focus-countries 
discussion received too much attention. SNV’s structure had a permanent 
conflict model as the Board had no say over its own staff and the staff remained 
in a difficult position sandwiched between the Minister and the Board. Its state 
character was incompatible with the nature of a voluntary organisation, SNV 
                                                 
ligers en tevens het KNV-standpunt in de huidige diskussie over de struktuur van 
SNV’, 19 November 1974, p. 9. 
89  Ibid. file 29, meeting minutes, Staff and Minister, 18 and 19 December 1974, p. 6. 
(‘Elf jaar lang heeft de zaak niet gewerkt en de Partikulieren kunnen niet in één mo-
ment omgebogen worden. De Partikulieren werken zowel t.a.v. doelstelling A als B 
remmend.’) 
90  Ibid. file 84, meeting minutes, SNV and Minister, 27 June 1974, p. 7. 
91  Ibid. file 26, meeting minutes, SNV Board, 19 August 1974, p. 6 (‘historisch onver-
kwikkelijk, politiek moeilijk en naar buiten onhaalbaar’).  
92  Ibid. file snv/ara/00313, meeting minutes, JVC General Council, 27 April 1978. 
93  Ibid. file snv/ara/00313, meeting minutes, KNV to Minister, ‘KNV congres ‘SNV-
beleid in uitvoering?’, 7 April 1978; Ibid. file snv/ara/00313, meeting minutes, JVC 
General Council, 4 October 1977. 
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policies were not flexible enough to match the continuously changing situation 
in the Third World and its decisions were often based on the ideas of inexperi-
enced volunteers instead of on those of the local people in charge. SNV only 
accepted JVC volunteers under conditions set by the state and it aimed at creat-
ing a uniform volunteer, thereby negating the plural character of the organisa-
tion and classifying JVC as a mere supplier of volunteers. And last but not least, 
SNV was much more expensive to run than it should be. The second model, 
which proposed the state jointly subsidising SNV and JVC, was historically 
desirable, but JVCers feared it would lead to ‘endless discussions about the 
structural change of SNV’. The meeting finally chose the third model in which 
there was a state subsidy for a separate JVC organisation.94 
In 1978, the split became reality and the private organisations went their own 
ways under the JVC umbrella and separate from SNV. In future, the JVC would 
receive funds directly from the government but for some time they kept two 
representatives on the SNV Board. The JVC later formed the PSO, together 
with OPIT and DOG. It was therefore possible to have ‘more volunteers for less 
money than in SNV with all the overheads and its yacking structure (ge-oh-
structuur)’, as one JVCer put it.95 
Secularisation  
Although relations between the private organisations and the Dutch state in the 
voluntary sphere were problematic from the start, the churches were widely 
regarded as the most important contributor in the field of Dutch development 
aid in the 1960s. Few people initially contested the role of the churches and 
missions in the development sphere but this changed in the 1970s. Development 
then came to be seen as something modern and different from the missions or, 
in any case, the missions and development started to grow apart. While politics 
in the realm of development aid had often been inspired by a Christian back-
ground, mistrust grew in the 1970s between the state and the Church on this 
matter. Several times during his time as Minister, Jan Pronk came into conflict 
with the churches over subsidies for church-related development projects.96 In 
general, this period saw an increasing secularisation and de-pillarisation of 
                                                 
94  Ibid. file snv/ara/00313, meeting minutes, General Council JVC, 4 October 1977. 
Also KDC archives, file 432/1924, letter, Edith de Boer-Sizoo to JVC board mem-
bers, 18 November 1977. 
95  Bieckmann, De wereld volgens Prins Claus, p. 158; Interviews 242 and 244; and 
PSO website: http://www.pso.nl/jubileum/index.asp?page+geschiedenis. 
96  J. Bos & G.H.A. Prince, ‘Partners in ontwikkeling: de beginperiode van het (kerke-
lijke) particuliere ontwikkelingswerk’, in: Nekkers & Malcontent, eds, De geschie-
denis, pp. 176-177. 
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Dutch society; a tendency that also influenced changes within SNV. The con-
cerns within SNV about the JVC’s position can be seen as a sign of this grow-
ing tendency. Volunteers’ new ideas were discussed by the SNV Board and 
members realised ‘that modern young people wanted it differently and regarded 
a technical project as technical work and wished to keep the religious aspects 
out of it.’97 
Secularisation was apparent in the projects in the field that were gradually 
becoming more independent of church and mission influence. A Vice Versa 
issue in 1974 featured an interview with Father Franken, who facilitated an 
SNV training centre in Morogoro by letting out a building formerly used by the 
Catholic mission: ‘It is like a symbolic changing of the guard: the missionaries 
– the development workers of the first hour – are being replaced by the volun-
tary crowd.’98  
In other instances, the change went less smoothly. Reint Rosenstok, volun-
teering on a Roman Catholic project in the Philippines, was appalled when the 
Father leading the project told him that one of the project’s aims was to fight 
communism.99 At the Technical Institute in Cochabamba in Bolivia, there was a 
sharp increase in conflicts when radicalisation among the teachers took place in 
a politically precarious environment. The Augustinian Father Kurvers, who 
headed the school, had ‘some problems with the ‘hippies’,100 by which he meant 
the SNV volunteers who were working as teachers, although he also came into 
conflict with his fellow Fathers.101 The SNV volunteers wanted the Bolivianisa-
tion of the school but at the same time some of them spoke Dutch during meet-
ings and largely determined school policy themselves.102 When the school 
management was finally Bolivianised, matters came to a head because the new 
Bolivian general director wanted to increase religious teaching at the school, 
while most of the SNV teachers and the Bolivian technical director felt that 
religion had no place in a technical school. The Fathers regarded the general di-
rector as ‘a red’, whereas the teachers saw him as a ‘right winger’. The general 
                                                 
97  Foreign Affairs, file 22, meeting minutes, SNV Board, 11 April 1968, p. 7. (‘Dat 
moderne jonge mensen anders willen en een technisch project als technisch werk 
zien en de levensbeschouwelijke aspecten daarbuiten willen laten.’) 
98  Theo Ruyter, ‘Trainingscentrum in Morogoro’, Vice Versa 8, 26 (1974), p. 12. (‘Het 
lijkt wel symbolisch voor een soort aflossing van de wacht: de missionarissen, ont-
wikkelingswerkers van het eerste uur, worden afgelost door het vrijwilligersvolkje 
dat op de een of andere manier ook een steentje wil bijdragen aan de ontwikkeling 
van de Derde Wereld.’) 
99  Interview 204. 
100  Interview 266. 
101  Interviews 253 and 267. 
102  Interviews 253 and 269. 
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director feared political consequences with the teachers becoming more militant 
and the government more dictatorial.103 In the end, the Fathers appointed a 
church representative as director and later, due to financial problems and the 
general political crisis, the Fathers sold the school to supporters of the 1980 
coup for an unrealistically low price.104  
The case of Bertoua in eastern Cameroon is also telling. Whereas in the 
preceding chapter we saw that the ties between the diocese and SNV were 
initially strong, problems arose after a while. Some of the volunteers were 
thought to be of ‘low calibre’ (laag niveau), as the former Bishop of East 
Cameroon put it. Most of the incoming SNV people were ‘of good intention’ 
but there were a few who overstepped the boundaries of what was deemed 
acceptable behaviour by the missionaries, especially in terms of their sexual 
behaviour. They left a mark on relations between the missionaries and SNV. 
Most of the volunteers tried to do their best and generally they did do a good 
job, but many did not know enough French to be able to cooperate with their 
counterparts and as a rule they had little knowledge about the country before 
their arrival.105 SNV field leaders in Cameroon accused the missionaries of not 
sticking to agreements, doing charity under ‘a cloak of development aid’ (een 
jasje van ontwikkelingshulp), and regarding the local people as inherently less 
capable than the whites. ‘Cameroonisation’ was a ‘lump of modelling clay.’106 
Relations eventually turned sour and, after seven months, the SNV team 
leader felt that it would be better to function independently of the mission. 
Formally the cooperation continued until 1981 and SNV was even regarded as 
part of the mission by the Cameroonian authorities. But in 1981 a range of 
misunderstandings and mutual breaches of trust finally led to an emotionally 
charged end to the cooperation. By then, Bishop van Heygen knew that ‘the 
Church had got into SNV’s bad books’.107 
The ideas of the missionaries and the new volunteers tended to clash in areas 
of sexuality and health. Carla Schoemaker, who was a volunteer stationed at a 
Catholic mission post in Zambia between 1980 and 1983, explained it as fol-
lows: ‘As a health advisor, people were not waiting for your arrival. The nurses 
in Zambia had a completely different mentality. They prescribed all kinds of 
medicine for children who were just trying to avoid going to school. My 
prescription would be to send them back to school!’ She was not allowed to 
                                                 
103  Interviews 267 and 272. 
104  Interview 253. 
105  Interview 83.  
106  Foreign Affairs, file 11, report by L.P.J. Mazairac, The Hague, November 1968, pp. 
19-20; SNV Archives, Yaoundé (Cameroon), ‘Jaarverslag 1981’, pp. 23-25 (‘een 
klont boetseerklei’); Ibid., SNV Kameroen, ‘Jaarverslag 1980’, p. 32. 
107  Interview 83. 
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discuss birth control or STDs, and personally did not agree with the Catholic 
preaching on abstinence.108 
Some volunteers lost their faith while abroad. Aldert van der Vinne, for 
example, went to Zambia in 1979 partly because of his religious convictions, 
but he soon became sceptical about his faith.  
I came from a Protestant background and here I began to realise the fact that that, in 
the final analysis, one tends to fill in the gaps that one does not understand with a 
deity. In our society less and less deity was needed, because of science. Here we 
were thrown back onto it because we did not understand why we didn’t receive any 
rain. So we had to pray for that (…) In the end, I grew away from it.109 
The increased secularisation not only impacted on relations with the mis-
sions. In general, the volunteers were sceptical of religious influences. One of 
SNV’s volunteers encouraged villagers to take matters in their own hands by 
saying: ‘Allah does not take care of everything,’ which provoked reactions of 
shock and laughter from the Malians present.110 This is not to say that there was 
no interest in religious matters: while the mainstream religions were losing 
influence amongst the volunteers, local religions were regarded as interesting. 
As Kik van den Heuvel said: ‘In the 1980s SNVers were definitely anti-Chris-
tian, moving more towards Marxism. But local religion was ‘cool’.’111 
Dire circumstances 
Apart from the growing disassociation with the missions, many SNV volunteers 
also no longer wished to be linked to colonialism. The first SNV teams were 
often led by people who had worked in the former Dutch colonies but by the 
1970s, the new volunteers did not want anything to do with such ties. Willem 
Zevenbergen was once taken to task by a young radical volunteer, fresh from 
The Netherlands, who was deeply shocked when he heard that Zevenbergen had 
previously worked as a colonial official in New Guinea: ‘Well Mr Zevenbergen, 
in that case you have a contaminated past!’ Zevenbergen was told. Later the two 
men got on well.112 Many educated people in developing countries, who worked 
                                                 
108  Interview 111. 
109  Interview 113. (‘Je kwam er hier achter, ik kwam dan uit een gereformeerde achter-
grond, dat je uiteindelijk de dingen die je niet weet, met een godheid invult. Bij ons 
was er door de wetenschap steeds minder godheid nodig. Hier werden we weer 
teruggegooid, want hier begrepen we niet waarom we geen regen kregen, dus daar 
moesten we voor bidden (...) Ik ben er behoorlijk van weg gegroeid.’) 
110  Nico Kussendrager, ‘SNV-ers in Mali organiseren preventieve gezondheidszorg’, 
Vice Versa 13, 2 (1979), p. 10. 
111  Interview 86. 
112  Interview 5. (‘Zo meneer Zevenbergen, dan heeft u een besmet verleden.’) 
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with SNV as supervisors, associates or counterparts, felt that it was high time 
that local people had more say in development projects: 
In the beginning, the project was without doubt paternalistic. Most of the Dutch 
came from farmers’ families with a colonising mentality. They were not bad people 
and they had no bad intentions but when I arrived, the situation was clearly one of 
inequality.113 
Most volunteers who were dispatched during this period were highly sensi-
tive to such arguments. They did not wish to be associated with charity, pater-
nalism or ‘doing good’ and wanted to break with old stereotypes about people 
in Africa, Asia and Latin America. 
There was a certain ambivalence among the volunteers about employing 
cooks and guards as some feared this would be classified as neo-colonialism. 
The volunteers did not want to have privileges and wanted to live on an equal 
footing with the local population. They knew that they continued to be regarded 
as Western and rich, but did not want to be classified as such. In a number of 
cases, the volunteers still lived in separate compounds with other foreigners, a 
case in point being the ‘Orange Quarter’ in Morogoro. Unlike in the preceding 
period though, this was regarded as a problem as it ran against the SNV concept 
of ‘working and living for, amongst and amidst the Tanzanians’.114 
Soon after their arrival, many came to realise that they could not manage 
without some of the amenities they were used to and needed to hire personnel so 
as to have enough time to carry out the work they had come to do. Local 
expectations also forced the volunteers to employ personnel: 
Of course I have a servant. If you do not have anybody who cooks for you, they 
regard you as a stingy bastard here. And if I do not ask the boy to get that tin of milk 
for me but did it myself, he’d think he was not doing his job right.115 
During SNV’s early years, volunteers arrived in teams but by the 1970s most 
worked with only a few fellow SNVers at their project location or, in some 
cases, were the sole SNV volunteer in a vast region. This meant that the volun-
teers were more dependent on local facilities and contacts, which was often 
challenging. In many cases, there was simply nothing available in the local 
shops and many volunteers took out as much as they could carry after leave in 
                                                 
113  Interview 264. 
114  Archives SNV Tanzania, Box: NOVIB/oud – ‘77/’86, etc’, file: Morogoro Wells 
Construction: final report, Niek Hoorweg, 24 November 1981. 
115  Nijzink Dag vrijwilliger!, p. 60. (‘Natuurlijk heb ik een bediende, Als je niemand 
hebt die voor je kookt dan zien ze je hier als een gierige rotzak. En als ik niet die 
jongen dat blikje melk had laten halen, maar dat zelf had gedaan, dan denkt hij dat 
hij zijn werk verkeerd doet.’) Also Nico Kussendrager, ‘Echte ontwikkeling is niet 
spectaculair’, Vice Versa 12, 3 (1978), p. 7; Interview 139. 
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The Netherlands. In Tanzania, volunteers had to queue for hours for sugar and 
flour and were only allowed a daily ration of three buckets of water. ‘Let’s go 
suffer,’ they would say when heading for the queue.116 Lieke Felten came out of 
this period with a life-long distaste for baking bread: 
I lived through the bad times when nothing was available. With a lot of creativity we 
made ends meet. We even made sausages ourselves and the like. On the one hand, it 
was good together, we helped each other (…) We took along things from The 
Netherlands, there was no other way. Cheese and clothes for the children (...) It left 
me with an abhorrence of baking bread; I will never ever do that again. We first had 
to get grain somehow and then dry it in the sun to get the vermin out. Then go to the 
mill and then bake the bread. But first we would have no yeast and then there would 
be no more gas halfway through the baking process: the bread was inedible. We did 
have charcoal, but then again no matches. We did not have electricity. But we did 
have water.117 
Medical services were non-existent in some project locations and Jan 
Schuthof, one of the first to work on SNV activities in Tanzania, made the 
coffins for several volunteers who died of malaria.118 For some time, Jan van 
Maanen, who became field director of SNV Guinea Bissau in 1979, slept in one 
of the beds in his hotel room, while the other functioned as the SNV field 
office.119 As the Cameroonian field leader wrote in 1978: ‘YOU DON’T HAVE 
TO BE CRAZY TO WORK HERE BUT IT SURE HELPS!’120  
The dire circumstances could lead to awkward situations. As the volunteers 
were white foreigners, they sometimes received better treatment than others and 
would have access to products that were not available to the rest of the popula-
tion:  
At the time, I received some privileges because of my skin colour. They might say: 
‘Pastor – because that is what I was called – Pastor, your sugar has arrived’. Purely 
                                                 
116  Interview 8 (‘Kom, we moeten gaan sufferen’) and Interview 112. 
117  Interview 110. (‘Ik heb in de slechte tijd gezeten dat er niets te koop was. Met veel 
fantasie hebben we het gered. Zelf worsten gemaakt en noem maar op. Het was 
gewoon gezellig. We hielpen elkaar (…) We namen Nederlandse dingen mee, dat 
moest wel. Er was echt niets. Kaas en kleren voor de kinderen (…) Waar ik een tic 
van over heb gehouden is broodbakken. Dat doe ik nooit meer in mijn leven. We 
moesten eerst graan zien te krijgen en dat dan in de zon leggen, om de beestjes eruit 
te krijgen. Dan naar de molen en dan brood bakken. Dan hadden we weer geen gist 
en dan hadden we weer geen gas, had je het half in de oven. Was het brood niet te 
eten. Charcoal hadden we wel, maar dan hadden we weer geen lucifers. We hadden 
geen elektriciteit. Water hadden we wel.’) 
118  Interview 90. 
119  Interview 18. 
120  SNV Archives, Yaoundé (Cameroon), SNV Kameroen, ‘Jaarverslag 1978’, p. 34 
(capitals in the original). 
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due to one’s colour, one gets a position of some sort. I was reminded of that quote 
from Glyn Roberts in Questioning Development: ‘Although our thoughts are with 
the masses, we move with the higher classes.’121 
Yet at the same time, the volunteers increasingly attempted to integrate into 
local society. Young, often from the alternative society, quite a number of them 
during this period ‘went native’. They learnt to speak the local language, wore 
local dress, ate local food, drank the local alcohol, played local music and the 
male volunteers often had local girlfriends.  
Going native 
During this period SNV volunteers worked at the local level and could get to 
know the local circumstances fairly well. Earlier, interaction between local 
participants and the teams of volunteers had frequently been limited to the work 
situation but the 1970s brought a tendency towards greater integration of the 
volunteers into local society. This was not only due to the fact that some volun-
teers were dispatched to areas with few other foreigners but many volunteers 
also regarded integration into local society as an ideal. They wanted to adapt to 
local circumstances and, in conformity with notions of development at the time, 
relate to the local people. While educated people used to be regarded as the best 
possible contact persons, by the 1970s ties with the ‘poorest of the poor’ were 
seen as crucial for development practitioners. 
Not only did volunteers often learn the local language, they also tried as far 
as possible to live like the local people did. Their housing was usually simple, 
transport was a piki-piki (motor cycle) or a bicycle and they ate the same food 
as the people amongst whom they lived. The volunteers occasionally received 
local names, not least because their Dutch names were not easy to pronounce 
for local people. Some volunteers also received names that referred to a physi-
cal or behavioural characteristic they had. One of the volunteer ‘comrades’ in a 
Tanzanian ANC camp was called Bwana Nyoka (Mister Snake) because he kept 
snakes and a very tall (2.07 m) volunteer in Bolivia was known as Chato 
(Spanish for ‘flat, low (short)’), as his real name was too difficult to pro-
nounce.122 SNVers might study local medicine, take an interest in music and 
participate in village rituals and festivities. Some volunteers not only learned the 
local language but also continued using words from it after returning to The 
Netherlands. They came home with souvenirs, dresses and music from the 
                                                 
121  Interview 139. 
122  Interviews 102, 255, 36 and 187.  
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county to which they had been sent: ‘African music is now accepted in Europe; 
development workers have certainly contributed to that.’123  
Many local people were impressed by the efforts that the volunteers made to 
adapt to local circumstances. ‘He spoke Swahili better than me!’ a driver who 
worked with volunteers in the early 1980s noted.124 Quite a number of respon-
dents made comments along the lines of: ‘The Dutch adapted quickly, they ate 
everything, they were easygoing. They loved to live in Africa. They really took 
root, it was not that they just did something.’125 Of course, comical situations 
also arose: ‘The music goes to the right and all the Dutch go to the left! We 
laughed till we cried when they danced.’126 Exchanging jokes and having a good 
time together was mentioned frequently by local people who had participated in 
SNV projects. Déni Balo, a women’s leader in Koula, Mali had never heard of 
the words SNV or OVN (Organisation des Volontaires Néerlandais, as SNV 
was called in French before 1985) and she did not know where the toubabounou 
(little white people) came from who visited their village but she did know that it 
was fun whenever they came: 
Breneti (Bernadette) came, and gave me a box with tablets (to distribute). As for the 
vaccination, she would do that herself. She would eat here. She used to come with a 
lot of food: so that we could eat together: all the women’s leaders. And she would 
knock on my shoulder and ask: ‘Hey, do you like the food?!’ We laughed together. 
She was a jovial person. (…) One could notice that she was really trying. She would 
squat on her haunches like us, ate with her hands like us (…)127 
The benefits of development work were interpreted in material as well as 
social terms by the local participants. Creating social ties; getting acquainted 
with a person and becoming friends was deemed very important by all the 
participants. The frequent shift in personnel was therefore difficult to accept for 
many of the local people:  
A person comes for two years. Everybody gets used to this person. This person takes 
on a name. The people meet with him, they exchange jokes, they talk with each 
other, they pat each other on the back. Then after two years, this person leaves again 
to be replaced by another. The locals take some time to get used to the new per-
son.128 
Some volunteers did not leave but stayed on in the country where they 
worked as a SNV volunteer. Others left for another country to do development 
                                                 
123  Interviews 63 and 86. 
124  Interview 99. 
125  Interview 59. 
126  Statement made during Interviews 26 and 68. 
127  Interviews 194 and 192. 
128  Interview 36. 
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work there and became part of the growing group of ‘development nomads’. 
During most of the 1970s the volunteers still saw their stay abroad as a tempo-
rary adventure for a few years, befitting their age and leftist enthusiasm. But by 
the end of the 1970s this was changing due to the increasing importance and 
influence of the Third World movement in The Netherlands. A growing number 
of SNVers regarded development work as their future and invested in a career 
that would take them abroad on a more or less permanent basis, although not 
necessarily to the same place. Many of these were former students from 
Wageningen Agricultural School and although the first volunteers had received 
only a fairly basic level of education, by the 1970s and 1980s there was a 
marked increase in the number of well-qualified people with higher educational 
backgrounds. 
‘Volunteers and love’129 
If any serious relationships developed among the first SNVers, they were 
mostly within the teams in which they worked. This changed in the 1970s and 
marriages and relationships with local people also started to occur and a rela-
tively high percentage of SNVers married locally. A conversation between three 
former SNVers in Botswana illustrates some of the consequences:  
1st SNVer: ‘Indeed, people tend to come back, I wonder why?’  
2nd SNVer: ‘To visit in-laws, that is for sure!’ 
1st SNVer: ‘Some people never leave. You both are here since 1983 and 1985!’  
2nd SNVer: ‘But I did leave for some years in between, but somehow grew attached 
to the place.’ 
1st SNVer: ‘Attached to in-laws, you mean!?’130  
While intercultural marriages occurred relatively frequently in development 
circles, many people in those days still regarded them as exceptional. The field 
staff merely encouraged the volunteers to consider the cultural differences but 
would make no further objections:  
I married a Zambian woman. In my time that was all OK with SNV. They just said: 
‘Think twice, the cultural differences are big, it might all go wrong.’ (…) We did 
hear that in the years before us, people were sent home if they were seen with local 
women.131  
SNV did not have a formal stance on intercultural relationships and reactions 
could differ sharply from one staff member to another. The experience of 
                                                 
129  Dick van Reeuwijk, ‘Toch groeit de behoefte aan een vriendin vrij spoedig’, Vice 
Versa 10, 3 (1976), pp. 16-20 (‘Vrijwilligers en liefde’). 
130  Hermans, SNV in Botswana, p. 25. 
131  Interview 112. 
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Tineke Louh-Fokkens in Cameroon, for example, was very different from the 
one described above:  
Tineke: Relations with SNV were good until I started living together with my 
Cameroonian boyfriend. Then the situation became a mess. While if one considered 
what the men all did! They had all sorts of local girlfriends. And mine was a serious 
relationship with a man (...) If we went out with the car, my husband had to sign a 
note in case of a fatal accident. That had to be done according to SNV rules, they 
insisted on it! When they learnt that we were having a relationship, they wanted to 
transfer me to another area. They did that more often when a relationship started. 
They would always have a dig at me. Like the fridge: they’d say: ‘This Cameroo-
nian is using the fridge!’ (…)  
Mr Louh: The field leader was strongly opposed to the relationship between me and 
Tineke. He came once and then Tineke got asked: ‘Do you let a black man drink 
cold water from the SNV fridge?!’ There was talk of shame about it. There were 
other ways they tried, they even got Bishop van Heygen to ‘convert’ us.132  
Matters worked out well in many cases but such marriages were not always 
easy. One girl was ostracised by her Islamic family when she started dating a 
Dutch volunteer and one SNVer married a Bolivian girl who was in the resis-
tance movement and had to go underground. In less spectacular cases, cultural 
differences, for example regarding bride price or time-keeping, might affect the 
relationship.133  
‘Volunteers and love’ obviously did not concern marriage alone. Many 
SNVers – mostly single young men – engaged in sexual relations that were 
never meant to last a lifetime. In the matters of sexuality in general, cultural 
differences played a role: 
For male volunteers there were two options: to marry or to visit a prostitute. You 
would notice that half of the male volunteers got married to a Filipino girl within six 
months and the rest would go to nightclubs every now and then. But any other 
                                                 
132  Interview 240. (Tineke: ‘De betrekkingen met SNV waren goed totdat ik ging sa-
menwonen met mijn Kameroense vriend, toen werd het een puinhoop. Terwijl als je 
keek naar wat die mannen allemaal deden! Die hadden allerlei lokale vriendinnen. 
En als je dan een serieuze relatie begint met een man (…) Als we een ritje gingen 
rijden met de auto dan moest mijn man een briefje ondertekenen in het geval van 
een dodelijk ongeluk. Dat moest van SNV, daar stonden ze op! Toen ze merkten dat 
we een relatie hadden wilden ze me overplaatsen naar een ander gebied. Dat deden 
ze wel vaker als er relaties ontstonden. Ik kreeg altijd steken onder water. Bijvoor-
beeld de koelkast: er werd gezegd dat ‘die Kameroener’ gebruik maakte van mijn 
SNV koelkast!’ (…) Mr. Louh: ‘De veldleider van SNV was erg tegen de relatie 
tussen mij en Tineke. Hij kwam een keer langs en toen werd tegen Tineke gezegd: 
‘Laat jij een zwarte man koud water uit de SNV koelkast drinken?!’ Daar werd 
schande van gesproken! En zo waren er veel meer dingen die ze geprobeerd hebben, 
ook de aartsbisschop Van Heijgen werd erbij betrokken om ons te ‘bekeren’.) 
133  Interviews 112, 266, 287 and 8. 
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option was impossible. You could not have a girlfriend; a girlfriend would mean 
marriage. That was difficult. Society, you know the Fathers: they had problems with 
such activities. They would of course hear: ‘The Dutch volunteers were in this or 
that night club!’ That is of course a subject rarely discussed in history but also 
during the SNVers’ preparation. Like: What should we do about such matters? 
These days perhaps that has changed. But from what I know, in those days, and also 
in Africa, everybody had to look for his own solution. Things that in hindsight one 
might now say: actually that was not wise, but well, one had to find a solution.134 
This was the period when up to a quarter of the volunteers came home with a 
sexually transmitted disease. In those days, knowledge about HIV/AIDS and 
safe sex were not yet widespread.135 The older generation of SNV staff mem-
bers and JVC representatives frowned upon such behaviour and called for more 
stringent measures to curb excesses: ‘He who abuses the poverty of the autoch-
thonous woman has understood little of development work.’136  
Although it was clear that sexual relationships and love affairs had a huge 
bearing on the work, SNV as an organisation did not deal with the issues and 
simply left it to each volunteer’s own sense of responsibility.137 
Partial integration 
The volunteers’ attempts to integrate into local society were much appreciated 
by the people with whom they worked, especially the fact that they accepted the 
local food, took the trouble to learn the local language and sometimes even 
married into the local community. These were regarded as signs of acceptance. 
Yet for many of the local people, the volunteers’ wish to integrate into local 
society also posed dilemmas; the acceptance was never entirely unreserved. 
                                                 
134  Interview 204. (‘Voor de mannelijke vrijwilligers waren er twee opties: trouwen of 
naar de hoeren gaan. Je zag zo de helft binnen een half jaar getrouwd met een Fili-
pina en de rest ging zo af en toe naar de nachtclub. Maar iets anders kon niet; een 
vriendin kan je daar niet hebben: een vriendin is trouwen. Dat is lastig. En de 
samenleving: de paters hadden het toen ook al moeilijk met dergelijke activiteiten. 
Die hoorden dan weer: ‘de Dutch volunteers waren in die en die nightclub! Dat is 
natuurlijk een vrijwel onbesproken onderwerp in de geschiedenis, maar ook in de 
voorbereiding van SNVers. Van hoe doe je dat? Vandaag zal dat misschien anders 
zijn. Maar wat ik weet, ook over Afrika, is dat iedereen zijn eigen oplossing moest 
vinden, dingen waarvan je achteraf misschien zegt: dat kan niet misschien, maar je 
moet wat.’) 
135  Dick van Reeuwijk, ‘Houding tegenover seksualiteit is ieders eigen verantwoorde-
lijkheid’, Vice Versa 11, 1 (1977), pp. 14-16; Also Interviews 8 and 90. 
136  Foreign Affairs, file 12, memo, De Vocht/De Vries to BV: ‘Gedrag SNV’ers te vel-
de’, 6 November 1972. (‘Verder heeft hij die echt misbruik maakt van de armoede 
van de autochtone vrouw, weinig begrepen van ontwikkelingssamenwerking.’) 
137  Van Reeuwijk, ‘Houding’, Vice Versa 11, 1 (1977), pp. 14-16. 
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Given the short stay of most of the volunteers, integration could only be partial. 
Most local people felt it was strange to see men with long hair and one SNVer 
who worked as a teacher at a technical school was called Jesus for this reason. 
Field staff member Jan Schuthof gave some of the volunteers a military haircut 
when they arrived.138 The dire circumstances in some cases made volunteers 
wary of local products. Volunteers in Mali were sometimes at a loss as to 
whether to accept and drink the dirty water they were offered, water that they as 
health workers advised the locals against drinking, or to accept it out of polite-
ness. Malians teased them with it by saying: ‘Il faut boire! Il faut boire’ (You 
must drink!).139 
Local domestic staff could be embarrassed by attempts at equality. A Dutch 
volunteer’s former servant in Cameroon remembered: ‘The man I was living 
with asked me when I served his food to sit with him at the table and share the 
meal. As a servant I didn’t understand this. I was not used to this. He wanted me 
to eat with him, as if I was not his servant.’140 Some people failed to understand 
why volunteers did not make use of the options available to them. With hind-
sight, former volunteers realised this:  
One had a certain status as SNVer, but also as a white person, to be prepared to 
work in the bush that way. We lived in a house, really local, and not a house that 
was deemed suitable for whites. We of course felt that was great. There was no 
electricity and only rarely did we have running water. Some Zambians might say: 
‘He lives the way we live’. But the large majority said: ‘What kind of a loser is 
that?’ They pretended to be nice to me but they could not understand why I went to 
live there. They thought it was silly that someone who could afford comfort chose to 
go and live in such circumstances.141 
The local people did not expect foreigners to completely adapt: they felt it 
was only logical that foreigners stuck to some of their own habits. They learnt 
about the strange Dutch predilection for sugarless black coffee, liquorice and 
treacle waffles.142 Most local participants also stressed that Dutch people were 
very time-conscious: 
Two minutes before the appointment, they would knock on the door. (…) They 
would always come on time, and the Tanzanian teachers came late. They would be 
                                                 
138  Interviews 95, 90, 96 and 140. 
139  Nico Kussendrager, ‘SNV-ers in Mali organiseren preventieve gezondheidszorg’, 
Vice Versa 13, 2 (1979), p. 9. 
140  Interview 67. 
141  Interview 113. 
142  Interviews 52, 59 and 62. 
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angry, they did not want to wait but to use every single minute. They would shout: 
‘Kwa sababu gani umechelewa?” (Why are you too late? in Swahili)143 
Whereas most people praised the Dutch for their strictness with time and 
money, the way in which they pressed for this was not always appreciated. In 
some cases critique was expressed too overtly and was felt to hurt local notions 
of diplomacy.144  
 
 
Photo 4.3 ‘Gerrit Ponjé at work as a woodwork teacher’, Lower Technical School, 
Tabora, Tanzania 1976. 
Source:  SNV photo archives, White, Tanzania, Vakonderwijs-Houtbewerking. 
Photographer:  Unknown. 
 
 
                                                 
143  Interview 140. 
144  Interviews 43 and 61. 
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Development dilemmas  
Increasingly, SNV’s work was affected by dilemmas.145 From the outset, SNV’s 
policy of acting upon the explicit requests of developing nations conflicted with 
its ideals and norms about development. As was shown in the preceding chap-
ter, there had always been discussions on the Board about how far SNV could 
make demands on its counterparts to respect agreements. In the field too, there 
had been dilemmas about how to avoid local politics interfering in SNV pro-
jects. As the wishes and needs of developing nations and their inhabitants 
became ever more central, this dilemma grew in intensity in the 1970s. The new 
generation of volunteers wanted to show respect for local customs and tradi-
tions, with local culture even being idealised by many volunteers. Development 
could no longer be imposed by the West but had to be based on local traditions. 
Whereas in the 1960s local culture was by and large seen as a hindrance to 
development, now ujamaa in Tanzania was praised as ‘an age-old African idea’, 
and an SNV project in Peru tried, as far as possible, to ‘work in the Inca way’ 
by using manual labour.146 ‘Participation’ became a key word and ‘target 
groups’ had to be drawn into the decision-making process. At the same time, 
however, volunteers often had clear ideas about the direction that change should 
take. Congruent with the wave of democratisation sweeping through SNV as an 
organisation in The Netherlands were ideals about emancipation, equality, 
democratisation and human rights that were very dear in the minds of many of 
the volunteers. Their opinions about health, religion and education could be at 
variance with local values too. The volunteers often aspired to a different status 
than the one locally allocated to them. 
This was no easy dilemma: volunteers frequently felt sandwiched between 
continuing to show respect for local culture and their personal democratic ideals 
of emancipation. What exacerbated this dilemma further was the fact that, while 
during the bricks-and-mortar era of the 1960s SNV volunteers had focused on 
constructing roads, wells, pumps, bridges, houses, etc., growing importance was 
being attached in the 1970s to education, primary healthcare and other areas in 
which ‘participation’ was even more likely to lead to direct political confronta-
tion. The emphasis on democracy at times brought SNV volunteers into conflict 
with their superiors in the ministries or in the organisations in which they had 
been placed. Hierarchy and status played an important role in working relations 
in some of the societies in which SNV was active. Volunteers’ ideas about 
                                                 
145  Cf. Ton Dietz ‘Particuliere ontwikkelingssamenwerking. De medefinancierings-
organisaties en steun aan NGO’s’, in: Lieten & Van der Velden, eds, Grenzen aan 
de hulp, p. 148. 
146  Film: ‘Die streep móet weg’ (1972) and film: ‘Peru – wegenbouw’ (1974) in DVD 
series: ‘Een geschiedenis in beeld’. 
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democracy and participation did not always go down well in such contexts and 
often led to conflict with local superiors. One volunteer wrote: ‘Bigger idiots 
than Doufta of course do exist – our Dear Lord also created us – but they are 
few and far between.’147 In several instances, SNV volunteers even had to leave 
the organisation in which they were working. And, as with nearly all issues 
during this period, this also influenced relations between SNV and JVC: 
It was difficult at times for JVC volunteers. They would see that fifty km from 
where they were, there were SNV volunteers. These would cost I don’t know how 
much money. But they would quarrel with the governor and get kicked out. The 
JVCers would then say: ‘And we are here, we are continuing to work hard, and we 
get nothing for it.’148  
Such dilemmas could divide volunteers and their local colleagues. At a 
Tanzanian school, for example, the volunteers cut the morning roll call, as it 
was then that corporal punishment was meted out. The Tanzanian teachers saw 
this as a lack of collegiality and tried to explain matters to the foreigners: 
None of the foreign teachers wanted to see students being caned. They saw it as a 
humiliation of the students. But we know our students. Even the parents agreed. 
Some of them take marijuana. In such cases one has to be strict. Actually the student 
should be expelled. But what will that bring? S/he will sit at home doing nothing – 
and perhaps become a prostitute or a thief. That is why we said: ‘We will not expel 
them. He or she can stay in school and in the end become a good mother or father. 
But we need to punish them so that they will improve their ways.’149  
Ideas about development and how it should be implemented could differ in 
many ways. SNV was then tending to work in the most remote and poorest 
areas of the countries with which a contract had been signed. However, not all 
the local people agreed with this policy: 
I remember that as a child I heard about a project in the bush. They had brought 
palm-oil milling machines. But to make palm oil we would always stamp it with our 
feet. We thought: ‘Why are those white people going into the bush? They should 
start with the people near the road. Now the people in the bush are becoming more 
developed than us.’150 
In some cases the volunteers got to know the people they worked with quite 
well and became ever more confronted with the discrepancies between ‘devel-
                                                 
147  Archives SNV Cameroon, Yaoundé, SNV Kameroen, ‘Jaarverslag 1981’ p. 43. 
(‘Grotere droplullen dan Doufte bestaan natuurlijk wel – Onze Lieve Heer heeft 
immers ook óns geschapen – maar ze zijn schaars.’) 
148  Interview 244. Also: SNV Archives, Yaoundé (Cameroon), SNV Kameroen, Box: 
‘West tot 1978/1980,’ file: Community Development: letter Willem Zevenbergen to 
Veldleider SNV in Yaoundé, 14 July 1976. 
149  Interviews 140 and 131. 
150  Interviews 51 and 61. 
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opment’ as an ideal and ‘development’ as an industry. The division between the 
world of the project and the world beyond the project had become a living real-
ity. As one volunteer remembered:  
I liked visiting the villages of the employees I was working with on the project. 
Once I came to a village and ended up with someone I got along very well at work. 
But when I came to see him, he said: ‘You are allowed to come. You are welcome 
but I don’t want you to try to change my village. That’s what we are doing on the 
project, but not where I live.’151 
The 1960s had been a time of optimism about the possibilities for develop-
ment. The economic crisis in the 1970s hit countries, especially in Africa, very 
hard and the early hopes for development were dashed. Although growing 
attention was paid within SNV to the wishes and needs of people in developing 
countries, disappointment was beginning to be felt in many field contexts and 
the enthusiasm and idealism of the early days of independence waned. In Zam-
bia, the end of the 1970s was seen to be marked by government passivity: 
One was not accountable to anyone. We were formally embedded in a government 
organisation. But the government left us very free in the way we interpreted our 
work. That is the way it was understood: just let them go ahead, we’ll see how we 
benefit from it, whether we’ll end up with a car.152 
The economic crisis had a bearing on working relations but most SNVers 
considered it logical that state officials, who only rarely received a salary, 
would not be highly motivated and needed to invent creative ways to get by 
financially. Lack of motivation was not, however, attributed solely to the eco-
nomic predicament: the ‘African mentality’ was also deemed to be a factor in 
people’s casual attitudes towards work.153 
                                                 
151  Interview 118. (‘Ik ging graag naar de dorpen toe waar de werknemers van de 
projecten vandaan kwamen. Ik kwam daar een keer in zo’n dorp terecht bij iemand 
waarmee ik goed overweg kon op werk. Maar toen kwam ik bij hem en toen zei hij: 
‘Je mag wel komen, je bent van harte welkom, maar ik wil niet hebben dat je 
probeert mijn dorp te veranderen. Dat doen wij op een project, maar waar ik woon 
niet.’) 
152  Interview 118. (‘Je hoefde aan niemand verantwoordelijkheid af te leggen. We wa-
ren wel ingebed binnen een organisatie van de overheid. Maar die overheid liet je 
heel erg los in hoe je je werk invulde. Zo werd het ook begrepen: ‘Laat ze maar hun 
gang gaan, we zien wel wat we aan hebben, of we er een auto aan overhouden.’) 
153  Interview 2; Lilian van Amelsvoort, ‘SNV in Tanzania: mogelijkheden en beperkin-
gen van een niet-gouvernementele ontwikkelingsorganisatie’ (Occasional paper, Nij-
megen 1991) p. 129; Archives SNV Tanzania, Dar es Salaam, Box Novib/oud – ‘77-
’86 etc, file: Morogoro Wells Construction: letter, Scheppingen to Frans (van de 
Laak) 18 February 1981; Ibid. final report, Niek Hoorweg, 24 November 1981; 
Ibid., Box: ‘Physiotherapy – ’85-’89, etc’, File: PHC group tot ’87, Theo van de Ven 
(Zanzibar) 4 September 1988. 
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‘Participation’ hardly ever worked in the way SNV volunteers anticipated it 
would. For example, a project was initiated in Tanzania in which bamboo pipes 
and wooden tanks were used to supply and store water. Hailed as a project 
embedded in local structures and praised for its local participatory element, 
SNV project leaders soon realised that it would be next to impossible to resolve 
problems with the material’s durability. Apart from problems with preserva-
tives, ideals about African communal labour soon had to be modified too. The 
project has envisaged that villagers would contribute to the project by digging 
the ditches for the pipes but reality proved less romantic and, faced with high 
rates of absenteeism, fines had to be issued if villagers did not show up when it 
was their turn to help dig.154 
The dilemmas centred around cultural differences, issues of adaptation, 
varying conceptions of development and tensions between the ideals of the 
volunteers and those of the locals with whom they worked. 
A changing profile 
Over time, the profile of the SNV volunteer changed. SNV wanted to get rid of 
its ‘boy scout’ image and called for more specialised volunteers with higher 
educational levels and more experience. With the demand for higher qualifica-
tions, especially in technical areas, and an SNV contract providing an alterna-
tive for military service, the percentage of female volunteers decreased sharply 
from around 50% of all volunteers in 1965 to a mere 21% in 1980. This trend 
was to continue throughout the 1980s. While the first volunteers all had a rea-
sonably good educational level, over the years more university graduates, es-
pecially from the Agricultural High School in Wageningen, joined SNV.155 The 
average age of SNVers increased too and the number of volunteers who went 
abroad with their families rose steadily, especially during the period that is dis-
cussed in the next chapter. SNV work became ever more specialised technically 
and the earlier emphasis on community development disappeared. Most of the 
new volunteers joined to work in the areas of medicine and health care, edu-
cation, engineering and agricultural techniques, but generally at a higher tech-
nical level than before. And in the 1980s SNV’s involvement in forestry pro-
jects also grew rapidly.  
The training the volunteers received before going overseas became more 
extensive and was rounded off with an in-country training course. Some of 
these local training centres were not well equipped for their tasks and were 
                                                 
154  Interview 86; Interview 94. 
155  Nijzink, Dag vrijwilliger!, p. 34. 
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heavily criticised by the volunteers.156 The concept of voluntary service came 
under increasing attack and, while some continued to argue that people working 
for SNV ought not to receive a salary, others felt that it was only right that 
people earned a decent income and had a sound legal position.157 Daily allow-
ances increased until they reached the equivalent of a regular salary and by 
1988 a formal system of remuneration had been introduced. SNV had gradually 
moved from being a voluntary service to a professional organisation employing 
highly qualified experts with working experience behind them before they 
joined SNV.  
Conclusion 
Several developments marked the period under review here. There was a rapid 
increase in development activities and the Third World Movement grew quickly 
both in the Netherlands and around the world. At the same time, after the initial 
period in which hopes for rapid development were still very much alive, devel-
opment policies came under increasing attack in the 1970s. SNV experienced 
this general trend too and the organisation was often presented as an example of 
mismanagement and failure. The critique firstly came from within: many 
volunteers returned to The Netherlands disappointed about the results of their 
work and held SNV and its field staff responsible for bad decisions regarding 
the choice of projects and countries, a lack of adequate preparation, etc. They 
also insisted that the voice of the volunteers was disregarded in the decision-
making process and demanded more democratic procedures be installed. The 
organised call from returned volunteers for more democracy and a conscious 
political stance in the selection of countries and projects was an important 
development of the 1970s.  
There was criticism from outside the organisation too. The Dutch right-wing 
press accused SNV of misusing tax payers’ money and burdening developing 
nations with ‘white elephants’. Such critique exacerbated existing tensions 
within SNV, not least those between the state section in SNV and JVC repre-
sentatives. The legacy of missionaries’ social work slowly came to be seen as 
something that should be overcome rather than built upon. Secularisation can be 
regarded as a third major feature of this period and changes in this direction 
finally led to the separation of the private (with many Christian organisations) 
and the state branch of SNV.  
                                                 
156  Nedwerk 2, 1 (February 1988), p. 7. 
157  Nijzink, Dag vrijwilliger!, p. 60. 
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The nature of SNV’s work also changed and, with time, the concept of 
voluntary service came to be regarded as problematic. As we will see in the next 
chapter, professionalisation became the key word in the 1980s. 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Photo 5.1 ‘SNVer Pierre de Kock is having a conversation with staff of the city 
hall in Gedaref’, Sudan 1989. 
Source:  SNV photo archives, Red, SNV, Voorbereiding.  
Photographer:  Marina Danzmann, 1989. 
  
5 
Expertise expected:  
The professionalisation 
of SNV (1985-1994) 
SNV started out as a voluntary service and during its first decades there was 
considerable debate about the meaning and conceptualisation of ‘the volunteer’. 
While the term was positively associated with youth and enthusiasm in the 
1960s and early 1970s, the notion ‘volunteer’ came, over time, to be negatively 
associated with amateurism. This had consequences within SNV: more people 
were calling for a professional approach that would be accompanied by an 
adequate salary and social-insurance package. In the course of the 1980s this 
process of professionalisation was implemented, both in terms of a salary for 
SNV workers and an increased emphasis on technical and managerial expertise. 
The formal start of salary payments in 1988 marked the end of a long road 
towards professionalisation and the start of a complex set of changes stemming 
from this process.  
Professionalisation  
SNV formally changed from being a volunteer organisation into a professional 
one in the second half of the 1980s. Many small steps had been taken in this 
direction over the years and SNV’s original character as a voluntary service had 
changed considerably since its inception in the 1960s. The professionalisation 
process took place in various ways: in terms of the SNVer’s average profile, in 
its financial and legal status, and in SNV as an organisation. Over the years, the 
profile of the average SNV volunteer had drastically changed from inexperi-
enced school leavers in the 1960s to highly qualified university-educated 
experts by the 1980s. SNV was increasingly taking on qualified professionals 
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who had several years’ work experience before joining SNV. The average age 
of SNVers thus increased and the new generation often had a family to take care 
of too. To remain an attractive employer, SNV had to improve the conditions it 
offered its personnel.  
These conditions formed the basis of the second aspect of the organisation’s 
professionalisation. The legal and financial side of the professionalisation 
process started with the revision of some of the secondary conditions – moving 
expenses, costs for schooling, and an improved insurance package. While no 
formal policy was developed for accompanying partners, they were expected to 
join the preparatory course. The volunteers’ ‘pocket money’ had increased 
steadily over the years and in 1988, SNV decided to shift from having volun-
teers to salaried ‘development associates’. 
There were several reasons for SNV’s more stringent recruitment demands. 
Firstly, governments in the host countries had experienced projects that had 
failed because the expatriate development workers had been too inexperienced. 
The number of lower and middle cadre in developing countries was also rapidly 
growing so there was less need to have expatriates at this level. In addition, 
projects formerly managed by DGIS were now under SNV supervision and 
these required more experienced personnel.1 To be sure, the previous form of 
deployment of SNVers in host organisations giving technical advice or execut-
ing projects still continued but the percentage of project managers in the organi-
sation grew sharply. The SNVer was no longer a volunteer full of adventurism 
and/or idealism trekking off to foreign parts but a professional who wanted to 
see his/her expertise rewarded like any other employee. Around 1960, when the 
Peace Corps and other large voluntary organisations were founded, the word 
‘volunteer’ had a positive ring to it but in the course of the 1970s this changed 
and volunteers were considered inexperienced amateurs. The idealistic élan of 
the 1970s had waned and professional management and marketing were the new 
terms in vogue. The political activism with which many volunteers had set out 
in the 1970s became less important as many development associates regarded 
SNV as just another employer and framed their working experience as a step 
along their career path. Quite a number of SNVers were still ‘caught up by the 
tropics’ (bevangen door de Tropen) but only a few were now inspired by ideas 
of revolutionary change.2  
With the professionalisation process, investments in time became greater. In 
the 1970s a large number of volunteers had returned to The Netherlands after 
                                                 
1  Matthieu Peters, ‘Doorgaande lijn’, Nedwerk, 1, 1 (1987), p. 2; ‘Vettere kluif voor 
ervaren SNVers?’ Nedwerk, 1, 2 (1987), pp. 1-2; Elly van der Klauw, ‘Carrière 
maken bij SNV?’, Vice Versa 21, 2 (1987), pp. 7-8. 
2  Foreign Affairs, file snv/2011/00328, final report, ‘Ontwikkelingswerk en carrière: 
eindrapport’, October 1990, pp. 39, 46-47. 
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two years of SNV service but in the 1980s a growing number regarded their 
future as being in ‘development work’ in the tropics. Some experts and their 
families lived outside The Netherlands for over a decade, often moving from 
one country to another. 
SNV as an organisation also developed in a more professional direction and 
ideas about management became more widespread in the 1980s. In the non-
profit sector, to which SNV belonged, concepts like management, marketing, 
and efficiency had formerly been unequivocally associated with ‘dirty’ capital-
ism but in the 1980s they also came to be used in organisations of the Third 
World Movement. SNV’s Head Office worked towards achieving an organisa-
tional structure that functioned more smoothly with an emphasis on efficient 
budgeting and effective administrative management. This led to the setting up 
of a financial department, more training of SNV personnel and longer-term 
bureaucratic structures. Policy-making became ever more important and the 
SNV Board paid more attention to the principles and guidelines that formed the 
basis of the organisation. 
Views on SNV’s professionalisation process 
In many respects the move towards a more professional approach was appreci-
ated. Most SNVers regarded the payment of salaries as being long overdue and 
were relieved that they were finally being adequately compensated for their 
efforts.3 Although this reaction predominated, the increasing professionalisation 
also evoked some critique. The former Chairman, Prince Claus, sent a letter to 
SNV’s Director in 1995, when the professionalisation process was already well 
established: 
I wonder, however, how long an organisation like SNV will continue to exist and in 
what form: as a professional development organisation, of which there are so many, 
or as a volunteer organisation? Although I do understand very well why SNV has 
shifted its priorities over the last few years, I have always had sympathy and under-
standing for the original objective that aimed at having young Dutch people gain 
experience around the world in its many facets. That is, I admit, not primarily for the 
benefit of people in the Third World, but in my opinion it is a good thing that young 
academics and experts can develop their consciousness and character for a number 
of years through acquiring experience in other countries and cultures before starting 
their careers in The Netherlands. That particular characteristic of SNV has always 
appealed to me very strongly and it is also in this respect that SNV has differed from 
other development organisations and NGOs.4 
                                                 
3  Interviews 136 and 176. 
4  Foreign Affairs, file: snv/ara/00931, letter, Prince Claus to Berteling, 29 September 
1995. (‘Toch is het voor mij de vraag hoelang een organisatie als SNV nog zal blij-
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Some SNVers also felt that professionalisation did not have positive conse-
quences alone. One former SNVer felt that, as the stakes became higher, SNV’s 
old aim of volunteers making themselves superfluous had disappeared and the 
preservation of one’s position had become a reflex reaction that negatively 
impacted on development relations.5 Some also said that in the past SNV had 
been ‘more fun’ and that the organisation was becoming ‘too serious’. This 
view was shared by some local people who complained that the new SNV 
development associates were more aloof and that people driving by in large 
4x4s were no longer in close touch the locals who they purported to help. ‘SNV 
has changed from a sociable to a professional organisation,’ one former SNV 
administrative worker said and in Cameroonian culture this was certainly not a 
compliment.6 With the changing profile of SNV and SNVers, relations did in-
deed become different: SNVers in more managerial positions were less likely to 
‘go native’ in village life and development associates with a family were proba-
bly going to spend more time at home.  
As with many changes that originated from Head Office however, repercus-
sions in the field were gradual and happened later than the dates of decision-
making in The Hague would suggest. When Zuhura Yegella joined SNV 
Tanzania as an administrator in 1992/1993 she still found an organisation 
‘based on personal relations’. She was shocked to discover that there was little 
control over expenditure and that decision-making and recruitment were very 
informal in character: ‘There were hardly any interviews; it was more like, “I 
know this person”.’ She could see the advantages of the personal atmosphere 
and in the oil company where she had worked before, she would ‘not have 
dreamt of knocking on the director’s door’, whereas in SNV she could just ask 
the director whether he could give her a lift as she had no driver’s licence. ‘It 
was everybody caring for everybody.’ But as the organisation grew, she felt it 
                                                 
ven bestaan en in welke vorm: Als een professionele ontwikkelingsorganisatie waar-
van er zovele zijn, of overeenkomstig de vrijwilligersorganisatie? Hoewel ik heel 
goed begrijp waarom SNV zijn prioriteiten in de laatste jaren heeft verlegd, heb ik 
ook altijd sympathie en begrip gehad voor de oorspronkelijke doelstelling die be-
oogde jonge Nederlanders over de wereld in zijn vele schakeringen ervaring te laten 
opdoen. Dat is dan, dat geef ik toe, weliswaar niet primair ten bate van mensen in de 
Derde Wereld maar ik vind het een goede zaak dat jonge academici en deskundigen 
hun bewustzijn en karakter gedurende enige jaren kunnen vormen door in andere 
landen en andere culturen ervaringen op te doen alvorens in Nederland hun carrière 
te beginnen. Dat bijzondere kenmerk van SNV heeft mij altijd bijzonder aange-
sproken en daarin onderscheidde SNV zich ook altijd van andere ontwikkelings-
organisaties en NGO’s.’) 
5  Interview 243; van Amelsfoort, ‘SNV in Tanzania’, pp. 129-132. 
6  Interview 56. Also Antoinette Gosses & Jan Goedhart, ‘Kleine consultants: geen 
bliksembezoeken’, Vice Versa 21, 4 (1987), p. 47. 
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was necessary to adopt a more professional approach, to build in controls to 
prevent abuse and to have a better decision-making process and formal proce-
dures to recruit and assess personnel.7 These references reveal the ambivalence 
of SNV’s ‘informality’. It could indeed reduce hierarchical relations and con-
tribute to a more personal and friendly atmosphere. The references also refer, 
however, to possible favouritism and local hierarchies slipping back in through 
the backdoor. Such tendencies were one of the reasons for SNV management to 
call for more formal procedures and stricter norms in terms of management.  
Despite the process of professionalisation, a lot of the flexibility that had 
characterized SNV in the past continued. SNV development workers still took 
their bicycles to every corner of the world and they retained a relatively large 
degree of freedom in determining the nature and content of their work. As quite 
a small development organisation, the informal and open atmosphere in SNV 
offices, where directors were usually accessible and did not stress hierarchy or 
formalities, continued to be appreciated by both the local people and expatri-
ates.8 
The new pragmatism  
Turning SNV into a professionalized organisation did not happen in isolation. 
In the Third World Movement, which traditionally had strong political over-
tones, activism had become less prominent. The Third World Movement had 
been very influential in the 1970s and early 1980s emphasising protest and 
action but it was starting to lose momentum. Many support movements col-
lapsed and a much smaller sector emerged in their place, one that was more 
pragmatic in approach and less directed towards political solidarity. Words that 
had been ‘wrong’ in the past, such ‘commercialisation’, ‘marketing’ and ‘effi-
ciency’, now also gained currency in an organisation like the Wereldwinkels. 
This trend coincided with an increase in large-scale charity actions that were 
very different in character from earlier activism and more geared towards a 
mass audience. Events and groups such as ‘One for Africa’ (Eén voor Afrika) 
could count on popular support, and large sums of money for charities such as 
Foster Parents Plan were collected. In other words, the overt political implica-
tions of development cooperation became generally less fashionable during this 
                                                 
7  Interview 147. 
8  Interviews 86 and 59. Marc Broere,‘Verhuizen naar Derde Wereld is hele heisa’, 
Vice Versa 25, 1 (1991), p. 8. 
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era, while at the same time large-scale activities organised through the mass 
media grew in importance.9  
The new pragmatism was informed by diminishing optimism about the 
possibilities for revolutionary change and the chance of rapid development in 
the Third World.10 The 1960s had been characterised by optimism and while 
there had been critique on the methods used in development in the 1970s, many 
people still placed their hopes on revolutionary change. During the first two 
phases of SNV’s history, critique of development had mostly come from con-
servative circles that saw development aid as a waste of money and no use to 
the Dutch economy. In the course of the 1970s, and especially during the 1980s 
however, critique from leftist, progressive circles increased. People who had 
worked in the development sector and a number of scholars expressed their 
doubts about whether it was possible to alleviate poverty through development 
aid. Critiques that had been firmly located in the right-wing press also now 
appeared in progressive newspapers, and in academic circles development aid 
was being negatively evaluated. In the 1960s relations between academia and 
development practitioners had been close but, by 1985, development as practice 
and development as studied had grown apart and the relationship had come to 
be one of mutual mistrust. It was pointed out that development money had often 
been wasted on projects of grandeur proposed by African rulers and in some 
cases did more harm than good for people in the Third World.11  
The authors of this critique were as such not very influential in the sector. 
Yet their voices were symptomatic of a wider trend of scepticism regarding 
development. In the 1970s it had seemed possible to divide the world’s coun-
tries into ‘good’ and ‘bad’ regimes and development aid was to be meted out 
only to regimes that were striving to achieve socio-economic equality through 
structural change and had a positive human-rights record. In practice, most of 
the focus countries for development aid had a socialist outlook and many 
socialist regimes paid lip service only to the aims of equality and human rights 
as stipulated under Pronk’s ministry. Initially, support movements, development 
                                                 
9  Nekkers & Malcontent, ‘Inleiding’, in: Nekkers & Malcontent, eds, De geschiede-
nis, pp. 53-54; Beerends & Broere, De bewogen beweging, pp. 126-127, 130-132, 
145-148. 
10  Nekkers & Malcontent, ‘Inleiding’, in: Nekkers & Malcontent, eds, De geschiede-
nis, p. 53. 
11  Cf. Kothari, ed., A radical history of development studies; Nico Kussendrager & 
Reint Rosenstok, ‘Stop(t) de hulp?’, Vice Versa 23, 2 (1989), pp. 1-6; Hoebink, 
Geven is nemen; Kristoffel Lieten & Fons van der Velden, ‘Inleiding: over de 
grenzen van de hulp’ in: Lieten & Van der Velden, eds, Grenzen aan de hulp, p. 4; 
Nekkers & Malcontent, ‘Inleiding’, in: Nekkers & Malcontent, eds, De geschiede-
nis, p. 52. 
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organisations and The Netherlands Ministry for Development Cooperation had 
turned a blind eye to abuses of human rights in such countries but as the intense 
oppression and authoritarianism in some of the focus countries became more 
widely recorded, this position became untenable.12 The simple opposition of 
good and bad regimes disappeared, leading to a far more critical assessment of 
socialist regimes than had been the case in the 1970s. In some cases this led to 
defeatism and a feeling of powerlessness but others felt that these reservations 
had led to a more realistic and pragmatic approach. 
Pragmatism also came to play a more central role in Dutch economic poli-
cies. The 1980s were years of economic crisis and it was often not easy for 
returning volunteers to find work after their contracts with SNV had ended. In 
some sectors, their experience in the tropics was regarded as an asset but it 
could also be a disadvantage: ‘Oh, five years of development aid, a woolly-
headed type, what can we do with such a red?’13 The crisis also meant that there 
was less money for matters considered secondary to the Dutch economy, and 
although the amount spent on development aid as such did not decrease, the 
definition of what fell under the development budget came to be interpreted 
more widely. 
Dutch development policies and the economic recession 
The ten years between 1985 and 1995 were ones of cutbacks. With the eco-
nomic recession, the prime political aim of the government at this time was to 
create a healthy Dutch economy. This demanded a sober, pragmatic approach, 
also with regards to Dutch development policy. The economic recession rein-
forced a tendency that had started after the end of Pronk’s mandate. Jan De 
Koning, who was Minister for Development Cooperation between 1977 and 
1981, had already introduced more pragmatism, changing the focus on human 
rights to the aim of economic independence. Developing nations were to strive 
for economic growth through international trade and business. Pronk’s legacy 
was continued to a certain extent as poverty reduction remained a point of at-
tention in De Koning’s approach too. With the stress on economic independ-
ence, however, De Koning shifted towards a two-track policy and put less em-
phasis on the human-rights policy of the receiving states. Cuba was dropped as 
a focus country, while Indonesia, its reputation in human rights policies not-
                                                 
12  Cf. Michael Jennings, ‘Almost an Oxfam in itself: Oxfam, Ujamaa and development 
in Tanzania’, African Affairs 101 (2002), pp. 509-530. 
13  Foreign Affairs, file snv/2011/00328, report: Huub Mudde, ‘Ontwikkeling en carriè-
re Persoonlijke verhalen’, (October 1990). (‘Oei, vijf jaar ontwikkelingshulp, geite-
wollensokken, wat moeten we met zo’n rooie rakker.’) 
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withstanding, received more development aid. De Koning’s policy was charac-
terised by a new pragmatism: ‘If it can’t be done as it should be, than it should 
be done in any way that it can,’ he once stated. Although the percentage of 
Dutch GNP for development cooperation remained relatively high, this was due 
to some extent to the fact that the minister allowed a large degree of ‘conta-
mination’ of the budget and many of the expenditures had little to do with 
development cooperation. These included matters as diverse as export transac-
tions by Dutch firms and the cost of receiving Vietnamese refugees.14  
After the 1981 elections, reducing this ‘contamination’ was formulated as a 
political aim. During Christian-Democrat Van Dijk’s brief period as Minister, 
however, little was realised to this effect because he ran into difficulties due to 
his past statements on South Africa’s apartheid regime and his conflict-ridden 
relationship with the Minister of Economic Affairs.15 
The government fell in 1982, after which the liberal Eegje Schoo became 
Minister, a surprise appointment as she had no prior knowledge of development 
affairs. A former member of the Emancipation Council, she stressed the impor-
tance of the ‘position of women’ in development policies that was in line with a 
wider international trend in Dutch development policies. This and ecological 
concerns were mentioned for the first time in the Memorandum Reassessment 
(Nota Herijking) in 1984. The Memorandum was much criticised for its stress 
on the private sector and its neglect of structural problems such as the interna-
tional debt crisis. With an economic recession in The Netherlands, Schoo had 
re-introduced the idea of development aid as a means of promoting Dutch ex-
ports and business interests, although it is questionable whether she succeeded 
in realising this aim. The Minister wanted to reduce the number of programme 
countries (formerly concentratie-landen) and the importance of human rights as 
the criterion for aid was considered even less important than under De Koning. 
Her support for the Indonesian government became legendary and she was even 
given the nickname: ‘Minister in Suharto’s Cabinet in extraordinary service’ 
(buitengewone dienst).16  
The next minister, Piet Bukman, who was in office between 1986 and 1989, 
largely continued the policies of his predecessor. The new pragmatism that had 
started with De Koning and had been strengthened by Minister Schoo remained 
                                                 
14  Nijzink, Dag vrijwilliger!, p. 67; Nekkers & Malcontent, ‘Inleiding’, in: Nekkers & 
Malcontent, eds, De geschiedenis, pp. 41-45; Hoebink, Geven is nemen, pp. 62-65. 
15  Nekkers & Malcontent, ‘Inleiding’. In: Nekkers & Malcontent, eds, De geschiede-
nis, pp. 46-50; Hoebink, Geven is nemen, pp. 65-70. (‘Als het niet kan zoals het 
moet, dan moet het maar zoals het kan.’) 
16  Quoted. In: Paul Hoebink, ‘Ontwikkelingssamenwerking van staat tot staat: motie-
ven, geschiedenis, resultaten’. In: Lieten & Van der Velden, eds, Grenzen aan de 
hulp, p. 75. 
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in vogue during his mandate too. And, like Schoo, Bukman strongly supported 
the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) of the IMF and the World Bank. 
In these programmes the International Monetary Fund granted loans only to 
countries that followed the economic policies stipulated by the Fund. The SAP 
approach was widely criticised for allegedly imposing a free-market principle 
on countries from which, in the end, only Western economies would benefit.17   
 
 
 
Photo 5.2 ‘SNVer René Stam teaches concrete technology to builders’,  
Bluefields, Nicaragua, 1987. 
Source:  SNV photo archives, Red, SNV, Nicaragua, Onderwijs. 
Photographer:  Rob Brouwer, 1987. 
 
The secret world of development 
Pragmatism, realism and professionalisation were thus increasing in Dutch de-
velopment policies at large, the NGO sector internationally and in The Nether-
lands, and in SNV as an organisation. This move was related to the increasing 
complexities of the development sector. The notion of merely ‘doing good and 
not looking back’ had long passed and by the 1980s development had become a 
specialized branch; ‘a secret world’ complete with ‘its own codes, jargon and 
                                                 
17  Nekkers & Malcontent, ‘Inleiding’. In: Nekkers & Malcontent, eds, De geschiede-
nis, pp. 51-53. 
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fashions’, as Paul Hoebink put it.18 The importance of ‘development fashions’ 
had been noted much earlier; in fact by one of the officials who was concerned 
with JVP’s foundation and who became Professor of International Economic 
Relations at Groningen University in 1965.19 New approaches appeared ever 
more rapidly as a result of the sharp critiques that the sector had received. From 
the start, ‘new is better’ had been part of the development ideology. This, 
however, exacerbated the tendency to stress that, while in the past there had 
been mistakes, the latest approach would adequately address these mistakes and 
have positive results. It is no coincidence that the SNV films from this period 
stated time and time again that the organisation had changed from an arrogant 
‘know-all’ strategy to a focus on the wishes and needs of the developing coun-
tries. ‘It would be sad if we stopped right now, just as it has at least become 
clear how not to do it.’20 
The larger degree of specialisation in the development sector meant that it 
became increasingly difficult for outsiders to keep up with the various trends, 
debates and policies. The world of development became one of abbreviations, 
neologisms and specialised terms. One woman in Mali, the secretary to a 
women’s group, had a notebook literally full of abbreviations of approaches, 
organisations and methods, with an explanation in French neatly written beside 
them. She had taken these notes at seminars and workshops she had been 
invited to but as she knew no French, she had no clue as to the meaning of most 
of what she had written down.21 In protest at all the ‘DDSP’, ‘SPD’, ‘durable’, 
‘sustainable’, ‘development’ and ‘programme’ jargon, Jaap Kok in Cameroon 
chose to call a wood project ‘Vandikhout’, based on the Dutch proverb (Van dik 
hout zaagt men planken) referring to the strength of will.22 
Several people who had worked for SNV held that the organisation was no 
exception in this respect. Within SNV, a ‘bubble’ of concepts and notions 
existed, the meaning of which often even escaped SNV workers themselves. 
Some of the old guard suspected that nothing much new was meant as they 
recognised debates and discussions they had heard before in SNV: it was all 
                                                 
18  Hoebink, Geven is nemen, p. 11. 
19  Van Dam, ‘Mode in ontwikkelingsvraagstuk’, Economisch-Statistische Berichten 
17, 5 (1978), pp. 496-500. The idea of fashions in development was first suggested 
by him in an interview: Foreign Affairs, file 299, report of a radio programme, 
‘Samenwerking met ontwikkelingslanden’ with Prof. F. van Dam, 18 January 1965.  
20  Films: Hèrè Be (1984). (‘Het zou dan ook treurig zijn als we er juist nu mee op-
hielden nu het tenminste duidelijk wordt hoe het niet moet.’) Burkina Faso: hout-
ovens (1988); ‘Still far to go’, (1993). in DVD series: ‘Een geschiedenis in beeld’.  
21  Interview with a woman in Mali, name withheld for reasons of privacy. 
22  Interview 57. 
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‘old wine in new bottles’.23 According to some, there were people in developing 
nations who cleverly used the sensitivities in the sector to their own benefit, 
while for poor people without any education it became increasingly difficult to 
access funds or attract the attention of donor organisations. One former SNVer 
quoted an ironic article on development cooperation related to these mecha-
nisms: 
An Argentine, Gino lo Fredo, wrote a brilliant satirical article on development aid: 
‘You don’t have your own NGO as yet? So you just have to talk the language of the 
good fairies. This time you have to know that it is all about gender, the next time it 
is rural development and yet another time you have to say sustainable development. 
If you use the language in the right way, you will get your own nice little develop-
ment institute. And then when the evaluation people come, you make sure that they 
arrive along very bumpy roads, so that they know that you are working very much in 
the middle of nowhere and you show them all sorts of things. Then you conjure up a 
grateful farmer out of your top hat and the whole thing will conclude with a frater-
nizing party, with guitar and singing, and the most beautiful girls in the institute will 
dance with the evaluator and he will feel so extraordinarily fraternised and will 
return home with a fantastic image of the institute!24 
The shift from optimism to irony and relativism can also be noted in the 
SNV films of the time that openly refer to the problems that SNVers encoun-
tered, and question the arrogance with which earlier development approaches 
operated.25 In SNV management, reference was also made to the limits of devel-
opment cooperation. In 1990, for example, the SNV edition Een druppel op de 
goede plaats (A drop in the right spot) referred both to the positive effects of 
SNV’s work and the limited influence a small organisation like SNV could 
have. Similarly, it was argued at a symposium on target groups that ‘SNVers 
could do nothing to alleviate poverty’.26 To some extent the developments were 
contradictory: on the one hand SNV and its personnel were becoming more 
modest about the possible achievements of development work, while on the 
other and congruent with the professionalisation process were expectations 
about the impact and scale of SNV’s work being higher.  
This was a time of inner reflection about policies, about the organisation and 
about its aims. This could lead to what an evaluative report called a ‘roving 
                                                 
23  Ibid.  
24  Interviews 172 and 2. 
25  ‘Niet alleen Han de Wit gaat in ontwikkelingswerking’, produced in 1974, was the 
earliest example of this influential genre that became more widespread in the 1980s 
and 1990s: Films: Niet alleen Han de Wit gaat in ontwikkelingswerking (1974); 
Hèrè Be (1984); Burkina Faso: veeteelt (1988); ‘Still far to go’ (1993), in DVD 
series: ‘Een geschiedenis in beeld’. 
26  SNV Archives, Part II, Box 5, report, ‘Twintig jaar verder, doelgroepen dichterbij?’ 
(SNV Symposium, The Hague 1985), p. 9. 
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policy’ (het beleid gaat snel zwalken) but it also meant, for example, that field 
staff in the final analysis exerted considerable influence on the organisation’s 
policies.27 Although the emphasis on activism was less prominent in the 1980s, 
SNV retained its progressive image. It remained bound by bureaucratic and 
administrative procedures of a state organisation but in sphere and outlook was 
much closer to the Third World Movement and the more progressive wing of 
the Dutch NGO sector. This dual character made SNV a ‘monster’ in terms of 
management, but a fascinating organisation at the same time. As an external 
evaluator reportedly stated: ‘His impressions hitherto were those of astonish-
ment at the way in which SNV managed – within an impossible construction – 
through a series of barely straightforward compromise solutions, to still remain 
an organisation that is not functioning too badly.’28 
A new name 
In 1985 SNV changed its name. As SNV had already gained widespread recog-
nition, it was preserved but the acronym was no longer spelt out and instead was 
followed by the description: ‘Organisatie voor Ontwikkelingssamenwerking en 
Bewustwording’ (Organisation for Development Cooperation and Awareness). 
The name referred to the institutionalisation of the B Objective that had slowly 
gained importance throughout the 1970s. As the word ‘volunteer’ was no longer 
used in the new name, SNV’s professionalisation was also emphasised through 
the name change.  
Before 1985, ‘SNV’ had been translated into the language of the country 
involved: in the French-speaking world, SNV was known as AVN (Association 
des Volontaires Néerlandais) for example in Mali and Ivory Coast, or OVN 
(Organisation des Volontaires Néerlandais) for example in Cameroon, and in 
English the abbreviation ONV (Organisation of Netherlands Volunteers) was 
used. After 1985, this changed and SNV was used everywhere. In some coun-
tries people found it hard to get used to the new abbreviation, as hardly anyone 
knew what the letters SNV stood for.29 In the countries where it had a field 
presence, SNV had a very diverse image. In Zambia and Cameroon, for exam-
ple, the abbreviations ONV and OVN respectively had gathered some renown 
                                                 
27  Archives, SNV Tanzania, Box: ‘Teamleidersoverleg 1990, etc.’, file: ‘Aanbevelin-
gen CV ’89’, report Scholten, ‘Sterker na verandering’ (1989), pp. 7-8, 30. 
28  Foreign Affairs, file 222, meeting minutes, SNV Board, 6 October 1989, p. 3. (‘Zijn 
indrukken tot nog toe zijn die van verbazing over de wijze waarop SNV erin is 
geslaagd – binnen een onmogelijke constructie – via een reeks van weinig recht-
lijnige compromisoplossingen toch een niet slecht functionerende organisatie te 
worden.’) 
29  Interview 80. 
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and a lot of people were aware of the organisation’s existence.30 In Tanzania, on 
the other hand, not many people had heard of ONV or SNV. In Tanzania the 
volunteers had, as a rule, initially been placed in government projects and local 
people just saw a white person get out of a government car without knowing 
that it was an SNVer. Often they did not even know what country these foreign-
ers came from. At a later stage, SNV’s activities usually adopted the project’s 
name. Project names such as Faida and TIP were widely known but nobody, not 
even the participants on the projects, knew that there was any relationship with 
SNV as an organisation.31 
In The Netherlands too the name change led to some confusion. Five years 
after the change, the abbreviation SNV was still explained as ‘Stichting Neder-
landse Vrijwilligers’ by most of the Dutch media. A research report on SNV 
concluded that SNV as an organisation was not widely known in The Nether-
lands and many of those who had heard about it still thought it sent young 
volunteers overseas.32 
In 1993 SNV changed its name again: SNV Organisation for Development 
Cooperation and Awareness became SNV Netherlands Development Organisa-
tion. Perhaps this was related to the little impact that SNV’s B Objective had 
made over the years. 
From awareness to networking 
The attempts to realise SNV’s B Objective to a greater extent were not particu-
larly successful. The aim had always been to arrive at a better integration of the 
A and B Objectives and have the B Objective implemented during the period of 
the contract itself. However some SNVers saw little connection between the 
‘practical work’ in the Third World and the ‘theorising’ about awareness in The 
                                                 
30  Interviews 56, 59, 62 and 114. 
31  Interviews 84, 108 and 146. Faida (Swahili for ‘success’) was an SNV project in 
Tanzania focusing on small business, TIP (Traditional Irrigation Programme) aimed 
at improving village water supplies. 
32  Archives, SNV, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania: Box: Teamleidersoverleg 1990, etc; File: 
‘Aanbevelingen CV ’89’, etc: ‘Overige RV-aanbevelingen (1990), bijlage bij agen-
dapunt. Aanbevelingen RV’s tav: Voorlichting en imago’ p. 1; Report G.H. Schol-
ten, ‘Sterker na verandering. Onderzoek naar de bestuursvorm van de Stichting 
Nederlandse vrijwilligers’, (1989) p. 7 (referring to final report, ‘(Maatschappelijk 
draagvlak van) Ontwikkelingssamenwerking’ (The Hague, December 1988). 
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Netherlands.33 In 1990 it was concluded that two-thirds of SNVers never under-
took any activities in the B sphere during the contract.34 
It also proved hard to mobilise returned SNVers to invest time and energy in 
the B Objective. There was no way in which SNV could demand returned 
volunteers actively give information about development work. The B Objective 
continued to depend on the goodwill of individuals and lacked a structured form 
and organisation. 
A first step towards improvement was to specialise. In the past, any of the 
former volunteers could give a presentation about their experiences but then an 
Information Pool was introduced that took into account the ex-SNVer’s skills 
and the nature of the request for information. In Vice Versa’s words, the pool 
functioned like a ‘kind of call-girl system’ and when a request for information 
came in, the Information Pool would search for a match in its database to fulfil 
the specific request.35 A 1987 report indicated, however, that there were too few 
ex-SNVers with too little expertise willing to implement the B Objective and 
that making arrangements to fill a request was not always easy.36 In addition, 
the B Objective was seen as precarious (hachelijk) as SNV depended on the 
Dutch government but the B Objective demanded a critical stance towards 
Dutch development policies. It was held that other Dutch organisations were 
better equipped to organise activities in the realm of awareness and information 
on development.37 
During this phase, the B Objective became less politicised and came largely 
to consist of constructing links between two places in the world. The most 
frequent forms this took were twin-town arrangements and project linkages 
initiated by returned development workers. Many towns in The Netherlands 
adopted a sister town in the South and letters, pictures and occasional visits 
were exchanged between Dutch towns and places in the Third World. Project 
linkage could, for example, mean a school in The Netherlands following the 
activities in a project carried out by SNV in the Third World.38 Often the twin-
town bonds involved educated people from the South as literacy was a prerequi-
                                                 
33  SNV Archives, Part II, box 11, report, Gera Schäperdaus & Joke van Aken, ‘To B(e) 
or not to B(e)’ … Een onderzoek naar de bewustwordingsaktiviteiten van terugge-
keerde vrijwillig(st)ers (Leiden, August 1985), p. 113. 
34   Ibid. box 12, ‘Samenvatting Bewustwordingsbeleidsplan’ (February 1990), p. 22. 
35  Frank Höppener, ‘Ex-SNV’ers willen ei kwijt’, Vice Versa 19, 3 (1985), p. 39 (‘een 
soort call-girl-systeem’). 
36  SNV Archives, Part II, box 11, report, ‘Notitie Voorlichtingspool’, (February 1987). 
37  Archives, SNV Tanzania, Box: ‘Teamleidersoverleg 1990, etc.’, file: ‘Aanbevelin-
gen CV ’89’, report Scholten, ‘Sterker na verandering’ (1989), pp. 6-7. 
38  Wichard Maassen, ‘Hebben mensen jouw boodschap nodig?’, Vice Versa 21, 2 
(1987), pp. 42-44. 
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site for maintaining contact between the two places. In the twin-town bond 
between Hazerswoude and Dioïla in Mali, for example, which had been set up 
by former SNVers, it was a teacher/journalist who acted as intermediary be-
tween the two towns. He would send information about Dioïla so that informa-
tion evenings could be organised in Hazerswoude:  
Every year there were meetings, in African style. They would eat African food, they 
would invite African people living in The Netherlands, show costumes, do a video 
to show how Africans lived and what their problems were, and all the people who 
came to the meeting would buy a support card.  
With the money, the local African market place was improved but as stall-
holders were expected to contribute to realising the improvements, the project 
did not last. The teacher in Dioïla, however, kept in contact and still occasion-
ally writes to the former secretary of the committee in Hazerswoude.39 
The B Objective ended in the early 1990s when it was replaced by a new 
task force called ID: International Dimension. While the B Objective had been 
meant to increase awareness among the Dutch population, the ID’s aim was to 
facilitate target groups’ international networking. The International Dimension 
group would help groups in terms of contacts, information and finance by 
putting them into touch with Dutch organisations and action groups working in 
the field of development.40 Even though much of the politicisation and the 
idealism of the 1970s had disappeared at the organisational level, many people 
still participated out of personal conviction in the 1980s and 1990s. Jeanette de 
Regt, who was intrigued by Africa as a child, for some time put her plans to 
work abroad on hold as she regarded it her duty to work in The Netherlands: 
I started my studies in Social Geography with the intention of going to Africa. But 
during my studies I understood that if one wanted to change the world, and that is 
what I wanted to do, one had to start with the West. Because that is where the 
problems are. It is the West that blocks the development of Africa. There are enough 
whites (witneuzen) in Africa, so if I really want to change the world I will have to 
stay in The Netherlands. That was rather a shock because I really wanted to go to 
Africa.  
She worked for the Dutch union for countrywomen for four years but then 
learnt that SNV had started a pilot programme in International Dimension to 
study how the international dimension could be designed from the field: ‘When 
I saw that, I thought: “That is my job. I can remain faithful to my mission to 
change the world starting from the West but I will still live in Africa for three 
years.”’41 But even the International Dimension group only functioned for a few 
                                                 
39  Interview 36. 
40  Verhoeven, Aid – A changing necessity, p. 29. 
41  Interview 42. 
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years and in 1997 it too was discontinued. A new group came in its place: the 
Bureau Services and Mediation (Bureau Dienstverlening en Bemiddeling) was 
established to develop activities in the areas of responsible tourism and fair 
trade. SNV also began to put a greater emphasis on knowledge exchange, both 
within and outside its organisation.42  
 
 
Figure 5.1 ‘So you are the representative of the target group’. 
Source:  Jaarverslag SNV Nepal 1984, p. 22. 
 
From project to process 
In this period, SNV management formulated policies and thematic concerns of 
development in a much more direct way than had ever been the case before. 
This tendency towards a clearer definition of policies and themes could be 
related to the increasing complexity of development work and the calls for more 
efficiency and management. A crucial step was a more process-oriented ap-
proach instead of the earlier project approach. Participation had already become 
a key term in SNV’s approach in the preceding decade and ‘identification of 
needs’, ‘participatory reappraisal’, ‘action methods’ and other terms became 
ever more important over the years. Many local participants interpreted the 
participatory approach as an attempt to extract labour and money from them for 
activities that they felt ought to be carried out by the state. In some cases it also 
merely reinforced social inequality. One traditional leader in Mali made an 
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explicit reference to local hierarchies: ‘The SNV adopted a participatory ap-
proach. I was the one who had to make that inventory; I had to ensure that a 
consensus was reached as to what the wishes and needs of the community 
were.’43 This dilemma was widely acknowledged by SNVers in the field: 
To avoid relying on political leaders and elites, the emphasis shifted to 
empowerment and the process approach, in which poor people not only had to 
decide but also had to take the initiative in and actively contribute to their own 
development. The focus was on the opportunities and ambitions of the poor and 
oppressed themselves and the development worker would merely coordinate 
and facilitate matters until the people could continue without his/her assistance. 
Development was no longer a project being carried out by ex-pat technicians 
but a holistic process that ought to originate and be realised by the people them-
selves. Attempts to introduce the process approach on a wide scale failed, 
however, as the differences between countries were too vast to permit such a 
‘blue print’ methodology.44 The approach was widely criticised for reducing the 
role of the development worker to that of a passive onlooker and one that was 
far too limited in view of the costs involved. In Bolivia, the process approach 
was never really implemented: ‘We found it nonsense here. You can’t just sit 
and wait in a village until something happens, can you? We really put it 
aside.’45 In addition, the process approach did not reduce the dilemmas of peo-
ple working for the SNV, on the contrary. Just as with the participation concept, 
the process approach could lead to difficulties if local people’s ideas of devel-
opment clashed with SNV policies. With increasing emphasis on local wishes 
and requirements, this dilemma only became a more intense source of conflict.46 
On top of this, two contradictory processes were at work. On the one hand, the 
increasing focus on professionalism and efficiency implied that planning and 
monitoring were necessary to ensure a result-oriented approach. The growing 
attention to the wishes and needs of poor people themselves, however, meant 
that activities could hardly be planned beforehand. With the earlier practical 
project approach, the number of wells, injections or plough-oxen could be 
counted but a development process was much harder to assess. SNV Head 
                                                 
43  Interview 37. 
44  SNV, ‘On the Right Track: SNV’s Policies in the Nineties’ (The Hague, 1994); IOB, 
SNV-Nepal, p. 46. 
45  Interview 261. (‘Dat vonden we hier onzin. Je gaat toch niet in een dorp zitten 
wachten tot er iets gebeurt? Dat hebben we echt naast ons neer gelegd.’) Also Inter-
view 57.  
46  Nico Kussendrager, ‘SNV zoekt het conflict’, Vice Versa 25, 3 (1991), pp. 2-5. 
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Office tried to address this problem by developing new monitoring and evalua-
tion methods.47  
Instead of the execution of projects, the development worker was now to 
give guidance to the development process in the new policies. In general, man-
agement skills became more important for SNV personnel. In the 1980s techni-
cal expertise had been essential to the work of the SNVer but in the course of 
the 1990s more emphasis came to be placed on management and coordination. 
In some cases this concerned the management of large DGIS or embassy 
projects or SNV projects that were usually smaller in size but growing in 
number. At the same time, management issues also became more important in 
the more traditional SNV activities in host projects. The coordinating and 
facilitating tasks in the new development approaches made management an 
important skill. Given SNV's long-standing tradition at the village level, the 
emphasis remained on rural development. The new approach of ‘integrated rural 
development’ involved closer cooperation with both national and local govern-
ment bodies than before, and so reinforced the need for managerial skills in 
diplomacy and negotiating. The budgets SNVers were dealing with rose sharp-
ly, thus increasing the need for sound management and the chance of potential 
dilemmas concerning political power and spurious motives becoming issues. 
These political aspects of development work made SNV opt for a stronger em-
phasis on local governance.  
SNV experts were becoming engaged in larger-scale activities than ever 
before. There was a shift from individual micro projects to larger programmes 
and ones involving more people and higher budgets and covering larger areas. 
This was a deliberate choice. With the emphasis on result-oriented development 
work and the higher educational levels, costs and expectations of the SNV 
personnel, SNV was aiming at achieving a more structural effect and carrying 
out more sustainable development work. The assumption was that this could be 
achieved if SNV activities were not restricted to small projects at the village 
level but were programmes that included diverse groups of people and covered 
larger areas. The era of young volunteers living and working in a village had 
come to a close and contacts with the target groups in many cases took on the 
form of field visits of various lengths instead of a permanent stay for the entire 
contract period. As Vera Gianotten of SNV Peru explained in an interview with 
Vice Versa: 
In the past you were satisfied if a husbandry expert after three years left some cows 
that gave 5 litres of milk a day instead of 2. Or if an irrigation expert left three 
                                                 
47  Interview 6; Foreign Affairs, file map snv/2009/00173, meeting minutes, half-yearly 
meeting of delegation SNV Board and Minister, 20 July 1995, p. 2. 
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channels. But SNVers can leave so much more in a developing country if only they 
get the opportunity.48 
The environment 
Apart from introducing approaches that proposed new methods in development 
practice, there were also some new thematic concerns. In the 1990s the envi-
ronment became an important aspect of development work and the issue had 
been raised much earlier in some countries: ‘SNV/N (SNV Nepal) was about 10 
years ahead of SNV/The Hague in the field of environment and produced its 
first Ecology Input Policy Plan in 1986’.49 Over the years, concern about the 
environment also grew in the Dutch development sector and an issue of Vice 
Versa in 1990 was devoted to environmental issues.50 It indicated what a long 
way there was still to go. People were suspicious in many areas of ‘protecting 
nature’, as they associated this with state rules and regulations and, even worse, 
with harsh fines imposed by foresters. A first step was to arrive at a more 
positive attitude towards environmental issues but even this was not enough. As 
one of the first Tanzanians employed by SNV pointed out: ‘A development 
worker who says: “Plant trees because that is good for the environment” will 
not move any farmer to action.’51 Explanations about the environment could 
help in this respect and SNVers readily provided these. Mr Salif Traoré from 
Zambalagoubou (Mali) had heard the following from a white man who accom-
panied a group of foresters:  
They explained to us that the Sahel was coming to Mali and that rain always comes 
from trees. So we needed to stop the Sahel from coming and to encourage the rains 
by creating a village forest. The project helped us a lot. We chose an unoccupied 
piece of land for the village forest.  
Cooperation went well because the foresters were local people and eventu-
ally Mr Traoré, who was asked to become the head of the committee for the 
village forest, became friends with them. At the same time, women were intro-
duced to the use and construction of improved stoves that reduced the amount 
                                                 
48  Frank van Ooyen, ‘Peru heeft professionals nodig’, Vice Versa 22, 3 (1988), p. 11. 
(‘Vroeger was je tevreden als een veeteeltdeskundige na drie jaar een aantal koeien 
op een project achterliet die in plaats van twee, vijf liter per koe per dag gaven. Of 
als een irrigatiedeskundige drie kanalen naliet. Maar SNV’ers kunnen veel méér 
achterlaten in een ontwikkelingsland, als ze daarvoor maar de gelegenheid krijgen.’) 
49  IOB, SNV-Nepal, p. 189. 
50  Han Beijersbergen, ‘SNV en het milieu’, Vice Versa 24, 2 (1990), pp. 13-15. 
51  Harm Botje, ‘Hellingen veranderen in groene terrassen’, Vice Versa 26, 1 (1992),  
p. 11. 
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of firewood needed. The village now sells wood to people from outside the 
village.52  
In the village of Nangola in the same region in Mali, SNV’s intervention was 
also regarded as a success. The village farmers were already in contact with the 
large state cotton society CMDT (Compagnie Malienne pour le Développement 
des Textiles) when they started to notice the negative effects of erosion. An 
anti-erosion project was started that mainly consisted of building dams and 
planting trees. The men in the village were involved and carried out the work, 
while CMDT and SNV jointly took care of the funding and the technical advice. 
There was no payment for the work but after it was all finished, Nangola re-
ceived the prize for being the best project village and a huge party was organ-
ised. One of the men closely involved in the village’s development affairs 
evaluated the project positively: 
Later they stopped the project. But that was not a problem because by then every-
body knew what to do. When they had an erosion problem, they started what they 
had learnt. There is simply no need for more instruction. (…) 
We want to thank SNV. They really had the know-how. We were losing land but 
through them we learnt a method of keeping the land: that increased our space for 
agriculture. So in the end this gave us a higher income.53 
The initial focus on environmental issues was later modified and a more 
integrated approach emerged that aimed at community development and pro-
tecting the environment at the same time. As this integrated approach to envi-
ronmental issues only gained currency after 1995, it is discussed in the next 
chapter.  
The position of women 
Another theme that was important in Dutch development policies in the years 
between 1985 and 1995 was ‘women and development’. Within SNV too, many 
discussions and activities revolved around the ‘position of women’. Throughout 
its existence, SNV had implemented projects that involved women and the very 
first team in Cameroon had even carried out a project with rural women. During 
the 1970s, with feminism’s ‘second wave’ in The Netherlands, SNVers had 
been concerned about relations between the sexes. But it was only from 1983 
onwards that women and development formally became a theme in SNV policy 
and not until 1986 that a first policy plan was formulated. This was relatively 
late. The worldwide Decade for Women had started in 1975 and it was consid-
ered that development projects often had detrimental consequences for women. 
                                                 
52  Interviews 196 and 137. 
53  Interview 184. 
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Vice Versa, that had in the meantime become independent of SNV as an organi-
sation, rebuked SNV for reacting to the issue ‘as about one of the last donors on 
earth’. In Dutch development policies there had been attention for the position 
of women – albeit piecemeal – before SNV ever started focusing on the sub-
ject.54 
SNV’s first steps into this new arena were not radical. The people in the 
organisation had learnt from experience that pushing for far-reaching change 
without support in the local community to back the transformation would lead 
to nothing: 
Of course, in relationships between men and women there is still much that one 
would like to see changed. I very carefully indicate how I would like things to be by 
asking, every now and then, how their wives are. Would he not like her to learn how 
to read and write? I am not going to shout that all veils and headscarfs must go. It 
makes no sense and I do not feel the need.55 
The aim of SNV’s new policy on women was to improve their living condi-
tions and their social status. Policy and practice did not coincide, as was so 
often the case. An evaluation of SNV’s Tanzanian activities in 1991 showed 
that some activities even increased women’s workloads as men were absent 
working on the project. It is also interesting to note that the explanations for the 
position of women revolved around socio-cultural factors and traditional cus-
toms. In other words, the 1960’s approach that presented other cultures as static 
and inherently different reappeared concerning women and development in the 
1980s.56  
For most SNVers, the theme of ‘women and development’ fitted well into 
the notions and ideals about their work. It was a burning issue for most SNVers: 
circulars sent by volunteers in Zambia nearly all refer to ‘the role of women’ or 
‘the position of women’. Thus in the July 1985 circular sent by SNVers in 
Zambia entitled Kasempabode. Avonturen van een ontwikkelingswerker (Ka-
sempa-Post. Adventures of a Development Worker), all kinds of tedious female 
tasks in the household were detailed in the section ‘the role of the woman’ 
before concluding: 
A daily routine from early morning to late in the evening. Bearing many children is 
of course also included. If one compares these duties to women’s rights, something 
                                                 
54  Nijzink, Dag vrijwilliger!, p. 68; Antoinette Gosses, ‘Met vrouwen heeft SNV kan-
sen gemist’, Vice Versa 21, 2 (1987), pp. 1-3 (quote p. 1: ‘ongeveer als laatste donor 
ter wereld’). Els Postel-Coster, ‘Van participatie naar mainstreaming’, in Nekkers & 
Malcontent, eds, De geschiedenis, pp. 323-338. 
55  Female volunteer in North Yemen (1986), quoted in Verhoeven, Aid – A changing 
necessity, p. 20. 
56  Van Amelsfoort, ‘SNV in Tanzania’, p. 133. 
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isn’t right. No voice in decision-making. Forced into a submissive role towards men. 
Ignored in development projects that assume the man to be the breadwinner. Passed 
over by men who take on a girlfriend, mistress, second, third or fourth wife. Possi-
bilities for protest: virtually nil. 
To be a woman in Zambia: a lousy job (een hondebaan).57 
In many developing countries, attention for women as a theme in develop-
ment was differently received. In most contexts women’s groups had existed for 
a considerable time but local NGOs that focused on women’s rights and anti-
discrimination activities were a new occurrence and eyed with suspicion. Elite 
men in Mali also criticised the new trend as a Western phenomenon. One 
women’s group leader remembered:  
Often the elite presents us with many problems (…) The men will tell me: ‘You, you 
talk like an intellectual. The rural woman wants water. You talk about equality, 
rights. It is not our culture.’58 
The women leading such NGOs rebutted such arguments in strong terms. 
Martha Noya, the Director of the Centro Juana Azurduy in Sucre, Bolivia ar-
gued that there was no problem with local initiatives being embedded in inter-
national trends: 
Here (in Bolivia) there is much influence from the US and Europe. The development 
agenda is to some extent set by those countries. But I would not see it as imposition. 
In the US and Europe there are indeed issues that are being addressed in a very pro-
found manner. Why should we not try to learn from these examples? As long as 
such experiences are adapted to the local context here, I do not see a problem.59  
These local initiatives proved useful for SNV, and a number of the organisa-
tions hosted SNV development workers. It was often a long process to achieve 
anything. The first SNVer to work with the Centro Juana Azurduy was success-
ful in creating micro-enterprises run by women’s groups. After she left though 
the small enterprises closed down one after the other. The women involved 
continued to regard themselves as beneficiaries rather than as the owners of the 
enterprise and in each group conflict and rivalry started to develop between the 
women. According to the Director, such enterprises simply did not fit the 
Bolivian context: 
What we noticed is that the whole idea of group enterprise in Bolivia simply does 
not work. Our idea then was to have a group work on a commercial basis. That was 
fashionable in development at the time. All the NGOs were trying to have small 
                                                 
57  Foreign Affairs, file 232, circular Zambia, ‘Kasempabode’ no. 2, July 1985, pp. 9-10 
(quote); Ibid. circular Zambia, Hillie, Pieter and Martin Bijl, 10 July 1985, pp. 3-4; 
Ibid. Circular Zambia, August 1985, Jelle, Piety, Yfke, Froukje, 16 September 1985. 
58  Interview 34. 
59  Interviews 254, 202 and 34. 
 EXPERTISE EXPECTED  167 
 
 
micro-enterprises run by groups. But they all noticed that it did not work. In Bolivia 
it either has to be a private, individual business or a family-run business.60 
The attention paid to the themes of the environment and women changed 
some programmes profoundly. A project in Guinea-Bissau that started in 1986 
and focused on improving living conditions in poor quarters of the capital in its 
first phases revolved around construction and housing. At a later stage, it also 
introduced job creation, women and the environment as aspects of development 
activities.61 These coincided with the main points that were introduced at a na-
tional level in development policies in The Netherlands, notably by the return-
ing Minister of Development Cooperation, Jan Pronk. 
Pronk again 
The Berlin Wall fell in 1989 and many people felt that a new era had started. 
For many it meant not only the end of the Cold War but also the so-called ‘end 
of ideologies’. Public opinion widely regarded it as capitalism’s final victory 
over the communist system. Communism had failed, not only in economic 
terms but also in the areas of human rights and democratic participation. In the 
Third World, many countries started experimenting with multi-party democ-
racy. The World Bank and the IMF introduced the link between development 
and democracy and, after 1990, new concepts such as accountability and good 
governance found their way into the development jargon. 
In 1989 Jan Pronk became Minister of Development Cooperation again. 
While Eegje Schoo in particular had stressed linkages between Dutch business 
interests and development, Pronk returned to a strong emphasis on human 
rights. Within a year of his appointment, Pronk presented the report Een wereld 
van verschil (A World of Difference), the ‘Development Bible’ as the then 
Minister of Foreign Affairs called it with some condescension. In the report, 
Pronk stressed the need to ensure equal opportunities for all people in the global 
village that the world had become. A number of themes received ample atten-
tion: sustainability, freedom, ecology, cultural aspects and women’s autonomy. 
Reactions to the report were varied: some criticised it for being overambitious, 
others felt it did not go far enough and yet others admired Pronk’s refreshing 
and challenging style. Pronk’s outspoken concern regarding freedom and human 
rights soon led him into difficulties, with his reaction to political events in 
Indonesia causing a major diplomatic crisis in relations between The Nether-
                                                 
60  Interview 254. 
61  Z.D. Rodrigues, ‘Wijkverbetering en werkgelegenheid in Bissau. De kleinschalige 
produktie van goederen en diensten in Reino-Gambeafada’ (Occasional Paper 38, 
Nijmegen 1993). 
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lands and Indonesia. After these incidents, it was made clear to Pronk that he 
should not make any further statements on Indonesian politics. Practice proved 
more resilient in terms of finance and Pronk could not prevent the increasing 
‘contamination’ of the development budget. Nekkers and Malcontent62 cite ‘aid 
for the former Soviet countries, (the) reception of asylum seekers, Dutch partici-
pation in peace missions, language courses for immigrants and a transport heli-
copter for the Dutch defence forces’ as being contributing factors. Not all of 
these made equal demands on the budget (‘aid for the former Soviet countries’ 
was, for example, of limited importance), but general ‘budget contamination’ 
was a problem during this period. In addition, the entire budget for debt relief 
was booked as development cooperation and amounted to a considerable part of 
the total expenditure on development. 
Put in a global perspective, developments were sobering. Hopes for greater 
democratic rule and good governance were dashed at the start in 1991 by the 
violent war in Yugoslavia. On the African continent wars in Angola, Somalia, 
Mali, Sierra Leone, Burundi, Liberia and notably the Rwandan genocide in 
1994 made it difficult to maintain the optimistic spirit that had been so wide-
spread right after the fall of the Berlin Wall. The Gulf War, the crisis in Haiti 
and wars in Georgia and Tajikistan were other examples that were interpreted as 
signs of a bleak future. These crises certainly had repercussions on Dutch 
development policies and in 1993 the Minister presented a report entitled Een 
wereld in geschil (A World in Dispute), referring to political instability. The 
end of the Cold War had changed the world order but not in the direction that 
Jan Pronk had hoped. 63  
SNV and the Ministry 
The relationship between the Minister, officials at the Ministry, DGIS and SNV 
continued to be fraught with tension in many respects. At a personal level, rela-
tions could of course be good, especially in the field where DGIS and SNV 
personnel often cooperated closely. Circumstances could bring people with 
varying idealistic views together. In Tanzania, for example, SNVers working as 
teachers at the ANC Solomon Mahlangu College were not allowed to go out in 
the evenings, ‘but naturally those guys were craving some contact and a beer. 
So they would sneak out at night to our bar. “Don’t tell anybody we were here!” 
they’d say’ after their illegal fraternising with DGIS people stationed nearby.64 
In a number of countries, the SNV country office also functioned as the Dutch 
                                                 
62  Nekkers & Malcontent, ‘Inleiding’, in: Nekkers & Malcontent, eds, De geschiede-
nis, pp. 54-56 (‘Ontwikkelingsbijbel’, p. 54). 
63  Ibid., p. 56. 
64  Interview 167. 
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consulate and/or DGIS meeting place which often led to considerable confusion 
among the local population.65 
Relations tended to depend on the personal attitudes of those involved. In 
some cases, contact between SNV and DGIS and the local Dutch embassy was 
fine, in others relations turned extremely sour. In Burkina Faso, the Embassy at 
a certain stage withheld all financial support, leaving SNVers technically with-
out a job, just because the SNV country director had dared to question the rela-
tionship between SNV and DGIS.66 Playing football together was no guarantee 
of an easy relationship: ‘On Queen’s Day, the Embassy and SNV played foot-
ball. Now those were two classes. DGIS was considered “dirty”; it was a big 
conflict. The Tanzanians thought it was a big joke, they could not see the differ-
ence (between DGIS and SNV).’67  
Contacts at a personal level did not prevent more structural problems from 
emerging time and time again. Despite the more professional approach, SNV’s 
image within DGIS remained one of amateurism for a long time. This was the 
case in the field as well as in The Netherlands. There were complaints by 
SNVers who resented being regarded ‘as greenhorns without experience and as 
real idealists’ by personnel directly employed by the Ministry.68 In the past, 
SNV had seemed no more than a handy leg up to DGIS and every year SNV 
staff left to accept better-paid jobs at the Ministry. Although SNV attempted to 
achieve a more professional outlook, its image proved difficult to alter and 
SNVers continued being associated with an open-sandal woolly-sock type of 
idealism. In 1991, five years after it had changed, a circular was sent round in 
DGIS to highlight the fact that SNV had changed from being a volunteer to a 
professional organisation.69 
In organisational terms too there was tension in the relationship between 
SNV and the Ministry. The 1989 Annual Report openly expressed unhappiness 
about the organisation’s cooperation with DGIS. The SNV Board felt that it did 
not have enough space to manoeuvre and develop a sound personnel policy, 
while complex procedures was hindering effective project management. ‘The 
SNV Board, not entirely satisfied about the effectiveness of its own operations, 
carried out research in the second half of 1989 to assess possibilities for 
improvement. The researcher, Dr G. Scholten (Organisational Studies) made it 
                                                 
65  P.e. IOB, SNV-Nepal, p. 80.  
66  Interview 3. 
67  Interview 86. 
68  Archives SNV Tanzania, Dar es Salaam, Box: ‘Project visits, ’79-’84, etc,’ file: 
RIDEP, Mwanza: report Mwanza, 30-9-1981. Also Interview 3. 
69  Foreign Affairs, file snv/2009/00173, circular, Minister to DGIS, ‘Uitvoering pro-
jecten door SNV’, January 1991. 
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clear that the current complex statutory form was the cause of organisational 
shortcomings and recommended changes in this respect.’70 Since the foundation 
of JVP in 1963 and SNV in 1965, the relationship between SNV and the Minis-
try had not been easy and a formula that worked satisfactorily for both had 
never been found. The state control over SNV had never been accepted without 
critique and, in turn, people in the Ministry had not always been happy with its 
relationship with SNV. There had even been plans back in the 1970s to turn 
SNV into an independent organisation.71  
In the course of the 1980s, SNV’s call for a more autonomous position be-
came ever stronger. The process of professionalisation certainly played a role in 
this and as SNV’s administrative and financial structures expanded, there was 
greater emphasis on policies and plans. Being dependent on DGIS was increas-
ingly resented. The stakes were also higher now: between 1985 and 1995 
SNV’s expenditure doubled from Dfl. 42.1 million to nearly Dfl. 86 million. In 
addition, the growing number of DGIS projects carried out under SNV respon-
sibility involved ever-larger sums of money: from Dfl. 12.7 million in 1985 to 
Dfl. 38.2 million in 1995.72 The SNV Board wanted to have these greater finan-
cial responsibilities translated into a larger say in the programme.  
To resolve this situation, SNV was given more independence from the 
Ministry and became a quango (a quasi NGO) that was not fully independent 
but not as closely linked to the Ministry as before either. This reorganisation, 
which took place between 1991 and 1994, gave SNV a more autonomous status. 
In 1986, a Memorandum of Understanding had been signed that gave SNV 
responsibility for the execution and financial administration of projects and the 
formal status of quango reinforced these agreements. No more civil servants 
would be appointed to the SNV Board. SNV’s status thus came to resemble that 
of the Dutch MFOs (Medefinancieringsorganisaties), NGOs subsidised by the 
government. However, SNV’s Chairman was still appointed by the Minister and 
a meeting was held once a year to discuss financial and organisational issues.73 
The greater degree of independence from the Ministry showed in the fact 
that SNV was given the chance to manage the finances of some of its small-
scale projects by itself. The steps towards SNV financing its own projects were 
taken hesitantly and fears were expressed that the new practice could lead to 
                                                 
70  SNV Annual Report 1989. (‘Het SNV-bestuur, niet geheel tevreden over de effecti-
viteit van het eigen opereren, liet in de tweede helft van ’89 een onderzoek instellen 
naar mogelijkheden tot verbetering. De onderzoeker, dr. G. Scholten (bestuurskun-
dige), heeft duidelijk gemaakt dat de huidige complexe statutaire vorm oorzaak is 
van de bestuurlijke beperkingen en beveelt wijzigingen daarin aan.’) 
71  Nijzink, Dag vrijwilliger!, pp. 52, 56. 
72  See Appendix 6; IOB, SNV-Nepal, p. 229. 
73  IOB, SNV-Nepal, pp. 45-47, 49. 
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conflicts of interest.74 The control and supervision of such self-managed pro-
grammes were a source of continuous debate. Some of these projects operated 
quite independently, even of the country office. In one case in Nepal, the coun-
try director was not allowed to visit one of the self-managed programmes as he 
was not welcome!75 The former situation in which SNV volunteers worked 
under supervision on a DGIS project slowly came to an end. Increasing num-
bers of projects received financial support from DGIS but were managed and 
executed exclusively by SNV personnel. Projects were in many cases contracted 
out to SNV from Dutch embassies too.  
In the past, SNV had had a unique position but as SNV’s professionalisation 
process proceeded, the differences between DGIS and SNV became blurred and 
finally changed the nature of the tensions between the two organisations. These 
had previously revolved around differences in presumed ideology and profes-
sional attitude but now they were more of a competitive nature. 
Where in the past tension had existed between the idealistically motivated volunteer 
and the DGIS professional, now the tensions overlap and operate in the same area. 
The difference is (too) small and so a relationship of rivalry has comes into being.76 
The unclear nature of SNV’s position – as both a state and a non-state 
organisation – irritated DGIS personnel, especially at a time when many offi-
cials felt SNV was being favoured by the Minister.77 In addition, the financial 
aspect of the new arrangement with SNV managing DGIS projects was eyed 
with suspicion:  
The sting in the discussion between SNV and the consultants has always been that 
SNV has an improper competitive advantage because part of its costs are paid by 
DGIS, enabling SNV to execute assignments more cheaply (....) That dilemma has 
not been solved by the cosmetic construction of taking a part of a project that is 
funded by DGIS out of the budget, transferring it indirectly to a central budget line 
assigned to SNV, and then having it returned to the project as SNV’s ‘own contri-
bution’. Apart from the bureaucratic bother for the DGIS administration, (...) this 
set-up is too transparent to circumvent the problems mentioned above.78  
                                                 
74  ‘Met de billen bloot’, Nedwerk 1, 3 (August 1987), pp. 1, 3.  
75  IOB, SNV-Nepal, p. 72. 
76  Foreign Affairs, file snv/2009/00173, memo, ‘Relatie DGIS-SNV’, 14 March 1995, 
p. 1. (‘Waar vroeger spanning bestond tussen de idealistisch gemotiveerde vrijwil-
liger en de DGIS-professional bestaat nu de spanning van overlap en op elkaars 
terrein werkzaam zijn. Het verschil is (te) klein en er ontstaat dus een concurrentie-
verhouding.’) 
77  Ibid., pp. 4-5.  
78  Foreign Affairs, file memo, snv/2012/00233, Embassy Nairobi/hoofd to plv DGIS II 
through CDP Nairobi: ‘Samenwerking posten SNV’, 8 July 1998. (‘De angel in de 
diskussie tussen SNV en consultants is altijd geweest dat SNV een oneigenlijk con-
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Despite the mutual stereotypes, SNV’s influence on DGIS was considerable. 
Many SNVers joined DGIS after their contract with SNV finished, bringing 
with them ideas and experience from their SNV period.79 There was a growing 
dilemma, with SNV wanting more independence from the Dutch state due, in 
part, to the tensions between it and the Ministry, DGIS and a number of the 
Dutch embassies. Yet as SNV development associates received more responsi-
bilities in larger projects financed by DGIS and the embassies, the relationship 
with them became closer. The fact that SNV depended on the decisions taken at 
the embassies or by DGIS was however increasingly resented.80  
Town and country 
The period of young volunteers working in one village had come to an end. 
Rural development remained the core of SNV’s expertise but many positions 
were moved to regional towns and contact with the target groups in many cases 
now took the form of field visits of varying duration. As there had been a 
considerable number of car and motorbike accidents in the past and also in view 
of the increased radius of many SNV projects, more SNV field offices were 
provided with 4x4s, and drivers were added to the support personnel to increase 
safety levels.  
More SNVers were stationed in a town or even in the capital. Towns became 
more important and SNV’s past focus on the countryside declined. In the late 
1980s, plans were made to include projects in towns to SNV’s emphasis on 
activities in the rural areas.81 Despite all attempts at poverty alleviation, the gap 
between the rich and the poor only increased in many developing countries. 
This also meant that the experiences of SNVers became more differentiated. In 
some towns, especially capital cities, everything had become available: luxury 
hotels and restaurants, sporting facilities, supermarkets, and expensive (but 
excellent) medical services. For those with a family, educational opportunities 
for their children and possibilities for social and recreational activities for the 
                                                 
currentievoordeel geniet doordat een deel van de SNV-kosten door DGIS wordt 
betaald, waardoor SNV goedkoper een bepaalde opdracht kan uitvoeren (...) Deze 
angel wordt er niet uitgehaald indien door een cosmetische ingreep een deel van een 
door DGIS gefinancierd project uit de begroting wordt gelicht en met een omweg 
naar een centrale aan SNV toegekende budgetlijn wordt overgeheveld om vervol-
gens als ‘eigen bijdrage’ van SNV weer bij het project terug te keren. Los van de 
bureaucratische rompslomp voor de DGIS administratie (...), deze opzet is te door-
zichtig om eerdergenoemd probleem te omzeilen.’) 
79  For example, Interview 5. 
80  Cf ‘Vol vertrouwen in de toekomst’, Nedwerk 4, 3 (1990), p. 1. 
81  Nico Kussendrager & Jan Simmers, ‘Wordt SNV stads?’, Vice Versa 20, 3 (1986), 
pp. 1-4. 
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accompanying partner became important criteria in deciding whether or not to 
accept a job with SNV. Some SNVers who had started out as idealistic young-
sters with strong ideas about what they saw as over-consumption and neo-colo-
nialism slowly moved towards accepting life with a car, good housing and even 
a swimming pool.  
These SNV families could easily integrate into local society but in a number 
of cases, SNVers lived in an enclave of white people and hardly established any 
contact with people from the country in which they were living and working. 
While in the period before, quite a lot of SNVers had idealised village life and 
wanted to integrate completely, the dilemmas this had created led in the subse-
quent period to a realisation that cultural background made a difference that 
could not be denied: ‘SNV did not push me to “go local”. Those kinds of ele-
ments were increasingly abandoned. The trend was to have more distance: after 
all we do differ from them, we have other needs.’82 The dilemma about cultural 
contact remained but the ideal of full integration was abandoned. One couple 
explained that they had problems living in an area in Zambia: ‘a club of whites 
in a group (op een kluitje) is not exactly our idea of integration with the Zam-
bian population’. They had ‘nice contact’ with their gardener and the house per-
sonnel but it remained ‘at another level’ than contact with family and friends.83 
In most countries, the possibilities for travelling around grew rapidly and 
many SNVers and their families used their leisure time to visit other SNVers 
working in the same country or to go to tourist highlights that were starting to 
attract foreign visitors in greater numbers.84 Visits by one couple or family to 
another were the most frequent form of contact, although people would also link 
up at annual meetings and on other occasions. The more general expatriate net-
works were usually linked to specific public places in town, such as a bar or 
restaurant, although personal visits could be important too. Within these net-
works, friendships were established, gossip exchanged, information shared and 
debates held. 
In the 1960s and 1970s, working as an SNV volunteer was in most cases a 
one-off experience and after their contract had ended most returned to The 
Netherlands. In the 1980s it started to be possible to envisage ‘development’ as 
a career and, although initially relatively small, a group of ‘development no-
                                                 
82  Interview 243. (‘Vanuit SNV kreeg ik niet de aansturing om ‘lokaal’ te gaan. Dat 
soort elementen werd steeds meer los gelaten. Het was eigenlijk eerder een trend om 
meer afstand te nemen: wij zijn nu eenmaal anders dan zij, wij hebben andere be-
hoeftes.’) 
83  Ibid. file 232, circular Zambia, Frans Neuman, Bas Neuman and Lia Nieuwets, May 
1986, pp. 3, 6-7. 
84  Foreign Affairs, file 232, circular Zambia, Betsy Dokter & Obe de Vries, 25 Decem-
ber 1984 - 1 January 1985; Ibid. circular Zambia, Ron, 22 March 1985. 
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mads’ emerged who moved from one country to another. The consequences of 
this varied hugely and were contradictory. In some cases these development 
workers became tired of personal investment in their surroundings: their know-
ledge of the country and its people remained superficial, and their contacts were 
restricted to a small circle of other, mainly white, people. They knew that they 
might soon leave for yet another country and start all over again with having to 
get to know people, the country, the culture, etc. At the same time, they were 
used to adapting swiftly to new circumstances and the frequent changes in their 
lives increased their flexibility and ability to communicate with people from dif-
ferent backgrounds. As SNV required an open attitude on the part of its per-
sonnel and stressed the importance of cultural contact, the number of people 
involved in negative gossip or with racist tendencies remained very low, al-
though there were some cases reported.  
While a growing number of SNV families lived in very acceptable condi-
tions, there were still SNVers who lived in difficult circumstances. One couple 
suffered severe bouts of malaria, had their computer melt because of the heat 
and had a fridge that was never cooler than 24˚C in the hot season. They were 
not jealous of those living in easier conditions but were struck by the lack of 
empathy among colleagues in the capital: ‘Some of them just didn’t have a 
clue.’ As there were only a few Western foreigners in the area, their contact 
with local people was intense but at the same time they were directly confronted 
with cultural, social and economic differences. Local people thought that they 
had a money-making machine as the SNVers had crisp new bank notes of, by 
local standards, large denominations (that they had received from the bank in 
the capital).85 Also in Nepal, where SNV’s aim was to develop the most remote 
areas of the country, circumstances were often harsh. There were projects in 
places that could only be reached by walking for a week on end.86 
I once heard an anecdote of an SNVer who lived in a hamlet somewhere in Nepal. 
Somebody from the field office in Kathmandu came to visit and the SNVer really 
had gone out of his way to get food on the table because, well, there was nothing 
much to get. And he had managed to score a cauliflower or something in the village. 
That SNVer had already complained that so little was available. Now he had organ-
ised a real feast for that director. So the director was enjoying his cauliflower and 
said: ‘Oh well, it is not going all that bad with that hardship of yours,’ The SNVer 
was not amused!87  
 
                                                 
85  Interview 2.  
86  Archives, SNV Nepal, Kathmandu, ‘Jaarverslag 1984’, pp. 80-81. 
87  Interview 176. 
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The partner of the SNVer 
As a result of the increased expertise required of SNV personnel, their average 
age showed an upward trend. This also meant that an increasing number of 
SNVers went abroad with a partner and children. In the past it had been nearly 
impossible for volunteers to be accompanied by a partner and the early SNV 
advertisements had all explicitly stated ‘preferably single’ as couples were only 
considered if both partners were suitable for an SNV contract. The age limit of 
35 had further limited the number of people with a family applying in the past. 
Generally it was only field staff who had been accompanied by their families 
but in the course of the 1980s, provisions were made to allow dependents to go 
too. 
Initially SNV was hesitant about dependents of its personnel going abroad 
but family life was regarded as a private matter with which SNV as an organi-
sation had nothing to do. KNV, however, called for a more active policy re-
garding dependents as the work of an SNVer could, after all, be influenced 
positively or negatively by his/her private circumstances.88 This has always 
been a feature of development work in general: family circumstances, personal 
relations and cooperation between people can be of crucial importance. These 
‘micro factors’ influence development work much more so than formal policies 
and objectives.89 As Aat van der Wel pointed out: 
I would call these macro factors! These matters are so important: to stand strong as a 
family (…) It is an absolute prerequisite for development work that that works out 
well. We saw it go wrong so often. A minority of the people we knew who arrived 
as a couple returned home married (…) Of course divorce occurs in The Netherlands 
too but the intensity with which you interrelate in a developing country makes it all 
much more extreme. I think stability in a relationship is more important to your job 
than technical professionalism. If I consider us, it is indeed my relationship with my 
wife that has made our stay in Tanzania possible.90 
                                                 
88  Foreign Affairs, file 2735, discussion paper, KNV ‘Dependentsproblematiek binnen 
SNV’, March 1982. 
89  Van der Velden & Zweers, ‘Personele samenwerking. Beleid, resultaten en perspec-
tieven’. In: Lieten & Van der Velden, eds, Grenzen aan de hulp, p. 256. 
90  Interview 167. (‘Ik zou zeggen: macro-factoren. Die dingen zijn zo belangrijk; dat je 
als gezin sterk staat (…) Dat is echt een voorwaarde voor ontwikkelingswerk: dat 
dat goed gaat. We hebben het zo vaak mis zien lopen. Een minderheid van de men-
sen die we kenden die getrouwd kwamen, gingen ook getrouwd terug. (…) Natuur-
lijk wordt er in Nederland ook gescheiden, maar de intensiteit waarmee je met elkaar 
te maken hebt in een ontwikkelingsland, maakt het allemaal veel heftiger. Ik denk 
dat stabiliteit in een relatie belangrijker is voor je werk dan technische professio-
naliteit. Als ik naar ons kijk: het is echt de relatie met mijn vrouw die het verblijf in 
Tanzania mogelijk maakte.’) 
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It was also pointed out that SNV was in any case interfering as its legal, 
financial and administrative procedures not only had consequences for the 
SNVer in question but also for his/her dependents. In many field councils, the 
partners of SNVers had a right to vote so, at this level, ‘dependents’ had already 
been drawn into the organisation.91 Furthermore it was realised that SNV could 
benefit by welcoming partners into its orbit: ‘As you know more and more SNV 
DAs (development associates) are arriving in Nepal with a partner. More often 
than not those partners have excellent qualifications of their own, and/or work 
experience.’92 Conditions improved during the professionalisation process but 
there were still judicial and financial aspects that were disadvantageous for 
SNVers with dependents. For some couples, this was a reason to change organi-
sation and, for example, take up an assignment with DGIS, even if they felt 
closer to the idealistic outlook of SNV.93 SNV’s attempts to address the issue 
were not appreciated by everyone and a brochure entitled ‘The Partner of the 
SNVer’ was deemed ‘noncommittal’ (nietszeggend) and was apparently not 
widely distributed: Anneke Ellen complained that she only read in SNV’s 
personnel magazine Nedwerk (later Nethwork) about the brochure’s publica-
tion.94  
New factors, such as schooling for children and social and recreational ac-
tivities for the accompanying partner, came to play a role when accepting an 
SNV assignment. People with families were less likely to ‘go native’ and they 
built up their social networks according to their own preferences, at times 
within the ex-pat community. Problems with privacy had always been an issue 
but were more intensely felt if it interfered with family life. One woman was 
quoted in the brochure on SNV partners: ‘People even climbed the trees in order 
not to miss anything – they wanted to see how we ate, drank, slept, etc. Ex-
tremely interesting.’95  
Generally speaking, the chances of matters working out well were highest if 
both partners were employed. After they had met several SNVers on a long 
journey through West Africa, a couple who were keen to work for the organisa-
tion decided to accept positions in it only if two contracts were available: ‘What 
                                                 
91  Foreign Affairs, file 2735, letter, Gert-Jan van Apeldoorn to SNV, 4 February 1988; 
Interview 292. 
92  Ibid. file 2735, letter, Hans Rijneveld, SNV Nepal to Hans van de Veen, 8 Novem-
ber 1989. 
93  Van Amelsvoort, ‘SNV in Tanzania’, p. 129. 
94  ‘Partnerbrochure: Afspiegeling van de maatschappij?’ Nedwerk, 1, 1 (February 
1987), p. 6; Foreign Affairs, letter, Anneke Ellen to Hans van der Veen: ‘Werk-
mogelijkheden partners’, 4 March 1987. 
95  SNV archive, Part II, Box 3: brochure, Marijke Swank, ‘De partner van de SNVer’ 
(September 1986), p. 4. 
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struck us during our travels was that if there were two partners and one was 
without work, the unemployed partner would completely “wither away”, espe-
cially if they were in the countryside in the back of beyond’.96 Serious problems 
could arise if the accompanying partner did not manage to find a niche for 
him/herself. Local counterparts tried to assist in such cases: 
Of course there were sometimes problems. Like a partner of a SNV person who was 
bored. We would try to make contact with such a person. But it was also the sort of 
problem that we could not intervene in. Although it could of course influence the 
job, like with field missions, some wives did not like being alone in the house for 
long.97 
Local circumstances were also often a determining factor in the ‘dependents 
issue’ and even in the selection of SNV personnel. A report on northern Camer-
oon recommended that the successor also be ‘without doubt a man’, as it 
seemed ‘next to impossible’ to the present SNVer for a woman to ‘have a 
chance to show her worth’ (zich waar te maken) in the ‘completely male world’ 
of northern Cameroon. He classified his working area as a ‘dirty, dusty and 
warm Muslim village,’ concluding with: ‘Fortunately I am single: a Dutch 
housewife would get sick of all the dust’ (een hollandse huisvrouw zou rolbe-
roertes krijgen van het stof).98 In some countries, people would not accept a 
female SNVer with a male dependent.99 Even more problematic was the issue of 
homosexuality, and there were countries in which it was forbidden by law 
and/or culturally not deemed acceptable.100  
If problems proved insurmountable, there was no other option than to return 
home. In the archives, references are made to couples returning to The Nether-
lands because of ‘personal problems’ that are usually left unspecified.101 Fortu-
nately, such cases were few and far between.  
‘Little kings’ 
A general pattern was that families returned to The Netherlands when their 
children got older. At nursery and primary-school level, acquiring a foreign 
language could still be seen as an advantage and in several larger places Dutch 
                                                 
96  Interview 136. 
97  Interview 41. 
98  Archives SNV Cameroon, Box: ‘Landbouw LLC etc, 1984-1987’, file LLC: report, 
name withheld for reasons of privacy, July 1985. 
99  Foreign Affairs, file 2735, letter, Rob Visser to SNV, 15 September 1987; Interview 
185. 
100  Ibid., letter, Van der Veen to Rookhuizen, 17 May 1988. Interviews 174 and 251. 
101  Case in Cameroon 1987 (for the sake of privacy not further specified); Case in file 
in Foreign Affairs, no permission to quote for the sake of privacy. 
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schools were established. At high-school level however, it was often difficult to 
combine an SNV job with good quality schooling for one’s children. Families 
working for SNV mostly had young children aged between 0 and 6 and, some-
times, up to 12 years of age.102  
For families with children, ties with The Netherlands were stronger. Firstly, 
most women went to The Netherlands in the final stages of their pregnancy to 
have their baby, sometimes accompanied by their partner. Time was spent 
teaching young children the Dutch language and familiarising them with Dutch 
culture. Typical Dutch festivities, such as Sinterklaas, were important occasions 
for children, especially when abroad. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Photo 5.3 ‘Full attention for the cheesehead who just arrived at the airstrip of Jinka 
(Gamo Gofa) together with his parents’ (‘Volle aandacht voor kaaskop 
die zojuist samen met z’n ouders op de airstrip van Jinka (Gamo Gofa) 
is aangekomen’), Ethiopia 1991. 
Source:  SNV photo archives, Red, SNV, Ethiopië, SNVers.  
Photographer:  Bart Eugenhuijsen, 1992. 
 
                                                 
102  Zevenbergen, De deskundige, p. 75; T.M.A. Wijnhoven, Werken in het buitenland. 
Verhalen van Wageningse ingenieurs die in het buitenland werk(t)en (Wageningen, 
1995), p. 8; Interviews 6 and 106; Nico Kussendrager & Reint Rosenstok, ‘Stop(t) 
de hulp?’, Vice Versa, 23, 2 (1989), p. 3. 
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I remember seeing parents who had brought videos from The Netherlands to show 
their children. At that time I thought it was unnecessary but when we had children 
ourselves later on, I understood. After all, it is important to pass on to your children 
something about the culture they come from and to which, in all probability, they 
will eventually return.103 
Young children were quick to adapt to their new environment in most cases. 
Regien who lived in Zambia with her two children noticed that initially the 
language barrier prevented her children from interacting with Zambian children 
in the neighbourhood. They mostly played with each other and with other white 
children, classifying all others as ‘the brown kids’ (de bruine kindjes). But after 
a time they picked up some words in the local language, started to know the 
Zambian children by name and made friends among them. ‘Now they know 
them all by name, play football and race one another, eat wild berries together 
and speak a mishmash of English, Dutch and Kaonde.’104  
SNV children did not live in the same circumstances as most of the other 
families in their neighbourhood. Usually they had better access to schooling, 
had more books and toys, and generally enjoyed more amenities than their 
peers. Although they lived in simpler circumstances than most Dutch children, 
they received a wider range of food, including sweets, than most of the children 
amongst whom they lived. This could turn the SNVers’ house into a focal 
meeting point: ‘The scenes reminded me of the past. Then we used to sit, all of 
us, in front of the only television in the village and watch Dappere Dodo (Brave 
Dodo).’105 
Family life abroad had many sides to it. Apart from the gap in material well-
being, SNV children were usually taller than other children of their age and 
were regarded as special because of their colour. This could make them behave 
like ‘little kings’, something most parents did not deem healthy in the long 
term.106 The experience did, however, have positive aspects too:  
One thing for which I am very grateful to SNV, although as such it is not really a 
merit of the organisation, is the fact that my children received an international edu-
cation. They have a much broader view of the world and interact so naturally with 
other people of whatever colour or origin and those with different ideas. Segregation 
in The Netherlands is quite an issue. For our children, the fact that people of differ-
ent backgrounds live together is quite natural. That may only be a secondary benefit 
of having been with SNV but I think it is very important: being a world citizen, 
acceptance and understanding. They got that all for free because they grew up in that 
                                                 
103  Interviews 2, 86 and 106. 
104  Foreign Affairs, file 232, circular Zambia, Regien van der Sijp, 17 January 1986. 
105  Ibid., circular, Zambia, Sander e.a., 1 January 1986, p. 7. 
106  Interview 6; SNV archive, Part II, Box 3: brochure, Saskia Kunnen, ‘Met kinderen 
naar een ontwikkelingsland’ (SNV brochure, August 1985), p. 7. 
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environment. These are things I think about and, for me, they were an added advan-
tage of having lived abroad.107 
Sometimes the children of development workers later also worked in inter-
national circles. In any case, a striking number of the (former) SNVers inter-
viewed had spent (part of) their youth outside The Netherlands. 
Cultural contact and monomania 
Cultural contact remained a central concept in SNV’s philosophy. Within the 
Dutch development landscape, SNV had become one of the organisations that 
was renown for its in-depth knowledge of the countries in which it worked and 
the serious interaction it had with its target groups, especially at grassroots 
level. The new approaches that SNV envisaged in the late 1980s and early 
1990s, such as participatory methods and the process approach, also presup-
posed not only knowledge about local people but also intensive communication 
with them. Although SNV had, from the start, paid attention to the wishes of the 
participants it worked with, over time SNV management attempted to translate 
this into the organisation’s methods and approaches. This tendency to focus on 
the wishes and needs of local participants also showed in the preparatory course 
that all SNVers followed before their departure. The part of the preparatory 
course given in The Netherlands had always involved little specific information 
on the country where the new recruit was to start working. In the beginning this 
was not considered very important but at a later stage, a general introduction to 
development work and cultural contact would be given in The Netherlands, 
while specific language training and information about the country’s history and 
culture followed during in-country training courses. Several institutes, set up by 
SNV and then handed over to local management, specialised in giving these 
courses but they were not always satisfactory and in a number of cases the local 
management did not live up to expectations.108 
Many development associates were keen to gain knowledge about their new 
country. The director of the training centre in Bobo Dioulasso (Burkina Faso) 
explained the tensions this could cause:  
On the one hand, he or she wants – and it could not be otherwise - to remain Dutch, 
on the other to be African with the Africans. Especially in the beginning, that creates 
tensions. You notice that they want to adopt every little detail.109 
                                                 
107  Interview 168. 
108  Interview 3; Nedwerk 2, 1 (February 1988), p. 7; ‘Taaltraining in Bobo Dioulasso is 
zwak’, Nedwerk 2, 1 (February 1988), p. 7. 
109  Nico Kussendrager, ‘Opleiding vrijwilligers in Bobo. ‘Je houdt als Nederlander al-
tijd je klompen aan’, Vice Versa 19, 1 (1985), p. 3. 
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With increased professional demands, more was expected from SNVers. 
Larger projects, higher positions and bigger budgets in most cases also implied 
an increased workload and more responsibilities for the professional SNV per-
sonnel. These often did not allow time for intensive study of the local culture, 
history and language. Administration, report writing, evaluations and planning 
could take on enormous proportions and left little time for field visits, commu-
nication and the building up of social networks within the local society. Some 
felt SNV was asking too much: ‘Life seems to exist of SNV alone,’ a female 
regional representative complained from eastern Cameroon. The ‘monomania’, 
as she called it, was only broken by the presence of her child. She did not con-
sider it right that the range of responsibilities she was charged with presupposed 
the presence of an unemployed partner who would ultimately share in fulfilling 
SNV tasks.110 
A factor further contributing to changes in the communication between 
development workers and participants was a different conceptualisation of cul-
tural contact. While integration and adaptation had earlier been key words, by 
the 1990s there was more emphasis on contact and understanding. In this sense 
the ‘Dutchness’ of SNVers was more widely acknowledged; as there was no 
way in which they could definitively ‘go native’, it was accepted that their inte-
gration would only be partial.  
At the same time, a start was made with the internationalisation of SNV by 
employing nationals in SNV country offices. This was not always easy. While 
members of the support staff had traditionally been local people, taking on 
nationals as SNVers was a new development. Lucy Muyoyeta was one of the 
very first to join SNV Zambia in 1985. People at the office were clearly not 
prepared for her arrival and conversations and correspondence continued to be 
in Dutch. She received differing information about her legal position, the bene-
fits that Dutch SNVers received were not given to her, and her salary level was 
also unclear. In addition, no thought had been given to the role she was to play 
in the organisation. Although most SNVers were kind and accepted her socially, 
she felt she was being treated like a guinea pig and left the organisation after 
just over a year.111 Zuhura Yegella also felt that when she started working for 
SNV Tanzania in the early 1990s, the organisation was a bit insular: 
When I joined it was a small, inward-looking organisation: ‘We are SNV, this is our 
staff, our projects’. They were not concerned with others. Now SNV is much more 
widely known. But that is only recently. In those days it was not known, the infor-
                                                 
110  Archives SNV Cameroon, Yaoundé, Box: ’88/’89: ‘1e ervaringsrapport’, 12 May 
1986. 
111  Interview 117. 
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mation system was not good. It acted more like a family; it had its own activities, it 
wasn’t very open.112 
During her time at SNV the atmosphere changed, especially when more Tan-
zanians were taken on and SNV increased its network in cooperation with other 
organisations. However, she regarded this shift towards being a more open or-
ganisation as a feature of the last ten years of SNV’s history.  
Decentralisation  
The workload of SNVers in terms of bureaucracy and paper work increased 
over time due to a growth in the number and the size of the projects being 
undertaken, the increased responsibilities of many development associates and 
SNV’s more structured organisation. This period also saw the delegation of 
tasks from The Hague to country offices, a process of decentralisation that 
meant an increase in the responsibilities of SNV field staff. They were expected 
to draw up five-year plans, annual reports and project documents, but Head 
Office only responded with marginal interest.113 
SNV became a relatively strongly decentralised organisation and the influ-
ence of local circumstances on the various SNV offices increased: SNV Nepal 
became more ‘Nepalised’, SNV Mali more ‘Malinised’, etc. SNV began to 
resemble an archipelago of independently functioning entities. Ultimately this 
did not make it easy for SNV The Hague to design an overall policy as any 
general guidelines were likely to be criticised for either not acknowledging the 
local context or being too general. Guidelines and policy documents developed 
by SNV management in The Hague were not always significant in practice. 
Often the interpretation of these documents was so strongly directed towards the 
local context that it seemed as if matters just carried on as usual.  
The implementation of new policies and strategies and the introduction of 
new themes in development depended to a large extent on the goodwill of the 
SNV country director. In the introduction to this volume we quoted Ton Nijzink 
on the discrepancy between SNV policy and practice: ‘It seems justified to 
suppose that both have their own dynamics, that they sometimes mutually 
influence each other and at other times function completely independently of 
each other.’114 
 
                                                 
112  Interviews 89 and 176. 
113  IOB, SNV-Nepal, p. 45. 
114  Nijzink, Dag vrijwilliger!, pp. 77-78. 
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Double Dutch 
Dutch trends and fashions in development remained of crucial importance. As 
Kik van den Heuvel, who worked for SNV Tanzania for a long time, put it: 
That is always the problem: It is 90% Dutch. Only 10% matters to the countries con-
cerned. Appropriate technology is trendy in Holland, so everything changes to that; 
gender is trendy in Holland, so everything changes to gender; the environment is 
trendy in Holland, so everything changes to environment, etc. It has nothing to do 
with the countries themselves, but Tanzania must adapt to that fashion. It all has to 
do with political scoring, with votes for the PvdA (the Dutch Labour Party). It is 
about trends in The Netherlands, what the in-thing there is. That is also what makes 
an organisation like SNV so chaotic, they switch from one side to the other because 
of changing Dutch attitudes. The people in the countries involved can’t make head 
or tail of it, but that is of no consequence.115 
In general, the two directions of interaction worked together: Dutch trends 
and local development were both constitutive in the practice of development 
and SNV’s development activities formed a multifarious process that involved 
actors from many different contexts. In the early days of development, decision-
making had taken place in the West. Now the practice of development had 
become a complex interplay of international, national, local and personal fac-
tors. The new struggles about control were also taking place at a meso and 
macro level. The history of the bamboo project in Tanzania, which started in the 
1970s, is telling. The plan to supply water through bamboo pipes was initially 
met with much scepticism in the national Ministry of Water and its architect, 
Mr Lipangile, was dismissed. Yet it was during this time that appropriate tech-
nology became the new ‘in-thing’ in development circles internationally and Mr 
Lipangile’s idea of using bamboo pipes to supply water fitted with notions of 
locally produced techniques fulfilling the basic needs in a rural area. As the 
project was praised by international donors, national politicians and even 
Tanzania’s President Nyerere joined in their approval. Although SNV project 
leaders were informed by a Dutch research institute that it would be next to 
impossible to resolve problems with the durability of the material, the stakes 
had become so high that there was no way back. SNV withdrew its support but 
the Tanzanian state continued the project until well into the 1990s. The critique 
of his colleagues notwithstanding, Mr Lipangile had, at one time, an entire floor 
in the Ministry of Water. When the project was finally discontinued, Mr Lipan-
gile did not mention practical problems as a reason for its demise. According to 
him, it had been the jealousy of other politicians envious of his success that had 
finally destroyed it.116 This example shows how factors from Tanzanian national 
                                                 
115  Interview 86. 
116  Interview 86 and telephone conversation with Mr Lipangile, 23 May 2005. 
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politics, Dutch development policies and international trends all interacted in 
one project.  
The ideal development worker in this period was far less a determinant than 
his/her predecessor and s/he was expected to coordinate the development that 
poor people themselves brought about. The stress on participation and empow-
erment, however, by no means meant an end to the dilemmas outlined in the 
previous chapter. For people in Third World countries, the development worker 
was now a common sight and anyone stepping out of a 4x4 with a logo on its 
side was likely to be classified as such. Mutual expectations about what could 
be achieved significantly influenced relations between development workers 
and participants: 
It always remains a top-down approach. We come to ask you: what do you want 
from development? Then the women will of course answer: ‘maternity’ assistance. 
They know that that is an answer that will fit the expectations of the organisations. 
However during my research, it turned out that many women chose to give birth 
alone, that this was an ideal; to go through the pain and the difficulties on one’s 
own. That sort of information one only gets by indirect means; never through such a 
straightforward question. Fifty per cent of health care is done by traditional healers, 
but that is never the answer to a question about development.117 
In such a context of mutual expectations, the interaction between politics and 
development, at all levels of interaction, became ever more complex.  
Local politics 
Each and every decision in some development organisations depended on the 
response from its head office, whereas in SNV the country offices had consider-
able manoeuvring space to determine their own course. SNV explicitly chose 
against imposing decisions about the course of development, expecting local 
people themselves to make these choices. Such a decentralised structure re-
sulted in a growth in the influence of local politics in SNV programmes, starting 
at village level and going right up to national politics. At times it proved hard to 
find a balance between preventing local power struggles entering programmes 
and imposing conditions for aid. 
In the Buba water project in Guinea-Bissau, local leaders determined where 
the pump would be placed and who would be involved in the maintenance 
group. This could give rise to new local struggles about control. In one village, 
the project pump became a source of conflict between the chief’s family and the 
rest of the villagers. The son of a village founder ensured that the pump was 
built on his compound and that his son became the pump technician. To ‘make 
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the pump last longer’, he argued, the technician closed off the water for several 
hours during the day. The villagers did not agree with this decision and on 
several occasions reacted angrily: ‘The pump is from the state, you have no say 
over it,’ they claimed.118 To avoid this kind of local conflict, people from one 
village in northwestern Zambia initially decided not to accept a project well in 
their village and it was only after they saw how surrounding villages were bene-
fiting from the project that they also joined in.119 
Similar problems were noted by the IOB evaluation committee in the case of 
SNV Nepal. Although SNV worked in one of Nepal’s poorest regions, there 
were indications that some of the public taps installed by the Community Water 
Supply and Sanitation Programme were being monopolised by the relatively 
powerful people in the villages. Furthermore, the selection of villages for the 
programme was at times based on political motives. Although the committee 
concluded that the water supply for poor people, especially for women, had 
improved in general, it was estimated that by 1990 30% to 60% of the taps were 
either no longer functioning or were in need of urgent repair. A 1992 report 
even stated that as many as 90% of the taps required maintenance.120 
Local politics also altered due to the influence of development programmes. 
While in some cases power structures were reinforced, new power relations 
could also be created by development activities. Local politics not only entered 
development; development entered local politics too. ‘Development brokers’, 
people who were able to act as mediators between the world of development 
and poor areas, gained new status and often also material benefits through their 
role.121 Some people tried to jump on the bandwagon to get a piece of the pie 
whenever the occasion arose. In eastern Cameroon, for example, elite formation 
suddenly took place when there were plans for forest management and wood 
exploitation by villages in the region. People who had never even lived in the 
village acted as if they were long-time village leaders, which led to social 
tensions in the communities involved in the project. The forestry programme’s 
development workers were quick to realise what was happening and stressed the 
importance of reviewing development as practice rather than as theory.122 
In some cases SNVers were not drawn into conflicts at all and they remained 
detached from the implications of development work. In other cases, however, 
the intertwining of development work and local hierarchies had serious conse-
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quences for the relations between development workers and local people. In 
other words, although it may be analytically possible to separate SNV and local 
politics, in practice the boundaries between these were blurred. Relations be-
tween local participants and development workers entered SNV as an organisa-
tion. 
These dynamics are hence multi-directional: development activities had their 
impact on the local context and at the same time local factors entered develop-
ment organisations. In Buba (Guinea-Bissau), for example, tensions mounted 
between Dutch development workers and Guinean state officials about the use 
of materials and the services of a water-supply project. One of the local 
politicians, for example, frequently asked for his car to be repaired at the project 
garage. Dutch SNVers and DGIS people interpreted this as abuse, and at some 
point in 1984 matters came to a head when one of the Dutch volunteers working 
as a mechanic flatly refused to comply with the politician’s demands. José 
Gomes Lopes, the Guinean project coordinator, could see his point but, not 
wanting problems with any of the political leaders in the region and knowing 
that the politician needed transport to carry out his work, he felt that the car 
should be repaired. It was the clash of two philosophies: the Dutch would not 
allow any flexibility in the use of project services and materials as abuse was to 
be avoided at all costs, while the Guinean coordinator regarded it as imperative 
to work in harmony with all state representatives and saw assisting the func-
tioning of the state and its representatives as part of development. A discussion 
between the Dutch coordinator and Lopes over the issue only made matters 
worse: the Dutch coordinator demanded all project activities to be halted in-
definitely and the project came to a standstill. Mr Lopes informed the ministe-
rial headquarters in the capital about the matter, and he was told that the Dutch 
coordinator had no authority whatsoever to stop the project. Project activities 
were resumed and some time later the Dutch mechanic was sent home. The 
issue thus involved political contexts at various levels, from relations within the 
project to district-level and then national politics. As this was the only conflict 
he faced during his entire time as project coordinator, Mr Lopes stressed that 
overall cooperation with Dutch development workers had been very good.123 
Local factors often determined the success of development work: if people 
working in the health sector in a given state had not received their salaries for 
months on end, development workers in the medical sphere realised that 
nothing much could be expected of them.124 
Development workers also used their status too – as white foreigners and 
development workers – to influence the course of events. Mr Fidèl Oket in 
                                                 
123  Interview 23. 
124  Interview 2. 
 EXPERTISE EXPECTED  187 
 
 
eastern Cameroon remembered how the SNVers working on the project he was 
coordinating went straight to Yaoundé (the capital) to see the minister as the 
governor had delayed granting permission to start building (the project con-
cerned a centre to re-integrate juvenile delinquents into society). In the presence 
of the SNVers, the minister concerned called the governor telling him that 
things should go ahead. Mr Oket felt that this would have been impossible for a 
Cameroonian: ‘There is a hierarchy in the state apparatus and you cannot jump 
from one level to the other,’ but the SNVers, ‘with their impatience and cour-
age’ could.125 
Many SNVers gained enormous insight into the societies in which they 
worked over the years. While there had been a tendency in the 1970s to stress 
democracy, equality and emancipation as universal principles, in the 1980s 
attention to cultural differences grew once again. The balance between cultural 
relativism and universal rights was often hard to strike, as a former SNVer’s 
reflections on Mauritanian political power show: 
Being Dutch it ran contrary to our democratic values when we discovered that the 
village leader did not have one rice field but maybe three or even four plots in the 
irrigation scheme. The question was whether we should actually have had any 
problems with it. If a village approves of it, who are we to question such issues? If 
that man through his status and position takes care of all sorts of things for the vil-
lage and in exchange gets some more plots, so what? But that is our misplaced sense 
of honesty. For them it is entirely acceptable. He made sure that the rice was trans-
ported out of the village before the rains and that the fertilizer and other inputs got 
there in time for the start of the agricultural season. It was like payment for his 
services.126 
These examples once again point to the dilemma between following the 
principles that formed the basis of SNV and letting local political processes take 
their course. In many cases, SNVers were hesitant both about accepting and 
intervening in hierarchical structures, unequal social relations and undemocratic 
political processes. This dilemma informed policy-making in SNV in the next 
period. 
Policy and practice 
While SNV and many other development organisations attempted to avoid im-
posing development activities, the word ‘development’ had created expectations 
that could not always be fulfilled. There was no way a relatively small organi-
sation like SNV could address all the needs and wishes expressed by poor 
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people, while expectations were sometimes unrealistically high. When SNV 
started to address the issue of water shortage in the Usambara Mountains in 
Tanzania, local people hoped that all their problems would be solved: ‘The 
farmers thought we were magicians who would miraculously make water ap-
pear again.’127  
In many respects development organisations functioned as states within the 
state, just as the mission stations had done before them. Since the governments 
of developing countries often proved unable or unwilling to provide the services 
needed by their people, development workers were first forced to create condi-
tions in which they could work. Thus, a project aimed at supplying an area with 
water was doubly appreciated as it provided the village with an access road, a 
bridge, transport facilities for the duration of the project, and labour and training 
opportunities.128 
The benefits of such a project were entirely unintended and unforeseen, and 
did not bear any resemblance to the formally stated aims of the project. Visiting 
development workers might come with food and presents for the people in the 
village or a party might be organised at the end of the work.129 Material and 
transport could sometimes be used for the duration of the project.130 In Camer-
oon, local field workers, all male school leavers, received motorbikes from the 
project to facilitate their work but instead of going into the field, they went 
racing through town.131 Sidi Diarra, who worked as a driver for SNV in Mali 
praised the organisation as, in contrast to many other people, he received a 
decent pension: ‘Thank God and SNV I have a pension.’132 The unintended 
benefits and advantages led to tactful answers when project evaluators arrived. 
If a project failed entirely in realising its aim, some of the participants might 
still want it to continue. For example, local people in Nepal saw that mistakes 
were made in the planning phase of a project but did not dare to say anything in 
case the whole project was withdrawn and there were no benefits at all.133 
The added advantages might be small and diverse, as in the examples men-
tioned above, but they could also be larger and more structural. Development 
projects could radically change the local context. In the south of Guinea-Bissau 
a water project was started in 1978. Before the project began, Buba had been a 
small village with some two hundred inhabitants and there were no schools in 
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the area, no medical services and transport had been a real problem. The project 
people, at a certain stage totalling fourteen (and their families), needed housing, 
which meant jobs for the local population and led to the expansion of the vil-
lage. Some time after the project had started, SNV brought in personnel from 
the capital because hardly any labour was available in the region. Slowly these 
people grew into a new community: ‘We all came from outside Buba but the 
project turned us into real Buba people,’ a former project employee ex-
plained.134 The fact that SNV had started a project in Buba had made all the 
difference. At a certain stage, Guinea-Bissau’s capital was without electricity, 
while the project generators in Buba ensured a continuous power supply.135 The 
presence of foreigners and local people with an income made it profitable to 
start a shop in the village and Buba is now a sprawling town of a few thousand 
people, with schools, shops, a daily market, a military base and two hotels. In 
2003, an opposition politician even suggested moving Guinea’s capital to 
Buba.136 The water-supply project was so important to the region that history is 
now divided into ‘the time before the project came’, ‘the time that the project 
was here’ and ‘the time after the project’.137 In terms of water supply, the pro-
ject certainly faced many problems that are still unresolved, but in practice the 
results of the project have been widely appreciated. 
The example of Buba shows the enormous off-spin a project can have, in-
cluding elements that were in no way part of the project’s formal aims. The 
impact of development work went far beyond the outlines of formal policy-
making and could have consequences in the sphere of political relations, trade, 
social status, job creation, transport facilities, population density and patterns of 
mobility. At the same time, local political hierarchies, economic structures and 
social relations at various levels strongly influenced development work. Such 
consequences and influences made it very difficult both to plan and evaluate 
development work. It became impossible to disentangle development work 
from its local context. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed SNV’s history in the second half of the 1980s and 
the first half of the 1990s. Three developments were crucial during this phase of 
SNV’s history and all three formed the foundation for the decisions that so 
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fundamentally altered the organisation in the new millennium. Not only the 
professionalisation process but also the steps taken towards ensuring a greater 
degree of independence from the Ministry were factors in SNV’s decision to 
become an independent NGO in 2002. The first few nationals taken on locally 
as development workers by SNV would, in the next period, be joined by many 
more.  
Apart from these three major changes, several other concerns that emerged 
in this period led to new developments in the following decade. SNV’s stress on 
participation and the local wishes and needs of the people led to an approach 
that focused on ownership and capacity-building in the period between 1995 
and 2005. And finally, dilemmas surrounding expectations and power relations 
made SNV decide to no longer finance specific projects or programmes but to 
concentrate on an advisory role. These profound changes will be discussed in 
the next chapter. 
 
  
  
 
 
Photo 6.1 Boating, Zambia, 1990s. 
Source:  SNV photo archives, Yellow, SNV, Zambia, SNVers.  
Photographer:  Bart Eugenhuijsen, s.d. 
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Building capacity:  
SNV at the Millennium 
(1995-2005) 
Over the last fifteen years the organisational structure of SNV has changed 
profoundly and it is now a very different organisation from the JVP and JVC 
initiatives of 1963. While the first volunteers and SNV staff were exclusively 
Dutch nations, the number of non-Dutch SNVers grew rapidly after 1990: by 
1999 the figure was 40% and this grew to 67% in 2004. Another major change 
was SNV’s departure from project implementation and funding to become an 
organisation advising on capacity-building of meso-level organisations and 
government bodies. Its ambivalent relationship with the Ministry finally came 
to an end when SNV obtained independent status in 2002. These three changes 
form the core of SNV’s history between 1995 and 2005 and are discussed in 
this chapter. 
Developments in The Netherlands and the wider context 
The changes that occurred in SNV since 1995 are part of a complex interplay 
between global developments, Dutch policies and the organisation’s internal 
dynamics. As discussed in Chapter 5, the first half of the 1990s was marked by 
various severe crises in a number of regions: Yugoslavia, Rwanda and the Gulf 
are but a few examples where extreme violence could not be prevented and/or 
halted by the international community. These ‘new wars’ – often fought by 
warlords within states and thus different from the classic model of a war be-
tween two states – became a matter of deep concern for global leaders. Humani-
tarian assistance, peace-keeping missions, conflict resolution, and refugee and 
migrancy issues had to be organised on an international scale. This was a gene-
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ral trend and internationalisation, or ‘globalisation’ as it came to be known, was 
one of its important features. New patterns of communication were created 
through technological innovations such as the worldwide web, the Internet and 
the mobile phone. And economic relations were referred to as the growth of 
worldwide capitalism, neo-liberalism and the global marketplace. Good govern-
ance and global warming became new notions in politics and the environment. 
The Al-Qaeda attacks of 11 September 2001 did not minimise these globalising 
tendencies and the events were interpreted in terms of ‘international terrorism’ 
and a global ‘war on terror’, with military interventions in Afghanistan, Iraq and 
elsewhere. In a very different way, the Tsunami disaster of 2004, which affected 
an enormous area of the world, evoked an international reaction on an unpre-
cedented scale.  
International development showed a similar trend. Given their very nature, 
development organisations had always been engaged in international coopera-
tion, intercontinental travel and global relations. Enhanced communication and 
transport networks and calls for better coordination now increased attempts to 
manage development work on a global scale and arrive at a stronger interna-
tional network of knowledge exchange on development issues. The Millennium 
Development Goals, a UN-initiated and measurable set of targets to reduce 
poverty and hunger worldwide by 2015 were also organised. 
Globalisation led to a new protest movement: Alter-globalists (or anti-
globalists) saw these new relations as merely increasing existing inequalities. 
Massive demonstrations were held – the ‘Battle of Seattle’ on the occasion of 
the World Trade Organisation’s summit in 1999 being a case in point. In the 
alter-globalism protest movement, development issues are linked to environ-
mental concerns, anti-war protests (against the US intervention in Afghanistan 
and Iraq) and critiques of existing economic relations. At gatherings such as 
those of the World Social Forum and the European Social Forum, attempts were 
made to find alternative models for world politics and economics. The NGO 
sector played an important role in organising these meetings.  
Within the globalisation and alter-globalisation lines of thinking, develop-
ment came to be seen on a wider global scale and to be related to international 
security, global environmental issues, worldwide migration and interculturality. 
These links also became important in The Netherlands. Debates about its multi-
cultural society and relations with Islamic immigrants and asylum seekers led to 
considerable political tension, and development, security and migrancy were 
important issues in the Dutch development sector.  
The political instability of the early 1990s led Minister Pronk to emphasize 
conflict prevention and sustainable peace as part of development cooperation. 
This new focus not only had consequences for Dutch development policy in 
general, but also for SNV. For example, in 1996 the Minister attended a cere-
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mony at which 3000 weapons were destroyed to signal the end of the war in 
northern Mali. He then promised Dutch engagement in developing the region, a 
promise that materialised in the form of a programme assigned to SNV: ‘He 
(Pronk) opened two doors, namely that of Gao and that of Menaka.’1 The 
Minister expected SNV’s engagement in other crisis situations too and, in the 
case of Rwanda, SNV’s Board was taken to task for not stepping into the lime-
light more prominently with its local knowledge about the troubled context 
there. The Minister also called upon SNV to consider playing a role in Bosnia-
Herzegovina.2 Despite ministerial pressure, however, SNV’s formal engage-
ment in the field of peace-building and conflict prevention remained limited. 
Pronk’s decisions in the field of development had far-reaching conse-
quences. His decompartmentalisation (ontschotting) and policy review (her-
ijking) resulted in a fundamental reorganisation of DGIS and many issues,  
 
 
 
Photo 6.2 Jan Pronk giving a speech on the occasion of SNV’s 30th anniversary. 
Source:  SNV Digital photo archive: 1990-1995 part I: SNV-JUB-06.tif. 
Photographer:  Unknown. 
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which had previously been dealt with by the Ministry, now came under the 
responsibility of Dutch embassies around the world. In the second half of the 
1990s, cooperation between SNV country offices and local Dutch embassies 
was of crucial importance. Pronk’s aim with the new approach was to arrive at a 
coherent Dutch policy in the areas of defence, foreign affairs and development. 
SNV could, as a rule, count on government support because Jan Pronk had 
known it for a long time and was kindly disposed towards it. However this 
changed radically when Eveline Herfkens took over in 1998. She openly 
doubted the value of expatriate technical assistance and felt that this form of 
development aid was expensive and ineffective. She even attacked the Dutch 
development sector by questioning the genuine objectives of many organisa-
tions, holding that they were merely pursuing their own interests.  
Despite her statements about the need to reform the sector, the new minister 
to some extent continued the policies of her predecessor. Good governance 
remained a crucial issue, both as an aim and criterion for aid. Herfkens took up 
the sector-wide approach that Pronk had introduced aimed at coherent, inte-
grated programmes for an entire sector rather than isolated projects. Such 
programmes were to be developed in cooperation with the government of the 
recipient country and frequently required considerable institutional support. Yet 
in other respects Herfkens’s approach differed markedly from Pronk’s and it 
can be viewed as a watershed in Dutch development aid. Not only did she 
reduce the number of partner countries for bilateral aid, she also, in line with the 
policies of the World Bank and IMF, felt that free trade should play an impor-
tant role in development. With this focus on trade, she radically opposed the 
alter-globalist movement in The Netherlands. Her notion that development co-
operation should focus on poverty alleviation and that concerns for other, re-
lated themes should be reduced was contrary to the alter-globalist trend of 
viewing development in a broader context. Herfkens opted for a technocratic, 
managerial approach to development. Her scepticism about the use of expatriate 
technical assistance intensified debate in the sector about transparency, the 
measurement of results, the scale of impact and the role of expat development 
workers. These debates were not only held in Parliament but also in organi-
sations like SNV, for which the new policy that would end the posting of Dutch 
technical experts overseas was extremely significant. 
After 2002, the Christian Democrat Agnes van Ardenne first became State 
Secretary and later Minister for Development Cooperation. Van Ardenne con-
tinued her predecessor’s emphasis on the role of trade and investment in 
development, regarding the private sector and socially responsible enterprise as 
crucial in establishing a climate of economic progress. Development was, in her 
view, not a matter for governments alone but also for civil society, private ini-
tiative and economic investment. Her policies included a renewed focus on 
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bilateral aid, while at the same time emphasising the need for development aid 
directed towards specific regions. With an emphasis on measuring the effec-
tiveness of aid and a results-oriented approach, van Ardenne required develop-
ment organisations to justify their existence. As SNV had in the meantime 
become independent of the Ministry, the Minister’s policies regarding subsidies 
for development organisations were important for SNV’s very existence. 
The struggle for independence 
In 2002 SNV became a fully independent NGO. From its inception, the organi-
sation had had an ambivalent relationship both with the Ministry and with the 
private development sector in The Netherlands. SNV’s activities in the 1960s 
and 1970s were marked by tensions between the state initiative JVP and the 
private JVC. JVC board members continued to view SNV as a state organisa-
tion and JVC separated from SNV in the end. In the course of the 1970s SNV 
moved towards becoming an NGO, having until now attempted to operate 
independently of the Ministry. Within DGIS and many of the Dutch embassies, 
SNV was associated with the MFOs rather than with Foreign Affairs.3 Despite 
these aspects of its organisational culture, SNV also showed a tendency towards 
bureaucratic procedures and hierarchical structures that are all too often 
characteristic of state systems. In addition, the operational staff in The Hague 
was in ministerial service during most of SNV’s history but as they were never 
fully integrated into the Ministry, they were regarded as Fremdkörpers (‘foreign 
bodies’) in other ministerial departments.4 Despite the professionalisation proc-
ess in the late 1980s, the situation only partly changed: field staff were con-
tracted directly by SNV, but The Hague’s operational staff continued to be 
employed as civil servants by the Ministry. Final responsibility for a number of 
decisions continued to lie with the Ministry. The appointment of the Board’s 
chair was the responsibility of the Minister and only in 1996 was an SNV 
director appointed from outside ministerial circles for the first time.5 The posi-
tion of the SNV Board vis-à-vis the Minister had never been very clear and 
                                                 
3  Foreign Affairs, file snv/ara/00050, letter, Hans Pelgröm and Hans Simons to Minis-
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while SNV’s quango status later resolved some of the tensions between itself 
and the Ministry, it also created new ground for conflict. The Minister contin-
ued to bear political responsibility for SNV’s activities, which was in the final 
analysis inconsistent with the more autonomous status of SNV. 
SNV’s ambivalent position laid its relations with the Minister, DGIS and the 
embassies open to conflict. Both in SNV and in ministerial circles the discus-
sions about its status tended towards disentanglement of the organisation. In the 
concept version of the first SNV business plan in 1996, it was recommended 
that SNV should aspire to a more independent position towards the Ministry 
than the present quango statute.6 The major impetus for the change, however, 
came from a report published in 1999 by the IBO (Interdepartementaal Beleids-
onderzoek, Interdepartmental Policy Study), investigating the postings of 
development personnel. Minister Herfkens had, in line with her doubts about 
the role of technical assistance in development, proposed the study. It concluded 
that expatriate experts should stop implementing projects and focus on provid-
ing advice and services, and that clear criteria should be developed to establish 
the effectiveness of technical assistants in their new role as advisors and service 
providers. It was thought advisable that: ‘The development organisation SNV 
will be entirely detached from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs: the administra-
tive and financial interweaving between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
SNV will be ended.’7 
Reactions to the recommendations made in the IBO report were positive at 
SNV’s Head Office: it was clear to all parties that the current situation had 
many disadvantages.8 The harsh critique of Minister Herfkens on the position of 
foreign development workers and her emphasis on effective aid had made the 
situation at SNV very tense and uncertainty about the organisation’s future 
intensified personal conflicts.9 Director Thea Fierens reflected on the challenges 
past and present in SNV’s staff magazine:  
                                                 
6  ‘Aanbevelingen van de Centrale Raad voor het concept-Bedrijfsplan’, Nedwerk 10, 
special (1996), p. 4. 
7  IBO commissions are installed annually by the Cabinet to conduct research on an 
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SNV wordt volledig losgemaakt van het ministerie van BZ: Aan de huidige be-
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An independent SNV will need to increase its public presence. We need to speak at 
fora, take part in discussions and produce publications (…) For a moment, it looked 
as if SNV was in difficulties. Our foundations were shaking. Doubt was being cast 
on the use of technical assistance.10  
Instead of passively awaiting the IBO report, steps were taken within SNV to 
prepare for the changes and to reflect on what future possibilities existed.11 The 
issue was of course about how SNV would continue its activities and the dis-
cussion by and large revolved around two possibilities: SNV could continue as 
an independent NGO applying for state subsidies on a regular basis or as an 
agency with the statute of preferred partner of the Dutch state. The SNV Board 
chose for the latter but knew that this option would not count on much support 
within the Ministry: ‘It is seen as an attempt to “save one’s skin”, the conse-
quence of “running with the hare and hunting with the dogs” for too long.’ For 
the embassies, it was logical that SNV, now that it was independent of the 
government, should seek a closer relationship with the state as a preferred 
partner.12 In the end, it was decided that SNV would go it alone and become an 
independent NGO.  
The plan was that SNV would become an independent organisation, separate 
from the Ministry, as of January 2002 and would at first still receive state 
funding. In the first year, SNV’s budget would not undergo any changes but the 
subsidies were to decrease gradually later. In the meantime, SNV could study its 
financial strategy.  
An independent SNV: Consequences and implications 
An important consequence of SNV’s independent status was obviously a new 
financial relationship with the Ministry. SNV’s financial security had always 
been a matter of course and in the first years following privatisation too, the 
Ministry guaranteed subsidies for SNV. It was clear, however, that its new 
status had huge consequences in this realm. A Subsidy Agreement signed by 
SNV and the Ministry ensured SNV funding between 2002 and 2006, during 
which time SNV was expected to study its financial position and future. SNV 
felt it had to find new ways to finance its activities and make economies to 
                                                 
10  Thea Fierens, ‘SNV Is Set to Continue as an Independent Development Organisa-
tion’, Nethwork 15, 6 (2001), p. 2.  
11  Interview 292. 
12  Foreign Affairs, file snv/2012/00233, report, ‘Postionering (sic) van SNV: naar een 
volledig zelfstandige gesubsidieerde instelling?’, 1998, p. 2. (‘Dit wordt door som-
migen geïnterpreteerd als een positionering om ‘het vege lijf te redden’. In feite 
betaalt SNV nu daarmee ook de prijs voor het (te) lang van twee walletjes eten.’) 
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reduce expenses as it was to be expected that its government subsidies would 
eventually be based on the organisation’s results and effectiveness. 
The first task proved no easy one. Although there was no formal demand 
stipulated in the Subsidy Agreement about diversifying its funding, SNV ini-
tially chose to look for additional donors and aimed to mobilise €5 million in 
external funding.13 In 2005, the first annual budget had even envisaged €11 
million from additional resource mobilisation but only €2 million was eventu-
ally realised, only accounting for 2.3% of SNV’s total expenditure. The other 
97.7% came from DGIS core funding.14 Although the idea of external funding 
was not entirely abandoned, SNV’s strategy became ‘to opt for a large compo-
nent of core funding from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in order to maintain 
an optimal autonomy and independence in its operations’. Yet it was precisely 
to prevent dependency that DGIS had always required other subsidised organi-
sations, such as the MFOs, to diversify their resources and look for other finan-
cial channels. This requirement did not apply to SNV, which led to its strong 
financial dependency on the Ministry, despite SNV’s autonomous position as an 
organisation.15 
Similar to the diversification of its financial resources, a reduction in ex-
penses had also not been a formal demand by the Ministry. Between 2002 and 
2006, SNV’s funding was ensured and an additional budget had been reserved 
to cover the costs of restructuring SNV as an autonomous organisation. In the 
Subsidy Agreement between SNV and the Ministry however, ample reference 
was made to efficiency and budgeting and SNV itself set targets in efficiency. 
The renewed stress on efficiency was largely expressed in the ratio of ‘primary’ 
costs (costs made directly in relation to SNV’s activities and organisational 
structure) and overheads (all support costs). As will be explained later, SNV 
changed not only in terms of status in this period but also in approach and 
policy.16 This change of direction, combined with the efficiency targets, led to a 
new emphasis on personnel policy, which created considerable unrest in the or-
ganisation.  
SNV employees with a Ministry of Foreign Affairs contract were given the 
option to choose between joining the Ministry as a civil servant or joining the 
newly independent SNV. The Foreign Affairs SNV staff, however, felt that they 
could not make a decision as SNV’s plans had not been properly prepared. They 
were indignant as they felt that attention was being focused on those already 
working in SNV and they were worried about their chances of actually ever 
                                                 
13  Willem Cornelissen & Maaike Oosterbaan, ‘Evaluation SNV. New Strategy, New 
Results?’ (Rotterdam, 2006), pp. 46-47. 
14  SNV Annual Report 2005, p. 18. 
15  Cornelissen & Oosterbaan, ‘Evaluation SNV’, pp. 55-56 (quote: p. 55). 
16  Ibid., p. 52-53. 
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joining Foreign Affairs given their average age (over 40), their unfamiliarity 
with the workings of the Ministry and SNV’s open-sandal woolly-socks image 
in the Ministry.17 
Some people left SNV as they no longer recognised the values and ideals in 
its new policy. Due to the new tasks and functions, most SNV staff had to reap-
ply for their jobs and in some cases, the profile of the SNVer did not fit the new 
requirements. These people were replaced by new staff. The situation had al-
ready been conflict-ridden at Head Office before the changes and any decision-
making was likely to be appreciated by some and to displease others. Not 
everyone stayed with the organisation. In addition, the new approach, the effi-
ciency norms and SNV’s new forms of decentralisation led to a series of reor-
ganisations and people from the administrative staff, advisors and support staff 
were laid off and a considerable number of people left both country offices as 
well as Head Office.18 As additional tasks were allocated to country offices or 
the regional SNV structures (mainly as a result of SNV’s new focus on a de-
mand-driven approach), the number of staff at Head Office decreased from 108 
in 2001 to 79 in 2003 and to just 65 in 2005. To put matters into perspective 
however, it ought to be pointed out that in 1990 the staff at Head Office totalled 
69 persons.19  
Tensions at the managerial level of SNV did not make it any easier to arrive 
at a more coherent organisation and implement reforms. In 2000 arguments 
between the then director and the Hague staff even made the national press, 
with the staff accusing the director of using a ‘dictatorial style’ and being 
unable to negotiate Minister Herfkens’s new policies in a meaningful way. The 
situation improved little under the next director who was fiercely criticised for 
her expenditure patterns, her salary and the management style she used. A num-
ber of SNV staff left the organisation as a result of these tensions.20 
As we will see in the section on SNV’s policies, the organisation changed 
direction and developed a new focus for its activities. This implied that, despite 
the need for budgeting, the organisation had to look for new development 
workers and fresh ways of positioning itself. Although attempts were made to 
reduce costs at Head Office, this proved no easy task as many costs in the past 
had been covered by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. SNV had to build up an 
                                                 
17  Foreign Affairs, file snv/ara/00015, Minutes, ‘Ontvlechting van SNV’, 20 December 
2001. 
18  Various interviews: unspecified for reasons of privacy. 
19  See Appendix 5; SNV Annual Report 2003 and 2005. 
20  Han Koch, ‘Ruzie hulporganisatie SNV’, Trouw (6 January 2000); Han Koch, ‘Ont-
wikkelingsorganisatie SNV verliest topman’, Trouw (11 July 2000); Harm Ede 
Botje & Ruth Hopkins, ‘Dure armoedebestrijders’, Vrij Nederland (1 July 2006). 
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independent human resources department, a financial administration and a 
complete organisational infrastructure. A budget had been reserved for this, the 
‘Dowry’ as it was called, but the investments required were huge. Due to these 
contradictory tendencies, SNV’s efforts in budgeting have not led to enduring 
results. The figures for 2005 show that costs in terms of development activities 
and organisation and administration had increased considerably. Although there 
was a slight decrease in expenditure at Head Office, this was due to the con-
tinuing process of decentralisation whereby some expenses were shifted to 
field-office budgets. Overall costs – both primary and support costs – in-
creased.21 
Apart from these drastic changes in the financial sphere, the general relation-
ship with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Development Affairs, DGIS and the 
embassies changed but as the changes in statute are still quite recent, the new 
relationship with the Ministry has not crystallised as yet. Some feel that because 
of SNV’s independent status, the organisation now has more room to manoeu-
vre, whereas others think that SNV has actually become more dependent on 
DGIS.22  
The new status of SNV had consequences in less prominent spheres too. In 
the judicial arena, the contracts between the Dutch government and the coun-
tries concerned had to be revised as SNV had become a private organisation. As 
in many countries, there was a trend to curb the rights and privileges of private 
foreign organisations, and most SNV countries were hesitant to undertake steps 
to put this into practice.23 Another issue was the archival record that had always 
been filed at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; these could now be housed at the 
SNV office.24 To mark the profound changes, SNV once more went in search of 
a new name. In the end, the name SNV Netherlands Development Organisation, 
which had been chosen in 1993, was kept, although SNV Connecting People’s 
Capacities is also used.25   
 
                                                 
21  SNV Annual Report 2005, p. 18; Cornelissen & Oosterbaan, ‘Evaluation SNV’,  
p. 52. 
22  Interviews (not specified for reasons of privacy). 
23  Foreign Affairs, map snv/ara/00015, memo, Hans Pelgröm to all field directors, 
‘Standaardverdragen’, 10 March 2000. 
24  Foreign Affairs, file snv/2013/00449, letter, staff members archive SNV to all field 
offices, ‘Overbrenging van archiefstukken van de veldkantoren naar het Ministerie 
van Buitenlandse Zaken’, 15 March 2002. 
25  Ibid., file snv/2013/00198, report, Hill & Knowlton, ‘Van vrijwilligers naar advi-
seurs: de kroon op het verzelfstandigingsproces’, 7 May 2002. 
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Support staff 
The new policy and the emphasis on efficiency resulted in support costs being 
reviewed. The measures to reduce the number of support personnel evoked the 
most discussion. SNV management proposed cutting the number of secretaries, 
drivers, guards and cleaners and in future to outsource support personnel as this 
was thought to be cheaper and more efficient. SNV management argued that it 
was important to operate in the country context instead of continuing to create 
separate bastions in which development organisations not only enjoyed condi-
tions far above the country norm but also inhabited a distinct social, economic 
and cultural sphere. In some countries, SNV support personnel had come to 
form an in-crowd with relatively high wages and elitist attitudes. The measures 
should be understood as an attempt to change patterns of material and social 
privileges, achieve an improved costs-results balance and come to terms with 
the new approach that involved much less direct involvement in the field. 
Those against the new measures issued by SNV management expressed 
other ideas. They pointed out that the people working in SNV offices often 
supported not only their direct families but many other relatives too through 
their wages and for those who had been with SNV for a long time, it might be 
difficult to find other work. The turnover of the average SNVer has always been 
high but many of the support personnel have been working for SNV for a very 
long time and in many country offices their presence has constituted the most 
important form of institutional memory available.26  
Support personnel expressed a strong attachment to the organisation in many 
cases. Mr Ganda Keïta started working as an office assistant for SNV Mali in 
the 1980s and regarded SNV as his family: 
I was walking on the street. I was completely alone, I had no mother, father, brother 
or sister; I was an orphan. Then I heard: ‘There is a fight against poverty in that 
organisation,’ so I thought: ‘I will go there and look’. To see whether they really 
help. At first there was some hesitation but now the relationship is very good. In the 
time before I joined, I must say, I wasn’t in good spirits. Really no good spirits. But 
now I have good spirits. My spirits have improved a lot. It seems to me that it is 
impossible to fight poverty but one can fight bad spirits. There is no end to poverty, 
poverty is still there but what has really changed is the spirits, the spirits are better 
now.27 
Some reasoned that as SNV’s stated aim was to improve job creation, the 
new measures went against SNV’s development goals. Many SNVers also 
stated that the costs for support personnel were generally relatively low and 
these were contrasted in the interviews we held with the high travel and board 
                                                 
26  Interview 150. 
27  Interview 47. 
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and lodging costs of SNV management. The measures were also regarded as 
unnecessary interference in the autonomy of the field offices by SNV manage-
ment: it should be left to the field offices to decide how to economise. Finally, it 
was held that the new rules demonstrated the gap between the field and people 
in The Hague. Outsourcing was regarded as entirely unsuitable in many con-
texts in the developing world and could even be impossible or irresponsible. 
Outsourcing offices do not exist in all regions and in remote areas there is no 
way in which administrative tasks, transport and other matters can be arranged 
through them. Few outsourcing companies in poor countries offer their person-
nel fair wages or have adequate forms of insurance for their staff. On top of this, 
personnel are often not qualified for the work they are asked to do. While SNV 
management acknowledged that in some cases it might not be easy to look for 
new ways of organising matters, the stress on outsourcing had to be seen in the 
light of the ongoing process of local embedding that SNV envisaged.  
At the local level, SNV offices were trying to assist their support personnel 
in looking for new means to secure an income. As a member of the support 
personnel in St. Cruz (Bolivia) explained: 
But now there will be fewer personnel. Maybe I also have to leave. It will only 
become one secretary and one accountant. It is hard. It is so terrible that it will end. 
My bottle is nearly finished. It is difficult. All of us at the office are stressed now. I 
personally have complaints such as backache and neck ache, so now I have to visit a 
physiotherapist to help reduce the stress. We have our families. It is not just us. 
After so many years in SNV, I shall have to leave. It is very difficult to start anew. 
But SNV said that they will help me to start a company.28 
Directions in SNV’s development policies 
In the 1980s management skills had become more important in development 
work and in the early 1990s this trend only increased, for example through the 
general emphasis, both nationally and internationally, on donor coordination in 
the sector-wide approach. The role of national governments was greater in that 
approach because decision-making about the division of funds largely lay with 
them. While SNV had earlier dealt directly with the cercle (county) in health 
care in Dioïla, SNV’s direct intervention stopped with the new sector-wide 
approach and the coordination of health services was provided on a national 
scale by the Malian government. This required managerial and negotiating skills 
at a higher level on the part of SNVers than before. The change did not always 
run smoothly. Seybou Diarra, working at the health centre in Dioïla, explained 
that the change to the sector-wide approach had not only brought about a short-
age of equipment and materials but also serious delays in construction: ‘All 
                                                 
28  Interviews 251, 57, 168, 236, 247, 250, 260, 261 and 286. 
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beginnings are difficult. The population was used to a certain speed. That speed 
slowed down,’ he commented.29 The sector-wide approach was contradictory to 
some extent to rurally integrated development, as the latter had always dealt 
with various sectors at once. It also contradicted to some extent the new focus 
on political decentralisation.30 While the role of central government increased in 
the sector-wide approach, good governance came to be seen in terms of a 
democratic model that gave more political manoeuvring space to local authori-
ties and civil society. SNV turned its experience in political decentralisation into 
a more structural programme. Local government became a practice ground and 
SNV has been strongly involved in the processes that enhance the control of 
local authorities and civil society in poverty reduction and development activi-
ties. 
A key term that came into vogue in the second half of the 1990s was ‘owner-
ship’. The term was only seldom specified but broadly referred to people real-
ising their own development process. Instead of viewing people as beneficiaries 
of aid, SNV sought to cooperate with local people as agents in their own devel-
opment. It was held that donor-driven development programmes were not likely 
to have any enduring results, as local people could never truly feel responsible 
for these activities. Most such projects led only to temporary relief and in many 
cases whatever results had been achieved disappeared after the project ended. 
Sustainable development was only possible if people had a real stake in the 
development processes. The ‘ownership’ concept built on the legacy of partici-
patory methods, empowerment and the process approach, and aimed at sup-
porting local dynamics of development rather than imposing development 
projects from outside. In the previous chapter we saw how development had be-
come an established business and, in many respects, a separate world of projects 
with its own code of behaviour, expectations and even linguistic conventions. 
Often when a project ended, nobody continued the activities and the results 
were soon invisible as no one took any responsibility for anything. The owner-
ship concept was meant to close the gap between the ‘world of projects’ and 
local contexts, and people were to plan, organise and implement their own 
development programmes. 
Within the SNV management, little attention was paid to the history of the 
‘ownership’ concept and the critique that had been expressed about it. The 
ownership approach has been taken to task for merely giving a semblance of 
participation because, in the final analysis, the decision-making process hardly 
changes, while the ownership concept creates the possibility of converting 
                                                 
29  Interview 38. 
30  Cf. Hans Pelgröm, ‘IBO Report: SNV must continue independently’, Nethwork 14, 
3 (2000), p. 2. 
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people into accepting managerial decisions. Bill Cooke has argued that this 
critique against the approach can be underpinned by the historical continuities 
between colonial systems of rule and the recent development approach of 
ownership. He showed how the ownership approach relates back to John 
Collier, who worked as a US administrator in the 1930s and 1940s. Collier was 
proud to call himself a ‘colonial official’ and developed the ownership concept 
and the action research approach as a means of co-opting and controlling the 
native populations in the US.31 Such historical links to colonial ideology and 
control barely informed policy debates but the term rapidly gained currency 
both internationally and within the Dutch development context. SNV was quick 
to adopt the ownership concept when it became central in the Ministry of 
Development Cooperation. On the ground, the critique that ownership can be 
linked to control was not shared. Thus a woman who set up a cultural tourist 
tour in Tanzania expressed pride in her achievements: ‘If you do it yourself, it is 
your own project and it makes you happier. (…) One can compare it to a small 
door one has to creep through. SNV made it wider and our possibilities are 
growing.’32 
A new policy: SNV’s repositioning 
SNV’s Corporate Plan was presented in 1996. The editors of its staff magazine 
introduced the theme with some irony:  
What sort of a thing is a corporate plan? It looks like something that SNV – for 
years on end – did not know that it was in need of. But now it has woken up, every-
thing is in commotion because it can no longer do without it. Because otherwise the 
organisation may be abolished. Or incorporated. Or brushed aside.33  
The most important aim of the Corporate Plan was to look for a ‘common 
denominator’, to search for the factors that bound SNV as an organisation and, 
in the process, establish and form its identity. Chairman of the SNV Board Hans 
Simons explained: ‘The surplus value for the field is to transcend the country 
                                                 
31  Bill Cooke, ‘A New Continuity with Colonial Administration: Participation in 
Development Management’, Third World Quarterly 24, 1 (2003), pp. 47-61. 
32  Interview 134. 
33  ‘Wat is dat eigenlijk, een bedrijfsplan?’, Nedwerk 9, 4 (1995), p. 1. (‘Wat is dat 
eigenlijk een bedrijfsplan? Het lijkt op iets waarvan SNV jarenlang niet heeft ge-
weten dat ze het nodig had. Maar nu is ze wakker geschud, is alles in rep en roer 
omdat ze niet langer zonder kan. Want anders wordt SNV opgeheven. Of ingelijfd. 
Of onder tafel geveegd.’) 
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level. Put extremely, SNV now consists of 28 different companies.’34 The situa-
tion of diversification was to be addressed by a stronger identity and a clearer 
profile. In the past, SNV field offices had often functioned quite independently 
of Head Office and the implementation of the organisation’s guidelines and 
policies was frequently related to the goodwill of field directors and staff. The 
Corporate Plan emphasised the role of regions and regional managers and the 
country offices now had to cooperate in six different regions. At a later stage, 
several countries were organised into clusters with one regional office with a 
regional manager. In many country offices this was regarded as impracticable 
and only led to more administrative duties and bureaucratic levels. The differ-
ences between countries were also an argument against the regional approach.35 
Such critique reached Head Office when the regional manager for West Africa 
complained that the 1997 reorganisation had only led to a ‘weakening and 
marginalisation’ of the position of the regions, and a 2001 report stated that 
considerable overlap existed between the regions and Head Office.36 However 
some felt that the reorganisation was positive and that SNV had tried to estab-
lish a more coherent identity: 
Also from The Hague: it is good that a clearer design is given to SNV. I remember a 
former employee who was recalcitrant about the ‘MacDonaldisation’ of SNV. But I 
answered that I did not agree that ‘MacDonaldisation’ was taking place. But that it 
has to be clear to everyone that one enters a restaurant when entering SNV. Not a 
bakery in one country and a hotel in the next. Worldwide it should be a restaurant. 
That is Point One. And that one may expect good cooking, of good quality. And yes, 
that that cooking is adapted to local taste; that rice is available if people in the region 
happen to eat rice. But good rice, well prepared.37 
                                                 
34  Nedwerk 10, special (1996), p. 1 (and passim); Ibid. 11, 4 (1997), p. 1; Also, Foreign 
Affairs, file snv/2012/00420, Report, ‘Repositioning SNV: State of the Art and Ap-
proach to Change’, 18 November 2001, p. 1. 
35  Interviews 121, 205 and 256. 
36  Foreign Affairs, file snv/2009/00179, memo, Regional Manager/West-Africa to Di-
rector, ‘Opzet studiedagen MT SNV’, 12 August 1998, p. 2; Ibid., file snv/ 2012/ 
00420, report, ‘Contours and Principles, Internal Organisation SNV’, 16 September 
2001, p. 4. 
37  Interview 261. (‘Ook vanuit Den Haag is het goed dat er meer vorm gegeven wordt 
aan SNV. Ik herinner me een oud-medewerker bij een bijeenkomst, die helemaal 
opstandig was over de MacDonaldisering van SNV. Maar toen heb ik geantwoord 
dat ik dat niet vond, dat er sprake was van MacDonaldisering. Maar wel dat het voor 
iedereen duidelijk moet zijn dat je een restaurant binnenstapt. Dat is één. En dat je 
een goede keuken kan verwachten, van goede kwaliteit. En dat die aangepast is aan 
de lokale smaak. Dat er rijst verkrijgbaar is, als de mensen in die streek rijst eten. 
Maar dan wel goede rijst: goed klaargemaakt.’) 
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SNV also took steps to work towards a clearer profile and, especially after 
the organisation became an independent NGO, the need to find a specific SNV 
niche in the development sector became more urgent. Such changes should not 
automatically be interpreted as a sign of a break with SNV’s long history of 
decentralisation. The strategy to focus more on the regional level, for example, 
meant a more centralised approach if viewed from the perspective of the coun-
try offices, but for The Hague such a move to the contrary involved more 
decentralisation.38  
The Corporate Plan did not stand on its own and was followed by a major 
repositioning of SNV’s overall development policy. In its 2001 Strategy Paper, 
SNV clarified the reasons and terms of reference for the drastic choice in favour 
of repositioning. The core change of the repositioning process was the shift 
from being a funding and implementing service to a non-funding advisory 
agency aimed at capacity-building. SNV also aspired to having a greater impact 
and shifted to meso-level organisations and political bodies, which would have 
ties both up to the macro level and down to the micro level.39 
The organisation had originally been founded because it was felt that advice 
was not enough and, after many years of sending highly qualified advisors in 
the 1950s, the JVP initiative had been started to send middle-level, hard-work-
ing and practical youngsters overseas who would put the advice into practice.40 
This shift from advice in the 1950s to implementation from the 1960s onwards 
was reversed by the end of the 1990s when SNV decided it would focus on 
advisory practice instead of directly implementing development projects itself. 
The implementation part of the SNV programme would be brought to an end 
and in future SNV would concentrate its development efforts in an advisory role 
and capacity-building. The shift in SNV’s policy coincided with changing 
emphases in the international development context and with new policies in the 
Dutch political arena: Minister Herfkens had made no secret of the fact that she 
was not in favour of technical assistance in the form of sending Dutch experts to 
developing countries to carry out development activities, and this certainly 
played a role in SNV decisions:  
The budget allocated to SNV by the Ministry remained unchanged. Had SNV not 
repositioned, the organisation would have disintegrated. The Minister saw no good 
in technical assistance, so then it is a political risk not to reposition. For how long 
                                                 
38  Interview 247. 
39  SNV, ‘Strategy Paper’ (The Hague 2000). 
40  Cf Chapter 3, Note 182. 
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can one permit oneself not to? One can’t take five or ten years to reposition. So there 
was considerable pressure there.41 
Dutch politics were, however, definitely not the only reason for change: the 
choice to end project implementation and take up an advisory role was also 
related to SNV’s internal dynamics. Development organisations not only 
created structures that ran parallel to the state; they also came with policies, 
principles and ideals that were not always in line with local notions. Develop-
ment organisations might foster ‘assistentialism’, whereas SNV’s aim had 
always been to make itself superfluous and have people in developing nations 
take over its activities. There were many examples of development organisa-
tions arranging matters in the fields of transport, education, health services, etc. 
while the local state apparatus was becoming weaker and weaker. SNV’s 
history was no exception here: for example SNV’s KLDP (Karnali Local 
Development Programme) was locally known as ‘KLDP Sarkaar’, (meaning 
KLDP government) referring to ‘its reputation to get things done where others 
had failed (or had not even tried!)’. On the one hand, SNV Nepal was proud of 
its achievements in the district, but at the same there were doubts as to whether 
‘outsiders’ ought to continue implementing development activities in the region. 
The qualifier ‘KLDP government’ not only indicated achievement, it also 
pointed to the problematic of development organisations taking over govern-
ment tasks. These issues naturally led to the proposal to facilitate and build up 
the capacity of the local government, the authorities and organisations in the 
region. Both local leaders and partner organisations, however, expressed their 
doubts about the plans. Was this transformation not ‘too much too early’?42  
Preparations to change into an organisation of advisors were not restricted to 
SNV The Hague. There was a clear need for exchange between the field and 
Head Office: ‘Past experiences on change within SNV indicate clearly that 
change will not materialize if it is solely prescribed by Head Office.’43 A CORE 
team was formed of SNV staff working in various regions that consulted each 
other on a regular basis and visited eighteen countries between September and 
October 2001, testing the attitude towards the change in policy in the field 
offices. CORE team members noticed on these visits the extreme complexity of 
                                                 
41  Interview 291. (‘Het budget dat SNV kreeg van het ministerie bleef ongewijzigd. 
Als SNV die omslag niet had gemaakt, dan was de organisatie afgebladderd. De 
minister zag geen heil in technische assistentie, dus dan is het politiek heel ge-
vaarlijk als je geen omslag maakt. Hoelang kun je je dat permitteren? Je kan geen 5, 
10 jaar gaan doen over zo’n omslag. Daar zat dus behoorlijk druk op.’) 
42  SNV archives Kathmandu Nepal, report, ‘Nepal Karnali Local Development Pro-
gramme’ (1999) p. i. 
43  Foreign Affairs, file snv/2012/00420, report, ‘Repositioning SNV: State of the Art 
and Approach to Change’, 18 November 2001, p. 7. 
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SNV as an organisation, reflecting at once the organisation’s capacity to adapt 
to different contexts and a ‘lack of coherence and (identification with) corporate 
identity’. Only in few countries was the need for change as such questioned but 
some SNVers were not at ease with ‘the new “professional-consultant-type” 
SNV’. In the view of the CORE team, this was ‘because they are idealists that 
want to make a difference, however small, for poor people in this world. They 
worry that a meso-level-oriented SNV will lose touch with poor people and thus 
lose the essence of what drives us.’ The CORE team concluded that SNV’s 
vision on this issue needed elaboration, that its policies in this respect were not 
sufficiently internalised and that ‘further shifts in mindsets (were) required’.44 
These tensions about aims, policies and decision-making processes have been 
felt at all levels in SNV. 
Money matters 
With its new approach, SNV wanted to focus on strengthening meso-level 
organisations and local government bodies aimed at furthering development and 
alleviating poverty. SNV gave these clients advice on strengthening their 
capacity in organisational terms. The changes thus brought about would be a 
sustainable form of development as they became part of the organisational and 
institutional facilities of the organisations themselves. Through the meso-level 
organisations and local governance bodies SNV hoped to directly address the 
provision of services, such as health, education, transport, etc, for poor people, 
thus making a structural impact without losing sight of those for whom its 
actions were meant. The advisory practice was to be initiated on a demand-
driven basis and the meso-level organisations with which SNV hoped to coop-
erate were expected to take the initiative and ask for advice. In practice, this 
proved difficult. As SNV was a relatively small organisation and its policies not 
widely known, not many clients found their way to its offices. 
The new capacity-building approach had a number of consequences. The 
most important were that SNV no longer came with any funding nor engaged in 
project implementation. Unlike most development organisations, the proverbial 
bag of money no longer played a role and a more equal and honest relationship 
was aimed at. Instead of implementing projects itself, SNV intended to enable 
its clients to implement development projects and programmes themselves. 
Many SNVers in theory agreed with the new approach and it was regarded as an 
important, albeit quite radical, step in the direction of equal relations in devel-
opment. It was widely known that the financial aspect at times attracted people 
whose intentions lay beyond the development sphere: 
                                                 
44  Ibid., p. 3. 
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In the past, many organisations were founded because money was available. Na-
turally that influences the entire functioning of the work. As such I can understand 
it; when one waves money, people capitalise on it. That is the way things are and 
development workers took part in that.45 
SNV’s decision to leave out the financial aspect was an attempt to end this 
system and have a clearer focus on development issues. Not only was project 
funding phased out but SNV also tried to break with the tradition of workshop 
allowances. This was a sore point: ‘There is tremendous competition between 
donors. They all give the same training and the people in the NGOs go from one 
workshop to another (…) Good hotel, nice food, allowances (…).’46 Quite a lot 
of people in SNV agreed with the decision, although it was by no means easy, 
as many other development organisations continued to give per diems to work-
shop participants. Local people were not all convinced: some objected to SNV’s 
new policy because they deemed it fair that they should be compensated for the 
time lost.47  
With the new financial policy, apart from the workshop allowances, other 
even larger dilemmas were involved. Advice was appreciated. Many organisa-
tions realised that problems did not always stem from their financial resources 
and that much could be resolved by better management, institutional change and 
sound policy-making.48 Yet, without any financial resources at all, no activities 
could be developed. Although SNV helped organisations to find donors, write 
proposals for financial support and build up a network of organisations in this 
field, it was often difficult to find financial means to start activities that benefit 
the poor.49 Lack of financial support was evaluated as a real problem:  
At present, capacity-building is no longer the most important priority because now 
we understand matters. But we would like to do more things in the area of produc-
tion. We would need economic support for that, start-up capital. And afterwards we 
can do it ourselves. Many women have the capacities, as they already did capacity-
building.50 
                                                 
45  Interview 4. (‘Heel veel organisaties zijn in het verleden gewoon in het leven ge-
roepen omdat er geld was. Dat heeft natuurlijk effect op je hele werken. Op zich kan 
ik dat best begrijpen: Als je daar met geld gaat zwaaien, dat er mensen op inspelen. 
Zo is dat nu eenmaal en daar hebben we als ontwikkelingsmensen zelf aan mee ge-
daan.’) 
46  Interview 139. (‘De donorcompetitie is verschrikkelijk. Ze geven allemaal dezelfde 
training en de mensen van de NGO’s lopen de ene na de andere workshop af (…) 
Goed hotel, lekker eten, allowances.’) 
47  Interviews 201 and 181. 
48  Interviews 32, 48, 137 and 249. 
49  Interviews 4, 78, 260 and 275. 
50  Interview 284. 
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This not only held for organisations with which SNV had developed a long-
standing relationship. New clients had usually had experience with other inter-
national development organisations and cherished expectations about forms of 
cooperation.  
In relatively rich northern Tanzania, the advisory approach was well ac-
cepted: ‘Advice is better than money. Money will be finished, even the next 
day, but an idea will remain forever, for the future.’51 And in Zambia, the matter 
was referred to rather casually: ‘Material aid of course is welcome, but knowl-
edge is here to stay.’52 In poorer areas however, people did not agree with this 
view. One support staff member at SNV Mali felt that development was impos-
sible without money: ‘Why have they become tired in the world? Because I 
know that they not only fight in Mali, they fight everywhere against poverty. 
Now the world knows that Holland is tired. When the Dutch were alone, there 
were only a very few intelligent Malians. Now there are many Africans who can 
give them a hand to help but in order to develop, one needs money.’53 People on 
the ground explained that asking for money did not necessarily mean ‘assisten-
tialism’, they argued that money and advice should go together.54 The dilemma 
was forcefully summarised by a woman working at a Bolivian political organi-
sation: ‘Personally I think it is a problem if we do receive money but also if we 
don’t receive money.’55  
Advice in practice 
Many SNVers were technical experts and often with a practical background. As 
the new approach in advisory practice required different forms of expertise than 
before, the confrontation for SNV’s personnel was at times encouraging, and at 
times hard:  
As such, I thought it was a fair move and I completely agreed with it. But it took a 
lot of investment from the people, even now too. It isn’t a piece of cake to become 
an organisation advisor or change manager. One does not change one’s thought 
patterns and paradigms just like that. In the past they were responsible themselves 
for implementation, while later they had to stand on the sidelines with local people 
carrying out an agenda in their own way and at their own pace: Those people have to 
do it. That is a complete switch.56  
                                                 
51  Interview 130. 
52  Interview 119. 
53  Interview 47. 
54  Interviews 16, 64, 72, 179, 198, 206 and 260.  
55  Interview 275 (Delsi). 
56  Interview 175. (‘Op zich vond ik dat een heel terechte move, waar ik ook volledig 
achter stond. Maar het heeft veel investering gekost onder de mensen, en nog. Je 
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Some of the more technical, practical people left the organisation but, with 
SNV’s recent involvement in the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), the 
importance of such practical expertise may gain ground again. In September 
2005 SNV organised a conference on the MDGs,57 which received harsh cri-
tique from the areas where SNV was active. The MDGs were deemed to be 
‘technocratic’, imposed from above and only to refer to a minimal development 
agenda. At the international conference in The Hague little attention was paid to 
this critique: the issue was how local capacities were to be mobilised to achieve 
the MDGs.58 
The aim of SNV’s repositioning process was to break with the spoon-feeding 
culture in development so that people would become the planners and organis-
ers of their own development. SNV did not have an easy task explaining its new 
policy within SNV, to its longstanding partners and to new clients. The advisory 
practice was initially viewed with reserve:  
SNV had of course started with a client-satisfaction evaluation, that methodology. 
Initially the results were quite negative: ‘No we are not satisfied’, ‘We are not satis-
fied,’ etc. So then the question came: ‘What is the problem?’ They said: ‘Well, in 
the past the development workers were always here, we could always address them, 
they did all kinds of things. Now that is over.’ And I would think: ‘That is just fine! 
That is actually what we wanted to achieve, that those organisations become more 
independent.’59 
Yet for some people, the very fact that SNV was still necessary meant a 
continuation of the old dilemma of ‘making oneself superfluous’ (zichzelf over-
bodig maken) and the very existence of SNV. Organisations with a sound 
structure and effective management barely needed SNV’s advice. It was weaker 
                                                 
wordt niet zomaar organisatie adviseur of een verander-manager. Je verandert niet 
zomaar je denkpatroon en je paradigma’s. Eerst uitvoerend en je verantwoordelijk 
voelen. En daarna aan de zijlijn en anderen die een ander tempo hebben, een ander 
denkpatroon, andere agenda’s: die moeten het toch doen. Dat is een enorme om-
schakeling.’) Also Interview 247. 
57  http://www.snvworld.org/public.  
58  SNV, ‘Conference on MDG Localisation in Africa; Options and Experiences: Pro-
ceedings’ (9-11 August 2005, Kampala), p. 9; SNV, ‘Mobilising Local Capacities 
for the MDGs – Report of the SNV Regional Conferences Prepared for the SNV 
International Conference’ (The Hague, 2005), p. 21. 
59  Interview 256. (‘SNV was natuurlijk begonnen met die klanten-tevredenheidstesten, 
die methodologie. Die vielen in het begin vrij vaak negatief uit: ‘Nee we zijn niet 
tevreden, we zijn niet tevreden’, etc. Dus toen kwam de vraag: ‘Wat is nou het pro-
bleem?’ Dan zeiden ze ‘Ja maar, voorheen zaten de coöperanten altijd hier: je kon ze 
altijd aanspreken, ze deden van alles. Maar dat is nu niet meer zo.’ Dan denk ik: 
‘Dat is toch juist prima, dat is toch eigenlijk wat je wilt bereiken: dat die organisaties 
onafhankelijker worden.’) 
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partners that could benefit from such advice but it was only one step from 
advising an organisation to telling people what to do. The aim became to make 
organisations function independently but the services that SNV provided started 
from the assumption that this was not possible. It is not always be easy to de-
cide if and when an organisation no longer needs advice.60 
This problem was exacerbated by the differences between poorer and rela-
tively rich areas. In poorer areas, there were hardly any meso-level organisa-
tions that could become SNV clients, and SNV’s general policy had to be 
adapted to fit the local situation. The flexible nature of SNV as an organisation 
allowed for such adaptations and in these areas SNV advisors developed alter-
native strategies that suited the context. Areas with enough potential clients 
were, on the whole, better-off and less in need of poverty alleviation. SNV’s 
demand-driven approach reinforced this. Organisations that already had access 
to the development sector were more likely to ask SNV for advice and in richer 
areas it was easier to maintain contact and build up networks than in remote 
areas.61 The meso-level organisations in these areas often employed people of 
the same calibre as those working for SNV and as a rule received advice and 
training from the donors that funded them. The idea of SNV advisors stepping 
into such an organisation and saying: ‘We are experts, we will give you advice!’ 
was felt to be inappropriate but it was deemed useful for SNV and similar 
organisations to exchange ideas and information as partners.62 Some thought 
that people in need did not benefit sufficiently from SNV’s activities and that 
those who handle the development discourse with skill and play to donor fash-
ions set the agenda. Many organisations claiming to represent the poor restrict 
their activities to the development market. Although cases occur where SNV 
reportedly cooperates with organisations that are hardly more than a façade to 
attract donor money, SNV has developed evaluation strategies to ensure that the 
local NGOs it works with are genuinely interested in reaching poor people. The 
discussion about how far SNV has succeeded in this is ongoing.  
It proved very difficult to measure the impact of SNV’s work and an evalua-
tion report indicated that no straightforward evidence existed to prove that 
SNV’s activities effectively reduce poverty and contribute to good governance. 
While this evaluation report argued that the limited possibilities for measuring 
impact should not create an excuse for not trying, another report stated that 
development organisations should be evaluated on the basis of their internal 
organisation and management and not on any measurement of the effects of 
                                                 
60  Interviews 50 and 9. 
61  Interview 81. 
62  Interview with SNVer, information withheld for reasons of privacy. 
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their activities.63 While no outright evidence existed about SNV’s activities con-
tributing to its overall aims of poverty reduction and good governance, there are 
‘strong indications’ that this is indeed the case.64  
One of the aims of SNV’s repositioning process was to increase the scale of 
impact and to bridge the distance between the macro and micro level through a 
focus on meso-level organisations. The stronger emphasis on meso-level orga-
nisations is regarded by some as a move away from the grassroots level with the 
risk of thereby losing SNV’s specific knowledge area. Some people held that 
SNV visits to villages were very short and contact with the local people was 
restricted to the elite. As an evaluation of SNV Nepal put it:  
SNV’s good ‘brand name’ in Nepal is based upon recognition by all the stakeholders 
that SNV has a proper understanding of and long experience in working in remote 
areas (…) Through its present repositioning, SNV risks losing this major value 
added.65  
Others, however, argue that this is a logical consequence of the changing 
working context: There is now sufficient local cadre in the countries where 
SNV is active to organise programmes and projects aimed at poverty reduction 
in local communities. Instead of having expats ‘fixing it’, as happened in the 
past, SNV, with its multicultural and international expertise, should seek to 
strengthen local organisations that serve the poor people in their own countries. 
In this debate, much depends on SNV’s history in a given region. SNV Bolivia, 
for example, has a longstanding tradition of working with meso-level organisa-
tions in many regions and here the policy change is not seen by many as a 
radical one. In these regions, the change from one steady advisor to changing 
teams of flexible advisors was viewed as the major consequence of SNV’s 
repositioning. While for the advisors the chances for professional exchange and 
cooperation grew dramatically, the in-depth personal and professional knowl-
edge within the counterpart organisations was said to diminish.66 
These dilemmas and issues have informed debates in and about SNV since 
the process of repositioning and have by no means finished. SNV management, 
its staff and all clients and stakeholders have their own opinions about the 
                                                 
63  Cornelissen & Oosterbaan, ‘Evaluation SNV’, pp. 44, 99-102, 120; Hans Dijkstal 
e.a., ‘Vertrouwen in een kwetsbare sector. Rapport van de commissie draagvlak en 
effectiviteit ontwikkelingssamenwerking’ (Unpublished report, April 2006). 
64  Cornelissen & Oosterbaan, ‘Evaluation SNV’, pp. 44, 120. 
65  Sumitra M. Gurung, Ram P. Yadav & Bert L.M van Woersem, ‘Country Programme 
Evaluation. SNV Nepal. Volume 1: Main report. Findings, Conclusions and Recom-
mendations’ (2003), p. 5. 
66  For example, Interviews 245, 250 and 256. 
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nature of advice, the shift to meso-level organisations and relations between 
SNV and its clients.  
The end of projects 
The change to an advisory role meant the end of SNV’s project approach: SNV 
would henceforth no longer be active in the actual implementation of develop-
ment projects. The arguments for the change were clear: SNV had become 
‘superfluous’ in this area as enough expertise could be found in local organisa-
tions. In addition, foreign-initiated projects often stifled rather than encouraged 
local initiative and the shift to advice was the ultimate consequence of SNV’s 
stress on ‘ownership’. While there were obvious benefits in project implemen-
tation, these did not always involve structural changes and tended to reinforce 
local hierarchies and aid dependency.  
The decision to focus on advice at a meso level implied that some of the 
relationships SNV had built up over the years would come to an end. Unsur-
prisingly, many of those who could no longer participate in SNV’s activities 
were positive about their experiences with SNV in the past, but reflected nega-
tively on the current changes. As is always the case when profound changes are 
introduced, the end of the project approach created unrest in some instances. 
Some people were well prepared and knew that SNV was planning to end its 
activities in the field of implementation. In other cases though, local people felt 
that SNV had abandoned participants without adequately preparing them to fend 
for themselves. In western Cameroon, for example, people were expecting a 
project to continue for fifteen years until SNV called a meeting to announce that 
it would finish in three years instead. And then less than two months later, 
people were called in again and told that it was in fact going to be terminated 
within three months. This created uncertainty among the local people, as one 
man put it:  
While appreciating the advice – because you can still advance through advice – we 
very much appreciate the funding. That funding and advice could go hand in hand. 
We appeal that funding continues. We were in shock when we heard SNV was 
going to stop funding. When you are feeding a child, and you suddenly stop feeding 
him/her, that child will feel that impact. That’s exactly what happened to us.67 
Even if people were prepared for the end of a project, it could still be a bitter 
pill to swallow. In many cases it was only a matter of time before everything the 
project had achieved started to run down or disappeared and, in addition, it 
meant a period of unemployment for those who had been connected with it. 
During the course of our visit to Guinea Bissau, 42 former SNV staff presented 
                                                 
67  Interviews 64 and 50. 
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us with a letter asking ‘in the name of all the workers of the water supply 
project in the regions of Quinara, Tombali and Bolama Bijagos with head office 
in Buba (...) [that] the Dutch research delegation submit to SNV and the Dutch 
government the request to compensate the project workers of Phase 1, Phase 2, 
Phase 3, Phase 4, Phase 5, Phase 6, Phase 7, Phase of the years 1978 to 1995.’68 
In many cases, former project personnel had had to be dismissed.69 
To a certain extent these examples reveal exactly why SNV moved away 
from implementation: the examples can be read as signs of aid dependency. At 
the same time, however, the examples point to the shared history that people 
have with SNV and its staff. Referring to both the personal contact and the time 
and depth of SNV’s cooperation with CICOL (Central Indigena de Comuni-
dades Originarias de Lomerio), Anacleto Peña stated: ‘For SNV, the support has 
stopped but not for us, as we have a very deep professional relationship with 
them.’70 Although the aim was to put an ever stronger emphasis on the wishes 
and ideals of local participants, once again the decision for change was not 
theirs. At times, it was assumed within SNV that relations with new clients 
would be easier, as they only knew its present policy. Thus when SNV opened a 
new office in Angola, it was stated that in this country SNV was ‘not hindered 
by any history of volunteerism or direct implementation services.’71 
Many people who had been involved in SNV projects did not appreciate its 
decision to end implementation and called for a combination of advice and 
implementation: 
Even today, there are requests that SNV/N not limit itself to advisory services and 
that small infrastructural activities go alongside it. However, various comments and 
feedback received illustrate that infrastructure on its own is not enough either and 
that in order to maximise impact, a balance between hardware and software is es-
sential.72 
SNV country offices could in some cases opt for a gradual shift from imple-
mentation to advice. In Mozambique, for example, it was decided that the 
project approach would only be abandoned gradually. As Mozambique was still 
in a phase of post-war reconstruction, SNV felt that only through a twin-track 
approach – in which the project approach coexisted with its new advisory role – 
could the changes be introduced.73 In Guinea-Bissau, the changes were not re-
                                                 
68  Letter presented after Interview 21. 
69  Interviews 44, 54, 62 and 225. 
70  Interview 283. 
71  Jan van Montfort, ‘The one to twenty principle’, Nethwork 17, 2 (2003), p. 4. 
72  SNV Nepal, ‘SNV/Nepal in Karnali, 1983-2003. Lessons learned and guidance for 
future interventions’ (Kathmandu, 2005), p. 1. 
73  Interview 20. 
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ceived in a uniform manner at all: in contrast to Buba, people in Bafata were far 
more positive about the transformations. While SNV was in the process of 
involving local cadre in an agro-forestry project in the Bafata region, war broke 
out and all the foreigners were forced to leave the country. Between 1998 and 
1999, local personnel continued working on the programme despite all the hard-
ships and insecurities of war, an experience that prepared them well to take over 
in 2001 when the SNV project ended and they formed a local NGO to work in 
the same area. While acknowledging the encouragement and support received 
from SNV, they were proud of their achievements: ‘We continue SNV, even in 
our own small way, but it still exists.’74 In other contexts too, such as in Tanza-
nia, a number of projects were transformed into local NGOs,75 sometimes with 
local participants hardly noticing that SNV had stopped its activities as they had 
never known that SNV was behind it in any case.76 The local NGOs that had 
started as SNV projects frequently had a hard struggle to survive. Under SNV, 
project funding had never been a problem but as soon as the transformation into 
a local NGO took place, some of the donors pulled out. And the process of 
separation could also be accompanied by quarrels, jealousies and competition.77 
The views of new clients 
With many of SNV’s historical partners unhappy with the policy changes, con-
tact between the two was often discontinued as there was no possibility except 
to change from implementation to advice or the partner was too far removed 
from SNV’s meso-level criterion. In regions where SNV already had a tradition 
of advising meso-level organisations, the area in which SNV worked remained 
very much the same and only changes of form were made. In other regions 
though, SNV had to build up new networks of contacts and partners. In Mali, it 
became more active in supporting the decentralisation process, not only at 
national level, for example through DNCT (Direction Nationale des Collec-
tivités Territoriales),78 but also through local governance bodies, notably the 
newly created CCC (Centre de Conseil Communal, Community Advisory 
Centre). SNV organised workshops and training in the fields of gender, bud-
geting and accountability, and facilitated the working of the CCC through lo-
gistical support. In Bolivia too, SNV supported political moves towards demo-
cratisation and decentralisation by advising the préfectures, and provincial and 
                                                 
74  Interview 24. 
75  For example, TIP, Faida, Pamoja. 
76  For example, Interview 146. 
77  For example, Interviews 88, 138, 142 and 145. 
78  Interviews 45 and 46. 
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community councils.79 This stress on capacity-building in local government was 
coupled with private-sector development. Within this general arena, SNV 
developed specific target areas, notably cultural tourism and market access for 
the rural poor. 
SNV’s activities in tourism started with a programme in Tanzania meant to 
develop forms of tourism that would benefit the local people, contribute to 
development and respect the region’s history, culture and environment. Various 
tourist modules in northern Tanzania offered tours with a local guide taking 
visitors not only to the tourist highlights but also to the local school or to a 
development project. SNV organised meetings and workshops, gave advice on 
the brochures and organised training for the guides. In 2001, SNV handed over 
responsibility for the modules to the Tanzania Tourist Board but the module 
holders have complained that support has since declined.80 SNV has expanded 
its tourism programme to the other continents on which it works and has 
developed new angles, for example in eastern Cameroon it is creating a network 
of exchange and support in the area of sustainable tourism. As these forms of 
tourism do not go back a long way, not all people are familiar with the sector’s 
constraints and possibilities. SNV attempts to create a platform that encom-
passes delegates from the Ministry for Tourism and the various tourism pro-
jects, and, in these cases, capacity-building mainly revolves around the ex-
change of knowledge and increased networking. The new vocabulary can lead 
to amusing situations. Charles Mbonteh of the Municipal Development Coun-
selling Group (MUDEC) explained, for example, that they were active not only 
in sustainable tourism but also in pro-poor tourism. When asked what the 
difference was between the two, he started laughing: ‘SNV jargon, ha ha! There 
is not really a difference. It is just that SNV wants to always be in front with 
new things.’81 
Larger organisations, like the Bolivian CEADES (Colectivo de Estudios 
Aplicados al Desarollo Social), saw itself as SNV’s complementary partner 
rather than as a client: and SNV’s advice was just a bonus because CEADES 
did not depend on it. When asked what the bonus consisted of, CEADES’s 
Jorge Cortés answered: 
SNV is an organisation with many inter-institutional relations: they have ties within 
the government, with other NGOS, local and international. SNV carries some weight 
and influence, even at government policy level. In this sense, SNV is a strategic 
counterpart. Through SNV we enlarge our information channels and our linkages 
with other organisations. Furthermore, cooperation with SNV enhances our credi-
                                                 
79  Interview 257. 
80  Interviews 129, 130, 134, 141, 143 and 144.  
81  Interview 231. 
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bility. Through this, access to donor funding is enlarged. This is an indirect conse-
quence. As donors have confidence in SNV, it is a very good reference. So if you 
can show that SNV is your counterpart, this also positively influences your image in 
the public’s eye.82 
In 2006, SNV invited 60% of its clients to evaluate the services it provided: 
90% indicated satisfaction with SNV’s services and 94% felt that these services 
contributed to capacity-building.83  
Change 
Over the last ten years, SNV has seen many changes in its internal structure. 
The major changes in its formal status and policy repositioning were accompa-
nied by numerous smaller ones in administrative procedures, structure and deci-
sion-making. The change from project implementation to an advisory role, the 
growing importance of the regional level, the organisation of SNV advisors in 
flexible teams, the dissociation of SNV activities from funding issues, and its 
restructuring in terms of financial and personnel management have already been 
discussed. In addition, in the course of the 1990s junior positions were created 
to give younger, less-experienced people a chance to work within the organisa-
tion and a Board of Directors replaced the single SNV Director in 2003. Steps 
were taken in the area of exchange and contact through the new communication 
media. Better evaluation methods were designed to assess the results of the 
organisation’s new advisory role and SNV’s emphasis on being a knowledge-
based organisation has grown. Its three broad practice areas – local governance, 
private-sector development and natural-resource management – were subdi-
vided into new categories and a new vocabulary was introduced with its reposi-
tioning as a capacity-building and advisory organisation. 
In SNV circles, the crucial change from implementation and funding to 
advice has been evaluated as theoretically sound but difficult to put into prac-
tice. It was also felt that not all the aspects of the new terminology that accom-
panied the changes were well chosen. New SNV partners, for example, are 
called ‘clients’, a term that is in most contexts seen as far too commercial. It 
was felt that the contract-product-client terminology does not adequately 
describe the sort of relationship SNV envisages having with the organisations it 
works with. In some countries, SNV staff continued to refer to other organisa-
tions as ‘partners’. The critique was clearly expressed by Amagoin Keïta, who 
was then working for SNV Mali:  
                                                 
82  Interview 249. 
83  SNV Annual Report 2006. 
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The changes can also be felt in terminology. A word like ‘client’: it means some-
thing, it changes a lot. It does not leave people cold. I was in the Ministry and by 
accident said the word client. The people reacted immediately: ‘No, we are not 
clients, we are not doing business here; this is about development. We are nobody’s 
clients! We are not buying anything. We are partners.’84 
Some SNVers have interpreted the change to a more commercial kind of 
terminology as being emblematic of the general changes within SNV. They see 
SNV as moving towards being a consultancy-type organisation; only differing 
from real consultancies in the way it provides advice for free and chooses its 
clients on the basis of a poverty-reduction criterion rather than on the basis of 
their ability to pay. With these critics, the new management-consultancy type of 
development is being taken to task for a lack of engagement: 
SNV’s objective and strategy paper says very little about a clear political engage-
ment by SNV. (…) All we do is provide advice; the rest is none of our business. 
Simple, neutral, clean. With such attitudes we are not much different from commer-
cial consultants. Just onlookers, just bystanders. The recent incident when SNV did 
not engage in the debate around the 11 September tragedy underscores this issue. 
Many in the organisation feel uncomfortable with this trend.85   
These arguments are challenged by those who hold that engagement does not 
exclude efficiency and that SNV ought to combine the traditional dedication 
and commitment of its personnel with a professional approach.86 SNV’s new 
approach and position have set a range of changes in motion and it has become 
a very different organisation. The rate of change was regarded by some as too 
fast, at times even endangering relationships with clients old and new.87 Many 
viewed the changes with mixed feelings. Some felt that SNV was still searching 
for a new identity whereas others argued that the organisation was moving in 
the right direction. While it is never deemed positive to remain static as an 
organisation, the changes in SNV were generally viewed as coming in too rapid 
a succession and in too many areas at once. 
Now SNV is in constant change: changes are coming too fast. For an outsider or for 
someone new to the organisation, the speed of change is too rapid. Before an ap-
proach is well understood, there is already another approach. I think what we need 
now is consolidation. People have problems locating you if you change that rapidly. 
                                                 
84  Interviews 49, 135, 147, 201 and 247. 
85  Foreign Affairs, file snv/2012/00420, Tom Derksen, ‘SNV – Towards a rights based 
development approach’, November 2001; Interviews 65 and 81; ‘Een professioneel 
uitzendbureau en niet meer dan dat’, Nedwerk 10, special (1996), p. 3; Rinus van 
Klinken, ‘SNV van onttutteling naar verzakelijking’, Nedwerk 11, 4 (1997), p. 8. 
86  Interviews 18, 78, 247 and 265. 
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An advantage of all the changes is that it keeps the staff sharp. It always poses a 
challenge. I don’t hate it.88 
Gender 
Not everything changed at SNV; there was also continuity. The themes of 
gender and the environment have recently played a pivotal role in SNV’s 
policies and, as we saw earlier, ‘women and development’ became an issue in 
SNV in the course of the 1980s. Initially static and monolithic ideas such as ‘the 
position of women’ and ‘the role of women’ informed the approaches to this 
new theme. Women were expected to change so as to fit into the existing devel-
opment models. Slowly, however, these ideas made way for an approach in 
which the range of choices that women had became central: women’s empow-
erment became a key notion. Within SNV, the word ‘gender’ was used from 
1993 onwards to indicate that the existing hierarchical relations between the 
sexes were not based on biological differences but as a consequence of the 
socially constructed differences between men and women. While in the 1990s 
gender was often organisationally classified as a separate category of develop-
ment, the concept of ‘gender mainstreaming’ gained currency after 2000. 
Gender equality was to be included in all policies, projects and programmes as a 
basic principle not only in planning but also in implementation. Through the 
gender audit, which was first developed in 1999, SNV tried to assess not only 
its results in addressing gender issues in the organisations with which it cooper-
ated in its activities but also the structural gender relations within its own 
organisation.  
In many contexts gender as a development theme evoked much debate and 
sometimes razor-sharp reactions. Delsi, a female member of the board of a 
Bolivian political organisation for indigenous people, put it as follows: 
Society here is very difficult; men have always been against the gender approach. 
‘Women will never listen to us any more’ is their critique. Women are only allowed 
to go to meetings if they first carry out all their household duties and take the 
children along. 
When she started working on the board in 1994, she was aware that the 
reasons for her appointment were not totally honest. The male members had 
decided to include a woman on the board ‘because gender is the in-thing now 
and then we will get more money’.89   
For many people, the importance of gender as such is clear but they do not 
regard all the ways of introducing the issue as appropriate. A male Tanzanian 
                                                 
88  Interview 133. 
89  Interview 274. 
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SNVer felt that the gender approach needed to be adapted to local circum-
stances:  
Like with gender, you need to know the perspective and the context. Development 
workers move with the wind. You must ensure that what you propagate is not for-
eign.  
Like female-headed households, that is not a problem here. Also when Ayo here 
gets home, he will get home and eat, not get home and cook. That also holds for me. 
My wife will cook. If I tried to cook, she would tell me to get out of the kitchen. She 
does not like it. So you talk about gender this and gender that at seminars and con-
ferences, but the women will simply not agree if I cook or if Ayo cooks. We should 
not waste our time on that.90 
Women too were not always prepared to accept a gender approach: 
A former female SNVer from The Netherlands went to talk to women’s groups to 
start doing something about gender. The women asked: ‘Are you married?’ She 
said: ‘No’. Then the women said: ‘In that case our relationship ends here. You do 
not live in our reality. How can you advise us on something you know nothing 
about?’91 
There is often only a thin line between adapting the gender approach to the 
local context and compromising the very core of gender equality. All the same, 
many people feel that matters are slowly changing and that the gender issue has 
helped to make men and women relate on a more equal footing:  
Aua: We did much in the area of women’s liberation. 
Man from the project committee: Women are important, they participate in all 
activities. Some even know how to write. They are informed when something is up. 
Before they only used face oil, now they know how to make it. Before, they only 
heard about things, about machines and so on, but now they know how to do things.  
Woman: We worked so hard. To prepare tomatoes, to make soap. We had heard that 
onions have oil in them, but now we know how to prepare it (oil and soap). We can 
put things into practice.92 
Gender continues to run through all SNV’s fields of expertise and is a 
specific issue of focus in West and Central Africa.  
Environmental issues 
In 1990 Jan Pronk referred to the relationship between development and the 
environment, bringing this issue into the policy-making arena.93 Within SNV, 
                                                 
90  Interviews 133 and 122. 
91  Interview 236 (Bakia). 
92  Interviews 25, 98, 255, 258, 282, 283 and 284. 
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environmental issues have received growing attention and while mainstreaming 
gender issues in the organisation was frequently intensely debated, this has not 
been the case with the environment. Brenda Liswaniso, who worked on both 
themes in SNV Zambia, only had stories about the opposition she encountered 
when working on gender. Her experiences concerning environmental issues ap-
parently went more smoothly.94 This is not to say that the relations between 
development and the environment were without dilemmas. At times, the themes 
did conflict: one SNVer remembered a fierce discussion at an annual meeting 
about whether a ‘not-ecologically-sustainable-but-gender-conscious project 
should be given precedence over an ecologically-sustainable-but-not-gender-
conscious’ project.95 A biogas project in Nepal put the two themes together: the 
plants reduced fuel-wood consumption while at the same time women needed to 
spend less time collecting firewood and cooking.96 
Development activities and ecological concerns were not always easy to 
combine. Poverty has often been seen as a reason for overusing natural re-
sources and development has in many cases been interpreted as economic 
growth, with little consideration being given to any of the ecological aspects 
involved. SNV has sought ways to arrive at a combined approach to develop-
ment and sustainable natural-resource management. At the local level this might 
take the form of creating and exploiting village forests in a responsible manner, 
while at a wider level, for example in national governments, SNV negotiated for 
ecological concerns to be integrated into state development policies. In Bhutan, 
for example, transport facilities were by and large seen as an important means 
of overcoming the difficulties of isolation and the marginality of many areas, 
but road-building could have highly negative consequences for the environment 
at the same time. SNV engaged in careful diplomatic networking between the 
various national ministries, local government bodies, building companies and 
the donors to ensure that road construction was realised at minimal cost to the 
environment.97 
The environment as a theme was only fully adopted within SNV’s policy 
after 1995. By this time, it had already become clear in the field that environ-
mental issues could only feature in relation to other themes. In many cases, 
political issues, economic aspects and ecological concerns could not be easily 
                                                 
93  Leo de Haan & Ton Dietz, ‘Milieu in de Nederlandse ontwikkelingssamenwerking 
met nadruk op duurzaam landgebruik’. In: Lau Schulpen, ed., Hulp in ontwikkeling, 
p. 90. 
94  Interviews 122 and 245. 
95  Interview 290. 
96  IOB, SNV-Nepal, p. 5. 
97  ‘Bhutan – Kingdom in the Clouds’ (2000) in DVD series: ‘Een geschiedenis in 
beeld’; Interview 292. 
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separated. In Bolivia, forestry was closely linked to the sensitive issue of land 
rights and community access to productive forests. SNV cooperated with 
CIDOB (Confederación de Pueblos Indigenas del Oriente Boliviano, Confed-
eration of Indigenous People of Eastern Bolivia) and APCOB (Apoyo para el 
Campesino Indigena del Oriente Boliviano) to create a Green Label for certified 
timber. The project aimed at protecting the environment, income generation and 
community organisation all at the same time.98 
Over the years many projects changed from being a purely ecological con-
cern to an integrated approach. In eastern Guinea-Bissau, for example, SNV 
started a project to help control bushfires in 1990. With a long history of colo-
nial intervention in this field, people initially associated the activities with coer-
cive measures and repression. Soon afterwards the intention was to draw agro-
pastoral activities into the project but in practice not much came of this as 
nearly all the staff were forestry experts. A 1992 evaluation again stressed the 
need for further integration of environmental concerns and agricultural activi-
ties. As of 1994, an approach was attempted that integrated socio-economic 
aspects and ecological concerns. This combination has remained pivotal, and 
now the project has been turned into the national NGO Aprodel. Aprodel staff 
gave the example of creating forest zones between pastures and farm land and 
as cattle could no longer go onto the fields, relations between the pastoralists 
and farmers were improving.99  
SNV was not the only organisation that tended to integrate environmental 
issues into a broader perspective. In Cameroon the Dja Wildlife Reserve had 
been created in the 1980s and placed under the auspices of the IUCN World 
Conservation Union (International Union for the Conservation of Nature and 
Natural Resources). As some local villages were moved and people were no 
longer allowed to enter the Reserve area, there were strong feelings of resent-
ment. From 1999 onwards the IUCN asked SNV to develop activities in the 
area around the Reserve to compensate for the disadvantages but as the SNVers 
travelled in IUCN cars and worked in close association with IUCN staff, local 
people did not distinguish between SNV and IUCN.100 
There were cases in which projects that had started out with environmental 
aims changed their mission as they noticed that a focus purely on environmental 
                                                 
98  Interviews 246 and 279. 
99  Interviews 24, 25 and 26. SNV Guinea-Bissau and the Royal Dutch Embassy ‘GITT 
(Gestão Integrada das Terras da Tabanca): A terra é do Povo: uma abordagem de 
autopromoção das populações’ (Brochure s.l., s.d.); SNV Guinea-Bissau and the 
Royal Dutch Embassy ‘GFC (Gestão de Floresta Comunitária): A terra é do povo: 
protoger florestas para servir o bem-estar das populações’ (Brochure s.l., s.d ). Also 
(example from Mali) Interview 41. 
100  Interview 61. 
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issues was becoming less fashionable in the development world. Thus a Malian 
organisation changed from doum palm plantations to private-sector develop-
ment as they noticed that their partners, SNV and USAID, had moved in other 
directions such as economic activities and political decentralisation.101 The ten-
dencies in the environmental arena gave rise to some critique. For example, in a 
letter to Nethwork it was held that ecological concerns had become a secondary 
issue within SNV and had been reduced to natural-resource management. The 
‘Hallelujah Approach’, the author alleged, had more form than content.102 
Today SNV is running a collaborative forest management programme with 
special attention for biogas in Asia, a water management scheme in Latin 
America and dryland management projects in West and Central Africa. These 
themes have sprung from the more general practice area of Natural Resources 
Management.  
National staff 
A development that has profoundly influenced the working of SNV was the 
sharp increase in the number of local personnel employed. Some nationals had 
joined SNV in the preceding decade, but these were few and far between. Due 
to the frequent changes in personnel, these early experiences were not always 
remembered when employing a national staff became more common practice in 
the 1990s.103 In some countries in Latin America and Asia, where access to 
higher education was relatively easy, the increase was gradual but in many 
African countries the SNV norm of 50% national and 50% Dutch personnel, 
which was set during the 1995 reorganisation, meant a sudden change.104 The 
1990s and the early years of the 21st century saw a spectacular rise in the 
percentage of local SNV staff and by 1999 the figure was 40% but would grow 
to 67% in 2004: SNV had changed from being a purely Dutch organisation to 
being a multicultural organisation with Dutch roots. 
Most SNVers saw clear advantages in the increased numbers of local staff. 
Whereas expatriate development workers need time to adapt to a new culture, to 
the climate and to learn the language, these problems do not occur with local 
advisors. Advisors recruited in the country are not only familiar with the cul-
tural habits and the local language, they also have easier access to information 
about political networks, administrative systems and social relations. Another 
argument was that the expertise of expatriate workers is re-exported once the 
                                                 
101  Interview 40. 
102  Albert Heringa, ‘Two steps forward and one step back’, Nethwork 15, 5 (2001),  
p. 10. 
103  For example, Interview 117. 
104  IOB, SNV-Nepal, p. 49. 
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contract is over, while with local staff the knowledge is more likely to remain 
available within the country. In addition, expat staff are far more expensive. 
Many people reason that the choice is obvious if the same work can be done for 
less money by locally employed staff.105 
 
 
 
Photo 6.3 Local staff visiting Rheden during their introductory course in The 
Netherlands. 
Source:  SNV photo archives, Yellow, SNV, Algemeen, Lokale veldstaf.  
Photographer:  Peter Drent, 1991. 
 
 
In general SNVers and clients were quick to add that expat personnel also 
had a role to play. ‘SNV now has more Malians. That is extremely positive. But 
of course, sometimes people from outside can offer a fresh perspective. I think 
this cultural exchange is very important.’106 This argument was also stressed 
when Minister Herfkens started questioning the value of technical assistance:  
(...) We would like to enter into a dialogue with the Minister regarding her vision 
and whether or not there is need and room for expatriate advisors to play a role in 
Development Cooperation. We would like to convince her that in the field of capac-
ity-building we are able to create a synergy by working with teams of advisors in 
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which both Ghanaian and Dutch experts work together in ‘a new way of work-
ing’.107 
While the intercultural character of SNV was much valued and SNVers 
regarded it as a positive feature of the organisation in all respects, the position 
of national staff has all the same become a vexed question. Non-Dutch staff still 
at times complained about Dutch being spoken in the offices and, although 
correspondence is now normally in English or in the national language, some 
information is still sent to them in Dutch.108 Salaries for local personnel posed a 
serious dilemma and differences in income between local and Dutch staff were 
seen as unfair and detrimental to staff integration and cooperation. However 
levelling wages might lead to a brain-drain of local expertise into the develop-
ment sector and create an island of development workers in a country context. 
Especially in view of SNV’s aim to strengthen local capacities this was viewed 
as a serious problem. Furthermore, as the judicial and financial position of local 
staff differed per country, there could be huge variations in income, benefits and 
rights between people who were working in neighbouring countries.109 There 
has been a recent tendency to employ personnel from other countries in a 
region. While again this South-South exchange is much valued, the fact that 
these advisors receive an expatriate contract or a third-country national contract 
has given rise to extra tensions about the various contract forms.110 It is also 
seen as naïve to assume that local staff will automatically defend local interests. 
As John Mlay stated, ‘Numbers are not the issue; the question is whether these 
locals come up with the local agenda. You often find that the locals just serve 
the foreign agenda. Now 70% of the staff are local, but will that help to set the 
local agenda?’111 Another dilemma is SNV’s rule that a person from a country 
cannot become the SNV director in that same country and some interpreted this 
as a lack of confidence in local staff.112 These are still issues of intense debate in 
many countries where SNV is active. 
SNV does not stand alone in its policy of employing more local staff: the 
shift from expatriate to local personnel is a wider trend. A parallel may be 
drawn with the Christian missions in Africa that started out as a Western initia-
tive and initially were expatriate organisations but gradually grew into local 
churches organised by African Christians. In the international development 
sector, qualified local personnel are much sought after. As people have started 
                                                 
107  Foreign Affairs, file snv/ara/00050, memo, Director SNV to R through DGIS, 
‘Ghana’, 5 November 2001, p. 2. 
108  Interview 246. 
109  Interviews 20 and 150. 
110  Interview 128. 
111  Interview 133. 
112  Interview 49. 
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recognising their (financial) value, the dilemma over the contractual position of 
local staff has not gone away. It was decided that some 70% of staff should be 
local but in a number of countries it has proved to be a challenge to find so 
many qualified people.113 
While within SNV the debate focuses on the position of local staff, for local 
participants the logic of SNV taking on local people is at times questioned. 
Many indeed view it as an asset: contact is easier as the language and cultural 
background are understood and people are likely to establish long-term relations 
as they live in the country.114 Yet, in some cases disadvantages were also men-
tioned. People expect foreigners to have greater access and more leverage in 
political channels than a local person.115 Some local participants have doubts 
about the managerial and organisational qualities of their fellow countrymen: 
‘Now there are many Malians. But let’s face it: Malians are not good at 
management. It is clear. Better to have Europeans in management (…)’116 The 
most important argument against local personnel has been that development is 
about learning something new: ‘The foreigners bring things from outside, things 
that we do not know (…) Development is about obtaining new things.’117 
The Netherlands? 
The percentage of local staff begs the question about the Dutch nature of SNV 
as an organisation. 1993 saw another name change in SNV. From then on, the 
organisation would be called SNV Netherlands Development Organisation, a 
name that had been in use in SNV Nepal for some time already.118 The new 
name showed that the B Objective in its original aim had been dropped: it was 
transformed into Bureau Dienstverlening en Bemiddeling (Services and Media-
tion Desk). Despite the changes, the new name also clearly referred to SNV’s 
Dutch background. Currently SNV is described as ‘a Netherlands-based, inter-
national development organisation’ and the multicultural aspect of SNV is 
stressed.  
In each country where it operates SNV has developed within the local 
context of political constellations, social relations and cultural aspects, and the 
organisational culture and the professional traditions may differ from one 
                                                 
113  Interviews 87 and 168. 
114  Interview 284. 
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116  Interviews 198 and 164. 
117  Interview 134. 
118  In 1985 SNV Nepal changed its name from Netherlands Development and Volun-
teer Service to Netherlands Development Organisation, Archives, SNV Nepal, Kath-
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country to the next. While some hold that SNV’s policies are by and large 
determined by Dutch politics and Dutch public opinion, others feel that the 
differences between the country offices are too great and that SNV lacks a 
coherent identity. These differences are largely due to the longstanding interac-
tion between the SNV offices and the national – or even the regional – prob-
lems, issues and debates. SNV’s CORE team has attempted to address this 
issue. In view of SNV’s new status, a more pronounced character was required 
for the organisation. The long tradition of decentralisation within SNV did, 
however, not make this any easier and SNV staff often interpreted decisions as 
stemming from The Hague and viewed these as an outside intervention. The 
fact that SNV management tried to involve its staff at the regional and country-
office level in the processes of decision-making apparently hardly reduced this 
interpretation. Local staff expressed strong sensitivity on this point and were 
often unwilling to take into account factors in Dutch politics, the Dutch media, 
Dutch evaluations and Dutch public opinion.119 The increase of local staff mem-
bers in SNV has been directly connected with the nature of development and the 
status of SNV as an organisation. In the words of Aat van der Wel, who worked 
for SNV Tanzania: 
SNV is a Dutch organisation, it still is. But it is being watered down. And that is not 
good: An organisation needs an interested public, a constituency. And what is the 
constituency in SNV’s case? Profiling in The Netherlands continues to remain 
important, I think. I have nothing against the process of localisation. But one has to 
ask the question: we come to bring something as an organisation and what do we 
bring in the case of Tanzanians who work for SNV?120 
Especially after the first nationals joined SNV, discussions were held about 
the languages that should be used within SNV. Most reports were already 
produced in the national language of the country involved, but Dutch remained 
important in meetings and in all correspondence with The Hague. In 1997, 
English was formally adopted as the language of communication internation-
ally, while national languages were to be used in the countries in all meetings 
and correspondence.121 In French- and Spanish-speaking countries, an adequate 
knowledge of English tended to limit the number of potential local candidates 
for SNV positions. By now, hardly any Dutch was being spoken in SNV offices 
                                                 
119  Various interviews (no further information for reasons of privacy). 
120  Interview 167. (‘SNV is een Nederlandse organisatie, dat blijft het. Maar dat ve-
watert wel. En dat is geen goede zaak: Als organisatie heb je ook een achterban, een 
constituency. En wat is dat dan voor SNV? Die profilering in Nederland blijft, denk 
ik, belangrijk. Ik heb niks tegen het proces van lokalisering. Maar je moet toch de 
vraag durven stellen: we komen als organisatie iets brengen; wat is dat dan in het 
geval van Tanzanianen die bij SNV werken?’) 
121  Nedwerk 12, 1 (1998), p. 1. 
 BUILDING CAPACITY  231 
 
 
and people were using the national language to communicate, although some 
local staff still claimed that: ‘The Dutch love to speak their own language.’122 
Some of the support staff who had worked for SNV for a long time knew some 
Dutch words and expressions and the last thing I heard as I left to return to The 
Netherlands after a research visit was the Tanzanian SNV driver shouting ‘Nou, 
doei!’ (Goodbye!). 
Despite the rapid growth of non-Dutch personnel, there is still a visible 
legacy of SNV’s Dutch background and elements of Dutch culture in some 
countries. The Dutch coffee culture is obvious in SNV offices worldwide, the 
informal, flat structure of working relations are noted by many local staff and 
the relatively outspoken and direct way of address that is used in meetings and 
negotiations is frequently mentioned in SNV as a typical Dutch trait. Some 
Dutch people working abroad still import, for example, Dutch cheese, peanut 
butter, chocolate sprinkles and liquorice, and treacle waffles can regularly be 
found in their houses too. Many of them would not want to miss out on Dutch 
festivals such as Sinterklaas with its mocking poems or Queen’s Day with raw 
herring at the Dutch Embassy.  
Some local staff indicated that over time they too have adopted some Dutch 
ways. Isabel Miranda from Guinea-Bissau talked about the open way in which 
Dutch people express their thoughts and criticise things and how this had influ-
enced her: ‘I can also be critical, no problem. I have become Dutch in this 
respect; I am very upfront now (…) I think SNV has changed me. Before SNV, 
in my world, I was more timid.’123 Interaction in SNV teams between people of 
different nationalities working at similar levels has increased over the years. 
Despite the growing intercultural character of SNV, the Dutch contact networks 
that came into existence in the 1980s continue to remain important. These 
networks now also offer the possibility to build up social contact with other 
SNVers and expatriates working in the development sector and to exchange 
information, ideas, and gossip. 
For people who are closely involved in the organisation, SNV may still 
appear very Dutch. For example, at the Ministry of the Environment in Mali, 
SNV was described as a ‘vector for conveying the Dutch culture in Mali’.124 
Local participants may evaluate this very differently and many do not even 
know SNV’s country of origin. ‘They have told us where SNV comes from, but 
I have forgotten! The advisor keeps on telling us.’125  
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Since SNV started, the possibilities for maintaining frequent contact over 
distance and for travelling between continents have grown enormously. This 
shows in the enhanced international character of many SNV teams, and the 
increased numbers of local personnel and also development workers coming 
from a third country. It is also clear in exchanges about concepts and policies 
that the development world is more international than ever before. New possi-
bilities also provide scope for a more coherent and integrated approach. When 
SNV was founded, contact between The Hague and the field was usually slow 
and difficult and contact between the various country offices was in many cases 
even impossible. This resulted in many decisions being taken by people ‘on the 
spot’. Nowadays new technologies allow Head Office in The Hague to dissemi-
nate information very fast and, in turn, to remain informed about new develop-
ments worldwide. These potentially conflicting tendencies may result in more 
centralisation and more internationalisation within SNV. 
 
 
 
Photo 6.4 SNVers hosted in Palmira, Lomerio, Bolivia, 1991. 
Source:  SNV Digital photo archive: 1990-1995 part I: BOL-SNV-02.tif.  
Photographer:  Guillermo Hopia, 1991. 
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Conclusion 
It is not easy as yet to fully understand the implications of the radical changes 
that occurred in SNV over the last ten years. As we saw in this chapter: three 
major changes stand out: SNV has seen a sharp growth in local personnel, it has 
become an NGO that is administratively independent of The Netherlands Minis-
try of Foreign Affairs and, thirdly, SNV has changed from implementing and 
managing development projects to advising meso-level organisations and 
government bodies in order to strengthen their capacities. These changes are so 
recent that the consequences are still unfolding and the interaction between the 
three areas of change may also lead to new and unforeseen developments. The 
next chapter attempts to draw together the connections between these new 
changes and the debates, dilemmas, and questions within and outside SNV. 
  
 
  
7 
Final remarks 
This book gives an outline of the history of SNV as an organisation from its 
inception to the present. The aim was to move beyond an inventory of bureau-
cratic, formal changes and to offer an interpretation of SNV through the eyes of 
the people working in or with the organisation. Such a socio-cultural history of 
a development organisation may not be of immediate, practical use for the 
development sector. This has long posed a dilemma in the relationship between 
research and development. In Development Studies as well as in other branches 
of research, such as economics, agriculture and technical areas, the emphasis 
has traditionally been on research that can provide information, knowledge and 
expertise perceived to be applicable in the development sector. The results of 
such applied research are seen to have immediate consequences for the ways in 
which development work functions.  
In a very different approach, the aim here has not been to mobilise research 
for development as such, but to provide a critical review of the development 
concepts, theories and practices through research. This strand of research forms 
a reflection of, rather than a factor in, development. In some cases, critical 
reflection has led to an outright rejection of the development paradigm. In what 
is called post-development literature, development is evaluated as a harmful and 
degrading paradigm that was imposed by the West on people in developing 
countries. In this literature the end of the ‘Development Era’ has been forecast: 
the classic development model is seen to have been a total failure and the post-
development era is now at hand.1 
It is obvious that this book belongs to the second strand of research in the 
sense that it offers an historical interpretation of development rather than pro-
viding practical models or schemes that can be applied in the practice of 
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development. Yet the reflections in this book have not led to the radical conclu-
sions of post-development theory. The main reason for this is that the aim never 
was to evaluate the history of SNV in any positive or negative way. This is an 
odd position: when discussing development, one is expected to take a stance 
and come up with a clear answer to the question: ‘Does development help?’ 
Literature on development is, on the whole, outspoken in its judgement of the 
sector and only a few authors study development as a social phenomenon 
without pronouncing an opinion as to whether development has failed in its 
mission and whether it should continue, undergo serious reform or stop alto-
gether. This book differs from this general characteristic in the literature in that 
the views of (former) SNVers and local participants, rather than those of the 
author, are presented.2 In reviewing the perspectives of (former) SNVers and 
local participants, it becomes clear that their assessment of SNV as an organisa-
tion and development policies in general varies sharply. A number of former 
SNVers have come to the same conclusions as the post-development critics and 
in interviews with them they strongly condemned the development practice as 
hypocrite and counter-effective. Others, especially people employed by SNV 
today, are critical of the approaches that were used in the past but defend the 
present approach as a viable and worthy way of reducing poverty. Yet others – 
both former and present SNVers – do not agree with the current approach and 
expressed criticism about the direction SNV has chosen.  
As has become clear throughout the book, local participants are generally 
more appreciative of SNV and, over the years, SNV’s performance has been 
positively evaluated by countless people in scores of countries. It is apparent 
from the participants’ views that they regard any development activity as a 
chance to improve their living conditions, as a possible strategy for getting by 
or an opportunity that may in one way or another benefit the community. In 
many cases, SNV’s development activities were appreciated for reasons very 
different to the stated aims of the project or development practice. In the post-
development literature, it is implied that at grassroots level many people oppose 
development activities and have rejected the paradigms underlying conventional 
development activities.3 While it is true that participants’ evaluations were often 
not congruent with assessments based on policy documents, this does not 
diminish the fact that local participants frequently expressed satisfaction with 
the activities undertaken. Many indicated that they had wanted an expansion or 
at least a continuation of the project. Any sound evaluation of development 
                                                 
2  Cf: Inge Brinkman, ‘Beyond the ‘development era’. Debates on colonialism, the 
christian missions and development’. In: Paul Hoebink, ed., The Netherlands Year-
book on International Cooperation (Assen, 2007), pp. 99-117. 
3  Majid Rahnema with Victoria Bawtree, ed., The post-development reader (London, 
1997), pp. xvi-xviii. 
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cooperation ought to take these views into account. Attacks on organisations 
such as SNV do not usually consider these arguments and conclusions are being 
drawn regardless of the opinions of those involved. In such cases, people in 
developing countries are once again being rendered voiceless and denied any 
say in what is good or bad for them. 
SNV has changed profoundly in the course of its existence. In the introduc-
tory chapter we identified some broad processes of change in areas such as its 
secularisation, professionalisation, SNV’s status in relation to the Dutch state 
and its internationalisation. The first process was a crucial factor in the 1960s 
and 1970s, and SNV’s history can only be understood in the light of the legacy 
of missionary traditions in development and the state’s more secular approach. 
By the end of the 1970s, SNV had definitely moved towards a more secularised 
conception of development. The separation of JVC from SNV can be seen as 
the final step in this process. This period also marked the change from a perhaps 
naïve ‘we’ll fix it’ notion of development to the realisation that development 
entailed immensely complex processes in the area of worldwide trade relations 
and structural economic dynamics. The tendency towards a more politically 
oriented notion of development coincided with a stronger emphasis on democ-
ratisation within SNV, leading to a larger say by field staff and volunteers in 
decision-making processes.   
In the 1980s, the era of voluntary service came to a close and SNVers be-
came salaried professionals. This professionalisation process notwithstanding, 
the legacy of the volunteer period remained important for a long time. Not only 
did outsiders sometimes still classify SNV as a voluntary service but the work-
ing culture in SNV also showed aspects that were clearly related to over 20 
years of voluntary service. SNV volunteers were inclined to regard the organi-
sation as a mere ‘dispatching’ agency and some of them more strongly identi-
fied with the local organisations they worked with than with SNV itself. SNV’s 
sharply decentralised character reinforced this tendency. Especially over the last 
ten years, attempts have been made to create a clearer SNV identity and to 
arrive at a more integrated organisation. A larger degree of interaction between 
‘the field’ and Head Office in The Hague formed part of these attempts, but 
many SNV staff still felt there was a distance between ‘The Hague’ and ‘the 
field’. SNVers from a non-Dutch background, in particular, regarded The 
Hague as far removed from the daily realities of their work and were often 
unwilling to take factors from the Dutch context that influenced SNV policy-
making into account. The stronger diversification of SNV’s personnel in this 
sense cannot be said to have reinforced attempts to arrive at a more integrated 
organisation. SNV started out in the 1960s as a Dutch initiative and, from the 
start, attempts were made to cooperate with local counterparts and to have the 
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organisation function as far as possible within the local context of development 
activities. In the 1980s the first steps were taken to recruit SNV personnel 
locally, a move that took off in the last decade when the number of non-Dutch 
personnel grew to account for nearly 70% of its staff. Apart from this process of 
internationalisation, changes in relations with the Dutch Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs have also crystallised over the last ten years. SNV had its roots in both 
private and state initiatives, and throughout its history has had an ambivalent 
relationship with the Dutch state. Several attempts were made to resolve the 
complex administrative and organisational ties between the Ministry and SNV 
and by the 1980s SNV had become a quango (a quasi NGO). However, this 
situation proved equally unsatisfactory and in 2002 SNV became an independ-
ent organisation, separate from the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs. As 
SNV at the same time was going through a process of repositioning and chang-
ing from implementing development projects to being an advisory, capacity-
building service of meso-level organisations, SNV’s recent history has been one 
of radical transformation and intense dynamics.  
The recent changes in SNV policy have meant that many previous activities 
have been discontinued. From conversations with people who have felt the 
direct consequences of these shifts in policy, we recognise that they were often 
unhappy with the ending of SNV activities. Numerous examples were given of 
programmes that had closed in haste and projects that had been abandoned 
without preparing those involved to take them over. Such experiences have 
invariably created feelings of loss. Although the reasons for this dissatisfaction 
are perhaps not always connected with the overall development of a country, 
this does not reduce people’s disappointment with the course of events. In many 
cases, cooperation between SNV and these people had lasted for years and 
expectations had been nourished about its continuation. Clear information about 
the reasons for, and the contents of the changes in SNV’s policies were not 
provided in many cases and people pointed out the importance of historical 
connections. Even if, for the development organisation, the activities may 
appear to have been phased out properly and handed over with enough care and 
attention, local participants may still point to the importance of a shared past, of 
personal bonds that were forged in the course of history, and of unfulfilled 
expectations. People do not agree to a straightforward erasure of such historical 
connections. As the Hon. L.I. Umenjoh in Teze (Cameroon) put it: ‘Let me ask 
you, madam, when you write the history of SNV’s forty years in Cameroon, to 
put a recommendation in your book for the people of Teze. Just so that they can 
see and read (…)’4 For SNV, project implementation may be a closed chapter 
and, in the eyes of many, these historical relations may have turned into 
                                                 
4  Interview 64. 
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unhealthy, unsustainable structures only leading to dependency and to an isola-
tion of development practices from the wider local context. Yet it would be too 
simplistic to classify the notions these people have about development as ‘old-
fashioned’, ‘spoon-feeding’ and ‘non-sustainable’. An easy dismissal of their 
views would be just as inappropriate as reaching simple conclusions about the 
development sector as a whole, without taking the views of the local people into 
account. SNV’s aim has remained the same: to reduce poverty. As long as poor 
people do not see the advisory practice and capacity-building activities at meso 
level as translating into a direct reduction in their poverty, their views remain of 
vital importance in understanding the relationship between the aims and results 
of development activities. Very few poor people would agree with the conclu-
sion of the Dijkstal report that development organisations ought not be judged 
on the basis of results and effectiveness but on the basis of internal manage-
ment.5 
It is difficult to do justice to the diverse experiences, the varying evaluations 
and different opinions of those we interviewed. Each and everybody talked 
about SNV from his/her own perspective and we have framed their experiences 
with SNV in a wider context of past events and later developments. The docu-
ments in the archives likewise revealed a multiplicity of views, ideas and 
experiences written within a personal framework. Any writing presupposes 
structuring and integration of some sort and it is the researcher’s task to attempt 
an interpretation without reducing diversity to a seamless whole. This task 
frequently posed problems as the aim of this book was to focus on SNV as an 
organisation and to give a voice to individuals who looked at SNV from their 
own perspective.  
One of our conclusions here is thus that studying the cultural history of a 
development organisation is to some extent a contradiction in terms. Focusing 
on the organisation will inevitably lead the researcher into the wider context of 
Dutch and international development policies, while the particulars of people’s 
experiences lead one away from such general trends and structural changes and 
into personal history, a local context and private backgrounds. The larger 
contours and the main historical lines of SNV as an organisation relate it to the 
Dutch political context and to the history of international development. 
Throughout most of its history, SNV has been a relatively decentralised organi-
sation: many decisions were taken in its country offices rather than at Head 
Office in The Hague. Despite this, SNV’s past is closely connected to Dutch 
social and political history, and with the main lines of international develop-
ment history. In this sense, although the book focuses on SNV, it can be viewed 
as a window on the history of development policies in The Netherlands and 
                                                 
5  Dijkstal et al., ‘Vertrouwen in een kwetsbare sector’; Cf. Chapter 6, Note 608. 
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changes in the international development arena. Seen from within the interna-
tional development sector, SNV can hardly be called a pioneer organisation. As 
Paul Hoebink pointed out, Dutch development policy was generally not very 
progressive and, entangled in a problematic relationship with the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, it was hardly in a position to develop an independent, coherent 
approach.6 As for most of its history SNV was an organisation caught between 
the divergent interests of Foreign Affairs, Development Affairs and the private 
development sector, it was next to impossible for it to steer a strong and inde-
pendent course that could have turned it into a strong and innovative force in the 
development world.  
At an institutional level, these broader connections can be easily discerned. 
However when delving deeper and following the finer, more local threads of 
SNV’s past, a very different picture emerges. Closer to the practice of SNV’s 
activities, SNV’s past becomes a kaleidoscope of micro factors emerging from 
‘the field’. Numerous changes and decisions at the more practical level were 
informed by local politics, social relations between development workers and 
local partners, and interests formulated by target groups rather than by formal 
policy-making. In the practice of development, local history rather than Dutch 
history or international development history is crucial to an understanding of the 
past. In the case of SNV and with its history of relative decentralisation, each 
country in which SNV had activities reveals a particular history and profile, 
often deeply embedded in the local political and socio-cultural context. In many 
countries, there are vast differences even between regions in the country itself, 
differences that show in the way SNV has developed in these regions. Each well 
and each piece of advice has its own particular history, framed in local, national 
and international factors of change. In the interviews we held, it became clear 
that development work was acutely influenced by marriage and divorce, friend-
ships and conflicts, and depended on many persons – partners, lovers, children, 
parents, friends, participants, colleagues, superiors, etc. Seen from below, it was 
impossible to distinguish between those parts of history that belonged to SNV’s 
history and those parts that did not. A ‘history from below’ makes SNV as an 
organisation diffuse: its borders, which appear so neat when writing from 
above, dissolve into local and personal dynamics. The arguments that underpin 
managerial decision-making at Head Office in The Netherlands are often un-
known to those in the field and these decisions, naturally, do not always fit the 
logic built up through local and personal circumstances. This tension between 
the centripetal and the centrifugal obviously not only had consequences for 
writing the history of SNV we envisaged but also formed one of the major 
frictions permeating SNV’s past. In its extreme form, socio-cultural history 
                                                 
6  Hoebink, Geven is nemen, pp. 232-234. 
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would imply writing a biography of one of the persons interviewed, the history 
of one of the objects referred to or of a relationship in a particular context, or 
the advice given by one person to another. SNV as an organisation would, 
however, only form a small part of such a history. It would render any periodi-
sation of SNV’s history as an organisation impossible to assess. The chapter 
division in this book reflects, to a large extent, the general changes and devel-
opments in SNV’s history, although for SNVers in the field and local partici-
pants these were consequential rather than their initiative. The chapter caesura – 
ranging from the JVC/JVP initiatives. to the start of the Pronk era and the Field 
Representatives’ Meeting of 1973, to SNV’s formal name change, and to the 
decision to write a Corporate Plan – are not even known by many of the local 
participants. Our aim was to describe the history of SNV through the perspec-
tives of (former) SNVers and local participants: the ways in which they viewed 
the general changes and tried to fit them into the other facets of their life formed 
the core of our study. We tried to seek a balance between ‘history from below’ 
and institutional history, and attempted to frame SNV as an organisation both in 
its wider contexts and in its particular personal and local histories. 
The general changes in SNV’s history have been vast. The context in which 
the JVC and JVP initiatives were taken differed in many respects from the 
present world in which SNV operates. This not only holds for the economic and 
political constellation at the national and international levels but also for the 
ideologies and paradigms underpinning the policies of the time. In the 1960s, 
the general view was of a world that could be controlled and constructed. This 
idea was especially popular in The Netherlands: man as a motor of events and 
as a creator of wealth and land had always been a strong notion in the Dutch 
context. This shows, for example, in the Dutch concept of de maakbare wereld 
(the ‘makeable’ world) and the rapid recovery of the Dutch economy after 
World War II strengthened this notion of technological superiority over nature 
and of man controlling the course of history. In terms of development coopera-
tion, this view now appears naïve but many people working for SNV left to go 
overseas with the idea of ‘we’ll just fix it’. The people in underdeveloped coun-
tries had to change unconditionally in the direction indicated by the developers.  
This idea has radically changed; SNV now gives advice and support to local 
developments. And with its focus on advice, it has, to some extent, returned to 
the approach before its foundation: SNV was first set up because it was felt that 
advice alone did not suffice. The new approach has further exacerbated a 
dilemma that has tormented the minds of development workers since the early 
naivety disappeared. On the one hand and more than ever before, the focus is on 
organisations and groups in the countries involved: SNV now attempts to work 
only at the request of local clients. The clients with their ideas, initiatives and 
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demands take the lead: they are ‘in the driver’s seat’, as was explained in the 
interviews. On the other hand, development work by its very nature always 
constitutes an intervention. Even if the work as such is technical, ‘development 
is fundamentally about changing how people conduct their lives, and the very 
claim to technical knowledge is itself a political act’.7 In this sense, the clients 
are not in the driver’s seat: they are being subjected to change. Whatever the 
methods used, the ultimate goal of development organisations is change for the 
better and an improvement in the existing situation. SNV claims to have exper-
tise in a number of areas; otherwise there would be no need for its activities. 
The dilemma between participation on an equal basis and the claim to expertise 
knows no solution, yet needs to be addressed when policies are designed. The 
historical legacies of colonialism, of earlier development traditions, of different 
perspectives on what development entails, and of changing relations between 
development workers and local participants weigh on such dilemmas and cannot 
simply be erased from discussions. The weight of these histories explains the 
often emotional debates that surround the dilemmas in development work, 
although these legacies are hardly ever analysed or interpreted in discussions. 
Coming to terms with history may be a fruitful exercise and could help to 
further the debate on development practice.   
Many people who had worked with SNV indicated in the interviews that 
their SNV time was an influential experience in their lives. Some stayed on in 
the country where they had been posted as volunteers, others met the love of 
their life, yet others continued working in the development sector. They all 
spoke with commitment about SNV: ‘This work is more. But what this more is 
is difficult to put into words.’8 The interviews with former SNVers showed that 
many people had had a lot of fun during their time with SNV. They explained 
about the unpredictable situations in which they had found themselves and that 
required so much creativity and flexibility, and they told stories of absurd 
experiences and cracked insiders’ jokes about SNV. As noted in the introduc-
tion, many old SNVers also expressed harsh critique of the organisation but at 
the same time (or afterwards) stressed their engagement and concern about 
SNV. The gentle irony, sometimes combined with frustration, with which many 
looked back on their time with SNV is difficult to interpret historically, Histori-
cal studies have, until now, left little room for any analysis of emotions or even 
opinions. Yet, as some interviewees stated, the notions of idealism, sacrifice and 
self-denial that are thought to accompany development work may be important  
 
                                                 
7  Frederick Cooper & Randall Packard, eds, International Development and the Social 
Sciences, p. 19. 
8  Interview 20. 
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Photo 7.1 Learning to dance, Colombia, 1966. 
Source:  SNV archives, Box 23. 
Photographer:  Unknown. 
 
 
to outsiders but what makes the people involved tick is the enjoyment and 
pleasure they have in their work. 
In development organisations, the past is often negated or condemned so as 
to defend the current approach. But in many cases in our discussions, former 
local participants took the opposite track: they praised SNV’s past and were 
critical of its current approach. New clients were in some cases hesitant about 
the implications of SNV’s policy regarding the financial aspects of development 
but on the whole felt that the advice they had received through SNV was useful. 
The stress on financial aspects may be misread as aid dependency and be inter-
preted as a one-sided focus on the material benefits of aid but from most of our 
interviews it became clear that people cherish complex notions of development 
and do not just reduce development to economics or consumption. The idea that 
pumping money into society and that welfare and well-being will automatically 
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follow from economic development has never informed SNV’s mission. Since 
its start in the 1960s one of its main aims has been the ‘transfer of knowledge’ 
and SNV has now chosen to abandon the financing and implementation role of 
development, focusing instead on advice, capacity-building, information, net-
working and knowledge. A broad perspective on development in the sense of 
change for the better is shared by many of the local participants in SNV’s 
activities. When discussing the meaning of development, people referred to a 
wide range of concepts and practices.  
For me, development means that one is looking to satisfy one’s basic needs. For that 
I need to know who I am. I need to know where I am. And I need to know what is 
around me. Starting from this position I can proceed, I can start by seeing what is 
lacking. In health, housing, clothing, food and education (...)9 
This quote from Baba Diarra from Mali combines aspects of identity, per-
sonhood, economics, knowledge, livelihood and the social context. He mentions 
basic needs and improved material wellbeing but relates these to knowledge, 
both about oneself and about one’s environment. Understanding the history of 
development may be part of this complex notion of development itself, like 
material wellbeing, self-fulfilment and increasing knowledge.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
9  Interview 184. 
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Interview 1: Yvonne van Vliet, former SNV head office staff, The Hague, 22 February 
2005, present: Inge Brinkman, Anne-Lot Hoek, language: Dutch, notes. 
Interview 2: Gertie Janssen, former SNVer, Leiden, 23 February 2005, present: Inge 
Brinkman, Jan-Bart Gewald, language: Dutch, notes. 
Interview 3: Margriet Reinders, former SNVer, Leiden, 24 February 2005, present: 
Inge Brinkman, Sabine Luning, language: Dutch, notes.  
Interview 4: Simone van Vugt, former SNVer, Wageningen, 1 March 2005, present: 
Inge Brinkman, Anne-Lot Hoek, language: Dutch, tape-recorded. 
Interview 5: Willem Zevenbergen, former SNV-staff, Zevenaar, 1 March 2005, 
present: Inge Brinkman, Anne-Lot Hoek, language: Dutch, tape-recorded. 
Interview 6: Kees Zevenbergen, SNVer and SNV head office staff, The Hague,  
3 March 2005, present: Inge Brinkman, language: Dutch, notes. 
Interview 7: Harry Sesink-Clee, former SNV-staff, Bilthoven, 7 March 2005, present: 
Inge Brinkman, Anske Sesink-Clee, language: Dutch, tape-recorded. 
Interview 8: Bert Satijn & Hetty Satijn-Bloemen, former SNVers, Delft, 15 March 
2005, present: Inge Brinkman, language: Dutch, tape-recorded.  
Interview 9: Han van Dijk, researcher, Leiden, 16 March 2005, present: Inge 
Brinkman, language: Dutch, notes. 
Interview 10: Theo and Coby Huber, former SNVers, Stellendam, 16 March 2005, 
present: Anne-Lot Hoek, language: Dutch, tape-recorded. 
Interview 11: Louk Kortenhorst, former SNV-staff, Heelsum, 17 March 2005, present: 
Liesbeth Kortenhorst, Anne-Lot Hoek, language: Dutch, tape-recorded.  
Interview 12: Rob de Coole, former SNVer, Bunnink, 23 March 2005, present: Anne-
Lot Hoek, language: Dutch, tape-recorded. 
Interview 13: Meindert Witvliet, former SNVer, Amsterdam, 1 April 2005, present: 
Anne-Lot Hoek, language: Dutch, tape-recorded. 
Interview 14: Marc Steen (informal conversation) SNV-staff, Bissau, Guinea-Bissau, 
29 March 2005, present: Inge Brinkman, language: Dutch, notes. 
Interview 15: Alfredo Handem, SNVer, Bissau, Guinea-Bissau, 29 March 2005, 
present: Inge Brinkman, language: Portuguese, notes. 
Interview 16: Augusto da Silva & Fernando Morne Djú, Bissau, SNV drivers, 
Bissau, Guinea-Bissau, 29 March 2005, present: Inge Brinkman, language: 
Portuguese, notes. 
Interview 17: Geert Kroon, SNVer, Bissau, Guinea-Bissau, 29 March 2005, present: 
Inge Brinkman, language: Dutch notes. 
Interview 18: Marc Steen, Jan van Maanen & Reinder Bouwmeester, SNV staff and 
former SNVer, Bissau, Guinea-Bissau, 29 March 2005, present: Inge Brinkman, 
language: Dutch, notes. 
Interview 19: Isabel Miranda, SNVer, Bissau, Guinea-Bissau, 30 March 2005, present: 
Inge Brinkman, language: Portuguese, notes. 
Interview 20: Luit Hummel, SNVer, car Bissau to Buba, Guinea-Bissau, 30 March 
2005, present: Inge Brinkman, language: Dutch, notes. 
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Interview 21: 42 former workers of Buba project, Buba, Guinea-Bissau, 30 March 
2005, present: Inge Brinkman, Luit Hummel, language: Portuguese and Krioulo, 
tape-recorded.  
Interview 22: Various people of villages near Buba, former project participants, Buba 
region, Guinea-Bissau, 31 March 2005, present: Luit Hummel, Catarina, 
Francelino, Alfucene, Inge Brinkman, language: Portuguese and Krioulo, notes. 
Interview 23: José Gomes Lopes & Francisco Pereira Junior, former project co-
ordinator and former worker of Buba project, Buba, Guinea-Bissau, 31 March 
2005, present Inge Brinkman, language: Portuguese, notes. 
Interview 24: Filomeno Barbosa & Aua Keita, former workers of SNV project, now 
SNV client, Bafata, Guinea Bissau, 1 April 2005, present: Inge Brinkman, 
language: Portuguese, notes. 
Interview 25: People of Demba Meta: ca 10 men, ca 18 women, and many children, 
project participants, Demba Meta, Guinea-Bissau, 2 April 2005, present: Aua 
Fatima (project animator), Inge Brinkman, language: Peul (translation into 
Portuguese), notes. 
Interview 26: People of Munhini: ca 10 men, ca 18 women, and many children, project 
participants,  Munhini, Guinea-Bissau, 2 April 2005, present: Aua Fatima (project 
animator), Inge Brinkman, language: Peul (translation into Portuguese), notes. 
Interview 27: Geert Kroon, SNVer, car Bissau to Mansoah, Guinea-Bissau, 3 April 
2005, present: Inge Brinkman, language: Dutch, notes. 
Interview 28: Mustafa Baldei, Jero Baldei & Fode Djaman, client organisation, 
Nhacra, Guinea-Bissau, 3 April 2005, present: Geert Kroon, Inge Brinkman, 
language: Portuguese, notes. 
Interview 29: Mussa Sani & Talbo Mané, client organisation, Mansoah, Guinea-
Bissau, 3 April 2005, present: Geert Kroon, Inge Brinkman, language: Portuguese, 
notes. 
Interview 30: Renee Oste, SNVer, Bamako, Mali, 4 April 2005, present: Professor 
Konaté, Anne-Lot Hoek, language: French, notes. 
Interview 31: Ibrahim Traoré, former SNV project engineer, Bamako, Mali, 5 April 
2005, present: Professor Konaté, Anne-Lot Hoek, language: French, tape-recorded.  
Interview 32: Dougoufana Bagayoko, SNVer, Bamako, Mali, 6 April 2006, 
present: Inge Brinkman, Anne-Lot Hoek, language: French, tape-recorded.  
Interview 33: Mamadou Keïta, former project co-ordinator, now SNV client, Bamako, 
Mali, 6 April 2005, present: Anne-Lot Hoek, Inge Brinkman, language: French, 
tape-recorded.  
Interview 34: Oumou Touré (Traoré) former counterpart organisation, now SNV 
client, Bamako, Mali, 6 April 2005, present: Anne-Lot Hoek, Inge Brinkman, 
language: French, tape-recorded. 
Interview 35: Cheick Oumar Sissoko, SNVer, Bamako, Mali, 7 April 2005, present: 
Anne-Lot Hoek, Professor Konate, driver Guindo, Inge Brinkman, language: 
French, notes. 
Interview 36: Aliou Badara Coulibaly, journalist and SNV contact person, Dioïla, 
Mali, 7 April 2005, present: Inge Brinkman, Anne-Lot Hoek, Professor Konaté, 
Cheick Oumar Sissoko, language: French, tape-recorded. 
Interview 37: Monzon Mariko, village leader and religious authority, Dioïla, Mali,  
7 April 2005, present: Inge Brinkman, Anne-Lot Hoek, Profesor Konaté, Cheick 
Oumar Sissoko, language: French, tape-recorded. 
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Interview 38: Seybou Diarra & Ibrahima Barry, former counterparts, Dioïla, Mali,  
7 April 2005, present: Cheick Omar, Professor Konaté, Anne-Lot Hoek, Inge 
Brinkman, language: French, tape-recorded. 
Interview 39: Hamadoun Dicko, former counterpart, Dioïla, Mali, 7 April 2005, 
present: Cheick Omar, Professor Konaté, Anne-Lot Hoek, Inge Brinkman, 
language: French, tape-recorded. 
Interview 40: Mamadou Ouattara, Tjédian Bougoudogo, Hamadoun Ouologuem & 
Mamadou Coulibaly, former counterparts, Bamako, Mali, 8 April 2005, present: 
Inge Brinkman, language: French, notes. 
Interview 41: Alassane Boncana Maïga, former counterpart, Bamako, Mali, 8 April 
2005, present: Inge Brinkman, language: French, notes. 
Interview 42: Jeanette de Regt, SNV staff, Bamako, Mali, 8 april 2005, present: Inge 
Brinkman, Anne-Lot Hoek, language: Dutch, tape-recorded.  
Interview 43: Johan Wachters, former SNV introduction course teacher, Kati, Mali,  
9 April 2005, present: Anne-Lot Hoek, Inge Brinkman, language: Dutch, notes. 
Interview 44: Damiaan Vreman & Thea Bongertman, SNVers, Bamako, Mali,  
10 april 2005, present: Inge Brinkman, Anne-Lot Hoek, language: Dutch, tape-
recorded.  
Interview 45: Cheick Mohamed Samaké, SNV client, Bamako, Mali, 11 April 2005, 
present: Professor Konate and Inge Brinkman, language: French, notes.  
Interview 46: Adama Sissouma & Boubacar Dicko, SNV client and SNVer, Bamako, 
Mali, 11 April 2005, present: Professor Konaté and Inge Brinkman, language: 
French, notes.  
Interview 47: Ganda Keïta, SNV support staff, Bamako, Mali, 11 April 2005, present: 
professor Konate and Inge Brinkman, language: French, notes.  
Interview 48: Bakary Doumbia & Michel Diawara, SNV clients, Bamako, Mali, 11 
April 2005, present: Professor Konaté and Inge Brinkman, language: French, notes. 
Interview 49: Amagoin Keïta, SNVer, Bamako, Mali, 11 April 2005, present: Inge 
Brinkman, language: French, notes.  
Interview 50: Joost Nelen, SNVer, Bamako, Mali, 11 april 2005, present: Anne-Lot 
Hoek, language: Dutch, notes.  
Interview 51: Félix Acho Tikum (informal conversation) SNV driver, car Douala-
Yaoundé, Cameroon, 12 April 2005, present: Inge Brinkman, language: English, 
notes.  
Interview 52: Véronique Ngo Lissougué, SNV support staff, Yaoundé, Cameroon, 
13 April 2005, present: Inge Brinkman, language: French, notes. 
Interview 53: Landlord of SNV building, Yaoundé, Cameroon, 13 April 2005, present: 
Inge Brinkman, language: French, notes.  
Interview 54: Françoise Nguiadem Etoga, SNV support staff, Yaoundé, Cameroon,  
13 April 2005, present: Inge Brinkman, language: French, notes.  
Interview 55: Ginette G.B. Kombelé-Spinhoven, former SNVer, Yaoundé, Cameroon, 
13 April 2005, present: Inge Brinkman, language: Dutch, notes. 
Interview 56: Joseph Kamga, former SNV support staff, Bertoua, Cameroon, 15 April 
2005, present: Inge Brinkman, language: French, notes.  
Interview 57: Jaap Kok (informal conversation) SNVer, Bertoua, Cameroon,  
15/16 April 2005, present: Inge Brinkman, language: Dutch, notes.  
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Interview 58: Fidèl Oket, former SNV project co-ordinator, Bertoua, Cameroon,  
16 April 2005, present: Mrs. Catherine Oket, Inge Brinkman, language: French, 
notes.  
Interview 59: Matheus Kala, former counterpart, Bertoua, Cameroon, 16 April 2004, 
present: Inge Brinkman, language: French, notes. 
Interview 60: Charles Pedene, former counterpart, Bertoua, Cameroon, 16 April 2004, 
present: Driver Stephen, Inge Brinkman, language: French, notes. 
Interview 61: Paul Gbalème, SNVer, Bertoua, Cameroon, 17 April 2005, present: Inge 
Brinkman, language: French, notes. 
Interview 62: Marcus Ndifor, SNV driver, Yaoundé, Cameroon, 18 April 2005, 
present: Inge Brinkman, language: English, notes. 
Interview 63: Thur de Kuijer, former SNVer, written interview, language: Dutch.  
Interview 64: Citizens of the Ngie district, former project participants and 
counterparts, Andek, Cameroon, 14 April 2005, present: Igondoh John Atosoh, 
Anduicho Lucas Anjokwe, Jerome Akwafi, Hon. L. I. Umenjoh, Stephen Ungitoh, 
Deborah Ungiloh, Awanakam Godlore Andengakan, Anne-Lot Hoek, language: 
English, tape-recorded.  
Interview 65: Fred ter Horn, former SNVer, Teze, Cameroon, 14 April 2005, present: 
Anne-Lot Hoek, language: Dutch, notes. 
Interview 66: Agnes Bijngsi, former counterpart, Bambui, Cameroon, 15 April 2005, 
present: Anthony Cameroon, Anne-Lot Hoek, language: Pidgin English (translated) 
notes.  
Interview 67: Alex Fonkula, former SNV servant, Bambui, Cameroon, 15 April 2005, 
present: Anthony Cameroon, Anne-Lot Hoek, language: Pidgin English (translated) 
notes.  
Interview 68: Simon Bijngsi, former counterpart, Bamenda, Cameroon, 16 april 2005, 
present: Anne-Lot Hoek, language: English, tape-recorded.  
Interview 69: Niba Tafor Fidelis & Eric Awa, director and employee of former 
counterpart organisation, Bamenda, Cameroon, 18 April 2005, present: Anne-Lot 
Hoek, language: English, notes.  
Interview 70: Enow Davos Egbe & Orock Dimas Nkongko, former project 
participants, Etoko, Cameroon 19 April 2005, present: Anthony Cameroon, Tambe 
Dickson Ashu, Anne-Lot Hoek, language: Pidgin English (translated) notes.  
Interview 71: Ashu Tambong Thomas & Tanyi Tambong Agbor, former 
counterparts, Etemetek, Cameroon, 19 April 2005, present: Anthony Cameroon, 
Tambe Dickson Ashu, Anne-Lot Hoek, language: Pidgin English (translated) notes.  
Interview 72: Citizens of Manyu, former project participants and counterparts, 
Bakwelle, Cameroon, 19 April 2005, present: Tambe Dickson Ashu, Anthony 
Cameroon, Arrey, Tambong, Valentine, Nkongho, Evelyn, Arreyndip, Lawrence, 
Arrey, Assam, Tambong, Matthias, Awuh, Lawrence, Anne-Lot Hoek, language: 
Pidgin English (translated) notes.  
Interview 73: Paulina Ntui, former project participant, Ewelle, Cameroon, 19 April 
2005, present: Tambe Dickson Ashu, Anthony Cameroon, Anne-Lot Hoek, 
language: Pidgin English (translated) notes.  
Interview 74: George Nkemka, former SNV counterpart, Mamfe, Cameroon, 20 April 
2005, present: Tambe Dickson Ashu, Anthony Cameroon, Anne-Lot Hoek, 
language: English, notes.  
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Interview 75: Miss Evelyn, former counterpart,  Mamfe, Cameroon, 20 April 2005, 
present: Tambe Dickson Ashu, Anthony Cameroon, Anne-Lot Hoek, language: 
English, notes. 
Interview 76: Alice Orok, former project participant, Etoko, Cameroon, 20 April 2005, 
present: Tambe Dickson Ashu, Anthony Cameroon, Anne-Lot Hoek, language: 
Pidgin English (translated) notes.  
Interview 77: Jean-Marc Sika, SNV-staff, Bamenda, Cameroon, 22 April 2005, 
present: Jean-Marc Sika, Anne-Lot Hoek, language: English, tape-recorded.  
Interview 78: Piet Schermerhorn, SNVer, Bamenda, Cameroon, 22 April 2005, 
present: Anne-Lot Hoek, language: Dutch, notes.  
Interview 79: Bakia Besong, SNV-staff, Bamenda, Cameroon, 22 April 2005, present: 
Anne-Lot Hoek, language: English, tape-recorded.  
Interview 80: George Kwalor Njabfu, SNV support staff, Bamenda, Cameroon,  
22 April 2005, present: Anne-Lot Hoek, language: English, notes.  
Interview 81: Verina Ingram, SNVer, Bamenda, Cameroon, 25 April 2005, present: 
Anne-Lot Hoek, language: English, tape-recorded.  
Interview 82: Fon Nsoh, SNV client, Bamenda, Cameroon, 26 April 2005, present: 
Anne-Lot Hoek, language: English, notes. 
Interview 83: Lambertus van Heygen, former Bishop and SNV project co-ordinator, 
Rijswijk, 12 May 2005, present: Inge Brinkman, language: Dutch, notes. 
Interview 84: Ashura Katoro, SNV support staff, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, 18 May 
2005, present: Inge Brinkman, Gertrude Mapunda, language: English and Swahili 
(partly translated) notes. 
Interview 85: Job de Graaf, former SNVer, telephone conversation, Dar es Salaam, 
Tanzania,18 May 2005, Inge Brinkman, language: Dutch, notes.  
Interview 86: Kik van den Heuvel, former SNVer, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, 19 May 
2005, present: Inge Brinkman, language: Dutch, notes.  
Interview 87: Paul van Hoof, SNV staff, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, 20 May 2005, 
present: Inge Brinkman, language: Dutch, notes. 
Interview 88: Peniel Uliwa, former SNVer, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, 20 May 2005, 
present: Inge Brinkman, language: English, notes. 
Interview 89: Zuhura Yegella, SNV support staff, Dar es Salaam, 20 May 2005, 
present: Inge Brinkman, language: English, notes. 
Interview 90: Jan Schuthof, former SNVer, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, 20 May 2005, 
present: Inge Brinkman, language: Dutch, notes.  
Interview 91: Mohamed Shekibula, SNV driver, informal conversation, driving from 
Dar es Salaam to Iringa, Tanzania, 22 May 2005, present: Inge Brinkman, 
language: English and Swahili, notes.  
Interview 92: Deodatus D. Mhindi, former project worker, Iringa, Tanzania, 23 May 
2005, present: Inge Brinkman, language: English, notes.  
Interview 93: Suzanna Mkude, Robert Mdota & Atika Mlowe, former project 
workers, Iringa, Tanzania, 23 May 2005 present: Inge Brinkman, language: 
Swahili, notes.  
Interview 94: Felix Nyenza, Amandus Kifyoga & Serio Kitime, former project 
participants, Mgama, Tanzania, 23 May 2005, present: Inge Brinkman, Mohamed 
Shekibula, 8 men, 1 woman, language: Swahili (translated), notes. 
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Interview 95: Benedict Mbandila, Bilas Kimaty & Innocent Mwihava, former SNV 
counterparts, Ifunda, Tanzania, 24 May 2005, present: Inge Brinkman, language: 
English (some Swahili) notes.  
Interview 96: Marcus Kiwuyo, former SNV counterpart, Isupilo, Tanzania, 24 May 
2005, present: Inge Brinkman, Mohamed Shekibula, language: English (some 
Swahili) notes.  
Interview 97: Benedito Nyaulingo, former project participant, Igumbilo (Iringa) 
Tanzania, 25 May 2005, present: Inge Brinkman, Mohamed Shekibula, language: 
Swahili, notes. 
Interview 98: James Amo, former project co-ordinator, Ruaha, Tanzania, 25 May 2005, 
present: Inge Brinkman, language: English, notes. 
Interview 99: Ramadani S. Matola, former SNV driver, Morogoro, Tanzania, 26 May 
2005, present: Inge Brinkman, language: Kiswahili, notes.  
Interview 100: Gideon Shangali, Telezia Joseph & Didie Pius, former workers in 
centre where SNVer had introductory course, Morogoro, Tanzania, 26 May 2005, 
present: Inge Brinkman, language: Kiswahili, notes.  
Interview 101: Frans H.J van de Laak, former DHVer (Dutch advisory engineers 
agency), Morogoro, Tanzania, 26 May 2005, present: Inge Brinkman, language: 
Dutch, notes.  
Interview 102: Tunga Ra Tunga, Mohamed Jambwali & Artha Sadiki, former SNV 
counterparts, Mazimbu, Morogoro, Tanzania, 27 May 2005, present: Inge 
Brinkman, language: Swahili, notes. 
Interview 103: Joseph Kundi, former SNV driver, Morogoro, Tanzania, 27 May 2005, 
present: Inge Brinkman, Mohamed Shekibula, language: Swahili, notes.  
Interview 104: Stanley Ndahani, former SNV counterpart, Dodoma, Tanzania, 30 May 
2005, present: Inge Brinkman, language: English, notes.  
Interview 105: S.L. Kamayugi, former SNV counterpart, Dodoma, Tanzania, 30 May 
2005, present: Inge Brinkman, language: Swahili, notes. 
Interview 106: Alvin Uronu, former counterpart organisation, Dodoma, Tanzania,  
30 May 2005, present: Inge Brinkman, language: English, notes. 
Interview 107: Joel Kalagho, SNVer, Dodoma, Tanzania, 31 May 2005, present: Inge 
Brinkman, language: English, notes.  
Interview 108: Mohamed Munyu Shekibula, SNV driver, Dodoma, Tanzania, 31 May 
2005, present: Inge Brinkman, language: English, notes.  
Interview 109: Abinely Chiwanga & Ngamalieli Kanugha, project participants,  
31 May, 2005, Msalato (Dodoma), Tanzania, present: Inge Brinkman, language: 
Swahili, notes. 
Interview 110: Lieke Felten, former SNVer, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, 1 June 2005, 
present: Inge Brinkman, language: Dutch, tape-recorded.  
Interview 111: Carla & Jacob Schoemaker, former SNVers, Lusaka, Zambia, 25 May 
2005, present: Anne-Lot Hoek, language: Dutch, tape-recorded.  
Interview 112: Renee Lourens, former SNVer, Lusaka, Zambia, 26 May 2005, present: 
Anne-Lot Hoek, language: Dutch, tape-recorded.  
Interview 113: Aldert van der Vinne, former SNVer, Lusaka, Zambia, 26 May 2005, 
present: Anne-Lot Hoek, language: Dutch, tape-recorded.  
Interview 114: Inos Mwale, driver SNV, Lusaka, Zambia, 27 May 2005, present: Anne-
Lot Hoek, language: English, notes.  
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Interview 115: Mutinta Zulu, SNVer, Lusaka, Zambia, 27 May 2005, present: Anne-
Lot Hoek, language: English, notes. 
Interview 116: Dik IJf, former SNVer, Lusaka, Zambia, 30 May 2005, present: Anne-
Lot Hoek, language: Dutch, tape-recorded.  
Interview 117: Lucy Muyoyeta, former SNVer, Lusaka, Zambia, 31 May 2005, 
present: Anne-Lot Hoek, language: English, tape-recorded. 
Interview 118: Arie de Kwaaiesteniet, former SNVer, Lusaka, Zambia, 31 May 2005, 
present: Anne-Lot Hoek, language: Dutch, tape-recorded.  
Interview 119: Maurice Ndobela, SNV client, Lusaka, Zambia, 1 June 2005, present: 
Anne-Lot Hoek, language: English, notes.  
Interview 120: Willem Lublinkhof, former SNVer, Mazabuka, Zambia, 2 June 2005, 
present: Anne-Lot Hoek, language: Dutch, tape-recorded.  
Interview 121: Gerrit Struif, SNVer, Lusaka, Zambia, 3 June 2005, present: Anne-Lot 
Hoek, language: Dutch, tape-recorded and notes.  
Interview 122: Brenda Liswaniso, former SNVer, Lusaka, Zambia, 3 June 2005, 
present: Anne-Lot Hoek, language: English, notes. 
Interview 123: Tebuho Yubai, former SNVer, Lusaka, Zambia, 6 June 2005, present: 
Anne-Lot Hoek, language: English, notes. 
Interview 124: Roy van der Drift (informal conversation) SNVer, Lusaka, Zambia, 
7 June 2005, present: Anne-Lot Hoek, language: Dutch, notes.  
Interview 125: Frans Olthof, former SNVer, Weert, 18 May 2005, present: Anne-Lot 
Hoek, language: Dutch, tape-recorded.  
Interview 126: Victor Ferrari, former SNVer, The-Hague, 20 May 2005, present: 
Anne-Lot Hoek, language: Dutch, tape-recorded.  
Interview 127: E.N. Mtui-Heriel, SNVer, Arusha, Tanzania, 26 July 2005, present: 
Inge Brinkman, language: English, notes.  
Interview 128: Annie Francis, SNVer, Arusha, Tanzania, 26 July 2005, present: Inge 
Brinkman, language: English, notes.  
Interview 129: Mister Loti, former client, Ng’iresi (Arusha), Tanzania, 27 July 2005, 
present: Ayo Godlove, Elke Seghers, Inge Brinkman, language: English, notes.  
Interview 130: Mama Gladness, former client, Tengeru (Arusha), Tanzania, 28 July 
2005, present: Lema, Ayo Godlove, Elke Seghers, Inge Brinkman, language: 
Swahili (translated) notes. 
Interview 131: Alex Righolt, former SNVer, Arusha, Tanzania, 29 July 2005, present: 
Elke Seghers, Inge Brinkman, language: Dutch, notes.  
Interview 132: Tom Ole Sikar, former SNVer, Arusha, Tanzania, 29 July 2005, 
present: Elke Seghers, Inge Brinkman, language: English, notes. 
Interview 133: John Mlay, SNVer, Arusha, Tanzania, 29 July 2005, present: Ayo 
Godlove, Inge Brinkman, language: English, notes. 
Interview 134: Ana Palanjo, former client, Mulala (Arusha) Tanzania, 30 July 2005, 
present: Ayo Godlove, Inge Brinkman, language: Swahili (translated) notes.  
Interview 135: Josephine Lemoyan, SNVer, Arusha, Tanzania, 1 August 2005, 
present: Inge Brinkman, language: English, notes.  
Interview 136: Female former SNVer, Arusha, Tanzania, 1 August 2005, present: Elke 
Seghers, Inge Brinkman, language: Dutch, notes. 
Interview 137: Felix Nnko, former SNV counterpart, Usa river, Tanzania, 1 August 
2005, present: Elke Seghers, Ayo Godlove, Inge Brinkman, language: English, 
notes. 
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Interview 138: Peter Kangwa, former SNVer, now partner organisation, Moshi, 
Tanzania, 2 and 3 August 2005, present: Elke Seghers, Inge Brinkman, language: 
English, notes. 
Interview 139: Job de Graaf, former SNVer, Arusha, Tanzania, 2 August 2005, 
present: Elke Seghers, Inge Brinkman, language: Dutch, notes.  
Interview 140: Japhet Mpande, former SNV counterpart, Moshi, Tanzania, 2 August 
2005, present: colleague teachers and Inge Brinkman, language: English, notes.  
Interview 141: Nelson Kangero, former client, Lomwe, (Northern Pare) Tanzania, 4 
August 2005, present: Inge Brinkman, language: English, notes.  
Interview 142: Ibrahim Kawa, former SNV counterpart, Moshi, Tanzania, 5 August 
2005, present: Anenmose L. Maro, Suitbert P. Mumburi, Inge Brinkman, language: 
English, notes.  
Interview 143: Elly Kimbwereza, Esrom Mndeme & John Mndeme, former SNV 
counterparts/clients, Mbaga (Southern Pare) Tanzania, 6 August 2005, present: Ayo 
Godlove, Inge Brinkman, language: English (part with teachers in English/Swahili), 
notes. 
Interview 144: Yassin Madiwa & Jerome Mwamboneke, former SNV clients, 
Lushoto, 9 August 2005, present: Ayo Godlove, Elke Seghers, Inge Brinkman, 
language: English, tape-recorded. 
Interview 145: J. Mzoo, former project worker, Lushoto, Tanzania, 9 August 2005, 
present: Inge Brinkman, language: English, notes.  
Interview 146: Omari Salim Mdoe & other leaders of Shashui, former project 
participants, Shashui (near Soni) Tanzania, 10 August 2005, present: Ayo Godlove, 
Yassin, Inge Brinkman, language: Swahili, notes. 
Interview 147: Zuhura Yegella, SNV support staff, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, 12 
August 2005, present: Inge Brinkman, language: English, notes.  
Interview 148: Kikilwa Mundiya, SNV client, Mongu, Zambia, 22 July 2005, 
language: English, tape-recorded.  
Interview 149: Kusiyo Mbikos Lewanika, former SNV counterpart, Mongu, Zambia, 
22 July 2005, present: Anne-Lot Hoek, language: English, tape-recorded.  
Interview 150: Eugene van Kemenade, SNVer, Mongu, Zambia, 23 July 2005, 
language: Dutch, tape-recorded. 
Interview 151: Sister Engelbergus, catholic nun, Mongu, Zambia, 25 August 2005, 
language: English, notes. 
Interview 152: Charlton Nzie, SNV driver, Mongu, Zambia, 25 July 2005, present: 
Anne-Lot Hoek, language: English, notes. 
Interview 153: George Mbangula, SNV driver, Mongu, Zambia, 27 July 2005, present: 
Anne-Lot Hoek, language: English, notes. 
Interview 154: John Mulamfu, former SNVer, Mongu, Zambia, 25 July 2005, present: 
Anne-Lot Hoek, language: English, notes.  
Interview 155: Henry Kaira, director of former counterpart organisation, Solwezi, 
Zambia, 28 July 2005, present: Mr. Felix, Anne-Lot Hoek, language: English, 
notes.  
Interview 156: Malambo Blann, former SNVer, Solwezi, Zambia, 28 July 2005, 
present: Anne-Lot Hoek, language: English, notes. 
Interview 157: Godfrey Azuza, former SNVer, Solwezi, Zambia, 28 July 2005, 
present: Anne-Lot Hoek, language: English, notes.  
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Interview 158: Ernest Phiri, former SNVer, Solwezi, Zambia, 29 July 2005, present: 
Anne-Lot Hoek, language: English, notes. 
Interview 159: Meshias Kabimba & other village people, former project participants, 
Solwezi, Zambia, 29 July 2005, present: Inos Mwale, Meshias Kabimba, Anne-Lot 
Hoek, people from the village, translated from local language: Dutch, notes.  
Interview 160: Tomas Killodamo, former SNV project worker, Solwezi, Zambia,  
29 July 2005, present: Inos Mwale, Ackim Kalembo, Anne-Lot Hoek, language: 
English, notes.  
Interview 161: Ackim Kalembo, former SNV project worker, Solwezi, Zambia, 29 July 
2005, present: Inos Mwale, Tomas Killodamo, Anne-Lot Hoek, language: English, 
notes.  
Interview 162: Sibongile Mauye, SNV staff, Solwezi, Zambia, 29 July 2005, present: 
Anne-Lot Hoek, language: English, tape-recorded.  
Interview 163: Willem Lublinkhof, former SNVer, Lusaka, Zambia, 2 August 2005, 
present: Anne-Lot Hoek, language: Dutch, tape-recorded.  
Interview 164: Godfrey Mutokoma, SNV driver, Lusaka-Choma, Zambia, 3 August 
2005, present: Anne-Lot Hoek, language: English, tape-recorded.  
Interview 165: Bert Witkamp, former SNVer, Choma, Zambia, 3 August 2005, 
present: Anne-Lot Hoek, language: Dutch, tape-recorded.  
Interview 166: Mwimanj Ndota Chellah, director of former SNV counterpart 
organisation, Choma, Zambia, 3 August 2005, present: Anne-Lot Hoek, language: 
English, tape-recorded. 
Interview 167: Aat van der Wel, former SNVer, Gouda, 13 November 2005, present: 
Inge Brinkman, language: Dutch, notes. 
Interview 168: Eric de Milliano, former SNVer and former SNV staff, Leiden,  
27 October 2005, present: Inge Brinkman, Anne-Lot Hoek, language: Dutch,  
tape-recorded.  
Interview 169: Raoul Snelder, former SNVer, 28 October 2005, Maastricht, present: 
Anne-Lot Hoek, language: Dutch, tape-recorded. 
Interview 170: Han Baartmans (informal conversation) SNV (head office) staff, The 
Hague, 15 November 2005, present: Inge Brinkman, language: Dutch, notes. 
Interview 171: Marcel Leijzer, SNVer and SNV head office, The Hague, 15 November 
2005, present: Inge Brinkman, language: Dutch, notes.  
Interview 172: Marjanne de Jong, former SNVer, Zeist, 15 November 2005, present: 
Anne-Lot Hoek, language: Dutch, tape-recorded.  
Interview 173: Ben Zwinkels, former SNVer, Den-Haag, 16 November 2005, present: 
Anne-Lot Hoek, language: Dutch, tape-recorded.  
Interview 174: Erick Baetings, SNVer, The Hague, 23 November 2005, present: Anne-
Lot Hoek, language: Dutch, notes.  
Interview 175: Arjan Schuthof, former SNVer, The Hague, 30 November 2005, 
present: Anne-Lot Hoek, language: Dutch, tape-recorded.  
Interview 176: Erik Nijland, former SNVer, The Hague, 8 December, present: Anne-
Lot Hoek, language: Dutch, tape-recorded. 
Interview 177: Younoussa Touré (informal conversation) researcher, Bamako, Mali, 
30 November 2005, present: Inge Brinkman, language: French, notes.  
Interview 178: Dr. Dougoufana Bagayoko, former project co-ordinator, Bamako, Mali, 
1 December 2005, present: Inge Brinkman, language: French, notes.  
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Interview 179: Baba Doumbia, former SNVer, Bamako, Mali, 1 December 2005, 
present: Inge Brinkman, language: French, notes.  
Interview180: Mamadou Golfa & Diabate Chaka (informal conversation) SNVers, 
Bamako-Dioïla, 2 December 2005, present: Inge Brinkman, language: French, 
notes. 
Interview 181: Badara Coulibaly, journalist and SNV contact person, Dioïla, Mali, 2 
December 2005, present: Inge Brinkman, language: French, notes.  
Interview 182: Dramane Dao, SNVer, Dioïla, Mali, 2 December 2005, present: Inge 
Brinkman, language: French, notes. 
Interview 183: Fily Camara Coulibaly, former project participant, Dioïla, Mali, 3 
Decmeber 2005, present: Badara, Inge Brinkman, language: Bambara and French 
(translated) notes. 
Interview 184: Baba Diarra, former project participant, Nangola, Mali, 4 December 
2005, present: Badara, Inge Brinkman, Bambara and language: French (translated) 
notes. 
Interview 185: Adama Fall, former project participant, Nangola, Mali, 4 December 
2005, present: Badara, Inge Brinkman, Bambara and language: French (translated) 
notes. 
Interview 186: Employees of ASACO, former project participants, Nangola, Mali, 4 
December 2005, present: Badara, Inge Brinkman, language Bambara and French 
(translated) notes. 
Interview 187: El Moctar Haidara, former counterpart, Dioïla, Mali, 5 December 
2005, present: Badara, Inge Brinkman, language: French, notes. 
Interview 188: Bemba Coulibaly, former counterpart, Dioïla, Mali, 5 December 2005, 
present: Badara, Inge Brinkman, language: French, notes. 
Interview 189: Abdoulaye Guindo, former counterpart, Dioïla, Mali, 5 December 
2005, present: Badara, Inge Brinkman, language: French, notes. 
Interview 190: Fatoumata Dicko, Sitan Coulibaly & 6 other women, former project 
participants, Boyan, Mali, 6 December 2005, present: Badara, Inge Brinkman, 
language: Bambara and French (translated) notes. 
Interview 191: Amadou Sangaré, former project participant, Ngoulougoubou, Mali,  
6 December 2005, present: 4 members of the community council, Badara, Inge 
Brinkman, Bambara and language: French (translated) notes. 
Interview 192: M’péné Sidibé & 10 other women of the village, former project 
participants, Ngoulougoubou, Mali, 6 December 2005, present: 2 people from 
community council, elderly male leader, Badara, Inge Brinkman, Bambara and 
language: French (translated) notes.  
Interview 193: Kotou Fombou, former project participant, Kola, Mali, 6 December 
2005, present: Badara, Médécin Chefe de Poste, Inge Brinkman, language: 
Bambara and French (translated) notes. 
Interview 194: Déni Balo, Fanta Togola, 8 other village women & 2 male village 
leaders, former project participants, ?, Mali, 7 December 2005, present: 20 
children, Badara, Inge Brinkman, language: Bambara and French (translated) notes. 
Interview 195: Sidi Diarra, former project worker, Dioïla, Mali, 7 December 2005, 
present: Some family members, Inge Brinkman, language: French, notes.  
Interview 196: Salif Traoré, former project participant, Zambalagoubou, Mali,  
8 December 2005, present: 10 other men, Badara, Inge Brinkman, language: 
Bambara and French (translated) notes. 
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Interview 197: Mamadou Sangaré, former project worker, Dioïla, Mali, 8 December 
2005, present: Mr. Balo, rest of family, Badara, Inge Brinkman, language: French, 
notes. 
Interview 198: Dramane Keïta, former counterpart organization, Dioïla, Mali,  
9 December 2005, present: Badara, Inge Brinkman, language: French, notes.  
Interview 199: Boubacar Touré, former client, Dioïla, Mali, 9 December 2005, 
present: Badara, Inge Brinkman,  language: French, notes. 
Interview 200: Sidi Al Moctar Touré, former counterpart, Fana, Mali, 10 December 
2005, present: Inge Brinkman, language: French, notes.  
Interview 201: Cheick Oumar Sissoko, former SNVer, Bamako, Mali, 11 December 
2005, present: Inge Brinkman, language: French, notes. 
Interview 202: Hadja Aissa Diallo, former counterpart organization, Bamako, Mali,  
12 December 2005, present: Inge Brinkman, language: French, notes. 
Interview 203: Bas de Gaay Fortman, former SNV board, Utrecht, 19 december 2005, 
present: Inge Brinkman, Anne-Lot Hoek, language: Dutch, tape-recorded.  
Interview 204: Reint Rosenstok, former SNVer and former KNVer, Almere, 21 
December 2005, present: Inge Brinkman, Anne-Lot Hoek, language: Dutch,  
tape-recorded. 
Interview 205: Isabel Miranda (informal conversation) SNV staff, Bissau, Guinea-
Bissau, 19 January 2006, present: Inge Brinkman, language: Portuguese, notes.  
Interview 206: Vicente Tito, former counterpart, Bissau, Guinea-Bissau, 19 January 
2006, present: Inge Brinkman, language: Portuguese, notes. 
Interview 207: Mamadu Sambo & Avelina Semedo Djaló, former counterparts, now 
clients, Bissau, Guinea-Bissau, 19 January 2006, present: Inge Brinkman, language: 
Portuguese, notes.  
Interview 208: Francelino Vieira & Venâncio Cò, former project workers, Buba, 
Guinea-Bissau, 21 January 2006, present: Inge Brinkman, language: Portuguese, 
notes.  
Interview 209: Alfucene Sambu, former project worker, Buba, Guinea-Bissau,  
21 January 2006, present: Inge Brinkman, language: Portuguese, notes. 
Interview 210: Sabado Cassamá, former project worker, Buba, Guinea-Bissau,  
22 January 2006, present: Inge Brinkman, language: Portuguese, notes. 
Interview 211: Lamarana Jalo former project worker, Buba, Guinea-Bissau,  
22 January 2006, present: Inge Brinkman, language: Portuguese, notes. 
Interview 212: Ganhe Balde, former project worker, Buba, Guinea-Bissau, 22 January 
2006, present: Inge Brinkman, language: Portuguese, notes. 
Interview 213: Baro Balde, Djenaba Balde & other village people, former project 
participants, Sintchan Cherno, Guinea-Bissau, 23 January 2006, present: Abdu, 
Inge Brinkman, language: Peul (translated) notes. 
Interview 214: Mamadu Cassamá & Secunan Biai, former project participants, 
Ntungane, Guinea-Bissau, 23 January 2006, present: Abdu, Inge Brinkman, 
language: Biafada (translated), notes. 
Interview 215: Dala Cassamá, former project participant, Ntungane, Guinea-Bissau,  
23 January 2006, present: Abdu, Inge Brinkman, language: Biafada (translated) 
notes. 
Interview 216: Yakubu Mane, Lasana Mane & Sirifu Mane, former project 
participants, Batambali, Guinea-Bissau, 24 January 2006, present: Abdu, Inge 
Brinkman, language: Krioulo and Portuguese (translated) notes. 
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Interview 217: Mamadi Sanha, Gumba Sanha & Chambu Sanha, former project 
participants, Sakunda, Guinea-Bissau, 24 January 2006, present: Abdu and Inge 
Brinkman, language: Krioulo, Biafada and Portuguese (translated) notes. 
Interview 218: Ansumane Sambú, former project participant, Gambil Biafada, Guinea-
Bissau, 24 January 2006, present: Abdu, Inge Brinkman, other village people, 
language: Krioulo and Portuguese (translated) notes. 
Interview 219: Regulo Nasumane Baio, political authority, Buba, Guinea-Bissau,  
25 January 2006, present: Inge Brinkman, language: Krioulo and Portuguese (later 
translated), tape-recorded and notes.  
Interview 220: Ansu Cassamá, former project worker, Buba, Guinea-Bissau, 25 
Janaury 2006, present: Inge Brinkman, language: Portuguese, notes. 
Interview 221: Mariama Diata, Quintino Nadegna, Delfina Sante & Nyoman 
Nadegna, no relation with SNV, Adegna, Guinea-Bissau, 26 January 2006, present: 
Abdul, Ansu Cassamá, Inge Brinkman, Krioulo, Balanta and language: Portuguese 
(translated) notes. 
Interview 222: Gletcha Nanhasse, Pedro Namone, Alberto Naonsa & Amadu Serra, 
former project participants, Gambil Balanta, Guinea-Bissau, 26 January 2006, 
present: Abdul, Ansu Cassamá, young men, Inge Brinkman, language: Krioulo and 
Portuguese (translated) notes. 
Interview 223: Bora Cassamá, Hadja Cadimane, Bambe Sambu, Abubacar 
Cassamá & Secu Camará, former project participants, Buba Tumbo, Guinea-
Bissau, 27 January 2006, present: Abdul, younger women and men, Inge Brinkman, 
language: Biafada, Krioulo and Portuguese (translated), notes. 
Interview 224: Elhaje Mamadi Djassi, Canjura Cassamá and Mamadu Sanha, 
former project participants, Injassane, Guinea-Bissau, 27 January 2006, present: 
Other old men, Inge Brinkman, language: Portuguese and Krioulo (translated) 
notes. 
Interview 225: Mamadu Sambu & others, former counterpart, now client, Bissau, 
Guinea-Bissau, 29 January 2006, present: Inge Brinkman, language: Krioulo and 
Portuguese (translated) notes. 
Interview 226: Luís Gomes, former counterpart, Bissau, Guinea-Bissau, 30 January 
2006, present: Inge Brinkman, language: Portuguese, notes. 
Interview 227: José António, former counterpart organisation, Bissau, Guinea-Bissau, 
30 January 2006: Present: Inge Brinkman, language: Portuguese, notes. 
Interview 228: Nicoline Suh, former SNVer, Bamenda, Cameroon, 22 January 2006, 
present: Anne-Lot Hoek, language: Dutch, tape-recorded and notes. 
Interview 229: Markus Ischere, Helvetas staff, Bamenda, Cameroon, 23 January 2006, 
present: Anne-Lot Hoek, language: English, notes.  
Interview 230: Lumumba Mukong, local consultant, Bamenda, Cameroon, 23 January 
2006, present: Anne-Lot Hoek, language: English, notes. 
Interview 231: Charly Mbontih, SNV client, Buea, Cameroon, 25 January 2006, 
present: July Graham, Bakia Besong, Anne-Lot Hoek, language: English, notes.  
Interview 232: Cletus Ako, SNV client, Cameroon, 25 January 2006, present: Bakia 
Besong, July Graham, Charly Mbontih, Anne-Lot Hoek, language: English, notes.  
Interview 233: Sustainbale tourism project Mount CEO, SNV partner, Buea, 
Cameroon, 25 January 2006, present: 2 employees, Mirjam and Ronny de Koning, 
Bakia Besong, July Graham, Anne-Lot Hoek, language: English, notes.  
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Interview 234: Rafael Fombon, former SNV counterpart, Kumba, Cameroon,  
26 January 2006, present: July Graham, Anne-Lot Hoek, language: English, notes.  
Interview 235: Ekima Ndongo Likenbi, SNV client, Limbe, Cameroon, 27 January 
2006, present: July Graham, Bakia Besong, Anne-Lot Hoek, language: English, 
notes.  
Interview 236: Bakia Besong, July Graham & driver Isac (travel report) SNVers, 
Limbe, Kumba and Buea, Cameroon, 23-28 January, present Anne-Lot Hoek, 
language: English, notes.  
Interview 237: Maureen Fusi, SNV support staff, Bamenda, Cameroon, 29 January 
2006, present: Anne-Lot Hoek, language: English, notes.  
Interview 238, Kekomo Jejong, former SNV project engineer, Bamenda, Cameroon,  
30 January 2006, present: Anne-Lot Hoek, language: English, notes. 
Interview 239: Fon Julius, former SNV project worker, Bamenda,Cameroon, 30 
January 2006, present: Anne-Lot Hoek, language: English, notes.  
Interview 240: Tineke Louh-Fokkens, former SNVer, Foumban, Cameroon,  
1 February 2006, present: Louh Amadou, Anne-Lot Hoek, language: English, 
notes.  
Interview 241: Thomas Besong, former SNV project worker, Limbe, Cameroon,  
2 February 2006, present: Anne-Lot Hoek, language: English, notes.  
Interview 242: Jos van Gennip, former SNV board, The Hague, 14 February 2006, 
present: Inge Brinkman, Anne-Lot Hoek, language: Dutch, tape-recorded.  
Interview 243: Theo Ruyter, former SNVer, Leiden, 16 February 2006, present: Anne-
Lot Hoek, language: Dutch, notes.  
Interview 244: Jos van Gennip, former SNV board, Brussels, Belgium, 21 February 
2006, present: Inge Brinkman, language: Dutch, notes. 
Interview 245: Eulogio Núñez, former SNV counterpart organisation, Santa Cruz, 
Bolivia, 1 March 2006, present: Zoila Villa-Gomez, Anne-Lot Hoek, Inge 
Brinkman, language: Spanish (translated), notes. 
Interview 246: Roberto Balza, former SNVer, Santa Cruz, Bolivia, 1 March 2006, 
present: Zoila Villa-Gomez, Anne-Lot Hoek, Inge Brinkman, language: Spanish 
(translated) notes. 
Interview 247: Conny Toornstra, SNV staff, Santa Cruz, Bolivia, 1 March 2006, 
present: Anne-Lot Hoek, Inge Brinkman, language: Dutch, tape-recorded. 
Interview 248: Jürgen Riester, former SNV counterpart organisation, Santa Cruz, 
Bolivia, 2 March 2006, present: Zoila Villa-Gomez, Anne-Lot Hoek, Inge 
Brinkman, language: Spanish (translated), notes. 
Interview 249: Jorge Cortés, SNV client, Santa Cruz, 2 March 2006, present: Zoila 
Villa-Gomez, Anne-Lot Hoek, Inge Brinkman, language: Spanish (translated) 
notes. 
Interview 250: Javier Bejarano, SNVer, Santa Cruz, Bolivia, 2 March 2006, present: 
Zoila Villa-Gomez, Inge Brinkman, language: Spanish (translated) notes. 
Interview 251: David Limachi, SNV support staff, Santa Cruz, Bolivia, 2 March 2006, 
present: Zoila Villa-Gomez, Inge Brinkman, language: Spanish (translated) notes. 
Interview 252: Karmijn Schipholt & Pablo van Linden, SNVers, Santa Cruz, Bolivia, 
2 March 2006, present: Anne-Lot Hoek, language: Dutch, tape-recorded. 
Interview 253: Frans Huls, former SNVer, Sucre, Bolivia, 3 March 2006, present: Inge 
Brinkman, Anne-Lot Hoek, language: Dutch, tape-recorded.  
 INTERVIEWS 258 
Interview 254: Martha Noya, former SNV counterpart organisation, Sucre, Bolivia, 3 
March 2006, present: Zoila Villa-Gomez, Anne-Lot Hoek, Inge Brinkman, 
language: Spanish (translated), notes.  
Interview 255: Jorge Cardozo, former SNVer, Sucre, Bolivia, 4 March 2006, present: 
Zoila Villa-Gomez, Anne-Lot Hoek, Inge Brinkman, language: Spanish (translated) 
notes.  
Interview 256: Dick Commandeur, SNVer and SNV staff, Sucre, Bolivia, 5 March 
2006, present: Inge Brinkman, Anne-Lot Hoek, language: Dutch, tape-recorded.  
Interview 257: Juan José Bonifaz, former counterpart, Sucre, Bolivia, 5 March 2006, 
present: Zoila Villa-Gomez, Anne-Lot Hoek, Inge Brinkman, language: Spanish 
(translated) notes.  
Interview 258: Barbara Kupfer & Roberto Vilar, former SNVers, Sucre, Bolivia,  
6 March 2006, present: Zoila Villa-Gomez, Anne-Lot Hoek, Inge Brinkman, 
language: Spanish (translated), notes.  
Interview 259: Gerónimo Diaz, former counterpart organisation, Sucre, Bolivia,  
6 March 2006, present: Zoila Villa-Gomez, Anne-Lot Hoek, Inge Brinkman, 
language: Spanish (translated) notes.  
Interview 260: Margot Dávila, SNV support staff, Sucre, Bolivia, 6 March 2006, 
present: Zoila Villa-Gomez, Anne-Lot Hoek, Inge Brinkman, language: Spanish 
(translated) notes.  
Interview 261: Hans Heydra & Albert Bokkesteijn, SNV staff, La Paz, Bolivia,  
7 March 2006, present: Anne-Lot Hoek, Inge Brinkman, language: Dutch, notes.  
Interview 262: Clara Bertran (informal conversation), researcher, La Paz, Bolivia,  
7 March 2006, present: Inge Brinkman, language: English, notes.  
Interview 263: Ria Hulsman, former SNVer, La Paz, Bolivia, 8 March 2006, present: 
Anne-Lot Hoek, language: Dutch, tape-recorded. 
Interview 264: Edmundo Garafulic, former SNV counterpart organisation, La Paz, 
Bolivia, 8 March 2006, present: Anne-Lot Hoek, language: Spanish and Language: 
Dutch, notes.  
Interview 265: Michiel Verweij, SNVer, La Paz, Bolivia, 8 March 2006, present: 
Anne-Lot Hoek, language: Dutch, notes. 
Interview 266: Remi Cuppers, former SNVer, Cochabamba, Bolivia, 9 March 2006, 
present: Anne-Lot Hoek, language: Dutch, notes. 
Interview 267: Fernando Rochas, former counterpart organisation, Cochabamba, 
Bolivia, 9 March 2006, present: Remi Cuppers, Anne-Lot Hoek, language: Spanish 
and Dutch (translated) notes.  
Interview 268: Helena Dassa, former counterpart organisation, Cochabamba, Bolivia, 
10 March 2006, present: Anne-Lot Hoek, language: English, notes.  
Interview 269: Eliecer Armisto Mora (‘Pepe Amigo’) former counterpart organisation, 
Cochabamba, Bolivia, 10 March 2003, present: Cynthia Monterey, Anne-Lot Hoek, 
language: Spanish (translated) notes.  
Interview 270: Rene Herbas, former counterpart organisation, Cochabamba, Bolivia, 
10 March 2006, present: Cynthia Monterrey, Anne-Lot Hoek, language: Spanish 
(translated) notes. 
Interview 271: Juan Rico, Alfonso Guardia & Mario Peredo, former project 
participants, Cochabamba, Bolivia, 10 March 2006, present: Remi Cuppers, Anne-
Lot Hoek, language: Spanish (translated) notes.  
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Interview 272: Ramon Dassa,  former counterpart organisation, Cochabamba, Bolivia, 
11 March 2006, present: Cynthia Monterrey, Anne-Lot Hoek, language: Spanish 
(translated) notes.  
Interview 273: Fredesminda Torres, former counterpart organisation, Cochabamba, 
Bolivia, 11 March 2006, present: Remi Cuppers, Anne-Lot Hoek, language: 
Spanish (translated) notes.  
Interview 274: Delsi Macoñó, former SNV counterpart, San Javier (Chiquitania) 
Bolivia, 13 March 2006, present: Zoila Villa-Gomez, Anne-Lot Hoek, language: 
Spanish (translated) notes. 
Interview 275: Augustin Parapaino, former SNV counterpart, San Javier (Chiquitania) 
Bolivia, 13 March 2006, present: Delsi Macono, Zoila Villa-Gomez, Anne-Lot 
Hoek, language: Spanish (translated) notes.  
Interview 276: Marselina Surubi Rodriquez, (SNV client), San Javier (Chiquitania) 
Bolivia, 13 March 2006, present: Zoila Villa-Gomez, Anne-Lot Hoek, language: 
Spanish (translated) notes.  
Interview 277: Informal conversation between Maria Chacom, Jenny Montano, 
Marcos Supayabe, Mauro, Joselino & SNVer Cecilia Moreno, former 
counterpart organisation, Concepcion (Chiquitania) Bolivia, 14 March 2006, 
present: Zoila Villa-Gomez, Anne-Lot Hoek, language: Spanish (translated) notes.  
Interview 278: Polonia Oli, project participant, Concepcion, (Chiquitania) Bolivia,  
14 March 2006, present: Zoila Villa-Gomez, Anne-Lot Hoek, language: Spanish 
(translated) notes.  
Interview 279: Miquelito Sorrioco, SNV client, Concepcion (Chiquitania) Bolivia,  
14 March 2006, present: Zoila Villa-Gomez, Anne-Lot Hoek, language: Spanish 
(translated) notes.  
Interview 280: Marcelo Surubi, former counterpart organisation, Concepcion 
(Chiquitania) Bolivia, 14 March 2006, present: Zoila Villa-Gomez, Anne-Lot 
Hoek, language: Spanish (translated) notes.  
Interview 281: Dionisio Roda Flores, SNV client, Concepcion, Bolivia, 14 March 
2006, present: Zoila Villa-Gomez, Anne-Lot Hoek, language: Spanish (translated) 
notes.  
Interview 282: Segfredo Bayado, SNV client, Concepcion, Bolivia, 15 March 2006, 
present: Zoila Villa-Gomez, Anne-Lot Hoek, language: Spanish (translated) notes.  
Interview 283: Anacleto Peña, former counterpart organisation, Pucio (Lomerio), 
Bolivia, 16 March 2006, present: Zoila Villa-Gomez, Anne-Lot Hoek, language: 
Spanish (translated) notes.  
Interview 284: Rosita Chuvilu, project participant/client, Pucio (Lomerio) Bolivia,  
16 March 2006, present: Zoila Villa-Gomez, Anne-Lot Hoek, language: Spanish 
(translated) notes.  
Interview 285: Anna Chivu (informal conversation), village inhabitant, Pucio 
(Lomerio) Bolivia, 16 March 2006, present: Zoila Villa-Gomez, Anne-Lot Hoek, 
language: Spanish (translated) notes.  
Interview 286: Bert Witteveen (informal conversation), SNVer, Santa Cruz, Bolivia, 
17 March 2006, present: Anne-Lot Hoek, language: Dutch, notes.  
Interview 287: Rienk Wiersma, former SNV staff, Gouda, 30 March 2006, present: 
Anne-Lot Hoek, language: Dutch, notes. 
Interview 288: Frans Alting von Geusau, former SNV staff, Oisterwijk, 6 April 2006, 
present: Inge Brinkman, Anne-Lot Hoek, language: Dutch, notes and tape-recorded. 
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Interview 289: Ellen van de Craats, former SNVer, The Hague, 10 April 2006, 
present: Maarten van der Hout, Anne-Lot Hoek, language: Dutch, tape-recorded. 
Interview 290: Riens Middelhof, former SNVer, written interview, language: Dutch.  
Interview 291: Thea Fierens, former SNV head office staff, The-Hague, 6 November 
2006, present: Anne-Lot Hoek, language: Dutch, notes.  
Interview 292: Jan Ubels, SNV (head office) staff, Leiden, 30 November 2006, present: 
Inge Brinkman, Anne-Lot Hoek, language: Dutch, tape-recorded and notes.  
 
 
 
 Written sources 
 
Archival material 
- SNV Archives (The Hague, The Netherlands) 
Part 1: Box 1-24. 
Part 2: Box 1-18. 
 
-  Private archival documents, Prof. Jhr. Dr. Frans A.M. Alting von Geusau.  
Various letters and documents 
 
-  KDC Nijmegen  
Files: 432/1912, 432/1918, 432/1919, 432/1922, 432/1923, 432/1924, 432/1925, 
432/1938, 432/1940, 432/1939, 432/3140, 829/436, 829/437, 829/438, 857/462, 
857/463. 
 
-  KIT archives 
Boxes: 3686, 3687, 3863, 4045, 4046, and 4212. 
 
-  IISG 
Foundation ‘Wij en Zij’ (Internationaal Solidariteitsfonds van de FNV): Files: 033, 
037 and 075.  
 
-  Archives Ministry of Foreign Affairs: 
- Part: ANV-SNV/1963-1974:  
Files: 1-18, 21-32, 71-75, 79-84, 293-300, 303, 306, 308-309, 320, 355-356, 372-
375, 492-493, 497, 542, 544, 546-549, 697-706, 861, 881, 889, 893, 1750-1751, 
1756, 1767, 1772, 1782-1784, 1827-1828, 1832-1833, 1835, 1901, 1909. 
-  Part: SNV/1985-1989: 
Files: 121-122, 221-222, 232, 1491, 2735, 2737 
-  Part: SNV/NA 1965-2001: 
Files: Snv/ara/00015, snv/ara/00050, snv/ara/00313, snv/ara/00324, snv/ara/00338, 
snv/ara/00663, snv/ara/00920, snv/ara/00931. 
-  Part: SNV afdelingen 1990-2003:  
Files: Snv/2007/00449, snv/2008/00573, snv/2009/00044, snv/2009/0093, 
snv/2009/00173, snv/2009/00179, snv/2009/00423, snv/2010/00341, 
snv/2010/00427, snv/2010/00493, snv 2011/00005, snv/2011/00328, 
snv/2011/00488, snv/2012/00133, snv/2012/00231, snv/2012/00233, 
snv/2012/00420, snv/2013/00198, snv/2013/00449, snv/2014/00143, 
snv/2014/00190, snv/2016/00198, snv/2019/00121, snv/2020/00157, 
snv/2021/00233. 
 
-  Reports and documents in SNV archives Yaoundé (Cameroon): 
Part 1: In boxes: 
-  Ribbink, Henk W. & Marlies de Leeuw, ‘Garoua en Maroua zijn (ook) niet op een 
dag gebouwd. Een onderzoek naar de stedelijke problematiek van 2 steden in 
Noord-Kameroen’ (Unpublished report, s.l. 1989). 
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-  Sluys, Jessica van & Fiona Boonstra, ‘Organisatie in ontwikkeling. Identiteits- en 
imago-onderzoek SNV Nederlandse Ontwikkelingsorganisatie te Kameroen’ 
(Unpublished report, Nijmegen 1997).  
-  SNV Kameroen, ‘Jaarverslag 1978’ (Unpublished report). 
-  SNV Kameroen, ‘Jaarverslag 1979’ (Unpublished report). 
-  SNV Kameroen, ‘Jaarverslag 1980’ (Unpublished report). 
-  SNV Kameroen, ‘Jaarverslag 1981’ (Unpublished report). 
-  SNV Kameroen, ‘Jaarverslag 1982’ (Unpublished report). 
-  SNV Kameroen, ‘Jaarverslag 1984’ (Unpublished report). 
-  SNV Kameroen, ‘Jaarverslag 1985’ (Unpublished report). 
-  SNV Kameroen, ‘Jaarverslag 1987-1988’ (Unpublished report). 
-  SNV Kameroen, ‘Jaarverslag 1989-90’ (Unpublished report). 
-  SNV Kameroen, ‘Jaarverslag 1990-91’ (Unpublished report). 
-  SNV Kameroen, ‘Jaarverslag 1992’ (Unpublished report). 
-  SNV Kameroen, ‘Jaarverslag 1993’ (Unpublished report). 
-  SNV Kameroen, ‘Jaarverslag 1994’ (Unpublished report). 
-  SNV Kameroen, ‘Jaarvergadering. December 1991, Obala’ (Unpublished report). 
-  ‘Trimesterieel verslag SNV Kameroen: 4e trimester 1995- periode 01/1/96-31/3/96’ 
(Unpublished report). 
-  Tukker, Henk, ‘Shifting cultivation in twee dorpen van de Province de l’Est 
Cameroun’ (Unpublished report, Wageningen 1978). 
-  Vries, M. de, ‘SNV in West-Afrika. Verslag van een dienstreis naar Kameroen, 
Ivoorkust, Boven-Volta en Nigeria in de periode van 6 november t/m 4 december 
1973)’ (Unpublished report, Den Haag 1973). 
-  Wiendels, Marion, ‘NGO’s in Kameroen. De strijd om de controle’ (Unpublished 
report, Twente 1994). 
Part 2: Archives behind kitchen:  
-  Box: ‘88/’89 P.D.’ 
-  Box: ‘1987. P.D.’ 
-  Box: ‘AZA '84, Amba ’79-’83, ABA, AMBK.’ 
-  Box: ‘West tot 1978/1980.’ 
-  Box: ‘Projekten afgesloten.’ 
-  Box: ‘Landbouw LLC etc, 1984, 1987.’ 
 
-  Reports and documents in SNV archives Dar es Salaam (Tanzania): 
-  Box: ‘Project visits ’79-’84, etc.’ 
-  Box: ‘Physiotherapy, ’85-’89, etc.’ 
-  Box: ‘Veldraad- en Regio-vergaderingen, ’88/’89, etc.’ 
-  Box: ‘Teamleidersoverleg 1990, etc.’ 
-  Box: ‘NOVIB/oud – ’77/’86, etc.’ 
-  Box: ‘Irrigation sector info, etc.’ 
-  Various Person Files (not specified for reasons of privacy). 
 
- Other archival material from Tanzania: 
-  CEC Dodoma, Files: SNV-CEC: Correspondence 1985-1994 and SNV-CEC: 
Correspondence 1995-2000. 
-  Ifunda Technical Secondary School. Files: ‘Rapportage, 2e kwartaal 1972’ and 
‘Rapportage, 3e kwartaal 1972’. 
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-  WaMo. Institute of adult education, Morogoro. File: ‘ONV’. 
 
- Reports in SNV archives Bamako (Mali): 
-  Peter Knoope, ‘Un langue clair’ (Unpublished report, Bamako 1994).  
-  SNV Mali, ‘L’Analyse du pays : Mali dans le cadre du plan d’action pour la 
période 1993-1995/97’ (Unpublished report, April 1993). 
-  SNV Mali, ‘Plan Stratégique SNV-Mali 1994-1998’ (Unpublished report, April 
1994). 
-  SNV Mali, ‘Plan Annuel 1996’ (Unpublished report, September 1995). 
-  SNV Mali, ‘Plan Annuel 1998’ (Unpublished report, June 1998). 
-  SNV Mali, ‘Plan Annuel 1999’ (Unpublished report, June 1999). 
-  SNV Mali, ‘Plan Stratégique pluriannuel 2000-2002’ (Unpublished report, July 
1999). 
-  SNV Mali, ‘Plan pluriannuel 2001-2003’ (Unpublished report, October 2000). 
 
- Reports in SNV archives Kathmandu (Nepal): 
-  Various archival documents 
-  Gurung, Sumitra M., Ram P. Yadav, Bert L.M. van Woersem, ‘Country 
Programme evaluation, volume I: Main report. Findings, conclusions and 
recommendations’ (Unpublished report, 2003). 
-  Kirant, Jitpal, Mukta Singh Lama-Tamang, Mukunda Raj Prakash, ‘Mid-term 
review of Praja capacity development programme (PCDP)’ (Unpublished report, 
2003). 
-  Post, Maarten, ‘Country Programme evaluation, volume II’ (Unpublished report, 
2003). 
-  SNV Nepal, Various brochures. 
-  SNV Nepal, SNV/Nepal in Karnali, 1983-2003. Lessons learned and guidance for 
future interventions (Kathmandu 2005). 
-  SNV Nepal, ‘Local governance strengthening transition program (LGSTP). 
Project final report (October 2002-December 2003)’ (Unpublished report, 2004). 
-  SNV Nepal, ‘Annual report 2004’ (Unpublished report, s.d.). 
-  SNV Nepal, ‘Annual report 2003’ (Unpublished report, s.d.). 
-  SNV Nepal, ‘Annual report 2002’ (Unpublished report, s.d.). 
-  SNV Nepal, ‘District partners programme. Final report 2002’ (Unpublished report, 
2002). 
-  SNV Nepal, Newsletter 1, 1 (Jan-April 2002); 1, 2 (September-December 2003); 
2, 3 (January-April 2004). 
-  SNV Nepal, ‘Mid-Term report, January to June 2001’ (Unpublished report, s.d.). 
-  SNV Nepal, ‘Annual report 2001’ (Unpublished report, s.d.). 
-  SNV Nepal, ‘Annual report 2000’ (Unpublished report, s.d.). 
-  SNV Nepal, ‘Annual report 1999’ (Unpublished report, s.d.). 
-  SNV Nepal, ‘Country policy plan. 1995-1999’ (Unpublished report, s.d.). 
-  SNV Nepal, ‘Karnali Local Development Programme: Final report of phase 1b, 
April 1st 1995- Sept. 30th 1999’ (Unpublished report, s.d). 
-  SNV Nepal, ‘KLDP evaluation’ (Draft report, 1997 ). 
-  SNV Nepal, ‘Annual report 1998’ (Unpublished report, s.d.). 
-  SNV Nepal, ‘Evaluation of MHDP Phase II Mechi Hills development programme’ 
(Final draft report, 1997). 
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-  SNV Nepal, ‘Evaluation of KLDP Phase 1b Karnali Hills development 
programme’ (Unpublished report, 1997). 
-  SNV Nepal, ‘Implementation plan for a trail bridge building programme’ 
(Unpublished report, 1986). 
-  SNV Nepal, ‘Jaarverslag 1984’ (Unpublished report, s.d.). 
-  Tolentino, Francisco A., ‘Micro and small forest enterprise development’ (SNV 
Nepal, 2004). 
-  Tuladhar, A.M. ea, ‘Trail suspension bridge programme (MPLD/RADC)’ 
(Unpublished report, 1985). 
 
-  Reports in SNV country office, Bissau (Guinea-Bissau): 
-  SNV Guinea-Bissau and the Royal Dutch Embassy, ‘PMBB (Projeto de 
Molhoramento dos Bairros de Bissau)’ (brochure s.l., s.d.). 
-  SNV Guinea-Bissau and the Royal Dutch Embassy, ‘PRODEC (Projecto de 
Desenvolvimento de Escolas Comunitárias): Um exemplo de desenvolvimento de 
ensino comunitário’ (brochure s.l., s.d.). 
-  SNV Guinea-Bissau and the Royal Dutch Embassy, ‘GITT (Gestão Integrada das 
Terras da Tabanca): A terra é do Povo: Uma abordagem de autopromoção das 
populações’  (Brochure s.l., s.d.). 
-  SNV Guinea-Bissau and the Royal Dutch Embassy, ‘GFC (Gestão de Floresta 
Comunitária): A terra é do povo: Proteger florestas para servir o bem-estar das 
populações’ (Brochure s.l., s.d ). 
-  SNV Guinea-Bissau and the Royal Dutch Embassy ‘ORW-H14 (Onderhoud 
Ruraal Water): Uma distribuição mais justa dos recursos naturais e o 
estabelecimento dos serviços sociais’ (Brochure s.l., s.d). 
 
Journals, magazines and series 
-  Informatie Bulletin (SNV 1965, in SNV archives, The Hague). 
- Nedwerk/Nethwork (SNV personnel magazine, 1987-2001: Quarterly, 2001-: Bi-
monthly, 1987-, in SNV archives, The Hague). 
-  SNV Annual Reports (1965-2006). 
-  Vice Versa (SNV bi-monthly, before 2004: Quarterly magazine, 1967-, in SNV 
archives, The Hague). 
-  Visum (JVP bi-monthly, 1, 1 (1963 - 1965: In SNV archives and Archives Foreign 
Affairs). 
-  ‘De Graal. Van jeugdbeweging voor meisjes tot internationale beweging van 
vrouwen’, Erasmusplein 6, 2 (1995), website:  
 http://www.kdc.kun.nl/erasmusplein/2-1995/graal.html . 
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AABN Anti-Apartheids Beweging Nederland (Anti-Apartheids’ 
Movement The Netherlands) founded in1971. 
AJV Afdeling Jongeren Vrijwilligers (Department of Youth 
Volunteers within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) before 
1966 called JVP staff, as of 1976 called ANV. 
ANC African Nationalist Congres, South-Africa’s national 
liberation movement since 1912.  
ANGOLA COMITÉ Solidarity organisation for the liberation movements in 
Angola and Mozambique from 1961 to 1976. 
ANV Afdeling Nederlandse Vrijwilligers (Department of Dutch 
Volunteers within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) before 
1976 called AJV. 
APCOB Apoyo para el Campesino Indigena del Oriente Boliviano 
(Support for the Indigenous Farmer of Eastern Bolivia). 
ARP Anti-Revolutionaire Partij (Anti-Revolutionary Party, 
founded in 1879, Protestant party, as of 1980 became CDA, 
together with CHU and KVP). 
AVN Association des Volontaires Néerlandais: As SNV was 
called in some French speaking countries like Mali and 
Ivory Coast before 1985. 
BITH see ITH. 
BOA Boycot Outspan (Anti-Apartheid organisation against the 
import of oranges from South Africa) founded in 1970.  
BRETTON WOODS System of rules, institutions, and procedures to regulate the 
ACCORDS  international monetary system, set up in 1944 between 44  
 allied nations. 
CCC Centre de Conseil Communal (Community Advisory 
Centre). 
CDA Christen-Democratisch Appèl (Christian Democratic 
Appeal, founded in 1980 as a fusion of ARP, CHU and 
KVP). 
CEADES Colectivo de Estudios Aplicados al Desarollo Social. 
CEBEMO Katholieke organisatie voor medefinanciering van 
ontwikkelingsprogamma's (Catholic organisation for co-
financing of developmentprojects), formed Cordaid in 
1999. 
CHU Christelijk-Historische Unie (Christian-Historical Union, 
protestant party, founded in 1908, as of 1980 became CDA, 
together with ARP and KVP).  
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CICOL Central Indigena de Comunidades Originarios de Lomerio 
(Federation of the Communities of Lomerío). 
CIDOB Confederación de Pueblos Indigenas del Oriente Boliviano 
(Confederation of Indigenous People of Eastern Bolivia). 
CMDT Compagnie Malienne pour le Développement des Textiles 
(Malian Company for the Development of Textiles).  
COMITÉ ZUID-AFRIKA (Committee South Africa, anti-apartheids's organisation) 
founded in 1960.  
COS Centra voor Internationale Samenwerking (Centres for 
International Co-operation). 
DGIS Directoraat Generaal Internationale Samenwerking 
(Directorate-General for Development Co-operation). 
DIO Directie Internationale Organisaties (Directorate 
International Organisations). 
DNCT Direction Nationale des Collectivités Territoriales 
(Directorate National Collectivities). 
DOG Dienst Over Grenzen (Service over Borders, church 
organisation that in 2000 joined with ICCO and SOH). 
EDUARDO MONDLANE Solidarity organisation supporting guerillas in  
STICHTING  Mozambique, Guinee-Bissau, Angola and the Cape Verdian  
 Islands from 1969-1997. 
EUROPEAN SOCIAL Annual conference held by members of the alter-  
FORUM  globalization movement, founded in 2002 (also known as  
 the Global Justice Movement).  
EWG Europese Werkgroep (European Working Group founded in 
1962, dissolved in 1968). 
FAIDA Swahili word for ‘profit, advantage’ (name of former SNV 
project in Tanzania, at present local NGO). 
FERDES Fonds d’Equipement et de Recherche pour le 
Développement Économique et Social (Fund for the 
Equipment and Research for Economic and Social 
Development). 
FIDES Fonds d’Investissement pour le Développement 
Économique et Social (Fund for Investment for Economic 
and Social Development). 
FOSTER PARENTS International child-centered development organisation since  
PLAN  1937.  
GNP Gross National Product. 
HIVOS Humanistisch Instituut voor Ontwikkelingssamenwerking 
(Humanistic Institute for Development Co-operation) 
founded in 1968. 
IBO Interdepartementaal Beleidsonderzoek (Interdepartmental 
Policy Study). 
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ICCO Interkerkelijke Organisatie voor 
Ontwikkelingssamenwerking (Interchurch Organisation for 
Development Co-operation) founded in 1964; joint with 
DOG and SOH in 2000. 
IISG Internationaal Instituut voor Sociale Geschiedenis 
(International Institute of Social History). 
IMF International Monetary Fund, resulted from the Bretton 
Woods Accords in 1944. 
IOB Inspectie Ontwikkelingssamenwerking en Beleidsevaluatie 
(Policy and Operations Evaluation Department). 
IOV Inspectie Ontwikkelingssamenwerking te Velde (became 
IOB in 1977). 
ITH Bureau voor Internationale Technische Hulp (Bureau for 
International Technical Assistance). 
IUCN World Conservation Union (International Union for the 
Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources). 
JVC Jongeren Vrijwilligers Corps (Youth Volunteers Corps) 
founded in 1962.  
JVP Jongeren Vrijwilligers Programma (Youth Volunteers 
Programme) founded in 1963. 
KAIROS Anti-Apartheids organisation founded in 1970.  
KAJ Katholieke Arbeiders Jeugd (Catholic Workers’ Youth) 
founded in 1925. 
KAPs Kleine Ambassade Projecten (small embassies projects). 
KDC Katholiek Documentatie Centrum (Catholic Documentation 
Centre). 
KIT Koninklijk Instituut voor de Tropen (Royal Tropical 
Institute).  
KLDP Karnali Local Development Programme. 
KNV Kontaktgroep Nederlanse Vrijwilligers (Contactgroup 
Dutch Volunteers) contact group of ex-volunteers founded 
in 1970. 
KVP Katholieke Volkspartij (Catholic People’s Party; founded in 
1945 as successor of an earlier catholic party, as of 1980 
CDA, together with CHU and ARP). 
LG Local Government (together with NRM and PSD working 
area of current SNV). 
MDGs Millennium Development Goals. 
MEMISA Medische Missie Actie (Medical Mission Action, former 
catholic missionary organisation, exists since 1925). 
MFO Medefinancierings Organisatie (Co-financing Organisation; 
organisation in the MFP programme). 
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MFP Co-Financing Programme (state subsidy programme for 
private development organisations, started in 1965). 
MUDEC Municipal Development Counseling Group. 
NAR Nationale Raad van Advies inzake de Hulpverlening aan 
Minder Ontwikkelde Landen, National Advisory Board 
Concerning Assistance to Less Developed Countries. 
NCDO Nationale Commissie voor Internationale Samenwerking en 
Duurzame Ontwikkeling, founded in 1995. 
NCO Nationale Commissie Ontwikkelingsstrategie (National 
Commission for Development Strategy) founded in 1970. 
1970: Voorzitter Prins Claus (later NCDO). 
NGO Non-Governmental Organisation. 
NJG Nederlandse Jeugdgemeenschap (Dutch Youth 
Community), founded in 1945. 
NOVIB Nederlandse Organisatie voor Internationale Bijstand 
(Dutch Organisation for International Support). Founded in 
1956. 
NRM Natural Resource Management (together with LG and PSD 
working area of current SNV). 
ONV Organisation of Netherlands Volunteers, as SNV was called 
in some English speaking countries before 1985.  
OVN Organisation des Volontaires Néerlandais, as SNV was 
called in some French speaking countries like Cameroon 
before 1985. 
OPIT Overleg Particulier Initiatief Tropenartsen (Association of 
Private Initiative Tropical doctors). 
PEACE CORPS American volunteers’ organization, founded in 1960. 
PROVO Non-violent anarchy movement, founded in 1965.  
PSD Private Sector Development (together with NRM and LG 
working area of current SNV). 
PSO Personele Samenwerking met Ontwikkelingslanden 
(Personnel Co-operation with Developing Countries; later: 
PSO Capaciteitsopbouw in Ontwikkelingslanden, Capacity 
Building in Developing Countries), founded in 1985. 
PVDA Partij van de Arbeid (Labour Party in The Netherlands).  
SAP Structural Adjustment Programme. 
SJALOOM Third world movement organisation founded in 1963.  
SNV Stichting Nederlandse Vrijwilligers (Foundation Dutch 
Volunteers, 1965) since 1993: SNV Netherlands 
Development Organisation. 
SOCUTERA Stichting ter bevordering van Sociale en Culturele 
doeleinden door Televisie en Radio (Foundation for the 
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promotion of Social and Cultural organisations through 
Television and Radio). 
SOH Stichting Oecumenische Hulp, founded in 1952: Church 
organisation aimed at emergency relief, in 2000: Joint with 
DOG and ICCO. 
S.O.S. Steun Onderontwikkelde Streken (Support Underdeveloped 
Districts, Catholic fair trade organisation of 1959). 
TIP Traditional Irrigation Improvement Programme. 
UN United Nations, international organisation founded in 1945, 
aimed at worldwide co-operation in the realms of trade, 
international law, global security etc. 
UNV United Nations Volunteers (since 1970). 
VASTENACTIE Catholic organisation for development co-operation 
founded in 1961. 
VSO Voluntary Service Overseas, founded in 1958. 
WERELDWINKELS Fair Trade Shops. 
WITHALL Werkcommissie Inzake Technische Hulp aan Laag-
Ontwikkelde Landen (Working Committee for Technical 
Assistance to Low Developed Countries) founded in 1949. 
WORLD BANK Resulted from the Bretton Woods Accords in 1944. 
WORLD SOCIAL Annual meeting held by members of the anti-globalisation  
FORUM  movement, founded in 2001.  
WTO World Trade Organisation, founded in 1995.  
X MIN Y MOVEMENT Dutch solidarity movement, founded in 1973. 
 
 
 Appendix 1:  Ministers and State Secretaries for 
Development Cooperation 
 
 
 
28/11/1963-14/4/1965  Dr I.N.Th. Diepenhorst (State Secretary for Foreign Affairs 
‘charged with the aid for less-developed territories’) 
14/4/1965-5/4/1967 Th. Bot (first Minister without portfolio, ‘in charge of aid to 
developing countries’) 
5/4/1967-6/7/1971 B.J. Udink (Minister without portfolio, ‘in charge of aid to 
developing countries’) 
6/7/1971-11/5/1973 Dr C. Boertien (Minister without portfolio, ‘in charge of 
development cooperation’) 
11/5/1973-19/12/1977 J.P. Pronk (from 18/7/1973: Minister for Development 
Cooperation) 
19/12/1977-11/9/1981 J. de Koning 
11/9/1981-4/11/1982 C.P. van Dijk 
4/11/1982-14/7/1986 Ms E.M. Schoo 
14/7/1986-7/11/1989 P. Bukman  
7/11/1989-3/8/1998 J.P. Pronk  
3/8/1998-22/7/2002 Ms E.L. Herfkens 
22/7/2002-27/5/2003 Ms A.M.A. van Ardenne (State Secretary for Foreign 
Affairs, in charge of Development Cooperation) 
27/5/2003-2007 Ms A.M.A. van Ardenne (Minister for Development 
Cooperation)  
 
 Appendix 2:  SNV chairpersons/directors 
 
 
 
Chairpersons of the SNV Directorate 
L.J.M. van de Laar (1965-1973) 
J.F. van Campen (interim, 1973-1974) 
H.R.H. Prince Claus (1974-1980) 
H.R.H. Prince Claus (Honorary Chairman, 1980 - 6 October 2002) 
B. Barten (1980-1988) 
P.J. de Lange (interim, 1989-1990) 
Ms M. Leegwater-van der Linden (interim, 1991) 
Ms A.L.E.C. van der Stoel (1991-1993) 
H.J. Simons (1994-1998) 
Ms T.O. Fierens (1999-2000) 
C.J.M Pronk (Chairman Supervisory Board, 2001-2006) 
 
Director/Board of Directors of the SNV Executive∗ 
F.A.M. Alting von Geusau (1963-1964) 
A. van der Goot (interim, 1964) 
W.J.H. Kouwenhoven (1964-1965) 
A.L. Schneiders (interim, 1965-1966) 
W.D.B.M. van Nierop (1966-1969) 
L.P.J. Mazairac (1969-1972) 
W.A. Erath (1972-1975) 
A.A.M. Hermans (interim, 1975) 
W. Zevenbergen (1975-1978) 
E.F. Jacobs (1978-1981) 
J. Dijkstra (interim, 1981-1982) 
M.A. Peters (1982-1989)  
D. den Haas (interim, 1989-1990) 
J. Berteling (1990-1995) 
J.A. Pelgröm (1996-1999) 
Ms T.O. Fierens (2000-2003)  
                                                 
∗  In 1963 the organisation had a Chef (director) JVP that changed in 1965 into Chef 
AJV (Afdeling Jongeren Vrijwilligers van het Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken/ 
Department Youth Volunteers of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs). As of 1976 the 
position was called Chef ANV (Afdeling Nederlandse Vrijwilligers van het Minis-
terie van Buitenlandse Zaken / Department Dutch Volunteers of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs). The Chef also functioned as the Secretary of the SNV Directorate. 
Since 1990 the position has been known as SNV Directeur (Director). 
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Board of Directors 
T.J.H. Elsen (Chairman Board of Directors SNV 2003- ) 
Ms A. Jenniskens (2003- ) 
J.A. van de Gronden (2003-2005) 
 
 Appendix 3: SNV countries* 
 
 
 
Africa 
Angola 1986 - 
Benin 1970 - 
Botswana 1978 - 2003 
Burkina Faso 1968 - 
Cameroon 1963 - 
Cape Verde 1985 - 1989 
Chad 1987 - 1995 
DRC Congo 2004 -  
Equatorial Guinea 1979 - 1984 
Eritrea 1994 - 1997 
Ethiopia 1974 - 1979 & 1983 - 
Ghana 1977 -  
Guinea-Bissau 1978 - 
Ivory Coast 1964 - 1982 
Kenya 1967 - 
Lesotho 1980 - 1988 
Mali 1978 -  
Mauritania 1986 - 1988 
Mozambique 1995 -  
Niger 1977 - 2005 
Nigeria 1965 - 1968 & 1970 - 1979 
Rwanda 1976 -  
Sierra Leone 1983 - 1984 
Somalia 1979 - 1982 
Sudan 1985 - 1997 & 2004 
Tanzania 1971 -  
Uganda 1979 -  
Zambia 1965 -  
Zimbabwe 1983 -  
 
                                                 
*  Years indicate the first year SNV was active in a country. This did not necessarily 
coincide with the formal opening of an SNV office. 
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Asia 
Bangladesh 1972 - 1984 
Bhutan 1988 - 
India 1965 - 1967 
Indonesia 1979 
Laos 2000 -  
Nepal 1980 -  
Philippines 1968 - 2001 
Sri Lanka 1969 - 1971 & 1976 - 1984 
Thailand 1979 - 1980 
Vietnam 1995 -  
 
 
Europe 
Albania 1993 -  
 
 
Middle East 
Jordan 1964 - 1966 
Lebanon 1964 - 1966 
North Yemen 1977 - 1990 
South Yemen 1988 - 1990 
Yemen 1990 - 1994 
Syria 1964 - 1966 
 
 
South America 
Bolivia 1968 - 
Brazil 1963 - 1979 
Chile 1973 
Colombia 1964 - 1970 
Ecuador 1981 -  
Honduras 1987 -  
Nicaragua 1979 -  
Peru 1967 -  
 
 
 
 Appendix 4: SNV activities 
 
 
 
Projects countries 
1965: 9   8 
1970: 70 12 
1975: 176 14 
1980: 167 24 
1985: 294 24 
1990: 420 28 
1995: 352 29 
 
Intervention level 
2000: 20% micro 65% meso 15% macro 28 
 
Clients 
2005: 2448  33 
 
 
SNV activity (%): 
Year Africa Asia Europe South America 
1980 75% 19% 6% 
1985 76% 13% 11% 
1990 66% 15% 19% 
1995 60% 15% 0.3% 24.7% 
2000 57% 8% 3% 32% 
2005 53% 19% 2% 26% 
 Appendix 5:  SNVers 
 
 
 
Year Number  Men Women Local Field staff Head office 
1965 123 61 62 
1970 454 281  173 
1975 444 345 99 
1980 442 350 92  46 
1985 567 425 142  49 61 
1990 612 391 221  79 69 
1995 596 375 221 122 102 
2000 712 278 434 354 
2005 937 347 590 628  65 
 
 Appendix 6:  SNV finances 
(expenditures in millions Dfl. or €) 
 
 
 
  total budget for Dutch 
Year SNV development cooperation 
1965 Dfl. 5.5  Dfl. 200.1 
1970 Dfl. 13.8 Dfl. 767 
1975 Dfl. 25 Dfl. 1,855 
1980 Dfl. 27.9 Dfl. 3,983 
1985 Dfl. 42.1 Dfl. 4,619.2 
1990 Dfl. 67.8 Dfl. 6,076.5 
1995 Dfl. 85.9 Dfl. 6,683.1 
2000 Dfl. 89  Dfl. 7,000.3 
2005 € 82.3 € 4,230 
 
 
 Appendix 7:  Chronology 
 
 
 
1924 KAJ founded 
1940  Colonial Development and Welfare Act (UK) 
1944  Bretton Woods Accords: World Bank and International Monetary Fund 
founded 
1946  FIDES (Fonds d’Investissement pour le Développement Économique et Social) 
founded in France  
1949  FERDES (Fonds d’Equipement et de Recherche pour le Développement 
Économique et Social) founded in France 
1949  Point Four Programme: Development programme outlined by US President 
Harry Truman in his inaugural speech 
1949  Indonesia gained independence 
1949  WITHALL (Werkcommissie Inzake Technische Hulp aan Laag Ontwikkelde 
Landen) founded 
1953  Flood disaster in the Netherlands 
1956  NOVIB founded 
1957  Comité Zuid-Afrika starts its activities 
1959  VSO founded in the UK 
1959  S.O.S. founded 
1960  American Peace Corps founded in the US 
1961  Angola Comité founded 
1961  Vastenaktie founded 
1962  The Dutch leave New Guinea 
1962  EWG founded 
1963  JVC initiative starts 
1963  JVP initiative starts, first teams of volunteers sent overseas 
1963  New Guinea comes under Indonesian rule 
1963  State Secretary for Foreign Affairs ‘charged with the aid for less developed 
territories’; I.N.Th. Diepenhorst appointed 
1963  Sjaloom founded  
1964  ICCO founded 
1965  SNV founded  
1965  Th. Bot becomes Minister without Portfolio ‘in Charge of Aid to Developing 
Countries’ 
1965  Dutch MFP started 
1966  First SNV Veldvertegenwoordigersbijeenkomst (Field Representatives 
Gathering) 
1967  B.J. Udink becomes Minister without Portfolio ‘in Charge of Aid to 
Developing Countries’ 
1967  Vice Versa started 
1968  HIVOS founded 
1968 X min Y founded 
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1969  CEBEMO founded 
1969  Wereldwinkels founded 
1970  KNV founded 
1970  Kairos founded 
1971  C. Boertien becomes Minister without Portfolio ‘in Charge of Development 
Cooperation’ 
1971  Anti-Apartheids Beweging Nederland founded 
1972  KNV is given two representatives on the SNV Board 
1973  J.P. Pronk becomes Minister for Development Cooperation 
1973  Important SNV Veldvertegenwoordigersbijeenkomst (Field Representatives 
Gathering) held  
1974  Prince Claus becomes SNV’s Chairman 
1974  SNV formally starts its B Objective 
1974  ‘Telegraaf-rel’: Dutch newspaper attacks Minister Pronk with negative reports 
about SNV 
1977  Jan de Koning becomes Minister for Development Cooperation 
1978  JVC splits from SNV 
1981  C.P. van Dijk becomes Minister for Development Cooperation 
1982  E.M. Schoo becomes Minister for Development Cooperation 
1985  SNV changes its name from Stichting Nederlandse Vrijwilligers to SNV 
Organisatie voor Ontwikkelingssamenwerking en Bewustwording 
(Organisation for Development Cooperation and Awareness) 
1986  P. Bukman becomes Minister for Development Cooperation 
1988  SNV formally starts recruiting personnel instead of volunteers 
1989  J.P. Pronk becomes Minister for Development Cooperation for a second time 
1993  SNV changes its name to SNV Netherlands Development Organisation 
1998  Ms E.L. Herfkens becomes Minister for Development Cooperation 
2000  SNV shifts from its project approach to an advisory role 
2002  SNV becomes an independent NGO 
2002  Ms A.M.A van Ardenne becomes State Secretary for Foreign Affairs in Charge 
of Development Cooperation 
2003  Ms A.M.A van Ardenne becomes Minister for Development Cooperation 
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